I don’t agree with John Quiggin or Matthew Yglesias about the standoff in Najaf and on whether continued military pressure is the correct policy to deal with al-Sadr.
I’ll suggest that today’s news that al-Sadr has apparently agreed to Allawi’s demands, and may leave the shrine of Imam Ali bears out the validity of the course of action, which was to make it clear that the cental Iraqi government – with U.S. military support – would not accept Sadr’s militia as a ‘second force’ within the country.
First and foremost, let’s not count our chickens just yet.But as I see it, the criticisms of the Alliance forces attacks on al-Sadr come down to three things:
# It probably won’t work, because al-Sadr will not surrender and his capture or death will stir up a Shi-ite uprising;
# It is a waste of our strategic assets (including credibility and moral standing) because al-Sadr isn’t so bad and Allawi is just another thug;
# It is immoral, because if 1) and 2) are true, we are killing Iraqis and risking our own and our allies’ troops for nothing.
I disagree on all three counts, and believe that today’s events support this case. Does anyone believe that he would have negotiated as he did if the Iraqi government had not made a credible threat to remove him and his men from the shrine?
It all started with a post by John Quiggin, over at Crooked Timber.
In it, he attacked the military operations aimed at the Sadr Army, and at the person of al-Sadr. A careful read of his post suggests that the core justification is straightforward: that al-Sadr is not a particular threat to the U.S. or to stability in Iraq. He is, instead just a (fairly) bad guy among bad guys.
These people weren’t Al Qaeda or Baathists, they were (apart from the inevitable innocent bystanders) young Iraqi men who objected to foreign occupation. Sadr’s militia is one of a dozen or so similar outfits in Iraq, and there are hundreds more around the world, quite a few of which have received US support despite having a worse record than Sadr’s. Moreover, there was no cause at stake that justified a war – the first started when Bremer shut down Sadr’s newspaper and the Sadrists retaliated by taking control of some police stations and mosques.
In his first post, Quiggin argues that the moral burden – the blood debt that we will owe for killing these ‘young men’ is simply not one that we can or should afford.
In his second post, Quiggin amplifies the points in the first post, and adds to it the certainty that violently suppressing al-Sadr and his militia will fracture the fragile Shi’ite/Sunni entente that exists today.
In the short term, his death would make it just about impossible for any Shi’ite leader to give support to the Allawi government1. Already, Ayatollah Sistani who has no love for Sadr and would have been happy to see him pushed out of Najaf2, has called for a ceasefire.
Quiggin’s solution in both cases is simple:
The only remotely feasible option is to make a place for Sadr and his supporters in the political process, and to hope that he is moderated by the attractions of office, as has happened in many cases before. There were some tentative steps in this direction in the period between the April insurrection and the current fighting.
My original disagreement with Quiggin’s point was simply that I disagreed with his calculus; that, simply, if the measure was the deaths that would be directly caused by a decision we’d never do anything – invading Normandy would have been an impossible decision if this is the formula that ruled the Allies’ thinking.
To a certain extent, this remains the core of my disagreement – which is to say that it is less on the subject of a detailed analysis and projection of the current political/military struggles in Iraq, and more on a challenge to the style and form of analysis that Quiggin is using.
But I have issues with his analysis, as well.
al-Sadr is an Islamist thug; he intends to push Iraq to set up a mullah-led theocracy like Iran’s, and closely allied with Iran. While I don’t share Trent’s beliefs that Abrams should and will be rolling down the streets of Tehran this fall, it’s clear to me that the current leadership in Iran does represent a key part of the Islamist forces that are arrayed against us, and that acceding to the expansion of those forces isn’t something that makes a lot of sense.
It is in that light – that of tipping the balance of power within Iraq toward those who we believe would steer Iraq toward a more effective civil society – the attacks on Sadr’s forces make sense, and seem worth the cost.
Yglesias disagrees:
This is a mission, then, that has an extremely low probability of success. In all likelihood it will either end with an exhausted America deciding to give up the game (in which case we’d best do it sooner rather than later) or else with a triumphant America having successfully set Iyad Allawi up as dictator of Iraq. He’ll go, naturally enough, by the title “president” or “prime minister” but that’s what he’ll be. This is not, I think, a goal of such overwhelming moral vitality that it’s worth expending significant quantities of American blood and treasure to achieve at a time when we face real, direct threats from other quarters. The point of suggesting that Allawi’s fans form a Lincoln Brigade in support of their hero is not to call them “chickenhawks” but is recognition of the fact that Allawi is not the bad guy here per se. Someone who chooses to fight for Allawi’s dictatorship over Muqtada’s could have some very good reasons for preferring the former to the latter, and should be welcome to take up arms on his behalf if that’s what he wants to do. But the lowish probability that the US Army and Marine Corps can successfully establish an Allawi dictatorship (and the vanishingly small probability that they can create a democracy) is not a reasonable objective of national policy at this point.
