I’ve been thinking a lot about Iran lately. It’s obviously a pivot point in the coming history of the Middle East. And part of me wants to view the recent actions – Obama’s apparent toughness (I’ll say apparent because like others I’m unhappy that he didn’t use the UN as the forum for the disclosures) seems good. the fact that France, Germany and the UK are siding with us is clearly good, and the fact that Iran is willing to open the formerly-secret facility is good.
But I keep getting this nagging feeling at the back of my neck. Yes, I don’t completely trust Obama internationally (more on that later). Yes, the Iranians have played us – with a pair of deuces in the hole – like masters. So there are reasons to worry.
But I just can’t make the data points fall into a neat line on one side or the other of the issue.
So I want to do something that I do at work when I have a decision to make with very little data – I want to box it in by asking ‘How will I know if I’m wrong?’ Proponents of both extreme positions – that we just got screwed by the Iranians and that we’ve just made a huge breakthrough with Iran – as well as the ‘we’re muddling forward and need to deal with a Nuclear but inherently nonbelligerent Iran (the Juan Cole position, as far as I can tell) need to stand up and say what facts would convince them that their position on this was wrong.
Please weigh in in the comments.
And because I want to make this a wide-ranging discussion, I’m going to do something I never do and openly shill for my commenters to go out and bring other people here and ask them to pile into the discussion.
Because my security with any of these positions will go up dramatically if I know that there is a point short of Tel Aviv as a crater or US troops fighting in Tehran that we can use to change course.
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It would help immensely if you told me what toughness it is you’re seeing. I don’t see any myself, other than a few odd pieces of rhetoric.
And, while this is a complaint, it’s not a personal I-hate-Obama style complaint, because I’m not sure what form effective toughness would look like.
Gasoline sanctions look tough, but they’re feel-good notions at best because neither the Russians nor the Chinese will respect them. (The Russians, in particular, will meddle in Iran for the same reason we meddle with the Ukraine– because they can, and because it will keep us busy and distracted. Russia would cheerfully give away half of Iran’s gasoline consumption just to piss us off.)
Military strikes are tough. And let’s even assume without justification that our intelligence is sufficient to knock out the program through an extended air campaign. In the mean time, Iran makes a credible attempt to shut down traffic in the Straights of Hormuz. They fail, but they don’t need to succeed, only to make a credible attempt. The result of that credible attempt will be spiking oil prices, prompting Obama to wonder, “Am I going to be the President who extended the worst recession in a generation by another year or two?”
So my sense is not so much that Iran played us, as that Iran has had the upper hand here for a while, and will shrewdly not let it go. What would convince me otherwise?
Actions on the ground.
If the Russians or the Chinese make serious noises about following through with gasoline sanctions, I would clearly have misread the situation. (I will note, in this vein, that the Iran-Venezuela MOU seems to be vaporware thus far, but then, that’s Chavez. Chavez is an idiot. Putin is not.)
Us starting an air campaign would be a clear sign I was wrong… or possibly that I’m right, but that Obama decided to risk it. That would take some serious stones. And you never know, he might do it. He looks weak, and he knows he looks weak, which might prompt a demonstration. Good God, the screaming in Europe will never end, though.
If the actions of Hezbollah and various other Iranian-banked groups suddenly start making nice, that would be an indication that I’ve misread something.
There was a good long while, where I thought a real detente was possible. Ironically, that got screwed not by anything anyone in this hemisphere did, it got screwed by the Iranian election, which dialed the Iranian government’s paranoia up to eleven. It might not have ever happened anyway, but that really reduced the potential for it.
Once data reaches a certain point, nothing but future events will do.
Iran’s leaders can’t take back the things they’ve said – about wiping out Israel, among other things; can’t take back the lies they’ve told about their program – the latest of which has just been illustrated; and can’t take back the things they’ve done – including a long record glorifying murder-suicide as humanity’s highest moral achievement.
Facts cannot be repealed. Barring a change of regime, we’re past the point where I could be convinced that the Iranians are not seeking a bomb, or that their intentions are benign, or that they are responsible and rational actors. Their record fails to support any of these contentions.
