It’s funny how many times I get prompted by reading two things and rubbing them against each other. There’s a discussion going on about the performance of the Israeli military vs. Hizbollah, and the presumption that they did poorly (I’ll suggest from my limited knowledge that urban warfare against an emplaced, well-armed enemy that doesn’t involve massive artillery or air strikes is probably a damn difficult exercise. I’d be shocked to see what other militaries operating under the constraints the Israelis chose to operate under would have done.)
Phil Carter points to an interesting issue of military doctrine (from an op-ed in the NY Times by Lt. Col. Terry Daly (ret):
…a counterinsurgency expert who served as an Army intelligence officer and provincial adviser in Vietnam, has an interesting op-ed in Monday’s New York Times. In it, he argues that the solution to the seemingly intractable security situation in Iraq might not be a few more soldiers — it might be a few good cops instead:
There is a difference between killing insurgents and fighting an insurgency. In three years, the Sunni insurgency has grown from nothing into a force that threatens our national objective of establishing and maintaining a free, independent and united Iraq. During that time, we have fought insurgents with airstrikes, artillery, the courage and tactical excellence of our forces, and new technology worth billions of dollars. We are further from our goal than we were when we started.
Lt. Col. Daly suggests:
Counterinsurgency is work better suited to a police force than a military one. Military forces — by tradition, organization, equipment and training — are best at killing people and breaking things. Police organizations, on the other hand, operate with minimum force. They know their job can’t be done from miles away by technology. They are accustomed to face-to-face contact with their adversaries, and they know how to draw street-level information and support from the populace. The police don’t threaten the governments they work under, because they don’t have the firepower to stage coups.
Phil suggests:
We should build an expeditionary constabulary force like the one Lt. Col. Daly envisions. The sun may be setting on the U.S. involvement in Iraq; there may not be time to deploy such a unit here. However, that should not hinder us from learning the lessons of this war to be ready for the next one.
Definitely interesting and worth further discussion. I’m working on a piece that tries to segment the problem I see and map it to responses. This will certainly help my thinking about it.
Let’s switch over to Josh Marshall, who sees moral rot instead, and cites an article in Ha’aretz:
In the Israeli daily Ha’aretz tonight, military affairs writer Ze’ev Schiff says that the main conclusion that will be drawn from the IDF’s disappointing performance in the Lebanon war will be that the army’s fighting capacity and edge has been blunted by years of policing duties in the territories.
Writes Schiff …
Most units, in their training and operations, followed fighting doctrines of police forces and not of standing armies. Hizbollah trains, fights and is equipped as an army, utilizing some of the most advanced anti-tank missiles and other weapons.
Marshall goes on to quote his reader EM:
The IDF’s troubles are the bitter legacy of the endless occupation. Armies engaged primarily in harassing civilians tend to perform poorly in combat. The Argentine army, which had been engaged in a dirty war against its own people, mostly powerless to fight back, suddenly found itself in a real fight in the Falklands. The British soldiers and Marines did not arrive strapped to tables with electrodes attached to their genitals, so the Argentines didn’t know how to handle them. They lost pretty quickly. Nor is this because the whole Argentine military were simply bullies and cowards; the Argentine air force, which had not been involved in rounding up and torturing helpless people, put up a good show against the Royal Navy. Occupation duty is always bad for combat units. The American units in Korea in 1950 and those sent to Korea from occupation duty in Japan to stop the North Korean offensive performed poorly by most measures. It would take months to get them back into fighting trim, and non-occupation troops, brought in from the States, would do most of the heavy lifting in driving the North Koreans back from Pusan and Inchon.
It may well be that both are making a similar practical point – that troops trained for combat make poor occupation troops, and that troops trained for occupation make poor combat troops. That makes sense, the skills and mindset of each are dramatically different – as they should be.
But I’ll suggest that the moral center of each argument is in a far different place. Marshall:
Occupation degrades a fighting force — a reality the Israelis need to confront right now and we Americans need to come to grips with as well. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is something Israel really cannot afford now as it becomes more clear that she is in renewed need of a very potent fighting army.
But, of course, this goes beyond the military sphere. Or rather the military sphere is revealing a deeper reality. The occupation itself is corrupting Israeli society just as it seems to have corrupted (remember that in its original and deep meaning, ‘corruption’ means ‘decay’, ‘rot’) the IDF. And here too, can we not see the echoes for ourselves?
What Marshall sees as ‘rot’, Carter sees as a requirement.
I’ve argued before that the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank was a drain – morally (in terms of international politics), economically, and militarily – the original justification was to keep Syrian tanks further from Tel Aviv. A tank invasion is arguable the last issue the Israelis need to face – war has changed that much since the 1970’s.
But the moral center of this conflict isn’t in the head of a young Israeli and what occupying Gaza has done to him – although that impact matters. It’s in the schools and back streets of the Arab world where the rot of hatred and genocide exist – and in Israel, where the full power of that hatred falls. Marshall may choose to focus on the Israeli, while offering an ‘of course on the other side…’ – I don’t.