The core of his disagreement, as I see it, is that since Allawi will be a less-than-perfect democrat (note the small ‘d’), it’s not worth spending our national credibility and blood to prop him up – but if I and the others who support a more-free Iraq want to raise a private army to do it, that would be OK with him. I think that’s still a poor position to take, because we do have a vital national interest in picking apart the Islamist problem, and that keeping them out of power in Iraq would seem to be a valid step in that direction.
And that, I believe is the core of my policy disagreement with Quiggin and Yglesias: That we have a vital interest in keeping the Islamists from gaining more power; that defeating the Sadr Army is a necessary step in doing this; that allowing him to hold hostage the holy sites Najaf strengthens him since it allows him to paint himself as the custodian of those sites; and finally, that it will be possible to defeat him and his forces without the ‘explosion of the Arab street’ that has been much threatened and seldom seen.
In a sense, what they are suggesting is that we should have given Monster Kody a seat on the LA City Council because he represented a largte armed forced in South Central Los Angeles. Now in some cases, gangs do transmute into political organizations (I can’t think of a specific example offhand, but I’ll grant that it’s happened). But that key transition – from force of arms to politics – is the key step that has to be taken, and that al-Sadr must take before it can be decided that he gets a seat at the table of power.
What also strikes me most of all is the tone of resignation and hopelessness in both Quiggin’s and Yglesias’ posts.
On one hand, it’s clear that they both strongly oppose both the current administration and the war which this Administration chose. And I imagine that no small part of their tone comes from the discomfort they feel at seeing death, injury, and destruction in the service of a cause they believe to be fundamentally immoral – much as we see the death of someone killed by a criminal in the course of a robbery as fundamentally different than the death of someone killed, say, in the course of trying to save a life in a fire.
I also wonder if it doesn’t come from trying to overthink things. History is fundamentally irrational; it is messy, contingent, and resistant to planning.
You do understand, don’t you, that it’s extremely unlikely that Sadr will actually disarm his militia?
At any rate, the deal that’s on the table here is one to incorporate Sadr into the political process (what Quiggin said we should do) and is not a defeat of his Islamist forces who will participate in the political process for as long as it suits them and return to violence when it suits them.
Bush and Allawi are basically surrendering here (for which I commend them) while refusing to admit that that’s what they’re doing (which is understandable, given the circumstances) but I would expect a true-blue hawk such as yourself to recognize that Finance Minister Sadr and the Mahdi Political Party are not putting Iraq down the primrose path to liberalism.
Budda Bing! Budda Boom!
The only remotely feasible option is to make a place for Sadr and his supporters in the political process, and to hope that he is moderated by the attractions of office, as has happened in many cases before.
Is Quiggin thinking of the Arab terrorist-turned-‘politician “I am”:http://marie427.free.fr/arafat.jpg?
The only remotely feasible option is to make a place for Sadr and his supporters in the political process, and to hope that he is moderated by the attractions of office, as has happened in many cases before.
Is Quiggin thinking of the Arab terrorist-turned-‘politician “I am”:http://marie427.free.fr/arafat.jpg?
You haven’t mentioned the role of the national Conference, which took a position much closer to mine than to yours, condemning the US/Allawi attack as well as Sadr’s occupation of the shrine. Sadr’s statement referred to the demands of the Conference, not to Allawi.
Now that the Conference has disbanded (it did much better on Najaf than in its primary role of selecting a government, BTW) we’ll have to see what happens. My best guess is that Sadr will withdraw from the Najaf shrine and go back to Sadr city, but that otherwise not much will change. In relation to my original post, I’d class this as “another messy compromise, with not much gained by either side”.
Still, if the current pointless bloodletting is stopped, that’s a win all round.
Matt,
Oh, I think al-Sadr’s militia will be disarmed whether al-Sadr does it or not. The Sadrists today are not nearly as devoted to Sadr the younger as they were to his father.
