Here’s Spencer Ackerman:
Hanlon went to Iraq, saw that the surge is teh awesomez0rs, and wrote an op-ed suggesting that he was anti-war until he saw the fruits of a successful strategy. Only…Hanlon wasn’t ever anti-war, and he was taken on a Potemkin tour of Iraq. The bloggers started ripping him to shreds, resulting in an embattled O’Hanlon drifting further rightward and becoming more bilious. Call it Joe Lieberman Syndrome. In a different context, he’d be Ja Rule in the middle of the 50 Cent beef that ended his career. Today in the Wall Street Journal, O’Hanlon’s got yet another tendentious op-ed, in which he bravely subdues yet another straw man on the left. As you read it, you can practically hear, “We gon’ clap back… We gon’ clap back…”
Harder to understand is how the foreign-policy establishment doesn’t put him out to pasture. Like the Bolton aide at the barbecue, few are willing to say publicly that O’Hanlon doesn’t know what he’s talking about, no matter how widespread that opinion actually is behind closed doors and over beers. Case in point: a friend passes along this piece of O’Hanlon-related intelligence:
I have a friend who worked on the Iraq Study Group, who told me they brought [O’Hanlon] in, along with the other 20 or 30 other experts on the various working groups. They found his recommendations to be both vacuous and moronic. The man is an empty shell.
Please, Hanlon, let it go, homie. Call it a day. You’re a young man and it’s a great big wonderful world out there, full of possibilities.
In otherwords, instead of engaging the actual points Hanlon makes – that Bush tried not talking to North Korea and it didn’t work, and he tried talking to Russia – and it didn’t work…suggesting that talking in and of itself may not be the absolute indicator of success in foreign policy…we get this Yglesias-worthy screed.
Nice work, Spencer. Way to add to the national dialog about foreign policy.
The overriding theme seems to be ad hominem attacks on O’Hanlon’s credibility; here’s Moira Whelan at Democracy Arsenal:
So what gives coming from this think tanker who has been a self proclaimed “war critic”?
I have a theory…
Think tanks in DC are traditionally known as refugee camps for the out-of-office team of foreign policy wonks. There’s an expected turn over when new administrations come on as each team goes about grabbing “the best and the brightest” to fill their ranks.
O’Hanlon has by now gotten the message that he’s burned his bridges with his Democratic friends. Those that like him personally even agree that he’s radioactive right now thanks to his avid support of Bush’s war strategy.
So what’s a wonk to do?
Well, one option is pre-positioning yourself for the future. By getting out there and going after the leading Democrats—people that some of his closest colleagues are actively supporting…is he lining himself up to say that he was critiquing the next Administration before it was cool?
Here’s the meat entirety of her substantive critique:
I’d like to think that O’Hanlon really is worried for our country and is pushing his ideas because they think they’re better, but you sort of jump the shark as a foreign policy wonk when you question the concept of diplomacy as he’s done with Obama.
In some ways, O’Hanlon’s attacks on Obama could be an endorsement of sorts. He thinks Obama will win, so better get out there and criticize now so you can get invited to lots of lunches with Don Rumsfeld in the future.
And, ever-substantive, here’s Big Media Matt:
Anyone who’s pissed O’Hanlon off this much is okay in my book. However, as the correspondent who brought this article to my attention observed, this seems like an odd time and place to go after Obama so severely if the intention is really to earn Clinton’s admiration. It looks in some ways more like pre-positioning for pro-McCain orientation in the general election.
It’s a mainstreaming of the old progblog stance – silence the opposition, because that’s so much easier than actually addressing anything that’s said.
Here’s O’Hanlon’s piece in the WSJ:
A central element of Barack Obama’s plan to change American foreign policy is his intention, upon becoming president, to meet with foreign leaders of extremist regimes — the type of rogue-state dictators that George W. Bush has generally shunned during his time as president.
Applied categorically, this would be a bad idea. Meeting with enemy heads of state is neither as original as Mr. Obama implies, nor as promising as he claims. As a specific option for dealing with difficult regimes, it has potential merit on a case-by-case basis, and should always be considered — but only after a careful assessment of what the United States believes it can get out of such meetings and dialogues.
Now I’m supporting Obama in the primaries, and I’ve argued before for direct talks with Iran.
But I’ll also suggest that O’Hanlon raises a key issue that we supporters of Obama shouldn’t ignore – much less try and shout down – which is that Obama says things which need a lot more explanation – things like this:
Throughout the Middle East, we must harness American power to reinvigorate American diplomacy. Tough-minded diplomacy, backed by the whole range of instruments of American power — political, economic, and military — could bring success even when dealing with long-standing adversaries such as Iran and Syria.
and
I will join with our allies in insisting — not simply requesting — that Pakistan crack down on the Taliban, pursue Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, and end its relationship with all terrorist groups.
and
There must be no safe haven for those who plot to kill Americans. To defeat al Qaeda, I will build a twenty-first-century military and twenty-first-century partnerships as strong as the anticommunist alliance that won the Cold War to stay on the offense everywhere from Djibouti to Kandahar.
and
We must also consider using military force in circumstances beyond self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global stability — to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction operations, or confront mass atrocities. But when we do use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of others — as President George H. W. Bush did when we led the effort to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. The consequences of forgetting that lesson in the context of the current conflict in Iraq have been grave.
