Before dropping snark on us at his own site (more below), lefty academic blogger John Quiggin stopped by the comments to my post on Basra below.
I posted a comment in response to him:
It’s interesting; I’ve just finished two of Biggest Guy’s books (he asked me to store them until his next phase) – “A Better War”, the revisionist Vietnam history, and “Masters of Grand Strategy”.
An observation occurs to me from both of those, which is that a typical mismatch is where one side is fighting to win, and the other is fighting to settle – pretty much the history of the latter part of the Vietnam War. Unless the imbalance of power is extraordinary, the side fighting to win tends to – win.
This also refers back to the endgame in WWII when there was heated debate among the Allies about conditional vs. unconditional surrender.
John Q’s notion, as I understand it, is that war is essentially a signaling exercise.
And in rationally bounded games, it typically is.
But as Taleb notes in “Black Swan” much of the interesting action happens outside those islands of stability.
A.L.
I’m kinda bummed that he didn’t reply, so I thought I’d put this up here and see what kind of discussion it triggers.
And as a historical point, I can’t think of a case where the winning side in a conflict made the initial peace offers; any help out there?
“War is a signaling exercise?”
And how many dead bodies of your countrymen are you willing to spend to “signal” something? This is the way of McNamara, and defeat.
I swear, the older I get the more of a Jacksonian I become.
And as a historical point, I can’t think of a case where the winning side in a conflict made the initial peace offers; any help out there?
Well, there is the example of Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War (June 1967).
But then you’ll always have someone insisting that Israel didn’t win that war, or that Israel never offered any peace proposals, or that Israel was never serious about this, that or the other, yadda, yadda….
And then there’s always Abba Eban’s quip about This is the first war in history which has ended with the victors suing for peace and the vanquished calling for unconditional surrender…., or something like that….
I don’t think Quiggen was thinking of history, exactly, but I’ll bet he’s seen West Side Story twenty times. There may also be a Star Trek episode that could be cited as a precedent. And Darth Vader made up with Luke Skywalker – albeit, only after he’d been dismembered and electrocuted.
#1:
I can’t tell which party you are complaining to, or about.
BTW, Andy Jackson was no stranger to ‘signaling’. Taking Florida (and massacre-ing Seminoles) took the death of something like 1500 of his troops. If he hadn’t won Florida, it would have all been ‘signaling’, no? And the Seminoles never did sign terms of surrender.
No blood for swamps, maaannnn.
Armed Liberal:
It’s normal. “When without a previous understanding the enemy asks for truce, he is plotting.” (Sun Tzu, IX Marches, 28.)
Generally the peace offers of the stronger side are dangerous. The best you can hope for is that the enemy is simply demanding everything he wants. More likely the idea is to strike you down in negotiations, or make a false peace that is a setup for resumption of the war on superior terms for an attacker who never had any intention of being balked of total victory in the end, or the offer may be intended to break up the alliances of the defender by offering a peace acceptable to some parties to the coalition but not others.
The Romans in the Third Punic War made their attack only after they had exploited to the utmost the desire of the Carthaginians not to fight, getting them to make concession after concession, let the Roman Army approach unmolested, and even hand over their weapons in return for peace, when the only peace the Romans ever had in mind consisted in the death of the city.
The Mongols made false peace offers as a matter of course. To believe them was to be exterminated.
Napoleon Bonaparte was also fond of false peace feelers. By asking for a truce, he created the impression that he was weak, and filled his enemies with overconfident zeal to attack and exploit his weakness, when really he was spoiling for a fight and wanted enemies who would run onto his sword.
Sorry to Godwin the thread so soon, but Adolph Hitler was a great man of peace too. But Winston Churchill, a great student of history, put a ban on all negotiations. On the whole, I think he was right to do so.
Our Islamic enemies aren’t like the Romans, who negotiated in bad faith in the context of a a unique hatred for one long-standing enemy, or like the Germans, who negotiated in bad faith when guided by a leader who had both a great appetite for that sort of thing and such gullible enemies that it would have been almost a “war crime” to give those suckers an even break. Our Islamic enemies are more like the Mongols in many ways, including a systematic cultural preference for negotiating in bad faith, with ultimately the total subjugation of all other people and religions always in the back of their mind. This is one of the big advantages of the Islamic system.
So, the fact that Al-Sadr was first to speak of peace means nothing. It doesn’t mean he was losing. It doesn’t mean he was not losing.