Sadr may be incorporated into the political process, but I doubt he actually survives enjoying any real political power. He knows this and sees his only REAL chance at power is to make a grab for it. Al-Sadr is not a politician – he is a thug. Once you understand WHO Muqtada al-Sadr is, the rest is not that difficult to understand.
Colt, I don’t have JPGs, but Middle Eastern examples of terrorists becoming democratic politicians include Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir.
“examples of terrorists becoming democratic politicians include Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir.”
If you can tell us WHY, you might be on to something.
John:
Yes, they had achieved their objectives. Unlike al-Sadr…
Colt – Ding Ding Ding!
You win A BRAND NEW CAR!
Joel, the CPA’s final opinion poll showed al-Sadr to be the country’s second most popular figure, after Ayatollah al-Sistani. Perhaps he’s gone down somewhat since then, but he’s destined to be a major factor.
Bush and Allawi are basically surrendering here (for which I commend them) while refusing to admit that that’s what they’re doing (which is understandable, given the circumstances)
Ah, yes. Surrendering to Arabs – always a smart move in a Middle Eastern war…
Oh, Armed Liberal, you can think of a gang that transmuted into a political organization: the Taliban Militia and their origin in Kandahar after the Soviets withdrew and as the Najibullah Government spun out of control…
Matthew,
Could you provide evidence for your speculation that: “In all likelihood it will either end with an exhausted America deciding to give up the game (in which case we’d best do it sooner rather than later) or else with a triumphant America having successfully set Iyad Allawi up as dictator of Iraq”.
I believe this is morally and strategically unsupported as a prospective state-of-affairs for Iraq, in addition to contradicting one of the explicit goals outlined by the President both before and after the war.
John has previously failed to maintain that the proportionality of the response to Sadr’s gang tactics was improper. In addition, his argument rests on equating the Sadrist militias with the nascent forces for democracy in Iraq. (You can find this discussion in A.L.’s past threads on Quiggin.) Until he re-works his argument, his position is untenable.
Matt,
“Perhaps he’s gone down somewhat since then, but he’s destined to be a major factor.”
He has. You might be right, but I predict it will be as a martyr – and a soon forgotten one at that. al-Sistani has already shown his (oblique perhaps) disapproval (and I don’t mean by flying to England) of al-Sadr’s activities. Especially the one where he orchestrated an attack on the al-Sistani compound, although he wasn’t blamed for that directly by al-Sistani – only through other, less important clerics.
Sadr is not bright enough to survive once his puppeteers are done with him. He will probably end up martyr’d by one of the many Farsi-speaking “Iraqi followers” which compliment the “Mahdi Army”.
Mark,
‘Could you provide evidence for your speculation that: “In all likelihood it will either end with an exhausted America deciding to give up the game (in which case we’d best do it sooner rather than later) or else with a triumphant America having successfully set Iyad Allawi up as dictator of Iraq”.’
Great question! There is no evidence – it is a position, which cannot be borne by history or contemporary fact. Which is why the experienced Mr. Yglesias said, “In all likelihood…” 😉 You nailed it with the “speculation” moniker.
Cheers!
John Quiggin:
Is Quiggin thinking of the Arab terrorist-turned-‘politician I am? [Arafat]
Response:
Colt, I don’t have JPGs, but Middle Eastern examples of terrorists becoming democratic politicians include Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir.
And lo, the goalposts shifted most verily.
John, do you have an example of an Arab terrorist who successfully became a respectable politican, even by Middle East standards?
I think Thomas Hobbes summed up what’s happened here pretty well (impressive considering he did it over three hundred years ago):
“The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not.”
A little hardball goes a long way with thugs like Sadr — and ultimately saves lives. A little appeasement goes a long way, too, just in the opposite direction. IMHO, Allawi et. al were exactly right in choosing to be formidable in the hopes it might result in a little more sociability. Go figure, so far at least it looks like Hobbes was right.
A note about Begin, who was an Irgun member… and how he ended up as a politician, instead of dead. Irgun, you see, had wanted to maintain armed groups within the nascent state of Israel. Ben-Gurion was, shall we say, unamused. “The combat that resulted is detailed in this post”:http://www.donaldsensing.com/2003_06_01_archive.html#200424083 by Donald Sensing, and referenced in “this A.L. post “:http://windsofchange.net/archives/003634.php re: the importance of the state having a monopoly on force.
