The Washington Post says:
Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr will disband his Mehdi Army militia if top Shi’ite clerics including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani order him to do so, a senior Sadr aide told Reuters on Monday.
Aide Hassan Zargani told Reuters that Sadr had told his representatives in both the holy Iraqi city of Najaf and also the Iranian city of Qom to ask top Shi’ite religious leaders for advice on whether to dissolve the militia.
“If they order the Mehdi Army to disband, Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr movement will obey the orders of the religious leaders,” said Zargani, who was speaking from Iran.
OK, a few interesting things here – first, it does seem to support the notion that Sadr’s forces didn’t do so well against the central governments; next the question of Iran’s involvement – and their interests – are going to be very interesting to ponder; next it means we’ll have a bunch of armed ex-militia guys wandering around to add to the Anbar crowd of newly unemployed gunmen.
In general, it seems very positive; the goal is a national government, and this is an important step on the way toward one. But I’ll watch things closely in the next few days.
Calculated bluff, though it’s interesting that Sadr has felt compelled to issue it.
If you look at the factional situation in Iraq, it’s unlikely – not impossible, but unlikely – that Sistani will issue this order. I’m going to try to sketch out the political dynamics without naming names, because the names don’t matter, the dynamics do.
(1) In a tribal society and Arab political culture, where assassination is a historically accepted political move (and currently often practiced), the government can rise to a partial guarantor of security at best. That is still a huge step forward in most cases, and it is possible for a government to carve out a role close to Western norms. Aiming at this is a very worthy goal. But the role of tribal and factional institutions will never entirely go away as the last guarantors of personal security.
That said…
(2) With a potential armed threat from outside the community, you want at least the potential for an internal defense force. But you never want to be beholden to just one option, or you’ve handed over de facto power to that option.
(3) Within the community, if your theological enemies have an armed force, this must not become the only armed force in the community. Not even in the absence of an external threat.
Corollary prediction: absent the rise of a 3rd armed force within the Iraqi Shi’a community, whether friendly tribal, factional a la the Thulfiquar Army, or whatever, Sistani will not ask Sadr to disband the Mahdi Army.
His best political move is to insert himself as the de facto go-between with Sadr’s agreement, and use his influence to simmer things down and have the Mahdi Army give way to the government for now. That keeps both sides needing him, and buys time.
The Americans’ best move is to work to create a 3rd armed force in the Shi’ite community aligned with or friendly to the Najaf school of Shi’ism, as opposed to their (and our) enemies in the Qom/Tehran axis. The difference in the schools’ approach to politics are very significant, in ways that reach far beyond Iraq and touch on the theological possibility of a modern, civilized Islam.
The idea that giving politics to religion just dumbs down religion to the level of politics seems modest, and almost intuitive. But if you look at the history of Islam ,and especially of its current jihadi exponents in al Qaeda and Iran, it’s obvious that this idea strikes at the very heart of their core theo-totalitarian doctrine.
People *say* a lot of things. i wonder what the definition of “disarm” is. This is the Middle East. Nothing can be taken at face value. Nor is it at all clear that the disarming of sadr forces wont bring on further intra shia massacres.
The Nation must prevail as the sole administrator of violence -as it is in any modern country-. Tribalism has to be slowly but constantly tackled, cornered and destroyed. A democratic political system cannot afford having different armed groups.
I was awaiting this move since at least two years ago.
_”The Americans’ best move is to work to create a 3rd armed force in the Shi’ite community aligned with or friendly to the Najaf school of Shi’ism”_
I think this is tremendously bad advice. Our goal is to establish a stable Iraqi government, balancing armed camps is not a good way to do this unless you think Lebanon is a good template.
We need to remember that Iraq is a parlimentary system- we are just starting to see the benefits of that kind of system at work as the different factions scheme and ally with each other. The Shiia _must_ take common cause with either the Sunni or the Kurds or elements of either in order to govern, particuarly since they are divided amongst themselves.
Maliki’s move against Sadr has actually drawn a tremendous amount of support from the Sunni and Kurds (as well as other Shiia groups). This is a direct contradiction to the analysis provided by the AP, NYT, etc. There may never have been a case to date where so much of the Iraqi government has shown solidarity.
