My friend Kevin Drum examines some of the reasons that mortgage modifications aren’t working worth a damn (as in “the mortgage is too damn high”).
If, in the long run, principal reductions really, truly were the most profitable way to deal with underwater homeowners, I’d expect that not only would banks figure this out pretty quickly, they’d be figuring out ways to create securitized bundles of principal reductions to sell to gullible German investors. That well can’t be completely dry, can it?
So why hasn’t this happened? There are a couple of obvious possibilities here. One is that the complicated nature of mortgage securitization simply makes principal reduction too hard. Once the loans have been securitized, tranched, retranched, and re-retranched, there are so many note holders with a legal stake that it’s all but impossible to get unanimous agreement to do a principal reduction. Another possibility is that banks are afraid of knock-on effects: once they start reducing principal in a few cases, their entire customer base will find out what’s going on and start withholding payment in hopes of getting the same treatment. Reducing principal for 10% of their customers might make sense, but banks might be afraid that there’s no way to hold the line there.
I personally think he’s covered the two main issues. With highly securitized debt, it’s not like there is one person at a bank that owns the loan who will make the decision (…it can literally work like that – early in my career I personally managed about $85 million in commercial ORE and pretty much called the shots on everything up to about $8 million). And yes, if banks suddenly started handing out 15% principal reductions, I might think about hitting the bank up and lowering my mortgage by $70K.
But…at the same time, foreclosing isn’t costless. It’s certainly not costless to the households who are displaced (I’m assuming that most of the people being foreclosed on are decent homebuyers with bad luck or bad underwriting skills, not flippers and pure speculators). It’s not costless to the communities they are pulled out of. And it’s not costless to the lenders; the numbers I see suggest that foreclosure pulls about $30 – $50K out of the price of an average home – and if the mortgage is underwater already, that’s a further haircut. That’s not to count the hit to the lender’s books from depreciation and other holding costs…not all of which count to lower the basis when a sale takes place.
It seems to me like we’re doing the worst possible thing, which is to lean against the collapsing wall and pray that it will somehow miraculously stabilize – that prices will ‘normalize’ – before it all falls over.
That eyes-squeezed-shut hope keeps our banks alive via an accounting fiction – worse, via an accounting lacuna where we simply agree not to look. It keeps homeowners over the edge in a constant state of false hope, and it freezes the spending and hopes of homeowners near the edge.
So what can we do that’s better?
Do we step aside and simply let it collapse and spend our money and energy picking up the pieces??
I toyed with an idea a few months ago – it never gelled, but I felt like I was onto something. It was that homeowners could take a written-down low-interest mortgage, but would lose some of the appreciation and their tax deduction.
Getting rid of – or aggressively clamping down on – the homeowners tax deduction is something we really ought to do. We subsidize overconsumption of housing by the middle and upper-middle class. We simply escalate the prices of all housing stock, and so hurt the working poor who are trying to achieve homeownership – the very people we ought to focusing our assistance on.
But it’s dumb to suggest – as I did – that workout homeowners should lose it – it simply makes the house that much less affordable.
But the idea of having them get rid of (some or all of) their appreciation isn’t dumb. It begins to separate house-as-shelter from house-as-investment, and offer to those who want to keep their house as a home – rather than a piggy bank – some options.
What if we simply agreed that people who are underwater can apply to have their mortgage reset to 100% of the current value of the house, at current low rates, but they accept a participating second from Fannie or Freddie, the terms of which are such that if they sell the house in the next seven or ten years, they get no appreciation, and thereafter they get some measure of the appreciation.
These loans have _some_ value, and can be held or sold – giving a better return to the lenders than simply foreclosing (nominal value of the participating debt plus the new mortgage, plus the ‘foreclosure hit’ that’s avoided). Communities are better off, because the ‘good’ homeowners – the ones who want to stay and keep their roots – can. I’m not jealous of them, because I can sell my house in five years and maybe make a few bucks (or not) which they can’t.
What’s the downside??
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