The problem that this faces, of course, is what happens when those who plot to kill Americans are given safe havens in countries that won’t let us come kill them; what happens if Syria is unwilling to yeild to diplomacy and the threat of war; if European allies are unwilling to stand up in combat in the Middle East?
And the broader issue is to place these conflicts into some kind of intelligible framework – one that can be explained to the American people, in order to sustain their support (something Bush has consitently failed to do); explained to the allies we hope to convince to stand beside us; and explained to our enemies…
I will say that if anyone can do it, Obama is likely to be that person. Now he just needs to do it. I’m hoping – and believing – he can. I wish I were certain…
I am certain that the folks cited above need to look in the mirror and do a gutcheck on who, exactly, should be ashamed.
Update: Corrected quote boundaries on Whelan quote.
The bloggers started ripping him to shreds
Which bloggers? Not this blogger, but the ones who have never been to Iraq and don’t know f*ck-all about the place. In hidnsight they look even dumber than they did when they first went after him.
My advice to Hanlon is to just walk away if the political left is such a hostile environment. There is life after the left. I’m doing just fine after walking away, and I cannot imagine going back for more of that crap.
bq. The problem that this faces, of course, is what happens when those who plot to kill Americans are given safe havens in countries that won’t let us come kill them; what happens if Syria is unwilling to yeild to diplomacy and the threat of war; if European allies are unwilling to stand up in combat in the Middle East?
Er… we go to war with Syria on our own. Why is this a big deal for you, AL? We went to war with Afghanistan for similar reasons, and the vast majority of the country – and a big chunk of the rest of the world – was bang on board with that one.
Of course, it’s well worth pointing out that, post-Iraq, the margins of support would be far lower, both domestically and internationally… which is as good a reason as any to consider Iraq a failure, since it blunted our resolve and broke our ranks. But the basic principle of attacking those who have harmed us, no matter where they’re hiding, is legitimate, and I don’t really see why you think it’s such a terrible thing, or why you think most Democrats would have a problem going to war with Syria if, say, OBL was there.
Still waiting for a response to my comment here, BTW… though I’m not holding my breath.
Sorry, Chris – I thought I had addressed the earlier point – but as to this point, I’m thinking it will be brutally hard for Obama to act unilaterally given his explicit commitment to collective action; the thing that would overcome that would be a clear conceptual framework that would explain where the bright lines lay. The thing I keep asking for…
I’ll actually come back and address your linked comment tomorrow.
A.L.
Michael:
The link (which is Spencer Ackerman’s) goes to Glenn Greenwald, who couldn’t rip up a box of Kleenex in a satisfactory manner.
Spencer Ackerman’s Gangster-Rap lecture isn’t exactly devastating, either.
AL — I think you’re projecting Santa Claus on Obama the Messiah.
The man is a shallow, one-term Senator with no real experience in national security or foreign policy and catering to the Che Guevara wing of the Democratic Party.
Obama’s love for his country is conditional. Sort of like Ike-and-Tina Turner: “Baby I’m sorry I had to hit you, but you make me so ANGRY! But I hit out of love Baby.” Man won’t even say the Pledge of Allegiance or wear a lapel pin flag — because he hates the Iraq War. His love of America is conditional.
Talk to Iran? About what? Surrender in Iraq, retreat from the Gulf, and allow Iran to nuke Israel out of existence? Institute Sharia in the US? Unless Obama is prepared to do all those things, he’s got no carrots at all. Recall this is the regime that sought and courted WAR with the US 1979-80 when threatened by the USSR and Saddam. That during war with Saddam repeatedly threatened to execute the hostages. If Iran would do THAT in a time of mortal peril, what would they do now?
Obama lacks the stones or love of America to do anything that might work short of bombing the hell out of Iran: assassinations of regime leaders coupled with support for Azeri and other separatist movements, with the “carrot” of turning that off if Iran says “uncle” and gives up it’s nuclear program entirely. He just doesn’t love America unconditionally. So he would not defend it.
Heck the man couldn’t even say the word “retaliate” when asked what he would do if America was nuked and proposes a “world apology for America” tour plus a “Muslim Summit” — presumably to offer the terms of our surrender.
There is no support for anything like Iraq, though the appetite for surrendering there is probably pretty small outside Democrats. No one likes defeat still less surrendering as we are “Winning” to AQ. Which is Obama’s position. Likely our policy in Republican circles will be something akin to “Killing Pablo” — assisting local military and rival groups to whack our enemies quietly before they get too big, with Kosovo as the only “go big” model.