Iraqi government forces now control the vital areas of Basra (including the docks), they continue to arrest (or kill) wanted militants, and theyve made it pretty clear they are going to settle the militia issue sooner rather than later… with the backing of basically the entire Iraqi parliment aside from Sadr’s block (which walked out some time ago anyway).
Remember- settling the militias is one of the highest priorities according to every analysis of Iraq’s progress from the Iraq Study Group on down. This was an eventuality, it had to happen at some point. Is this the right time? We will have to see. A lot of US sources are saying this was premature, but Maliki has other ideas. He has the ball, now we are going to see how he runs with it. But it shouldnt be understated how important it is that this is an _Iraqi_ decision, to be enforced overwhelmingly by Iraqis.
I don’t think this will go anywhere, it is a stalling tactic. Even if Sistani, and maybe some other Ayatollahs in Najaf, were to call for disbanding the militia, it is unlikely that the Iranians at Qom will do so. But I think it is interesting in that it attempts to give Qom a role in Iraq. One of the things that has been happening is that Najaf is resuming its place as the center of Shiite scholarship and religious rulings and this brings it into conflict with Qom. In fact, the rise of Najaf directly threatens the centrality of Iran among the Shia and the authority of the Mullahs over the Iranians. This is a battle with long term implications that Iran can not ignore.
Interesting point Chuck. It’s important to remember that even amongst the Shiia there is often little love lost for Iran. A lot of people died in the war, one of the most brutal and horrific of the last half century.
I’m totally spit balling here- but I think there may have been a break amongst the Iranian agents and much of the rest of the Shiia. I’m trying to think what has prompted this crisis at this time, which according to US sources was not unexpeceted but WAS months earlier than envisioned. If the Iranians made a power play that failed somehow, this could be their payback. Perhaps a conspiracy quietly unmasked or a failed assasination?
Sadr is acting oddly, even for him. I’ve had a big problem with the way people made him out to be this machievellian puppetmaster when he’s shown precious little ability to do more than rile everyone up every now and again. But this has been weird. It _could_ be read that he served up the more radical elements of his movement on a plate. Im curious that he may fold the rest into the IA (as Badr and others have) leaving those REALLY infilitrated by Iranians out in the cold.
There’s my longshot prediction for the near future- Sadr folds the Mahdi Army into the Iraqi government, similar to the Anbar Awakening Councils. My mind is going that way solely based on the line Sadr seems to be trying to walk, and the pressure the Iraqi Government is exerting on him. If Sadr wants to stay relevant politically that is clearly the decision they are trying to force him to make. We’ll see.
Mark,
Sadr mostly lives in Iran these days. I don’t see many scenarios where his forces get folded in to anything, though I do see continuation of the salami tactics that seek to slice off his less committed supporters and lead them to other loyalties. While killing the Iranian agents within his forces.
As for the Anbar Awakening model, that’s mine too. For a whole, host of reasons, however, Sadr isn’t that guy. The Badr Brigades are of course the antithesis of that, and dealing with them will be far harder than Sadr’s thugs were.
An Iraqi government that can exercise greater control, and use the regular army to enforce security with the backing of multiple ethnic communities, is obviously a desirable goal to get closer to. For a whole host of reasons, however, many of which applied to the Sunni areas before the Anbar Awakening, they are unlikely to be a complete solution. To which I’ll add that the ability to defend the Najaf School’s interpretations of politics and Islam takes precedence even over our wishes for Iraq.
Put all that together, and my thinking says: reinforce the Iraqi government, help them take steps, but don’t depend exclusively on them. Apply tribal solutions to a tribal environment, as a key ‘second front’ that can change the calculus of future confrontations, and defend key interests that go beyond the government itself.
Is Sadr really in control of “his thugs,” or does he simply position himself in front of them when they move?
Mark Buehner,
Lebanon worked fine for about a century. Moving in that direction is not necessarily a bad idea for now.
