(Sorry, I just love the Glenn Gould movie)
So I broke down and subscribed to Foreign Affairs. I want to learn what the smart folks (like Dan Drezner, who has an article in the Marc/April issue) are thinking and writing about. I acknowledge my lack of expert knowledge and think it’d be good to hear what expert have to say.
So this month, along with Drezner’s article, there’s a lead article by Ray Takeyh on Iran, in which he argues strongly for detente. He argues, in fact, for the inevitability of detente, because of the strength of Iran.
In order to develop a smarter Iran policy, U.S. leaders must first accept certain distasteful facts – such as Iran’s ascendance as a regional power and the endurance of its regime – and then ask how those can be accommodated.
OK, there’s some things to think about in that.
But – no where in the article is there anything about the demographic issues or the potential collapse of Iranian oil revenues – and the political implications that presents for the “endurance of its regime”. Now it may be that those issues are overblown; there are certainly arguments to be made.
But I’d say that it’s pretty difficult to talk about Iran and our long-term strategy with them without dealing with these issues – or at least raising and dismissing them with some arguments that hold some weight.
And it’s difficult for me to sit down and accept the authoritay of someone who is a Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign relations and author of ‘Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic’ when he tells me that Iran is an unstoppable force in the Middle East and doesn’t deal with the reasons why Iran may either be a hollow power – or why it may be motivated to be aggressive within a specific window of time. If this is what the leading experts are doing – heaven help us all.
Then Noah Pollak sent me a note announcing the new issue of Azure, the magazine he’s involved with.
In it, David Hazony (editor in chief of the magazine) has an article on ‘The New Cold War’ in which he details the issues in containing Iran.
By most measures, Iran is an easier mark than the Soviet Union. It does not yet have nuclear weapons or icbms; its Islamist ideology has less of a universal appeal; its tools of thought control are vastly inferior to the gulag and the KGB; and its revolution is not old enough to have obliterated the memory of better days for much of its population. In theory at least, it should be much easier for the West to mount a similar campaign of relentless pressure on the regime – from fomenting dissent online, to destabilizing the regime through insurgent groups inside Iran, to destroying the Iranian nuclear project, to ever-deeper economic sanctions, to fighting and winning the proxy wars that Iran has continued to wage – in order to effect the kind of change of momentum needed to enable the Iranian people to bring their own regime down the way the peoples under communism did in the 1980s and 1990s.
This article cuts closer to my presuppositions and beliefs than Takeyh’s; it stands as a counter to his arguments about the inevitability of Iranian power with an argument about the necessity of countering it.
But it’s more in the nature of a polemic than an analysis.
And the question, of course, is whether it’s the right polemic. And some analysis would help make that case. Or Takeyh’s.