Commenter Abu Frank is one of the folks whose challenges to Joe’s and my thinking are most welcome in the comments here. As I’ve noted, one reason I do this is to sharpen my own arguments, and if there was no one to sharpen them against…
Yesterday, he commented, in response to my post on an Op-Ed in the LA Times that I felt ‘blamed the U.S.’ for Saddam’s intransigence. Here’s his first (and core) comment, in it’s entirety:
Armed Liberal:
Why are you letting this bunch of old news upset you? Meisler’s article isn’t saying anything new to anyone who’s been following the story.
What’s your counter-claim?
(1) that the US didn’t do what Meisler says it did (send signals that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam, and use UNSCOM as a cloak for its own intelligence gathering)?
(2) that even if it did, those actions didn’t create disincentives to Saddam to cooperate with the inspections?
(3) that even if they did create disincentives, they were only minor?
(4) that even if they created major disincentives, Saddam’s non-cooperation was not the USA’s fault?
If (4), that doesn’t contradict Meisler; he doesn’t discuss the law or morality of the situation, just the power play: “Hussein never had much incentive to cooperate”, not “It’s all our fault”.
I don’t agree with him – even though I still think it was a ‘damn good argument’, and the issue I have is found not so much in parsing the historical record as in deciding how we want to view that record.
I can sift the record and find connections from and to almost anything; I have to judge which ones to give primacy and call causes.
Part of my objection to the modern philosophical interpretation of history is found in Fackenheim’s ‘Metaphysics and Historicity’, which I quoted over at Armed Liberal a long time ago. The relevant quote looks like this:
And from historical self-consciousness there is but one step—albeit a long and fateful one—to a wholesale historical skepticism: to the despairing view that history discloses a variety of conflicting Weltanschauungen, with no criterion for choice between them anywhere in sight [A.L.: except essentially artificial and arbitrary ones, per Derrida]. But when events move as they do today, this step is easily taken.
Just how commonly it is in fact taken may be illustrated by a review of three typically contemporary attitudes. The first is what may be called skeptical paralysis. Here historical self-consciousness has led to two results: to the insight that wherever there has been great purpose, there has been great faith; and to the loss of the capacity for commitment to such a faith. Hence there is paralysis which recognizes itself as paralysis and preaches doom.
Which pretty closely maps to what I’m seeing in Abu’s argument. There are conflicting narratives that can be built around our interactions with Saddam, which certainly supports Abu’s point. But…
…the act of building and accepting those narratives it itself not without consequence. By coincidence, Joe just linked to a great Norman Geras post on Arendt and Eichmann. In it he says (forgive the long quote, and do go read the whole thing):
I also have a wider theoretical misgiving about the emphasis on perpetrator normality: this is that it runs the risk of permitting the sociology and psychology which is involved in trying to understand what happened to displace the ethical perspective. Let us return to Arendt’s writing. On the face of it she was unambiguous about Eichmann having to bear the moral responsibility for his deeds. From a moral point of view she dismissed the notion that, in similar circumstances, others might have acted similarly to him. As though addressing the man himself, Arendt declared:
there is an abyss between the actuality of what you did and the potentiality of what others might have done.
But in explaining Eichmann, his mentality, his normality, Arendt also speaks of his committing crimes
under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.
If it is well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel it, though, mustn’t this at least mitigate the degree of his moral responsibility?
From an interpretative point of view I think we are bound to stick with Arendt’s assignment of full responsibility to Eichmann, since she is so clear and emphatic about it. On the other hand, I believe that all the talk, in the relevant literature, of the normality of the perpetrators carries a danger of encouraging us to think: well, because of these psychological pressures, these social mechanisms or administrative structures, those patterns of internal rationalization and so on, what the perpetrators did is ‘understandable’. But isn’t there a sense in which, as Primo Levi wrote, one must refuse to understand? Or one must say: each and all of the factors – social, psychological or whatever – that tempted or pressured you, they are understandable; still, you made a choice or choices which you should not have made and which others did not make – you crossed the line.
I think that in judging history, particularly political history, we have to keep in perspective the moral issues; we have to be willing to keep in mind that what we’re watching isn’t chess, and that there is a moral balance which must be weighed. And I simply can’t weigh Hussein’s desire to hold on to power as the moral equivalent to Clinton’s or GWB’s intent to remove him.
Clearly there is an argument to make about diplomatic strategies and the tactics of negotiation – and the need to leave an opponent an out in order to get them to comply. There are also counterarguments to that about the trustworthiness of the other side, and whether they are worth negotiating with at all.