The bottom line is that an Irgun ship bearing volunteers and weapons was sunk near Tel Aviv. And Begin et. al. learned that it wasn’t about negotiations any more. The government would give orders, and they would be obeyed – or Irgun would be destroyed.
Unlike al-Sadr, Irgun didn’t have a foreign government backing them and directing them to create exactly this kind of challenge to the new state. So Irgun saw the writing on the wall – and put down the gun as a tool of internal politics, and became part of the new country.
If Sadr does the same, he too could become a politician instead of a thug. But that is not the agenda of his backers in Tehran, and it will not be Sadr’s agenda either.
Personally, I agree with “Yglesias’ assessment above”:http://windsofchange.net/archives/005397.php#comments – though not with his pleasure at an American surrender. This bloodletting is not pointless, it’s critical to the integrity of the new Iraqi state – and stopping it short of Sadr’s death will ensure more bloodletting long-term, not less.
Welcome to the down side of Iraqi sovereignty. “As I predicted,”:http://windsofchange.net/archives/005148.php there are some lessons they will have to learn for themselves the hard way.
As Armed Liberal has said, it’s still early yet. This can still go either way, and it is probably too early yet to say what WILL happen.
Doubts Over Sadr Peace Deal
Also, always good to link to Healing Iraq, who is at the National Convention. Also, his description of the various people tripping over themselves to speak is funny. (Keep reading down for his take on Sadr):
Healing Iraq
So, no comments on this, from me yet. As Matthew points out, Sadr is probably bluffing, and there will really be no “surrendering” of arms. I think it unlikely.
And if so, we don’t know what the response will be from the current government. The defense minister is still talking tough.
I’ll wait and see.
First, does anyone think this result would have happened without the credible threat of imminent military action?
Matt –
The article I read had it in this order: disarm > join policial process. That’s an important distinction to make…
John –
I think that the interesting question is whether the Mahdi army disarms in any meaningful way.
My guess is that once they have surrendered the shrine, their military power will decline quickly; if they’re smart, they’ll trade disarmament for seats at the political table. If not, we’ll have a battle in Sadr City and Fallouja in the next month or so. I don’t see Allawi tolerating a potential internal rival at this scale any more than Begin did.
A.L.
Basically, this has been a crisis brought on by the strange mixture of pusillanimity and brutality we have seen in Iraq policy.
Sadr was indicted for murder about a year ago.
The Iraqi investigative judge went to extraordinary lengths to verify the accounts of the eyewitnesses who said Sadr ordered the murder of Ayatollah al-Khoei. It seems he’s at least guilty of tacit encouragement of the murder.
After the warrant was issued, there were several operations planned to arrest Sadr, but these were all cancelled, some at the last minute, by higher headquarters.
The Marines (I MEF) who were leaving last fall didn’t do it. The Spanish who were coming into Najaf, undermanned for the conduct of offensive operations, didn’t want to do it. Other operations were cancelled. Forces in Najaf province, as in the rest of the south, were seriously thin. The governments involved (Spain, Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, sending the largest contingents) told their commanders that the prime directive was zero casualties. In fairness to them, they had probably been sold on a peacekeeping/civic action mission, not a guerrilla war.
What we did: it’s called “telegraphing your blows.” Sadr must have learned at some point he was a wanted man and started building up his Jaysh al-Mahdi in a serious way. These guys are uneducated young men who have joined up out of admiration for Sadr’s father, who is a revered figure in Iraq, or because they don’t like the indignities of the occupation. They are quite motivated, of course no match for US forces, but willing to die, for sure.
It was like we didn’t take Sadr out back them because we didn’t think it would be a fair fight, so we let him buld up his forces.
It was obvious long ago that he is probably mentally deranged and would be a long term problem for Iraq if allowed to roam free with his own army.
His Jaysh wiped out a small town near Diwaniya in March just because it was a haven for gypsies who sold liquor and allowed dancing.
When he started his uprising in April, the fighting and destruction undid or prevented a lot of good work that the CPA had completed or in progress. They overran and ransacked one CPA compound (al-Kut). Civil affairs operations pretty much stopped in several governorates after that. Mind you, the tragedy is that things were going pretty well until then in that region.
But from last August until April, nobody could pull the trigger on Sadr. I don’t mean kill him, but he should have been arrested at least.
Mind you, the tragedy is that things were going pretty well until then in that region.