For Democrats it would be do nothing, offer puppies and hugs and rainbows. Until we have enough nuked cities and we end up wiping out most of the world’s 1 billion Muslims. Most Dems have persuaded themselves: 9/11 didn’t happen, if it did we deserved it, and it was no big deal, and it could never happen again. Sigh. Nothing adult. No consideration that we have real enemies, dangerous people who want to kill us, but who can be deterred by action that places leverage on them.
As opposed to talking a lot. Obama = West Wing politics. Aaron Sorkin for Secretary of State?
AL, again, I have real problems seeing where you’re coming from. The things you quote seem to answer your concerns quite directly – Obama explicitly demands that governments hiding anti-US terrorists (e.g. Pakistan) cease to do so. More importantly his “explicit commitment to collective action” is, as your own quote points out, only in effect when we’re not acting in self defense:
bq. We must also consider using military force in circumstances beyond self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global stability — to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction operations, or confront mass atrocities. But when we do use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of others [Emphasis added]
So this seems straightforward to me – Obama seems pretty determined to fight anti-US terrorists regardless of where they are. When doing military stuff beyond self defense, we do our damnedest to work with others in doing so. An excellent policy in the post-Bush era, I think.
Of course, you don’t have to believe that Obama really means this, or believe that this is possible in the way Obama thinks it is, or you may even wish that some enterprising journalist would get into more specific hypotheticals with Obama in an interview. But it’s nonsense to say he hasn’t drawn the bright lines you’re looking for, both in the quotes you’ve presented and on his website.
Chris, this is an issue I’ve “discussed”:http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/008238.php for “some time”:http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/006138.php ; the notion that we’ll ‘fight bad guys wherever they are’ is either stupid, a political lie, or deeply frightening.
A.L.
I have reached the point where I’m no longer confident in what people say in an election year. It’s not that I assume they’re all lying, but political dreams are almost always tempered by the opposition party and the reality on the ground. So, I haven’t been paying good enough attention.
Still, I think the idea of Obama meeting with foreign extremist nations might set a new tone, that the United States is now willing to work with rogue nations to produce some middle ground. I agree, I have very little hope for talks producing any changes. However, just the show of diplomacy might improve our standing, giving us some more bargaining power in the ME.
Or it might not. It’s certainly possible that our stance might make us look weaker. However, at the very least, it would help us shore up allies in Europe which have clearly distanced themselves over the last 5 years. That alone could be worth the trouble.
I have to admit, one thing the US needs right now is a good statesman. I really think that any of the three remaining candidates could do that part of the job admirably.
bq. Chris, this is an issue I’ve discussed for some time ; the notion that we’ll ‘fight bad guys wherever they are’ is either stupid, a political lie, or deeply frightening.
AL, yes, I’ve read your posts prior to this – and they don’t make any damn sense either. This post, for example, relies a great deal on some utterly bizarre interpretations of Democratic talking points.
It’s pretty simple – if a sufficiently high-value target was hiding in a foreign country, and that country was not cooperating with us in capturing said target, we’d be well within our rights to unilaterally go to war with that country. Alternatively, depending on the tactical situation, it might be better to send covert troops in to kill the target without officially declaring war. (And spare me the “but that creates death squads” line, please… there’s a world of difference between having our own guys carry out elimination of enemy targets and creating assassination squads of foreigners, as you yourself admit in that link.)
Now, neither of these is without complications, and they’re not fun to contemplate. But they’re all vastly more legitimate, from a moral and geo-political standpoint, than our “we need to get weapons inspectors into Iraq to check for WMDs, but now we need to invade because we think the weapons inspectors can’t get the job done, even though they say they can” misadventure in Iraq… a war that you’ve fully embraced.
So Chris, just for grins, explain how my interpretation is ‘bizarre’?
I can’t help you with the whole comprehension thing, except to say that the vast bulk of the folks who read what I write don;t seem to have that problem.
A.L.
And Chris, as long as you’re explaining, I’d love to know what level of certainty we’d have to have before going to war with every country that has a ‘high-value target’? And why it is that the people who actually, you know, shoot people for a living who I know are both massively uncomfortable with the political and policy implications of sending assassins and of the realistic possibilities that something like that could work well.
Perhaps you could enlighten them?
A.L.
bq. So Chris, just for grins, explain how my interpretation is ‘bizarre’?
Well, the following interpretation:
bq. So we can go kill people in foreign lands, but we can�t actually � you know the way it�s historically been done since Westphalia � go to war with the state supporting or housing them.
…doesn’t really follow from what you quoted in that post – at no point does anybody say that we can’t go to war with regimes harboring terrorists.
bq. I can’t help you with the whole comprehension thing, except to say that the vast bulk of the folks who read what I write don;t seem to have that problem.
Funny, that comment thread is full of people who do have that problem – many of whom, like Davebo, have simply stopped engaging with what you write. (As has the bulk of the Democratic establishment, but that’s something you keep avoiding…)
bq. And Chris, as long as you’re explaining, I’d love to know what level of certainty we’d have to have before going to war with every country that has a ‘high-value target’? And why it is that the people who actually, you know, shoot people for a living who I know are both massively uncomfortable with the political and policy implications of sending assassins and of the realistic possibilities that something like that could work well.