I continue to believe that allowing Iran to get the bomb sets the clock ticking on some form of armageddon – and I repeat my estimate of 10-100 million dead within the next 18-20 years.
So, what to do?
I could be convinced that a military option was not feasible or going to work. The military is not a magic wand, and there are things that the bombs we have (even nuclear ones) can’t do. I am not currently at the point where wiping out every man, woman and child in Iran would make sense to me, which means we’re talking about specific capabilities against specific targets.
I cannot be convinced that a well-funded human rights campaign is a bad thing on moral grounds. And the record of such efforts vis-a-vis the Soviets, when all of the same b.s. arguments against such things were trotted out (destabilizing to relations, help the regime unify against us, etc.) makes me dismissive of those arguments now. So, too, does the fact that these arguments, if accepted, means you can never launch a human rights campaign against a country actively opposed to the West (which is, after all, the arguers’ primary objective). So I’m not really dissuadable on that subject.
I might be convinced that economic sanctions would work. BUT you’d have to show me key vulnerabilities in the Iranian system that are subject to such things, AND examples of determined hostile regimes having a major national military strategic program derailed by economic sanctions that are unrelated to materials needed for the program itself, AND show me convincing evidence that other nations (Russia, China) won’t simply cheat on, ignore, or block any meaningful sanctions applied.
That is, of course, a rather tall order.
Which leaves us with the clock ticking down toward those 10-100 million. Anyone who ever really wanted to see key locations in the Middle East…. I’d do it within the next year or 2, if I were you.
So I don’t know anyone who’s an expert personally, but I’ll link to posts:
Abu Aarvark: “Quiet Success on Iran”:http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/05/quiet_success_on_iran
“Does the road to Iran go through Jerusalem”:http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/05/does_the_road_to_tehran_run_through_jerusalem
I read an article about the missles coming from Russia are a bigger deal than nukes themselves…. but can’t find it now. I’ll keep looking.
I think it is out of our hands and only a change of regime will move things our way. Nor does such an eventuality look like a pipe dream this time around; the Shia clergy seems to be turning against Ahmadinejad, there are independent Shia authorities in Iraq, and Khamanei nearing death. But it may take several year and betting on the future is always a risky business. It’s safer to bet on a fixed fight, but no one seems willing to put in the fix.
_And the record of such efforts vis-a-vis the Soviets, when all of the same b.s. arguments against such things were trotted out makes me dismissive of those arguments now._
Yes, but is there any proof that they actually worked? I’ve heard a half-dozen reasons for why the soviet empire collapsed, mostly due to fall of oil prices, military competition with the US, and spending in Afghanistan (eerily relevant today).
Let’s reflect the timeline of major Human Rights speeches:
Kennedy “Ich ben ein berliner” (The I am a doughnut speech…. for those who listen to Izzard) 1963
Reagan “Evil Empire” 1983
Reagan “Tear down this wall” 1987
Wall Comes down 1989
Collapse of Soviet Empire 1991
Now, I would argue that the “wall” had more to do with internal collapse, since the american government had been discussing human rights violations in Russia for 40 years. Even so, Reagen’s speeches likely had a stronger effect on the East European Block then on Russia itself…
Even so, Iran is a very different story. Most Iranians are very weary of US support. Which makes sense, considering our issues with the Shaw. During the election, Ahmadinejad consistently tried to declare his opponents as “american proxies”
Even the most reformist candidate Moussavi attempted to distance himself from the US in speeches. Remember some of his speeches called for a”new Islamic Revolution” and that “we are the true followers of Khomeini”. Or take the deabtes, Moussavi talking about the captured “British”http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/mousavi-vs-ahmadinejad-examining-irans-first-major-presidential-debate Marines:
_You know, the marines invaded or encroached upon Iranian waters and then the forces arrested them. It was a great job and should be acknowledged indeed._
These aren’t the words of someone who is leading a Pro-western revolution.
Now, maybe that the green revolution has failed they want US support? It’s certainly possible. Still, unless it can be ascertain that the leaders want the help and support of our government, I would be hesitant to give it.
_”Most Iranians are very weary of US support”_
You’ve got a poll you think is trustworthy or is this anecdotal?