Yeah, the sad thing is that the Shia are finally getting the political clout they’ve been denied for so long, and this guy is screwing everything up for them. It’s sad so many of them don’t realize it.
klaatu: “pusillanimity”
If you do, you’ll clean it up!
First, does anyone think this result would have happened without the credible threat of imminent military action?
Since “this result” includes the humiliation of Allawi by (1) the USMC, which started the fight without reference to him, (2) the National Conference, which negotiated a settlement over his head, and (3) by his own National Guardsmen and troops, who deserted rather than “attack fellow Iraqis in a city that includes some of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam”; and since the apparent gain is little more than a return to the status ante quo; it doesn’t seem much to skite about.
we have a vital interest in keeping the Islamists from gaining more power
Depends who you’re arguing with. I’d guess this might cut some ice with Yglesias (if he accepted the strategic judgements); with Quiggin, the proposition that young men from Sadr City should be killed to suit some foreign country’s convenience is exactly what he’s objecting to.
And incidentally — if you think that “keeping Islamists from gaining power” is such a vital national interest — which I don’t necessarily accept, but since you do — you have Yet Another Reason why invading Iraq was a damn fool stunt.
Christopher Allbritton at, http://www.back-to-iraq.com has some very good posts on this. One point he makes is that the Moqtada is not popular with the Iraqi people, thought his anti-americanism may be.
I don’t really have anything to say, thought the people I trust enough to borrow opinions from on Iraq are Wes Clark, Juan Cole, Al Gore and the afore-mentioned Allbritton.
It’s not a direct response to this post, but I’ve posted my thoughts on the Conference at my blog, and also at Crooked Timber.
Abu Frank,
“[I]f you think that “keeping Islamists from gaining power” is such a vital national interest — which I don’t necessarily accept, but since you do — you have Yet Another Reason why invading Iraq was a damn fool stunt.”
This statement betrays a basic misunderstanding of one of the aims of the war, which was to establish a liberal democracy in the ME. The Coalition could hardly do much to keep group X from power, but it could help establish a political system that prevented the rise of another dictator. Liberal democracies are generally better at this than any other system we’ve invented so far, contrary to the ravings of marxist profs and Noam Chomsky.
If Sadr disbands his militia, denounces illegal acts, participates in the new quasi-democratic system, etc., and the Iraqi government & people approve of this, then the West will have to deal with it. (It’s not my first choice, but it’s also not my country. I take heart from the fact that Sadr would probably fare poorly in elections, based on polls I’ve seen.) Notice, however, that he would be accepting the terms of a liberal democratic system.
So your contention that this development is a failure, depending as it does on your (probably wilfull) misunderstanding of the war’s objectives, is false.
As to your musings about “Yet Another Reason” why the liberation was foolish – when you feel like addressing the freedom of 25 million Iraqis from fascist dictatorship, I’ll take you seriously. It always amuses me that the left apparently thinks everyone will forget about this bit.
Point of fact, as of this morning (8-19-2004) Al-Sadr is still in the Najaf mosque and the Iraqi government is still threatening to clean his crew out of it.
There was no “surrender” by the Americans or the Iraqi government. Nothing has changed.
Given the fighting that has taken place, I doubt Muqtada al-Sadr has any say in what is going to happen next. Sadr is surrounded by Iraninan Revolutionary Guard minders and al-Qaeda thug “dead enders” who are going to make sure this goes down as a bloody mess with the sacred mosque destroyed.
The delay is the American and Iraqi government’s playing the “avoid the blame game” and being too cute by half in the process.
Sadr is surrounded by … al-Qaeda thug “dead enders”
Probably not, given how al-Qaeda feels about Shi’ites.
Praktike,
I’m not so sure about that. It was the Arabs who came up with the saying “the ememy of my enemy is my friend.” Besides I’ve read there’s evidence of al-Qaeda and other Sunni radical groups working with Hezbollah, AQ leaders taking refuge in Iran, etc. I wouldn’t be a bit surprised to find AQ “dead enders” working with Sadr.
I wouldn’t be a bit surprised to find AQ “dead enders” working with Sadr.
In some specific instances, maybe.
To protect a shrine they want to destroy? Doubtful. Doubtful al-Sadr would be working with such a crew in this instance. I view the explosives stuff as cover in case the assault goes wrong.
I could be mistaken. We’ll see.