Ah, but _when_ to do this stuff, and how effective it would be, is a different argument. I’ve never claimed that making those calls was a trivial matter – of course it’s not – or that covert ops are foolproof. But the principle that we’d be within our rights to do so – which is what I’ve been arguing for – is sound, and it’s definitely not the case that covert ops never work, just that they’re not nearly as risk-free as we’d like.
It’s also important to clarify the use of the word “assassins” here. Assassinating _state leaders_ has traditionally been viewed as a bad and dangerous road to go down, in part because it raises the possibility of endless tit-for-tat retaliation. Killing the leaders of stateless terrorist organizations isn’t in the same boat because A) we don’t have much choice in the matter – it’s by definition impossible to formally go to war against a stateless entity, and B) terrorist organizations are already trying to kill us by similar means, so it’s not like things can get much worse.
All that said, it should be reiterated that no Democratic politician – certainly not Obama – is arguing that such covert stuff should be the cornerstone of foreign policy. I’m merely pointing out that A) considering their use as part of a foreign policy arsenal is not “stupid, a political lie, or deeply frightening” as AL suggests, and B) at no point has any Democrat said that we would never go to war, directly and unilaterally, with a state protecting terrorists who had attacked the US. And, again, making both those claims is far less controversial, from a geopolitical standpoint, than what we did in Iraq.
Some rapid thoughts:
A) Terrorists organizations are not something “alien” to a State.
B) Since the Second World War, all other conflicts in which the US have participated have been in one way or another preventive actions: the main reason to go to war was that it would be much better to do it at that moment.
Things are not so clear in foreign issues.
BTW I personally prefer the straigth approach of invade the country and hang the tyrant.
Well, Chris, if the standard is that I have to convert every troll, I’m bound to fail…<g>
More seriously, the issue is that to me and a lot of other reasonable people, it isn’t clear what the core policy of the Democratic candidates is past “We’ll negotiate, and if that doesn’t work we’ll go to the ends of the earth to kill the bad guys,” which pretty much sums it up (in blog-comment shorthand).
When Obama can explain it – what and how he would make those kinds of decisions – I’ll be a lot more comfortable with him and that he’ll win.
And I’m sorry, but the super-secret ninja war model is in fact common in the anti-Iraq war blogs that want to make it clear that they aren’t antiwar in order to roll over for the terrorists.
And as a grace note, if I wanted a big media job or to work for a politician, I’d feel horrible about the fact that I don’t have one. I’ll content myself with the simple fact that I get to say exactly what I want and that I make a fair amount more money than most people in those industries. A small consolation, but it works for me…
A.L.
bq. Well, Chris, if the standard is that I have to convert every troll, I’m bound to fail…
Davebo was a troll? Eric Martin? Kevin Drum? Yeah, I guess it is easier if you write off liberals who ignore you as trolls…
bq. More seriously, the issue is that to me and a lot of other reasonable people, it isn’t clear what the core policy of the Democratic candidates is past “We’ll negotiate, and if that doesn’t work we’ll go to the ends of the earth to kill the bad guys,” which pretty much sums it up (in blog-comment shorthand).
And, as I’ve been showing in this thread, things aren’t “clear” to you because you’re simply not listening to being said. Case in point, using your own “blog-comment shorthand”, the bad guys we’ll go to the ends of the earth to kill (Al Qaeda) aren’t the people we’ll be negotiating with (Iran). Now, you can, of course, have problems with either of those individual policies, but you’re not even making that argument – you’re attacking the Democrats for something that they never actually said.
And from the Democratic standpoint, there’s not much point in explaining something when the person asking for the explanation isn’t listening.
bq. And I’m sorry, but the super-secret ninja war model is in fact common in the anti-Iraq war blogs that want to make it clear that they aren’t antiwar in order to roll over for the terrorists.
Insofar as I’ve seen calls for more robust covert ops, they’ve been used as an alternative to the Iraq war model. (Where, since we can’t wage conventional war on the state of Al Qaeda (since it doesn’t exist, and we already attacked Afghanistan, the closest proxy) we go to conventional war with some other Middle Eastern state we don’t like, because, hey, it’s all part of the same dysfunctional regional culture, yadda yadda yadda.) That doesn’t mean the folks arguing for more covert ops are saying that’s _all_ we’ll ever need. But again, this is an example of you not seeing what’s being said, but reading off of some alternate script, where those darned Democrats are axiomatically untrustworthy on foreign policy.
bq. And as a grace note, if I wanted a big media job or to work for a politician, I’d feel horrible about the fact that I don’t have one. I’ll content myself with the simple fact that I get to say exactly what I want and that I make a fair amount more money than most people in those industries. A small consolation, but it works for me…
AL, I’m glad you have a life you’re happy with. But, oddly enough, this isn’t actually about you, but about the arguments you’re making. Now, if you’re tacitly admitting those arguments shouldn’t be taken that seriously because, hey, you’re just doing this as a hobby, then fine – all the more reason for the Democrats to discount what you’re saying. But if we’re supposed to be pretending that you’re making a serious critique of the Democratic party, then your real-world job is largely irrelevant – the only thing that matters is if they have any validity and/or traction.
