To expand on the post on Basra, below, go read this Abu Muquama post on Cordesman’s NYT column on the fighting.
Cordesman goes on to write, of the fighting in Basra, that…
There are good reasons for the central government to reassert control of Basra. It is not peaceful. It is the key to Iraq’s oil exports. Gang rule is no substitute for legitimate government. But given the timing and tactics, it is far from clear that this offensive is meant to serve the nation’s interest as opposed to those of the Islamic Supreme Council and Dawa.
A few thoughts: One, the fighting in Basra and Baghdad is, on one level, about asserting the control of the central government. That is a good thing. But two, on another level, the fighting that took place last week was about ISCI trying to set the stage for this fall’s provincial elections. It wasn’t about the central government versus local authorities at all — it was about cold-blooded intra-Shia politics.
Note that AM thinks we backed the wrong dog in the fight:
Do we have a dog in such a fight? Alas, we do. That dog’s name is ISCI. As the same friend mentioned above has noted, historians studying Iraq decades from now will wonder why the United States allied itself with the Iran-backed ISCI instead of the popularly-supported Sadr movement. (Hint to those historians: it’s because they dress well and speak English. This is what happens when you send smart but young Republican loyalists — who only speak English — to help run the CPA in Baghdad.) Once again, we have backed the loser…
Might I suggest that our deference to Al-Sistani might have had more to do with it? While their relationship is a complex one (see this interesting article suggesting they are more closely aligned than not), it’s certainly the case that they were significant rivals in the formative period of 04 and early 05.