Well, I’ll be first the say that I’m not sure how accurate any poll taken in Iran actually is. For one, you need a specific poll that addresses the question perfectly. Second, free speech issues still abound in Iran, and since the green revolution, I don’t think any foreign press has been allowed. Here are some older ones, that don’t exactly answer the question.
Here’s a “2007 poll”:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article1415550.ece that gives a 52% approval rating of “the United States”. This is not necessarily approval of the American government (which I would expect to be much lower)
Here’s an Iranian-American “poll”:http://www.niacouncil.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1036&Itemid=2 but it just says most favor diplomacy over war (but still doesn’t exactly address the human rights issue).
Still, the best chance for Iranian reform (or to gauge pro-western sentiment) this year was Moussavi. And Moussavi openly endorsed kidnapping British sailors. It doesn’t give me a warm fuzzy feeling about our prospects.
Since this seems to be developing along predictable, repetitive lines, let me try something else. To wit, moving one of the OP’s goal posts:
Why on Earth would we want to have US troops in Tehran, even in the extreme case?
Consider Iran’s stance in the frame of intent and capability. The intent of the ruling clique is overt, and history ranging from the 1930s to 2001 suggest that taking it seriously is warranted if we value our safety. Trying to change the intent without (or even with) boots on the ground is almost certainly fruitless, and not worth the cost or risk.
Capability is another matter. In conventional terms, Iran lacks the ability to project force. It’s sought to get around that limit in part by supporting or directly employing terrorist tactics. (That it does so substantiates its intent.) This has managed to inflict marginal damage on Israel, and more to the point US troops, but either is capability of inflicting sufficient direct pain to deter this when and if they have the intent.
Rather obviously, the issue is the remaining unconventional capability threat. If the reality of a nuclear weapons program with impending realization were removed, then Ahmandinejad could gas all he wanted and would be at worst an annoyance. It would seem the maximum amount of force consistent with actual US interests is to remove that capability and potential. (If there’s a relevant lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s that the Iranian people will have find their own way out of Hades.)
Do we need troops in Tehran, or even on the ground in large force to do that? One would think not. This isn’t about holding ground, it’s about trashing an asset. It is one time when ‘over the horizon’ forces might just do the job.
Nor do we necessarily have to go on a bunker busting hunt for buried facilities, though some amount of that is likely part of a campaign. A couple of possible alternative/additional approaches:
– Nuclear refinement processes are notoriously energy intensive. That’s why the original Manhattan Project sites were located near the TVA and Columbia River hydro-power areas. No power, no refinement, and it’s difficult to harden energy sources. Target accordingly.
– Rocket and nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians are a scarce and necessary resource. Target them deliberately. Yes they can be dispersed, but then they aren’t doing their jobs.
I’m sure someone with access to actual intelligence on the Iranian WMD program can do better than that. But even at this level it seems to me you can move one of the goal posts inward, so long as you’re willing to accept a goal of destroying capability rather than reforming intent. The ante in cost and shrecklichkeit is less than the OP makes it.
Tim, I agree in principle. I agree strenuously that trying to occupy Iran is a fool’s game. I agree that in principle, periodic strikes to degrade their nuclear facilities would probably be enough– we’ll assume our intelligence is sufficient for that.
But what about the possibility of Iran taking actions to spike oil prices by trying to close the Straight of Hormuz? Hell, what about the possibility of oil prices spiking merely as a response to our actions? In ordinary economic times, I’d probably do it. In the very beginnings of a tenuous recovery… well, I’m glad I’m sitting here in my armchair, rather than making the call myself.
“Most Iranians are very weary of US support”
Don’t you mean “wary”?
I suggest we suspend judgement on the matter until after nukes have been positioned in Venezuela.
What scares me about a nuclear Iran is the Pakistan scenario. It take a particular blindness not to see the future of Iran in Pakistan. Iran is demonstrably not in an equilibrium, sometime in the coming years or decades, the government will change, and that change could well be violent and chaotic.
When our pundits wring their hands over a civil war or uprising in Pakistan, how can they possible consider it acceptable for Iran to develop nuclear weapons?