Which they don’t.
LOL – I’m actually framing a reply to your old comment, Chris, so look for it by Monday. Kevin and I chat by email pretty frequently; as noted in a recent post, the core liberal blogs tend to self-link and engage in less dialog with blogs that don;t agree with them – look at Memeorandum, and you’ll see an interesting pattern in which only right-blogs talk about certain links, and only left-blogs about others. That’s a bummer, but reality.
Re covert ops – the phrase I used in talking about the left commentariat’s willingness to use real force was “Merchant of Venice” – I assume the metaphor makes sense to you? We’ll certainly go to war – as long as a set of impossible to meet conditions are met. And for the realistic part of our foreign policy force projection, we’ll use covert ops.
I’ve detailed my objections to the covert ops model – which you don’t seem to have answered – repeatedly.
And as I’ve noted, I’m pretty happy with the way this election is framing out. The two leading candidates are both people I could live with, and both have and are rejecting the kind of knife-fighting partisanship I’ve criticized the netroots for.
As to this being a hobby – well, what else is it? I’m not sucking up for a crap job at the Atlantic and I’ve had staff jobs in politics. My youngest is too young for me to run for office, and what this is really about for me – as I’ve said often before – is an opportunity to develop arguments and viewpoints that I can bring back to the real world where I do get to participate in the political dialog (and the arguments I’ve developed here have helped there), and an opportunity to meet interesting and smart people.
Which I keep doing.
A.L.
bq. I’ve detailed my objections to the covert ops model – which you don’t seem to have answered – repeatedly.
Actually, I’ve talked about your covert ops objections twice on this very thread – once where I pointed out that there was a difference between covert ops and creating death squads, and once where I pointed out that there’s a difference between using covert ops against terrorist organizations and assassinating heads of state.
But then, we’ve seen a definite pattern of you arguing against people for things they haven’t said, and largely ignoring the meat of what they have said. Maybe your forthcoming response will be an improvement on that, but once again, I’m not holding my breath.
Chris, there’s a world – a universe – of difference between the kinds of passing comments you made and some kind of realistic conception of the issues involved in this kind of policy. If you at least acknowledged that gap and the policy implications it carried with it, I might take what you say more seriously. Instead what I see is a pattern on your part of making claims about the state of our argument that don’t have a lot of support.
This isn’t the Marc and Chris show; if you find what I’m saying vacuous, I’m sure you have better things to do with your time. When you actually make arguments about these things – instead of telling us about how powerful your arguments are – I’ll find the time to engage more with you.
Later.
A.L.
_shrug_ What can I say – it pisses me off when people purposefully misrepresent Democratic policies, and it _really_ pisses me off when the people doing so claim to be loyal Democrats. (See also Zell Miller and Orson Scott Card.)
So I don’t find what you say “vacuous” – I find it to be a lie. Saying things like “it will be brutally hard for Obama to act unilaterally given his explicit commitment to collective action” simply isn’t supported according to _your own selected Obama quotes_. “Engagement” isn’t the issue here – basic recognition of the truth is. And on that count, I think the comments above speak for themselves.
Chris, there is this simple thing called a hyperlink. Feel free to fill a comment with hyperlinks demonstrating the falseness of what I say. Until you do, you’re the archetypical third-grader waving your hands and saying “liar, liar, I win” in lieu of making any kind of arguments of your own.
Claims, BTW, are not arguments. I’ve provides quotes and a framework around them; feel free to do the same thing.
A.L.
AL, this entire thread has been chock full of arguments, like this one here. But if you need it even more explicitly spelled out:
1. You said “I’m thinking it will be brutally hard for Obama to act unilaterally given his explicit commitment to collective action.”
2. I point out that Obama has never, to the best of my knowledge, disavowed unilateral action, and that his “explicit commitment to collective action” only applies to situations where we are _not_ acting in self-defense. Or, as your own Obama quote says:
bq. But *when* we do use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of others. [Again, emphasis added.]
3. Therefore, your claim is false – Obama’s explicit commitment to collective action is _conditional_ on the kind of action we’re trying to take, and will not impede his ability to act unilaterally in situations like this one:
bq. The problem that this faces, of course, is what happens when those who plot to kill Americans are given safe havens in countries that won’t let us come kill them; what happens if Syria is unwilling to yeild to diplomacy and the threat of war; if European allies are unwilling to stand up in combat in the Middle East?
That is an argument, AL – you said something, I point out how the facts disprove what you said. Simple. Fini.
Chris, why do I feel like I’m dealing with a badly-written Turing Machine?
Let’s take a few common-examples and see where they takes us.
