It’s all grand tactics. And those aren’t enough. From Summers again:
We thought we were pursuing a new strategy called counterinsurgency, but actually we were pursuing a defensive strategy in pursuit of a negative aim – a strategy familiar to Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century. In his chapter on purpose and means in war Clausewitz discusses various methods of obtaining the object of war. One way is what Clausewitz calls “the negative aim.” It is, he said, “the natural formula for outlasting the enemy, for wearing him down.” In a later chapter, Clausewitz discusses the relationship between the negative aim and the strategic defensive. “The aim of the defense must embody the idea of waiting,” he said. “The idea implies . . . that the situation … may improve … Gaining time is the only way [the defender] can achieve his aim.” Basic to the success of a strategic defensive in pursuit of the negative aim, therefore, is the assumption that time is on your side. But the longer the war progressed the more obvious it became that time was not on our side. It was American rather than North Vietnamese will that was being eroded.
In his review of General Westmoreland’s biography, Hannah writes:
… [General] Westmoreland mentions several factors that prolonged the war, but … we are entitled to conclude that he did not regard these factors likely to be decisive. Indeed, he tells us he suffered these impediments because he believed that “success would eventually be ours.” But it was not. Why not?
General Westmoreland does not directly answer the question but the answer emerges without being stated. We ran out of time. This is the tragedy of Vietnam – we were fighting for time rather than space. And time ran out.
In the introductory chapter to this book we posed the question – how could we have done so well in tactics but failed so miserably in strategy? The answer we postulated then – a failure in strategic military doctrine manifested itself on the battlefield. Because it did not focus on the political aim to be achieved – containment of North Vietnamese expansion – our so-called strategy was never a strategy at all. At best it could be called a kind of grand tactics.
I’ll think about it more and comment. I also participated in the post-speech blogger conference call…more on that as well.
Predications for Criticisms of Obama’s Speech Last Night
1) People who are or were already opposed to our continued military presence in Afghanistan will naturally be upset that we’re not pulling out sooner and that there may be a temporary increase in troops before we leave.
2) Obama sent conflicting signals for his first eleven months in office that ultimately will undermine any action we take in Afghanistan.
3) Despite saying that the “facts on the ground†would decide the policy, by setting an actual date for leaving, it is that date and not the “facts†that will likely determine when we leave.
4) Setting a date is a mistake that tells the enemy how long they need to hold on until and the Afghan people how long they have to make nice with the very bad people who will be returning once we leave.
5) Obama’s promises tend to come with an expiration date and by interlocking domestic policies with a speech on Afghanistan, it sends a signal that he’s essentially uncommitted to any foreign policy that distracts from his domestic agenda.
I’m sure others who are more knowledgeable about military affairs and foreign policy will see the ones I’m missing.
Summers’ point is true. With state support, and unlimited NVA soldiers, even the destruction of 80% of the Viet Cong in Tet didn’t matter. Hence his recommended cross-Laos battle zone isolation strategy.
For a guerilla force whose safe havens across the border are under attack by that state’s government, and which is disliked by an armed population in the theater of war, the equation is a bit different. The latter can even be fatal if safe havens exist, as it was in Iraq.
This doesn’t mean we are guaranteed to outlast al-Qaeda and the Taliban. NATO is _this_ close to coming completely unglued, and may well do so within the next 5 years. But neither are the enemy guaranteed to outlast us, if Pakistani and Afghan tribes start deciding those foreigners are way too much trouble.
Which way it will tip depends heavily on a network of local factors and systems across 2 borders, which are frankly beyond the analytical ability of people who aren’t in the zone or very familiar with the culture and current developments.
And THAT’s this negative strategy’s real weak point. It would be fatal in an era of traditional media, but in an era of pervasive blogs and social networks… some of the right rules are different. If the Obama perpetual campaign’s tools and approaches were rolled out with a coordinated messaging (propaganda) campaign, it might work. Will he? Doubt it. Don’t think he cares enough to divert those resources.
Summers:
bq. “Basic to the success of a strategic defensive in pursuit of the negative aim, therefore, is the assumption that time is on your side. But the longer the war progressed the more obvious it became that time was not on our side. It was American rather than North Vietnamese will that was being eroded.”
“Der Spiegel’s review of the speech”:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,664753,00.html reads more like one of Uncle Jimbo’s beat downs over at Blackfive. Brutal.
Owwwwww. Der Speigel has written mean things before, and their American coverage is often unbalanced (beyond merely not balanced, unbalanced). Still, I think I’d rather have them writing the things they were saying about W., rather than this piece.
I thought Europeans were supposed to love this guy? It certainly doesn’t bode well for having NATO countries in continental Europe do much stepping up; we’ll see if the “7,000 troop NATO surge” that was talked about pre-speech ever materializes, or if Obama’s “new approach” leaves him ignored.
I will say that I thought his “proposal to focus on agriculture in Afghanistan”:http://washingtonindependent.com/69301/obama-announces-30k-more-troops-for-afghanistan was smart. It has been one of the missing pieces so far, or at least not the center piece it should have been. If it becomes that centerpiece, that will be progress.
The part about not taking on efforts beyond America’s means or responsibilities was also a potential positive, as it removes a number of traps for the foolish.
The question is what those responsibilities ARE, exactly, and how they’ll be brought to a successful conclusion. Like, for instance, how the limits he outline square with “we’ll be turning this over to the Afghan government in 2011.”
The fears that the mid 2011 timeline in Afghanistan undermining our efforts there seem to be a bit over wrought to me.
I think the greatest problem we have in Afghanistan is with our supposed friends, ie. the Karzai Government. The “promise” to withdraw in 19 months is essentially meaningless to everyone but Karzai and his clique.
He has been put in an extremely difficult position by this threat. It is certain that the announcement will cause a complicated round of jockeying for position in the “anti” Taliban clique of War Lords and this movement will generate a lot of intelligence about where everyone stands in relation to us.
Let’s look at the deadline as a tactical move in 6 months to a year. I don’t think it will look as bad as it does today and I would also think there would be a lot of call by the military for something like this since they are now in a position where their “allies” have neither shown much willingness to shoulder the burden of the war, nor any sign that they are covering our back.
Not a great speech, not a perfect plan but not an altogether bad one either.
It seems to me that we have had very little understanding of this country and its politics even though we have been fighting a war there for nearly a decade.
I am optimistic about what we will learn now that the threat of withdrawal has been put into play.