The catch-22 is that once the Iranian regime develops and deploys nukes, it becomes our interest to see the current regime remain in power _no matter how bad they are._ That is disturbing in many ways. It also costs us perhaps our best leverage against the regime. We wont be able to support reform movements in any meaningful way if nuclear weapons slipping out the back door in a domestic uprising is a possibility (or worse, being launched).
We need to consider that NOW, not realize it later.
I don’t disagree Mark, something has to be done….I’m just not sure what that is. In my opinion, an act of aggression is going to create a more dangerous, volatile situation than we can deal with (largely because of the troops in Iraq).
I agree with Joe in that our best hope lies with a “green revolution”, though how we can help (or if we can help) the green revolution depends alot on what they want from us, and how they plan to continue into the future. I would want contacts on the ground before I blindly step into that fray. On that, we disagree.
From a pollitical standpoint, I think the only card we have is to 1)pull sentiment in our favor & 2)Delay. Delay, delay delay. Slow them down as much as possible. Get as much information on them as we can. Illustrate their lies. Disrupt their economy with sanctions. Get Iranians to be frustrated (most Iranians do not want nukes, see poll above). Get China & Russia to be as hesitant as possible (though I don’t expect them to stop trading with Iran).
Barry: I am “judging”, the human rights abuses in Iran are terrible and need to be ended. I don’t think anyone here disagrees on that point. BUT the key is whether that open condemnation will accomplish anything. Bush has tried blanket condemnations for 8 years with no results. Now we’re trying something else.
BUT the key is whether that open condemnation will accomplish anything.
Precisely so. It will not.
Which is why we should wait until Venezuela has nukes before engaging in any further speculation.
(Anything else would be irresponsible.)
Alchemist, I generally agree with your sentiment and I absolutely agree there isn’t a silver bullet out there that can ‘solve’ this dilemma.
What worries me is that I think there is a consensus building out there that ‘delay’ becomes equivalent to ‘ignore’, essentially just kicking the can down the road and hoping for a miracle. I don’t think we are doing anything that is delaying Iran’s nuclear progress from whatever timetable they have in their heads. During the periods they play ball somewhat with inspections, they are demonstrably both cheating and working on other components to their system.
Furthermore, I think there is already an assumption in the administration that Iran is going to go nuclear and we aren’t going to stop them. So setting containment (whatever that means in practice) is what the jockeying is about.
That could well be our best bet, I don’t know. But I really don’t think the problem I listed above has entered the equation yet, and that worries me. If Obama has weighed his options and decided that an armed Iran is better than any of the other bad options, so be it. But I do hope everyone realizes the implications of that. The Mullahs will have bought an extremely powerful insurance policy to their rule, as well as making themselves the focus of American diplomatic and security attention indefinitely. There is a high price there as well. Buying another dozen Aegis armed ships is going to be extremely expensive, for instance.
Marcus – You’ve got assume that Iran would try to close the Straits. That means my hypothetical has to include taking out the Iranian navy, air force and relevant missile installations, as well as seriously degrading their air defenses. You might try an initial surprise strike, but it’s not realistic to assume that will do the job.
And it’s safe to assume that any action at all, Hormuz or no, will cause a spike in oil prices and a drop in worldwide stock markets. Markets hate uncertainty, and there’s no way to remove that from an act of war. But right now there’s some amount of slack in the oil market, due to a global recession. If you’ve got to take the hit, maybe better than waiting for the resumption of a capacity crunch and price run up? The eventual alternative is to have Hormuz and the Gulf States subject to Iranian blackmail at will.
I am specifically disagreeing with Joe and Alchemist that our best hope lies in a green revolution. If we’re looking after US interests, such a revolution is somewhere between irrelevant (see Alchemist’s point about Moussavi) and an indirect/unreliable way of altering Iranian intent or capability. If it happens, fine, but counting on it is wishful thinking.
I’m not 100% sure that a green Iranian revolution is our best hope, Tim. That wasn’t what Marc asked, though.
He asked me what I was open to argument about, and what would change my mind in those areas. I told him.
