So Jimbo decided that we ought to do a Freefly interview while we were sitting at the hotel patio. After he set the camera up, I asked what he wanted to talk about and he said “Afghanistan”…
Sadly, the video ended before I could really make the points I’ve been musing over. So here we go…
I’ve been working on a long post about Afghanistan, inspired in large part by Andrew (Abu Muquama) Exum’s blog challenge asking:
Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in Central Asia – and how do you propose to secure them?
There were seven days of answers (1,2,3,4,5,6,7), culminating in Exum’s own response (read the whole thing, but here’s the nub):
That unknown colors my own thoughts. I believe, contrary to many of this blog’s readership, that Steve Biddle really does get our interests right in Afghanistan:
The United States has two primary national interests in this conflict: that Afghanistan never again become a haven for terrorism against the United States, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Neither interest can be dismissed, but both have limits as casus belli.
I also believe that both interests can be secured, and I believe that neither interest is worth unlimited U.S. and allied blood and treasure.
Go read forward from this post, and see a lot of other chatter about Afghanistan.
So?
Once I read all this, I’m left deeply anxious and concerned. These are among the smartest people in the country who are engaged around this issue; they are all people who have significant experience in foreign and military policy.
And it just seems to me like they are missing the most important point.
A resurgence of terrorist violence across Southeast Asia has exposed links between various Islamist terror organizations that have proved resilient despite a yearslong U.S.-funded crackdown by authorities in the region.
The rise of terrorism has come into focus in the wake of a series of attacks in the Philippines, southern Thailand and, most recently, the suicide bombing here July 17 on the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels that killed nine people including the two bombers. The terror resurgence comes after years when authorities appeared to be gaining the upper hand.
As the terror groups expand their activities, investigators are uncovering connections that show how the main organizations across Southeast Asia, many of them inspired by al Qaeda, are providing militants, training and shelter to each other. That has increased their effectiveness and made them especially difficult for authorities to crack.
As this story points out, our conflict is not with a country (Afghanistan or even Iraq); it’s with a movement (that is, to be sure partly fed by state sponsorship – but the most important states doing the sponsoring, in money, manpower, and ideas have been Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt). And as long as we keep defining our strategic objectives in the context of a single country, or maybe a country and its geographic neighbors, we’re misaligning our objectives with the problems we face.
What matters in Afghanistan is how our prosecution of the conflict there impacts the broader movement of radical, violent Islam. Outside of this effect, the conflict in Afghanistan is strategically meaningless.
What matters here is not a spatial geography or Westphalian interaction between states who have authority over their own geography and people; we’re talking about a cultural and intellectual geography – a map of relationships and beliefs.
And as long as were fighting on the wrong map, no matter how hard we try or how smart we are, I worry that we are bound to lose.
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