“Here’s a tidbit”:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3690010.ece for all of those earnest pursuers of truth who have been so, so impressed with Iran and al Sadr for “pursuing peace….”:http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/are_peace_offers_just_for_losers.php#c10
One, I have grave doubts the Iraqi Army/Police forces showed any abitlity to take on Sadr ON THEIR OWN. Without US/British airpower/artillery they didn’t do squat. The parallel is the French Metropolitan troops in Algeria. “Hostile fire call the LEGION.” guess whom the Legion is.
Two, Sadr’s disbanding the militia is a talk strategy. One,Sadr’s militia has no place to go(the Army or Police) because they are essentially the militia for Maliki’s party. Two, the threat of no party with a militia not getting a vote in the next election is unacceptable to both him, the Sunni’s and the Kurds. The three factions have sufficent votes to stop that idea in Parliament.
Three, the structure of the government is no where close to a national government. US forces on the ground can not get the Maliki government to contribute much of anything to Sunni areas where we have done the grunt work to bring the violence done to a simmer. People whom have to feed their families will resort to whomever pays if they cannot obtain legitimate work.
Four, the LEGION has to back off. Sadr does not need to rocket the green zone to bring the violence level back to boil. All he needs to do is call of the truce w/ the Sunni’s and let ethnic cleansing resume. The resentment levels are very high on all sides of the sectarian and ethnic maps as the promised levels of “good civil” government are not being seen on the ground.
Five, Mark B I am really curious as to where you are getting your information about the docks of Basra. The pieces I see have never implied they were under the control of Sadr.
_”Iraqi troops may move to reclaim Basra’s port
By James Glanz Published: March 13, 2008_”
“_BASRA, Iraq: Several senior Iraqi officials said on Wednesday that the government might soon deploy Iraqi Army troops to seize control of this city’s decrepit but vital port from politically connected militias known more for corruption and inciting terrorism than for their skill in moving freight.”_
“NYT”:http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/world/middleeast/13basra.html?ex=1363060800&en=6ab5669ff770ea51&ei=5089&partner=rssyahoo&emc=rss
Well this is new:
_”The position of Hojatoleslam al-Sadr, whose fighters fought government forces to a standstill in Basra, was looking precarious. His former erstwhile ally Nouri al-Maliki, the Shia Prime Minister who personally led the Basra crackdown, saw his standing bolstered by his tough approach to the militias.”_
“Times Online”:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3701511.ece
_”Despite the inconclusive results of his Basra offensive, Mr al-Maliki has refused to back down and this weekend stitched together a rare consensus of Kurds, Sunnis and Shias to back a law banning from future elections any party that maintains a militia.”_
_”That united stance has put the Sadrists on the back foot, and support for the militia was waning even in Sadr City itself as official forces pushed ever deeper into al-Mahdi Army territory.”_
More on the political consensus:
_”A top leadership council called Saturday on Iraqi parties to disband their militias or risk being barred from taking part in elections and participating in political life._
…
_The council is made up of President Jalal Talabani, a Sunni Kurd, the two vice presidents – Sunni Arab Tariq al-Hashemi and Shiite Adil Abdul-Mahdi – as well as al-Maliki, parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and leaders of the parliamentary factions._
_The council’s decisions have no force of law but are significant because they represent powerful political interests.”_
“AP”:http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/080406/world/iraq_politics
I guess (in fact I know) you can spin all this to continue insisting this is a factional move by Maliki instead of an Iraqi Government move to take full control of the country (as extolled by the Iraq Study Group). But that a view increasing hard to maintain, i think.
AL,
Always wishfully misreading factoid tea leaves because you haven’t researched deeply enough.
1. Sadr has made this type of statement before, several times if my memory is correct. Juan Cole points to 2004, but I recall more recently also.
2. Perhaps because he knows the Shia Ayatollas will not intervene in a fight among rival Shia militia/political parties (Dawa, Badr, Sadr).
“Iraq’s top Shiite religious leaders have told anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr not to disband his Mehdi Army, an al-Sadr spokesman said Monday amid fresh fighting in the militia’s Baghdad strongholds.”