Japan attacks the US – response is clearle self-defense.
Germany declares war on the US – response is clearly self-defense.
US attacks French fleet in North Africa. Hmmm….self defense?
North Korea invades South Korea. Soviet UN Ambassador (contrary to what actually happened) doesn’t storm out of the Security Council, vetoes UN resolution. Not self-defence, no legal international coalition – what do we do?
The problem is one you skate over – the definition of ‘self-defense’ is something that is fuzzy at best – unless you want to simply say that attacks on US soil by identified national powers are self-defense and everything else – isn’t.
So what do we do re everything else?
Ah – covert ops. And when one of those ops goes wrong, and our soldiers are captured? Well, the country they are captured in has causus belli against us, goes to the UN, and guess what – the Security Council takes action against us! As they should, because under international law, we’ve committed an aggressive act of war on another nation’s soil.
Thanks for playing…
A.L.
A.L.,
“The problem that this faces, of course, is what happens when those who plot to kill Americans are given safe havens in countries that won’t let us come kill them; ”
Aren’t we faced with the situation in question now? and have been for the last six years? aren’t the remaining plotters of 9-11 believed to be hiding in Pakistan? Hasn’t Pakistan, in effect, refused to go after them? Hasn’t Pakistan refused to allow us to go after them? Or does it hinge on the difference between “given safe havens” and allowed safe havens?
Does Bush, McCain, Clinton, Huckabee, Biden, Paul…anyone at all, have an effective answer to this? Should Obama be measured any differently? Apparently the answer, it seems to me, to the problem you outline is that we can live with the situation. Apparently what happens is: nothing.
mark – that’s a legitimate reply; not necessarily an effective one.
I’ve suggested (over and over) that the rationale for invading Iraq was to shock the leaders of other countries (Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) into shutting down their support for these movements.
As noted, that didn’t work so well.
So what’s Plan B? I’m waiting to hear from the candidates, and my decision in November may be largely driven by what I hear. And I’m continuing to noodle on the question myself…
A.L.
A.L., Well, for what’s worth, my view is — and it isn’t a view that would get anyone elected — that what’s in order is a more realistic sense of the limits of American military power. It’s frustrating, I know. As far as I can see, however, those limits are controlled by three phenomena: 1) continued belief in the concept of national sovereingty; 2) human nature. (As it turns out, people who feel bullied don’t necessarily turn around and behave the way you want them to behave.); 3) size of the planet and its population. As a result, it may be that there are times when, confronted with the situation you outlined, and the situation we are presently in with regard to Pakistan, that there is nothing effective we can do. Looking to a presidential candidate for an answer when there is none may not be an act with much to recommend it. I wonder if ultimately winning what you are fond of calling the Long War might require more patience, caution and wisdom than action, given the circumstances.
I think one of the saddest of many sad ironies resulting from our misadventure in Iraq is that it has exposed the limits of our military power. We were probably better off bluffing. Now, not only are we actually weaker, but we are perceived as such, which is probably worse–at least in terms of our ability to influence events in the Middle East. That said, I’m not convinced that even trying to influence events in the Middle East serves our interests in the long term.
It’s kind of shocking to win the cold war only to find yourself relatively powerless as the only superpower.
mark – I wouldn’t be quite so quick to define how Iraq will be perceived in the next decade; while I think the real goal was to shake the despots in the ME, it may well be that a ‘decent’ outcome will prevail there, and the impact of that will be larger than the one we intended to have.
More later – off to the opera now.
A.L.
A.L., Enjoy the opera.
I have no doubt that ultimately there will be a “decent” outcome in Iraq. But given the price paid for that outcome, it seems a bad gamble that such an outcome will have an effect commensurate with that price. Also, given what Iraq has gone through, I hardly think it will appear as an attractive model for neighboring states to follow.
Again, enjoy the opera. At least there’s no super bowl to miss tonight.
mark,
You’re correct there were limits to our military that entered Iraq. We knew those limits before 9/11 and before we entered Iraq. In that sense, the critics’ assessments have been fair and true. Nothing that went wrong in Iraq before the current COIN surprised me because as a recently ETS’ed soldier when 9/11 happened, I knew how our military trained, planned, and was structured. I knew our non-SOF joes and janes would have difficulty with LIC and SASO (and did even worse than I expected), and weren’t set up to do the post-major combat OOTW. The ‘Phase IV’ in Iraq simply represented what we avoided as a military.
But you know what? That’s why we evolve. Our difficulties in Iraq have, like few other missions could have, spurred fundamental changes in a military institution whose leadership is traditionally resistant to change (for understandable and often justified reasons). If we support our evolution in the Long War, make the necessary changes to succeed in Iraq, and internalize those changes, the transformed military will no longer be the limited military that entered Iraq.
We have a choice: accept the limits of the old ways of our military and lament their vulnerable exposure in Iraq (actually, the world knew those limits already – why do you think our enemies choose to fight the way they do while our allies shy away from it?) or we can evolve so that we will be a stronger military that has addressed its biggest weaknesses and added missions like OIF to its skillset.