“his capture or death will stir up a Shi-ite uprising”
Since when does a display of power encourage defiance? Its weakness that causes people to rise up, whatever the rhetoric, the vast majority of Iraqis want to live. By displaying that we can wipe out any band of rebels with ease, we _discourage_ uprisings. By allowing people to wave guns around, kidnap IP, and shoot at Americans whenever the mood takes them, and then walk out scott free, we encourage the behavior. This isnt rocket science. Some Iraqis are suicidal but we are rapidly helping that finite group reach their goal. There is a difference between risking your life for a winnable goal and fighting a hopeless battle that is almost certain to kill you. That is how wars are won, by breaking the enemies will to fight. This cycle of violence nonsense is nonsense.
Mark Buhner makes a good point. To go back to my Monster Kody example; a free and defiant Kody was a rallying point for people who opposed ‘the system,’ regardless of their awareness or concern that he was a murderous thug.
Kody in Pelican Bay is a much less attractive figure.
There’s a lot of anti-American (and anti-Baghdad) sentiment in Iraq, and as long as al-Sadr is seen as the one standing up to America and Baghdad, he’ll be attractive. When he’s not …
A.L.
I think Joe’s put his finger on it. If Moqtada were just Moqtada, that would be one thing; luring him into politics might be possible (after demonstrating clearly that the alternative is getting killed). But the Iranians certainly will not want this outcome.
In proxy wars, it’s always a mistake to pretend the proxy is acting for itself alone and to ignore the motives of the man behind the curtain. And this is a proxy war.
Trent, A.L. & Joe;
As usual, you’re the only ones truly making sense in this comment thread.
Yglesias seems to be fundamentally wrong on virtually anything he takes a position on.
Quiggen, in stating that ” the people I trust enough to borrow opinions from on Iraq are Wes Clark, Juan Cole, Al Gore – – -“, totally destroys any credibility he may have outside IndyMedia and DU.
I have to remember, don’t read any blogs comments, they always ruin a day.
Mike
. . . invading Iraq was a damn fool stunt.
This statement betrays a basic misunderstanding of one of the aims of the war . . .
This statement has nothing to do with the aims of the war. Whether the invasion was wise or foolish depends on the actual interests of the USA and the actual effects of the invasion, not on the aims of the clowns who concocted it.
The reason it was a damn fool stunt is laid out at some length in say Chris Albritton’s latest; briefly, the US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it. As Powell said, you break it, you own it; well you broke it, and you don’t know how to put it back together. The possibility of an Islamist regime is just one aspect of that, and not the worst.
If Sadr disbands his militia, denounces illegal acts, participates in the new quasi-democratic system, etc. . . . he would be accepting the terms of a liberal democratic system.
More relevantly, he’d be gambling that he’d be less likely to be eliminated by the US or Allawi if he relinquished the protection of the Mahdi Army and the Najaf shrine — not a judgement that a man trained in politics in the school of Saddam would be quick to make.
It’s not my first choice, but it’s also not my country.
Well said. However, my comment bore on A.L.’s assessment of US national interest, specifically, that “we have a vital interest in keeping the Islamists from gaining more power”; with no qualification on how the gain it.
“Quiggen, in stating that ” the people I trust enough to borrow opinions from on Iraq are Wes Clark, Juan Cole, Al Gore – – -“, totally destroys any credibility he may have outside IndyMedia and DU.”
Hmm. Mis-spelling my name is par for the course and fabricating quotes seems to be SOP in the comments threads at this blog (for the record, I never said anything remotely like this and, while I’ve cited Cole often, I don’t have any idea what Wes Clark thinks about the war, and I’ve never cited Gore).
But what kind of reasoning could suggest that Al Gore has no credibility outside Indymedia and DU? In case you’ve forgotten, Mike, he got more votes than George Bush four years ago.
Abu Frank,
“Whether the invasion was wise or foolish depends on the actual interests of the USA and the actual effects of the invasion, not on the aims of the clowns who concocted it.”
You suggested there were many reasons why the war was a “damn fool stunt”, naming one of them. You didn’t distinguish between the private reasons of the individual actors and the reasons given by the state actors, so this is just a transparent attempt to avoid criticism. Nor do I see how calling Bush & Co. “clowns” is relevant. Please elaborate.
As to your proof that the war was a damn fool stunt, you offer the view that: “the US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it..”
I don’t agree with this view. Please provide evidence for it. Note: appeals to authority are unpersuasive to many non-leftists, so a fully articulated argument on this point would be nice.