3. It appears that there is an ongoing fight for power among the major Shia political factions as a prelude to provincial elections in October. All of these factions have militias, even if sometimes they where the uniform of some “national” army or police organization. The question to ask, is when push comes to shove, who will they obey, their factional leader or some national officer in the chain of command. The Kurdish Peshmurga though some now are part of the Iraqi army will never obey prime minister Malicki over their Kudish leaders. Most recently 10,000 Badr Corps militia were reported to have fought alongside the Iraqi Army against the Sadrist militias in Basra. Afterwards, they were inducted into the Iraqi army by Malicki. It is a mistake to see Maliki as some pure champion of national unity. He is a partly corrupt faction leader as are the others. Dawa, Badr and Sadr “gangs” were all stealing and profiting from the Basra oil. The provincial elections threaten Dawa’s (who are in control of the provincial gov) hold on the Basra oil, should the Sadrists win as many are predicting.
4. The National Security council has called for disarming “all” militias in the past. It’s unclear whether one can read this statement as some new departure (with teeth) aimed only at Sadr’s militia. Nor does the National Security council have the authority to exclude any party from the elections. It was only Malicki who threatened and singled out the Sadrists by name, not the National Security council.
Sadrist spokesmen in response have agreed in principal that all militias should be dissolved, but only if all are dissolved equally. This all seems to be political posturing aimed at the provincial elections, since the Iraqi army is not strong enough to disarm any militias, much less the Sadrists.
5. It’s ironic that you champions of the Second Amendment don’t see the need for armed militias in the the violent insecurity that is Iraq. None of you would give up your arms if you were a poor Shia living in Baghdad.
1. Yep.
2. Anybody who thinks they have a handle on what Al-Sistani will do or not do must have a better Quija Board than i do.
3. Baby Steps. Militias folded into the IA is better than militias defying the government and running through the streets in black pajamas. Why think that? Folding militias into the armed forces has been the cornerstone idea for dealing with them for years (back to the Iraq Study Group again).
SOMETHING needs to be done. If the alternative is fighting and somehow killing off every militia… this is a political alternative. We are supposed to be looking for political alternatives. Might any given militia disobey orders or rise up? Of course, but then again they would immediately face the ire of all the other factions folded up in the IA. The Mahdis have been a good object example of what happens when a single militia (the most powerful one in this case) is turned on by everyone else.
I generally hate making Iraqi analogies to American founders, but in this case the homoginization that took place of state forces into a single Continental Army was one of the driving forces behind establishing a federal government. What would have stopped South Carolina from suceeding once the British were finished (nothing, actually, as we found in 1861)… all the other states.
Giving the Iraqi militiamen something else to consider giving their loyalty to is superior to giving them NOTHING and letting them roam the streets unemployed. Losing that government paycheck might not seem like a great idea either.
4. Its official Iraqi policy that all the militias be dissolved or wrapped into the IA. The fact that virtually the entire government is in agreement… but more importantly lined up behind Maliki can’t be glossed over. Its unprecidented. Whatever specific threats they make is probably less important than the fact that they are making them together and seem willing to enforce them.
As far as disarming militants… thats never been a plausible goal and it was a major mistake for Maliki to mention it. Disarming them of medium and heavy weapons (mortars and rockets) is well and good (and can never be verified). As an entity, they need to disarm or join the IA or disband. Disarming the people individually would clearly require Basra to be torn to the ground like Fallujah, and nobody wants that.
5. No-one is calling for Iraqi citizens to give up their arms. They are calling for militias to disarm, which could mean a number of things (disband and keep your weapons, keep your weapons and join the IA, disarm and become a political faction). Its one thing to have a rifle in the closet, another to be out setting up personal checkpoints on the corner and shooting at government representatives.
That’s it. It has happened previously in our countries, in different times and different environments, but it was a similar fight. As far as I can recall, the Irgun was dissolved into the Israeli army and Wyatt Earp was not so different from the criminals he finally hunted ; as it was the point for the Spanish inquisition, that ended a period in which constant rioting against Jews, new Christians and “witches” threatened to hinder the development of the Nation-State.
It is not about peace or Justice, it will not be pleasant, or fair. It is about the State and its rule.