Tim’s argument re: what could be done about capability speaks to the debatable points around a military response. I’m open to arguments on both sides there.
What I said was that I wasn’t really open to arguments that a coordinated human rights campaign is a bad thing. Bad news is, Obama is the last guy who would ever launch one against an enemy of the United States. Which is a shame, but it’s of a piece with his general mentality and so cannot be surprising.
Fair point, Joe. I should have gone back to your original comments rather than accepting Alchemist’s summary. And I agree that it’s hard to come up with reasons NOT to turn up the heat on Tehran vis-a-vis human rights; I’m cautioning against regarding that as a total strategy.
I was putting up my ‘campaign plan’ as an attempt to demonstrate that there’s little rationale or support for going to one of Marc’s proposed extremes. My alternative is not one that I’d propose as an immediate step anyway, at least given my limited (zero) access to credible intelligence.
But if I take it for a moment as a strawman position, I could be persuaded away from it by several things:
– Credible evidence that Iran is not pursuing a bomb. The problem is what is ‘credible’. The IAEA is not credible, and Iraq gave a great exhibit of what can happen, with regard to both false positives and negatives, when dealing with hostile regime playing a shell game, some of which is likely to be info ops (maskirovka).
– A coherent strategy of engaging Iran diplomatically, meanwhile upping the ante to create credibility for a threat of disabling force. That could include your human rights campaign, and some limited, perhaps deniable, kinetic options that were linked to – for instance – verifiable instances of Iranian interference in Iraq and Afghanistan, or clandestine attempts to breach sanctions or import WMD technology or materials. Like you, I doubt the current administration is capable of this, but you never know.
– Or (unfortunately the most realistic) the Israelis decide they can’t rely on our fecklessness and take direct action, resetting the whole scenario for the worse.
Isn’t the real question here whether Obama has the nuts and the resources to prevent an Israeli strike? Isn’t the intent of Israel to strike a given?
That’s going to end up being the interesting (in the Chinese proverb sense of the word) dynamic that develops.
_kinetic options that were linked to verifiable instances of Iranian interference in Iraq and Afghanistan, or clandestine attempts to breach sanctions or import WMD technology or materials. _
Hey, this I can deal with. If we want to make weapons, technology, expertise, aid vanish while it’s traveling …. that’s fine. I don’t think Obama would be against this either… as long as it would not lead to open hostilities.
bq. I don’t think Obama would be against this either… as long as it would not lead to open hostilities.
That’s tantamount to saying he wouldn’t do it, since there can be no such guarantee.
The direct damage done is not likely to be significant. The whole point is to convince Iran that we are ready to get as kinetic as necessary, given their behavior. That has to include being ready to double-down if Iran responds in kind. Yup, that’s called escalation, but it’s also called credible deterrence, which we’ve now lost.
I thought speaking up for the protesters in Iran more vigorously than Barack Obama did was pointless, and the American President was right to go quietly.
News of the Qom nuclear facility convinced me I was wrong. The march to nuclear jihad is faster and more determined than I thought, and our will to confront it is weaker than I thought. There is no upside in dealing with the radical Iranian regime to refrain from punching any button we can and snatching at any straw we can.
Armed Liberal:
It’s an excellent question. I don’t have an answer though, and I don’t know anyone who does.
I think we’re getting jerked around by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and because of the ideological / religious character of the state we won’t be able to deflect it from striving to strike terror into the hearts of unbelievers, that means us.
So I should say what could plausibly happen to convince me that Iran is a normal state rather than a religious / ideological project established by Imam Khomeini, or what would show me that the project does not have the character he said it has, and that his heirs have affirmed ever since, in word and deed.
I don’t know what would convince me that that’s true.
A clerical anti-nuclear coup, dedicated to the proposition that the bomb is un-Islamic, and to purging the state of activities and facilities that conflict with what Imam Khomeini said against the bomb? That could convince me that the connection I think I see between a mandate for jihad and a desire for nukes is an illusion.
It would have to be something like that – a new set of actions, based on a stance that it is believable that hard-core followers of Imam Khomeini might be sincere in following through on, or in the event of regime change, based on the interests and orientation points of the new regime.