“And as a historical point, I can’t think of a case where the winning side in a conflict made the initial peace offers; any help out there?â€
Try Google. After just two minutes I found this:
“July 5, 1775 – The Continental Congress adopts the Olive Branch Petition which expresses hope for a reconciliation with Britain, appealing directly to the King for help in achieving this. In August, King George III refuses even to look at the petition and instead issues a proclamation declaring the Americans to be in a state of open rebellion.â€
I have no doubt I could find dozens of other examples – didn’t Ho Chi Minh try to establish friendly relations with the USA prior to the Vietnam war?
Um, Kevin – the Battle of Saratoga was – October 1777; the Battle of Yorktown was – October 1781 (a good month, I guess…). In 1775 things were not going so well for the Americans…
…so if your point is that temporary disadvantage doesn’t mean you certainly lose the war, I’ll agree. But my point that the side that perceives it is losing predominantly makes peace offers stands.
Barry – you’re right about the Six-Day war. Not sure how to put my head around that one, let me think a bit.
David – I’ll agree that precombat posturing and skillful management of the negotiations around starting a war are often the province of the stronger side; are you suggesting that’s what’s going on in Basra?
A.L.
Does the “Potsdam Declaration count”:http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html ? I’ll go with yes for now.
If I remember the history correctly, the Japanese fully embraced the Potsdam Declaration, even if it involved their full capitulation(barring isolated islands). For now, I’ll count it – since we won, and we made the initial offer.
When Yamashita laid siege to Singapore, I believe he laid down terms first.
_where the winning side in a conflict made the initial peace offers_
I’ll go with your offer can include a capitulation of the other side – even though non-serious declarations get a roll of the eyes. not sure how much peace there is where the best you get is ‘we ll get back to this later’, which is what we have now.
*David_Blue at 5*
_Generally the peace offers of the stronger side are dangerous. The best you can hope for is that the enemy is simply demanding everything he wants. _
And if I was Japan in 1945, this is exactly how I would view it. Or anyone who has dealt with lawyers, or modern day diplomats.
*A.L.* , I think your better question is – have there been any realistic peace treaties since WW II? Intra-country if you wanted to narrow it down.
And while you’re at it – here’s something for your “winning” post from earlier – “How Moqtada al-Sadr Won in Basra”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1726763,00.html. Especially once you pass the title, and get to ‘staffed to the gills’.
I think its too soon to actually say who made the first peace overtures here anyway. I’ve seen one report that stating that the Iraqi government instiagated this move via talks in Iran, so Al-Sadr might be accepting their request, not the government accepting his.
And, as people above have already noted, peace offers are the mark of a losing side only if we view them as a genuine attempt to resolve a conflict, rather than as a means of gaining advantage over your opponent.
I didn’t reply because, like andrewdb at #1, I couldn’t make any sense of the suggestion that “war is a signalling exercise’.
My view is that war is both a mistake and a crime. Certainly, that is true of the events we’ve just seen in which after hundreds of deaths the status quo ante has been restored. I have no idea what kind of “signal” was intended here, or who was intended to parse the deaths and maimings you cheered on.
The only sensible thing to do when such a war breaks out is to end it as soon as possible. I gave Sadr credit for good sense in seeking peace. More recent info suggests that the credit should be shared with the Iranians and with the Iraqi government representatives who went to Iran to negotiate the deal.
If you want to say that the winners are those who want to keep on killing at all costs, go right ahead and say it.
I gave Sadr credit for good sense in seeking peace. More recent info suggests that the credit should be shared with the Iranians….
Heh….
John, I’ll suggest that through most of human history, the sides that kept on killing – like say, the North Vietnamese in 1976, and the Americans and Britons in 1946 – wound up winning. It applied in anticolonial wars as well – think Algeria.
It’s interesting that you generalize from a war you don’t approve of to all wars …
A.L.
#7 from Armed Liberal:
No. I don’t think that’s what is going on in Basra.
That’s not Muqtada al-Sadr’s pattern. He’s not a sophisticated combatant. He’s more at the level of a child who throws a rock to hurt another child, does some damage and then cries off the fight. Later of course he does it again, and again.
Bloody the other guy, cry off the fight, rinse, repeat is a rewarding pattern, easy to get into, and if you are allowed to keep getting away with it horribly effective in the long run.
I think he got mauled this time.
But I don’t think the fact that he was the first to cry peace tells us much. He might also have done that even if he had been doing pretty well.
