William Pfaff, the columnist for the IHT and New York Review of Books (and author of ‘Fear, Anger and Failure: A Chronicle of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror, from the Attacks of September 11, 2001 to Defeat in Baghdad in 2003’ – which ought to give you a sense of his position on the war) has a column up in the IHT that explains how he thinks we’re missing the boat on the war on terror.
Of course, he’s wrong both on matters of fact and theory. But there’s something that he made me think about so let me roll it out for you as well.His core claim is:
Terrorism and the measures adopted against it acquire reciprocal momentum that is all but impossible to stop once a certain threshold has been crossed. That threshold was crossed in Russia last week, with potentially enormous consequences for civil liberties in that country, for civil peace in the Caucasus and possibly for the existing peaceful relationship between Russia and America.
This is why issues of nationalism, irredentism and religion – the usual motives for terrorist outrages – are so desperately dangerous. Ignored or misinterpreted, assigned to spurious international causes, they can do immense damage. They have to be dealt with in their natural dimensions.
Note that he doesn’t believe in an ‘international terrorist movement’ – he thinks it’s a straw man erected by nationalist leaders to keep from dealing with the real, local causes of terror.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has mistakenly (or culpably) assigned an international cause to his crisis. He has followed George W. Bush and Ariel Sharon in identifying his national problem as “international terrorism.” This is not true. Putin’s terrorism problem is specific to him and to Russia. America’s terrorism problem is specific to the United States, its past, its foreign relationships and its policies. Israel’s is a matter of Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians.
The source of terrorism in Russia since the late 1990s has been the ethnic nationalist uprising in Chechnya that Russian authorities have brutally been trying to stop.
Today there certainly are international reinforcements fighting for the Chechens, and there are increasing numbers of radical Islamic teachers and clerics in the Caucasus. Like Iraq, the region has become a battlefront in the war of Islamic radicals against the infidels. But to hold them responsible for what has happened in Chechnya is like insisting that “regime remnants and foreign terrorists” are the only ones doing the fighting in Iraq.
The affairs retain their national causes, and the only hope of solution remains national. But once the terrorist action-reaction auction begins, it is almost impossible to stop. Russia has already invaded Chechnya twice to “end terrorism,” but terrorism simply got worse. Ariel Sharon’s entire career has consisted in failed attempts to solve Israel’s problem of national existence by brute destruction of what he considers its enemies. The United States invaded Afghanistan and overturned the Taliban government, but the terrorists took to the hills and the country is in political and social pieces. And now there is Iraq.
He’s misreading matters on several levels, but we ought to keep in mind one thing which he may be getting right – that there are specific geopolitical drivers that make terrorism an attractive proposition for certain populations, and that we ought to be splitting those off as a key element in our struggle against terrorists. He has a point in that, but it’s not enough by itself.
Here’s what he’s missing, and it’s relatively simple.
What’s the difference between the horror of Columbine and the greater horror of Middle School #1?
State support.
It’s the difference between two crazy kids with guns and homemade explosives and a platoon armed with military weapons and professional-grade demolition gear. It’s the difference between a group that has the patience and resources to preposition guns and explosives months before, and two kids who learn to shoot by playing Doom and going to the neighborhood rifle range.
I don’t think that dismantling the network of state support for terrorism will end terrorism; I think that – as long as we’re fighting Bad Philosophy, people who think like James Wolcott will decide they don’t want to wait for a hurricane, but to do a little damage on their own.
But that damage will be far more limited – even though still tragic – while the scale of damage that will be done by terrorists with state resources knows no clear upper limit.
That’s why I supported the war in Iraq, and continue to do so. because the immediate objective must be to break down the network of state sponsors of terror, and Iraq was probably the best place to start.
Pfaff ignores the reality of state support for terror in other states – as the Arab world uses the Palestinian proxy soldiers to fight their war with Israel ‘to the last Palestinian’; he ignores the reality of Saudi and Iranian – and Iraqi – support for transnational terrorist organizations, and the support by those organizations for local terrorists.
But the problem of facts on the ground isn’t his biggest one.
His message is clear – we’ve lost.
He posits terrorism as a part of an ‘auction of violence’ in which each side raises the bid against the other, and suggests that
The religious fanatic has no tangible goal to be satisfied. He – or she, as we increasingly find – wants paradise and the destruction of heretics. For such a person, the terrorism auction has no earthly limit.
and
If the terrorist auction has a tangible value, such as an independent Chechnya (if that is what the Beslan terrorists wanted: nobody has yet said what they wanted, assuming that they wanted anything tangible), there is no solution except to give it to them. Everyone knows how to solve the tangible and national part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An acceptable compromise of their national claims was agreed to long ago. The clash of eschatological expectations between some Israelis and some Palestinians is what continues to make that solution impossible.
(emphasis added)
Now when one person says something like this, it’s possibly careless writing or a slip of the tongue. But when you hear it twice, it begins to sound like a movement.
“…give it to them.”
And in so doing, prove to every group with a grievance and a high tolerance for blood that they can get what they want if they kill enough children.
I’ve argued before that the war on terror stands on three legs:
1) kill or capture the terrorists;
2) harden the targets;
3) provide countervailing ‘philosophies’
To that, on rereading my post on Boyd and terrorism, I’ll add something which may mirror what he and Matt said, but is in my mind profoundly different.
From ‘Patterns of Conflict‘, slide 108:
Action:
Undermine guerilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of the people – rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
Infiltrate guerilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerilla plans, operations, and organization.
Seal-off guerilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with the outside world.
Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerilla teams into affected localities and regions to inhibit guerilla communication, coordination, and movement; minimize guerilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.
Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of guerilla cadres and their fighting units.
Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerilla controlled regions. Employ (guerillas’ own) tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication with the outside world.
Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerilla influence with government influence and control.
Visible link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
Idea:
Break guerillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-temp/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
*If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides.
(emphasis and footnote his)
This is dealing with guerrilla warfare, not terrorism, but I believe that the precepts apply there just as clearly. ‘Root causes’ must be a part of the solution – but are not and never will be the solution themselves.
Was I too harsh on Matthew? I’m thinking about it.