As far as wider and long-term influence, hopefully, the transformation spurred from our Iraq mission is sustained and employed intelligently enough moving forward so that we won’t lose our gains and revert to Version 1.0 in every subsequent event. When I was looking to buy a new laptop recently, I didn’t shop for an ENIAC, either. Also, anywhere we would employ these skillsets wouldn’t be peaceful, well-governed, stable, and prosperous, so that the choice against isn’t as clear as it is to us in our home.
On the other hand, if the only lesson we take away from Iraq is a cautionary tale – a “misadventure” – so that our progress is thrown away in favor of the old ways, we risk losing the hard-earned advancements we’ve made in Iraq and the progress we could have built upon them.
A related column I wrote for my school newspaper as the “surge” began last year: “When Anti-war is Anti-peace”:http://www.columbiaspectator.com/node/23957
A topical new post in the always-instructive Small Wars Journal: “Evolution vs. Revolution: FM 3-0”:http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/evolution-vs-revolution-fm-30/
Eric, I’m afraid I wasn’t very clear earlier. I never meant to suggest that we can’t win militarily in Iraq. By limits of US military power, I meant more the fact that even by winning in Iraq, we cannot force Pakistan to give up bin Laden, e.g., or in A.L.’s hypothetical Syrian example prod them to turn over bad guys. We would have to invade Pakistan to do that, which we can’t do, because we are tied up in Iraq. I was referring to limits of military power as an instrument of geo-political strategy. I think it is fair to say that those who thought a US invasion of Iraq would result in a re-made Middle East were counting on the transformation to be a lot quicker and a lot less expensive than it will turn out to be…..if it every actually happens. The expense and the length of time required then make it virtually impossible to use US military power elsewhere….thus exposing and creating limitations on its use. I hope that’s clearer.
bq. The problem is one you skate over – the definition of ‘self-defense’ is something that is fuzzy at best – unless you want to simply say that attacks on US soil by identified national powers are self-defense and everything else – isn’t.
AL, the issue here is that the argument you’re now making isn’t the argument you _were_ making.
You’re weren’t saying “well, gosh, the concept of ‘self-defense’ is a somewhat fluid concept, and I certainly wonder how Obama will make that distinction.” That would have been a slightly less egregious argument to be making, although again, the quote _you yourself gave_ states:
bq. We must also consider using military force in circumstances beyond self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global stability — *to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction operations, or confront mass atrocities*. [Emphasis added]
Rather, you were saying “I’m thinking it will be brutally hard for Obama to act unilaterally given his explicit commitment to collective action.” Or, in other words, “Those darned Democrats are complete chickenshits about really going to war on their own.” Call me whatever names you like, but all I did here was to point out that the quotes you have listed _do not support_ that kind of statement. Which pretty much disproves what you were saying in comment #21.
And as for the rest of your argument, I’ve already done as much as I can to show how you have a consistent pattern of ignoring and/or misinterpreting what Democrats say on national security. That being the case, there’s not really anything more for me to say here.
mark,
“I think it is fair to say that those who thought a US invasion of Iraq would result in a re-made Middle East were counting on the transformation to be a lot quicker and a lot less expensive than it will turn out to be”
That could be. Certainly, there seemed to be a ‘hope for the best’ rather than ‘plan for the worst’ mentality. Not all our optimism in Iraq was misplaced (eg, the Kurds, the majority of Shia, and at least some Sunni were supportive or at least open to the prospect of an American-built, post-Saddam Iraq), and I’ve heard enough anecdotes about what could have been done in Iraq if we – the international community, as well as Americans – knew then what we know now. But we underestimated the obstacles, didn’t understand our own incompetencies, and a guerilla force has the advantage in the post-war, anyway. The largest obstacle is that we undertook a mission without the means to do that mission. It’s meant a harsh learning curve with mistakes and frustrating losses – of time, opportunities, political capital, lives and treasure – in order to develop the necessary means.
Was there a, as some realists suggest, reliance upon the entire ME falling neatly into place as a quick domino cascade by, say, the end of the Bush Presidency? I don’t think so. I think changing our harmful pre-OIF course in Iraq and transforming the failed state was viewed as a key step among a set of steps. On one hand, Iraq was a festering problem for us, causing real harm, exposing the international community’s inability to enforce its own strictest measures, while legitimating and fueling anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, given its central position in the region, a post-Saddam stable liberal Iraq should decrease regional tensions, help the other steps, and bolster our influence. At this point, though, we have not achieved a stable liberal Iraq, so we can’t know yet how such an Iraq would influence its neighbors. As far as a time frame, even discounting our own incompetencies entering Iraq, given how long it took for US-led changes to take hold in East Asia and Europe post-WW2, coupled with ME history, I think it would have been unreasonable to expect regional transformation within one Presidency.