It seemed to me you were wondering aloud: is this a reliable signal? Can we tell from who started talking of peace first who was winning?
From the point of view of a broad reading of military history, there’s a definite answer to that question. No, this is not a trustworthy metric.
And from the point of view of the persistent raiding pattern built into Islam, there is also no clear signal.
And from the point of view of what we can see of Muqtada al-Sadr’s playbook, there is also no clear signal.
I just think the guy got caned. I think he’s a mook. I think he’s dangerous in that he is part of a dangerous system, but individually he’s a fat lump of dead-headed arrogance.
I’m a strong believer in the power of individual genius in war. I don’t believe in a dominating role for “institutionalized military genius”. I think there’s always going to be that wild talent out there, the Joan of Arc or Nathan Bedford Forrest or Vo Nguyen Giap, the one who isn’t the standard model and doesn’t have all the approved “standard model military genius” stamps, but who has vast talent and a mighty aptitude for self education, and who will do stuff that would turn your hair white.
But Muqtada al-Sadr is nothing like these immensely dangerous super-freaks. He’s not the kind of guy who can be killing you while it looks like you’re killing him. He’s just not up to it. I sincerely doubt that he even knows how to manage a fight on the scale that he just got. I don’t think he knows how to pick good subordinates either. I think he’s been getting by on the half-heartedness and lack of ruthlessness of his enemies, that’s all.
“In 1775 things were not going so well for the Americans…”
The Olive Branch Petition came very shortly after the battle of Bunker Hill. I am very surprised that an American would regard that as a low point in the colonists’ fortunes. Certainly the Brits don’t remember it as a triumph. I suppose you could say they won the battle, in the sense that the rebels quit the field, but that’s a notoriously poor guide to the effect of an engagement on the larger struggle. If you reckon that Britain was “winning” at that point there is not much I can say except that your idea of winning strikes me as eccentric. I’m with General Clinton: “A few more such victories would have surely put an end to British dominion in America.”
Speculation, anyone?
I can’t think of a case where the winning side in a conflict made the initial peace offers; any help out there?
China, in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
#8, Dave… you definitely don’t remember the history correctly. Not only did the Japanese fail to embrace the Potsdam Declaration, they dismissed it with contempt (“mokusatsu”). Granted that the word was only used by a lower-level government official who essentially shot his mouth off, effectively closing off negotiations that a faction of the government (not the military, naturally) was interested in… But if your government is more interested in saving face than capitulation, you haven’t accepted a call for surrender. ;p
_#8, Dave… you definitely don’t remember the history correctly. Not only did the Japanese fail to embrace the Potsdam Declaration, they dismissed it with contempt (“mokusatsu”). Granted that the word was only used by a lower-level government official who essentially shot his mouth off, effectively closing off negotiations that a faction of the government (not the military, naturally) was interested in… But if your government is more interested in saving face than capitulation, you haven’t accepted a call for surrender. ;p_
True! And then, after this (and, of course, Hiroshima) it was “accepted”:http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c05.html . I’m just going for AL’s statement – the winning side in the conflict made the initial (and realistic, based on VJ) peace offer, not if it was initially dismissed. I should have used ‘eventually embraced’ as a modifier.
Dave – sorry I wasn’t clear – It’s not whether the side that eventually wins that makes proposals – it’s the side that is, at the moment the proposal is made – winning.
A.L.
AL, I’ll point out two examples, of many, where one side in a conflict failed to take the chance of peace and ended up much worse off as a result.
The Korean War: After repulsing the initial North Korean attack and occupying Pyongyang, the US/UN forces could have proposed a peace deal at least as good as the status quo ante with a high likelihood of acceptance. Instead MacArthur pushed on, the Chinese entered the War and the US suffered its worst defeat up to that time. Three bloody years later, the status quo ante was restored.
French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars: Thanks largely to Bonaparte, the French revolutionaries successfully resisted attacks by the old regimes of Europe. Rather than settling for peace Bonaparte took power and decided to spread the revolution through Europe. 20 years and millions of deaths later, the Bourbons were back in France, and all the conquests of Napoleon were lost.
It’s certainly true that, throughout human history, the desire to fight wars and to keep on fighting them has been strong. I don’t see that as a good argument for continuing on the same lines.
John, I appreciate the comment but think you’re answering a question different than the one I asked.
I absolutely agree that there are a number of cases in war (as well as other conflicts) where one side – enjoying a temporary advantage – should have paused and sought stability instead of overreaching.
