When Yglesias, Reynolds, and I agree, is the world in danger? I sure hope not…
Matthew Yglesias (who links approvingly to my post on the ebbing of downballot Democrats, and who wrote a thoughtful and polite email concerning our recent contremps) has a post in which he points to a column by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, and links it to the following theory:
To make a long story short, the president is trying to cover his right flank with tough talk (i.e., the National Endowment for Democracy speech) while, in fact, withdrawing US troops from Iraq. Meanwhile, Democrats who do not agree with this strategy are being unfairly castigated as cut-and-runners.
Now this is my personal nightmare – one of the ones where you’re in the room, invisible and unhearable as something horrible goes down.
Instapundit shares my concern:
[Megan McArdle] But there are actually rumors that the White House is contemplating accelerating our departure, which seems lunatic to even discuss when the country doesn’t appear to have a functioning anything.
[Instapundit] I hope those rumors are false. Because if the White House — by which, in this case, I mean George W. Bush — decides to drop the ball on this, I’ll probably vote Democratic, even if Kucinich is the nominee. A half-hearted war is the very, very worst kind. I think that Bush understands that. He’d better.
Look, for me it’s simple. I’m willing to overlook a lot of what I don’t like about the Bush Administration because I believe that he’s the only candidate whom I believe (today) is resolute about this whole war thing.
The second it looks like he’s planning to ‘declare victory and leave,’ I can promise you that Atrios will look like Karl Rove in comparison to me.
That’s because I’m convinced that decision leads almost certainly to nukes in the U.S. and then the real possibility of a genocidal war abroad.
Hi.
If. If the American president does that, then we’re all in deep sheep dip, sure. Those who supported America the most would be deepest in it. Besides the catastrophic consequences in the present war, I do not think you would ever find another Tony Blair in that case, because backing people who won’t back themselves isn’t a practical option. It’s a disaster scenario on every level if it comes to that. But is this a plausible “if”?
People were concerned that George W. Bush was going to give the game away in his last speech to the United Nations. He didn’t. People have been concerned at many points that he might fail to follow through as he needed to. He never does pillow though. Some allies go bad, advisors wobble and squabble, weapons of mass destruction don’t show up where they were supposed to, enemy leaders don’t get captured on cue, the press is adverse and the poll numbers fade, but George W. Bush chugs on regardless.
I think something he said on his Asian tour is to the point: he wants people to listen to him face to face and look him in the eye, so that players in the region can confirm with their own senses that here is a guy who’s not fading or losing focus, he’s got exactly the same spirit he had on 12 November, 2001.
Do you think he’s bluffing? I don’t. I have more faith in the constancy of George W, Bush than in almost any other aspect of this setup.
Kristol and Kagan say that Bush wants to win while the Pentagon wants to get out. But does Bush want to win re-election more than he wants to win in Iraq? It’s not that we want to get out of Iraq for arbitrary reasons, but because we are taking an unexpected number of casualties and are making little headway in the guerrilla/terrorist phase of the war. That doesn’t look good to the voters. Hence, premature Iraqization. Why should we think that Rumsfeld’s plans—remember, before the war he predicted about 30,000 American troops in Iraq at this time—are not approved by Bush, and the speech is just a rhetorical smokescreen?
(Kristol and Kagan talk about extending troop deployments to keep up the necessary manpower on the ground. That’s sweet, from two guys who don’t have three minutes in uniform between them.)
Compare this to Wesley Clark’s detailed plan, which I think is much the best I’ve seen from the Dems. (Clark is not even my first choice.)
Yeah, I’ve got Clark’s plan up on WordPad; I’m commenting fairly extensively, but here’s the short version:
“From the beginning, the Administration has insisted on exclusive control of the Iraqi reconstruction and occupation. This has cost us the financial and military support of other nations and made America a bigger target for terrorists. Ending the American monopoly will change the way this enterprise is viewed-in Iraq and throughout the world.
…well, not exactly.
It is fundamentally a US – UK monopoly, but that’s because the powers that control the EU – France and Germany – have made it clear that they don’t want to play. Saying that you’ll get the EU involved – without accepting terms that would severely compromise the mission – is pretty much handwaving at this point in time.
I’ll expand on that (and know I need to) as well as suggest some ways around it.
Clark hints at what he’d be willing to pay for it; “They will be more willing to help if America works with them on issues they care about: climate change, the International Criminal Court and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” But those aren’t prices that I’m necessarily willing to pay, and I’m pretty far to the left of the majority of the US population.
So far my only response is: Good try; let’s see what the second draft looks like.
A.L.
I firmly agree with David’s comments on President Bush’s constancy. He’s not the cut and run type. I look forward to the day the last Vietnam-era general retires, and the armed services are no longer run by officers who see every conflict as a quagmire.
It looks like President Bush is damned if he does, and damned if he doesn’t. Everybody griped because he didn’t give Iraqis more say in the reconstruction, now they gripe because he’s turning too much responsibility over to them. Iraq belongs to the Iraqis. We never intended to keep it. It therefore makes sense to eventually turn responsibility for securing and governing Iraq over to Iraqis.