Given Bush’s attempts – however aborted they became – at diplomacy from the start, I also don’t believe it was ever his strategy to do a Sherman’s March through the Middle East and Central Asia beating the brush for terrorists like some kind of fox hunt – Bush has been careful to work within international boundaries. He’s been a liberal. Right away, the US cut a deal with then-enemy Musharraf rather than send our military from Afghanistan into Waziristan at a time when Americans were still howling for blood and we maybe could have gotten away with it. Even in Iraq, Bush tried to work though the UN to give Saddam a legitimate last chance to reform his regime, even though lawyer-Clinton had already set the precedent for unilateral US military enforcement, the pronouncement of Saddam’s failure to comply, and the policy at regime change.
With OEF locked in, one other unilateral invasion/intervention after 9/11 was pretty much the limit. So, should we have used that invasion on Iran, Pakistan, or nK rather than Iraq? If so, how and on what grounds? And to what end? Or, not used the invasion at all, and perhaps concentrated our troops in Afghanistan? Or perhaps invest those troops in places like the Phillipines and Djibouti? In Iraq after 9/11, rather than change course, should we have continued to maintain the containment of Iraq and absorb the secondary costs in perpetuity? Or, cut a deal with Saddam to end the containment like we negotiated with Musharraf? A decade-plus after the ballyhoo’ed international intervention of Desert Storm, was our best choice after 9/11 in Iraq to cut loose our ’90s internationalist posture, and return to our Reagan-era realist relationship with the ME? Maybe send Don Rumsfeld as a special envoy for another photo op with Saddam to apologize for the last decade and ask for his help.
I think Bush’s decisions in the Long War have helped place a brighter spotlight on the limitations and shortcomings of the US-led liberal world order, but those weaknesses were already there and they weren’t secret. Like our military, the members of the international community have a choice, too, to evolve or go back. That particular drama is playing out in Afghanistan more than in Iraq.
The realist critique of Bush’s liberal strategy and end-state vision of the Long War has been consistent and forceful, and realists have greatly empowered the anti-war movement. After 9/11, what would the realist strategy have been?
Eric, you make good points. But I think you continue to skip over the basic — and perhaps, simplistic — issues I have raised. I’ll boil them down to two statements, and then address your points as best I can.
1. I assume that after 5 years of bungling — call it learning — we can eventually reach a tolerable situation in Iraq and then leave. My unanswered question is: Will it have been worth it? Will it have been worth 5,000 US lives, 150,000 or so Iraqi lives, $800,000,000 in direct costs, and God knows how much in indirect costs needed to revamp a tired force? Will a reasonably democratic Iraq, with strong ties to Iran, and the distant hope or promise that democracy might — that is to say, maybe, perhaps, let’s hope — get something of a boost in the region in 2015 or 2020 have been worth all the death and destruction? Some will say yes; I think most will say no.
2. What I call the misadventure in Iraq, whatever the ultimate outcome, has demonstrated — once again — to ourselves and to the world that using military force as instrument of foreign policy is limited and not very effective. In terms of the principle goal, i.e. reducing terrorist violence against Americans and US interests, our invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has been an abysmal failure. In fact, it has resulted in an increase, not a decrease of such violence. It has sucked up energy, personnel and resources into fighting an insurgency; it has given the Islamic jihadist movement momentum; it has enlarged the pool of recruits for that movement; it has given the movement more convenient targets.
To answer your last question, I would say that the realists strategy after 9-11 would have been to kept the pressure on in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was an effort that had the backing of the entire world, Muslim included, and was thus perceived as legitimate…because, I would argue, it was legitimate.
You, I think, are arguing that the Iraq war can ultimately achieve success on its own terms. I argue that such success ultimately does more harm than good. And the long term success it is supposed to be able to achieve is based upon what I view as a very shaky premises. It is an untested theory that democracy in the Middle East is the antidote to Islamic jihadism. I strongly doubt it is a correct theory. It is an open question of whether a legitimate democratic state in Iraq can be the product of a foreign invasion. It is even more of an open question that a democratic Iraq state, following a decade of violence and foreign occupation will serve as a model for neighboring states.
I haven’t really addressed the points in your last comment directly. I see that you go to Columbia. I work just behind Barnard on Claremont. How bout I buy you a beer at Le Monde and we continue this in person.
Well, Chris, I don’t see any contradiction between saying that Obama will have a brutally hard time acting unilaterally given the clear stances he’s made on the issue, and saying that acting unilaterally may be necessary in situations that are shrouded in deep ambiguity but touch on issues of national self-defense. The ambiguity of the situation, combined with the political commitments he’s made will combine to limit his actions pretty substantially – so I’m (as usual) puzzled by your stated incomprehension.
And if you’ve done as much as you can to demonstrate the hollowness of my arguments wrt the Democrats and defense policy, you just need to get out more, because as far as I see you haven’t done much.
Note: the last paragraph is my best effort to copy your style of argument, which is to make a claim, assert dominance, and toss in a backhanded insult. I respect that I may not be all that good at it yet…
A.L.