John,
Actually, I believe Mike Daley likely meant to address this to roublen vesseau, who placed the comment immediately before yours. These kind of mistakes have been happening more frequently since Joe moved the attribution from the bottom to the top of the comment.
Might I humbly suggest to Joe that the attribution appear at the top AND the bottom of each comment?
Mr. Quiggin;
Abject apologies, not only is Lurker absolutely correct in highlighting my ignorance, but to be so careless as to mis-spell your name. Should have just gone with John, that I can handle.
Your upbraiding of me was entirely correct and most courteous.
However, isn’t there always one somewhere?, the Al Gore who won the popular vote bears little, if any, resemblance to the almost psychotic MoveOn.org Al Gore of the last two years.
Mike
John –
I’ll gently suggest that the discussion threads in this blog (where I get smacked at pretty regularly) are among the best ones I’ve seen on any blogs; I’d welcome pointers to other blogs that have good ones – we can always learn something.
A.L.
A.L.
WoC is pretty much the class act of comments.
Mike
“Since when does a display of power encourage defiance?”
All the time. See the Jews at Masada or in the Warsaw Ghetto or in 1948 or 1967 or 1973, for instance. See the Palestinians in starting both intifadas. See the Americans at Bunker Hill and Midway. See the British after Dunkirk, and in the Battle of Britain, as well as against the Spanish Armada, and so many other times. See the Germans fighting in Berlin as it fell in 1945. See Thermopylae. See the Alamo. See Finland against the Soviet Union in the Winter War. See North Vietnam against France and America. See the Kurds.
And on and on and on.
“I’d welcome pointers to other blogs that have good ones….”
Obsidian Wings is pretty good.
Mark:
You didn’t distinguish between the private reasons of the individual actors and the reasons given by the state actors . . .
As previously stated, the wisdom or folly of the invasion depends on its actual effects not on the wishes / hopes / plans that prompted it; that applies equally to the plans of individuals and the plans of state actors.
Unless you mean to hint at a distinction between private and public interests: that the invasion might be bad for the USA but good for clique that determined on it. So to avoid ambiguity: the invasion was a damn fool stunt from the point of view of the US national interest, whether helpful or harmful to Cheney, Rumsfeld, Feith, et al.
the US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it..”
I don’t agree [that the US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it].
You need to specify better which part[s] you disagree with. But concentrating on “doesn’t know how to restabilise it”: This isn’t really a strong assertion. Nation building is an art not a science, and it’s a difficult art, which is why of the last 14 US-led attempts, only three (Japan, Germany, Panama) resulted in lasting democracy (IHT, 2004-03-16). Of course it’s harder with internal ethnic or religious rifts, problematic neighbours, and inadequate resources for public security and reconstruction (IHT, 2004-05-07): all of which apply in Iraq.
appeals to authority are unpersuasive to many non-leftists
It’s a natural mistake, living in the USA at the present time, to think that contempt for relevant expertise and experience is a right-wing characteristic; but it’s a mistake nevertheless. Just as the Bush administration despised the judgement of security professionals such as Clarke, Zinni, and Shinseki, so did the French Revolutionary commissars despise the professional judgement of French army officers; just as the administration despises scientific judgement on global warming, Stalin and Lysenko despised bourgeois genetics; just as the administration pursues a policy of fiscal irresponsibility against professional advice, so did Mao Tse-Tung purse the Great Leap Forward. This behaviour isn’t the preserve of either the left or the right; it’s a characteristic of hyper-politicized ideologues; it just so happens that there are more of these on the right than on the left in the USA at the present time.
Abu Frank,
“You need to specify better which part[s] you disagree with. But concentrating on “doesn’t know how to restabilise it”: This isn’t really a strong assertion.”
I disagree. You said: “the US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it”.
The assertion is quite strong. It is a claim about the knowledge base of America. You are claiming that the US Administration is intellectually too deficient to implement democracy in Iraq. The (weakly-sourced) newspaper articles upon which you base your position make no claims about the intellectual capacity of US Administrations; as such, they do not support this claim.
I would note, also, that the newspaper articles do not claim that the US is incapable of establishing democracy. The articles suggest, not surprisingly, that the US has less success when it subverts democracy in a county to shore up its own interests. This is a legitimate criticism, and I’d be happy to debate this problem with you in the context of Iraq. But your broader intimation that the US will fail in attempts to democratize Iraq is unsupported.
My comment about appeals to authority apply to both left and right. I’m not persuaded by linking someone else’s view about the success or failure of the project of democratization. I assume my audience is intelligent enough to decide for themselves; please do the same.