My question is whether – at the moment where one side seems to have an advantage over the other – the advantaged side is likely to propose a truce? In this case, the facts may (or may not) support the notion I propose – it’s not 100% clear who proposed the truce nor who is advantaged in this. But as a matter of historical record, I can’t think of a lot of examples of this – which suggests that it’s some kind of proxy measuring tool for who’s up and who’s down in a conflict.
There’s a longer discussion to have about the morality of war in an immoral world…
A.L.
As others point out above, the Olive Branch provides a very good analogy. The government attempted to suppress a rebel militia, and the initial inconclusive outcome was enough to indicate that an attempt to enforce its will would be bloody and uncertain in the outcome. The Continental Congress correctly offered peace at this point, George III foolishly declined. At least Maliki had more sense than that.
As yet another example, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war ended when India announced a unilateral ceasefire.
I’ll go reread my copy of “New Age Now Begins” and try and get a sense of the contemporaneous feelings at the time of the Olive Branch; as I recall, there was a lot of fear and anxiety on the part of the Continental Congress about the overwhelming strength of the British and the futility of fighting them…but let me check and come back on this.
A.L.
To sum up my position so far. Sensible winners propose peace at the first reasonable opportunity. In many cases, initial winners are not so sensible and these often end up as losers (not that the other side wins, in most wars everyone loses).
If you want a real example of fighting to win, I suggest you look at Paraguay’s war against all its neighbours in the 19th century. That’s a prime example of the kind of thinking you seem to endorse, or treat as so ubiquitous as to be irresistble.
Combing back to the present case, you can judge the outcome for Sadr one way or the other. But one thing that is clear about the recent fighting is that the Iraqi people (1000 or so of whom are now dead) lost. To the extent that the government is supposed to care about the people, it lost too. Considering the government as the representative of the Dawa/ISCI militia, I’d endorse the general judgement of a loss on that basis as well.
(Sun Tzu, IX Marches, 25.)
I’m not saying this is happening in Basra. The bottom line for now is: insufficient data.
I have a low opinion if Muqtada Al-Sadr as an individual, though I respect his structural advantages and I have a high opinion of the dangerousness of the system he’s a part of. So my speculation, based on uncertain information, is that he has not done very well. But, I don’t call that anything but speculation.
I’m just stressing that who talks peace first is an uncertain signal.
(Of course, it can be a clear signal, especially if you know the style of the people making the peace offer. If they are culturally inclined to deal in good faith and wouldn’t be asking for peace of they didn’t want it, that’s revealing. But this doesn’t apply to people like Muqtada Al-Sadr.)
Nonsense. That’s like saying we should look at the Hindenburg as an example of air traffic safety.
We won our own civil war in 1863, with the capture of Vicksburg, and Lee’s repulse at Gettysburg. The South had no hope of military victory after that. At that point, by your advice, we should have sensibly offered to negotiate a peace. In fact, the Democratic Party was offering them peace on a daily basis.
They would have welcomed a peace negotiation. A large part of their military strategy was aimed at bringing such a negotiation about. Their rock bottom price would have been the preservation of slavery, and likely their recognition as a sovereign nation to boot.
I assume you would have insisted that we accept those terms, so as to avoid drowning in blood along with all our little warmongering children, like Paraguay. Sorry if we disappointed you.
AL: “My question is whether – at the moment where one side seems to have an advantage over the other – the advantaged side is likely to propose a truce? […] I can’t think of a lot of examples of this – which suggests that it’s some kind of proxy measuring tool for who’s up and who’s down in a conflict.”
There’s your problem, right there. You want to use peace offers as a proxy for losing. But before you can determine whether it is a good proxy you need some other index which will tell you who has the upper hand when the peace offer is made. (Without that you are just arguing in a circle: X sued for peace because he was losing and we know X was losing because he sued for peace.) So you are up against an old problem in IR theory: how to measure power.
I do think there is some information to be got from peace offers. But the mere fact that an offer was made doesn’t usually tell you very much. You need to know the proposed terms. If a belligerent who previously demanded unconditional surrender is now willing to settle for a few minor territorial adjustments, of course that speaks for itself. You also need some idea of whether the offer is being made in good faith.
AL has acknowledged that the matter (in general, and possibly re: Basra) is more complex than his entry suggested. I move we close this thread.
…or am I wrong about what AL has acknowledged? 🙂
I think the issue is resolved and it would make sense to close the thread.
I’ll take #28-30 as a peace offer and accept :-).