Mark:
You are claiming that the US Administration is intellectually too deficient to implement democracy in Iraq.
The main point here isn’t the current administration’s intellectually deficiencies; it’s that establishing a stable democracy in Iraq is something that no one knows how to do (that is, no one has a strategy that could claim a reasonble confidence of success). That said, it is true that the US has made mistakes that reduce its chances of success, and that a major reason for that is willful neglect at the political level of expertise available at sub-political levels.
. . . your broader intimation that the US will fail in attempts to democratize Iraq . . .
A bit too strong. The situation in Iraq is highly unstable; very little can be ruled out, even success. The invasion was an act of folly not because reconstruction was doomed to failure but because the chances of success were poor.
[And, one might add, because the administration refused to examine the difficulties candidly, or to give itself the best chance of dealing with them. But then, if it had made admitted the difficulties, the resultant political difficulties would likely have prevented the invasion; so in practical political terms, the choice was between a bungled occupation and no occupation at all.]
I’m not persuaded by linking someone else’s view about the success or failure of the project of democratization.
Of course, one could link to all kinds of views on the subject; I linked to the IHT articles because they lay out a view that I agree with at greater length than would be convenient in a blog comment (and with more literary skill and a greater depth of knowledge than I lay claim to).
“The main point here isn’t the current administration’s intellectually deficiencies; it’s that establishing a stable democracy in Iraq is something that no one knows how to do (that is, no one has a strategy that could claim a reasonble confidence of success).”
Abu Frank,
You keep changing your argument. First you said the problem was the US intellectual failing. I disputed that, so now you say it’s that “no one [not just the US] knows how to establish a stable democracy in Iraq”. (Again, this is something I’d dispute.) In the same sentence, however, you change your position again, and claim that no one has a reasonable strategy. These claims are all different, and involve different arguments (none of which you’ve made very convincingly). Once you decide on your position, perhaps you can come back and try to justify them one at a time so they can be dealt with properly.
Mark:
You keep changing your argument.
Not at all. (Incidentally, you don’t mean argument you mean position.)
First you said the problem was the US intellectual failing.
First I said, quote, “US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it.” I didn’t say that was because of some special US intellectual failing. Point is, the US broke it without knowing how to fix it. Why it didn’t know isn’t the point (and wasn’t specified).
. . . now you say it’s that “no one [not just the US] knows how to establish a stable democracy in Iraq”.
Perfectly consistent with the above.
. . . you change your position again, and claim that no one has a reasonable strategy.
Again, to quote, “no one has a strategy that could claim a reasonble confidence of success”. Not a change of position; a clarification or restatement of the only position I’ve taken. If someone proposes a certain undertaking, saying, “I know how to do this”, and then when he fails, defends himself saying “Sure I know how to do that; it’s just that the failure rate is 80 per cent”: was his original claim true or false?
The reason no one has a strategy that can command success is that (as far as anyone knows) no such strategy exists; so, this is a thing that no one knows how to do and that likely can’t be done (though it’s also possible that the US and the better disposed Iraqis may somehow muddle through); so (one more time) bringing this on, in the likelihood of failure, was a damn fool stunt.
Abu Frank,
Your claim was as follows: “[T]he US has willfully created a destabalising political power vacuum in about the most strategic region of the world, and doesn’t know how to restabilise it”.
The claim was about the knowledge of the US with respect to restabilizing the region. It’s about what the US knows and does not know. You claim that the US doesn’t have knowledge of something, specifically, the knowledge of how to restabilize the region. I don’t know why this wouldn’t count as an intellectual failing. If I claim that “I do not know how to play basketball”, I am making a claim about my (lack of) knowledge, and you would be correct in noting my intellectual failing in this regard.
I then noted that the links you provided don’t establish this lack of knowledge of the US Administration. (You fail to address this point.)
Your position then morph’s into one where the US doesn’t have a strategy with a reasonable chance of success. The US could know how to restabilize the region, but this knowledge might not give one a reasonable chance of success (because of, say, a failure to implement such knowledge or to do some improperly). These positions may not be inconsistent, but they are varied and different in significant respects.
“The reason no one has a strategy that can command success is that (as far as anyone knows) no such strategy exists; so, this is a thing that no one knows how to do and that likely can’t be done..”
This might be the case, but you’ll have to make an argument for it. You haven’t so far.