The question is how long this will take. If most of the trouble is centered in Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle, we should be able to turn the quieter areas over to Iraqi police, concentrate our forces in the trouble spots, and bring some of our troops home.
I propose the following measures to improve security in Iraq.
Riyadh delenda est!
Fair enough, A.L. Just do me one favor: submit Bush’s proposals to the same feasibility tests as you do Clark’s. [Calpundit thread on Clark’s suggestion to bring back UN WMD teams, as Blix has asked and Bush has denied, wasting our resources.]
You could warm up by asking Cato to compute the manpower needed for his tactical proposals and compare it to the number of soldiers on the ground.
I’m not as concerned as Kristol and Kagan. Here’s why. K and K are obsessed with sheer numbers, as if that is the critical element. It is not. How those numbers are used is the decisive measure of things.
One of the problems we have had has been the configuration and tactics used by our forces. To conquer Iraq, we sent in a some Heavy formations: Third Infantry, 1st MEF, 3/7th Cavalry, and the 101st Air Assault. Fourth Infantry, one of the two very heavy divisions in the U.S. Army, was sent in as follow-on.
3rd Infantry and 1st MEF were pulled out. It is worth noting that 1st MEF had no killed in action between May 1st and the time they pulled out. The Marines followed, almost as a religion, the 1940 “Small Wars Manual” that governs Marine activities in low intensity conflict. Meanwhile, 3rd Infantry, and the 4th that followed, moved around in large column and conducted massive sweep and clear operations that ended up pissing off a lot of the Sunni we were trying to move over to our side.
The theater commander has wisely decided to change the mix. Moving in are an entire Marine division, the 1st (“Guadalcanal”) Marine division, a brigade of the 25th Infantry from Schoefeld Barracks in Hawaii, and a reaction force from the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, among others. Kristol and Kagan are wrong in the extreme if they believe that this war will be won by massive numbers of American heavy forces. Numbers mean nothing if the forces are configured poorly to fight an insurgency.
Rather, what I think the Pentagon has hit on is to increase the number of infantry trigger pullers-the leg guys, and reduce the number of combat service support personnel. You’ll notice that the 1st Marines are being sent into Fantasyland-right smack dab into Fallujah and Ramadi? They are going to pull out the Small Wars Manual and do what they do best: again. 1st Cavalry is being brought in as the reaction force of heavy armor. We are lightening the presence in Kurdistan and in the Shi’a country (the private understandings reached with al-Sadr and his crowd allow us to do that…) because we don’t need to be there.
The Peshmergha and the Shi’a militias can handle things quite nicely in those areas, and we’re not even speaking of the British command in al-Bashrah.
Why does this make me happy? When you have to place your bets between regular leg infantry, led by a young lieutenant and seasoned by a good senior noncommissioned officer, and bands of guerillas, take some advice. BET ON THE INFANTRY!
Infantry ALWAYS wins wars against guerillas. Infantry won in the Phillipines. Infantry won in Nicaraqua and Haiti. Infantry EVEN won in Vietnam. However, in the latter case, American infantry had to deal with PAVN Regulars, very well put together and battle wise North Vietnamese infantry units. Those guys always brought their “A” game to the table, and won respect from the Americans the hard way: they proved it. The VC were no slouches either.
At the same time, the Pentagon is quite rightly reupping the Iraqi police and, apparently, intends to bring the Army back. Massive numbers of American armored troops will not win this war. Massive numbers of Iraqis will. This is the very opposite of what happened in the old RVN. We carried the load in that war for so many years that by the time the ARVN’s had to stand on their own, they folded like a cheap card table at the first serious North Vietnamese offensive.
At the end of the day, the Iraqis must be responsible for themselves.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
First, for Cato: it’s Tehran delenda est. Forget about convincing the Iranians to seal their border; they are the principal sponsors of terrorism. They are no more likely to help us in Iraq than they are likely to help the Jews and Bahai’s…they are fighting an existential war against us in Iraq, knowing that if we succeed in creating a free and stable Iraq, they are doomed (at the hands of their own people).
I am a huge fan of Marine infantry, but this terror war cannot be understood as a purely Iraqi conflict. It is regional, and the old Marine manual doesn’t really apply to the strategic issue (although of course it’s good for the tactical Tikrit Triangle issue). Our main weapons are political, not military. Ergo:
Yes, patrol the borders with Iran and Syria and Saudi. Some of this can be done with drones, some with Iraqis, both are a lot better than US troops either in vehicles or on foot;
But, above all, support the Syrian and Iranian people, help them bring down the regimes. Once the mullahs in Tehran and the Baathists in Damascus are gone, the terrorists who now find safe haven, staging facilities, money, documents, weapons, and professional intelligence assistance from the terror masters will be isolated, and the newly-freed IRanian and Syrian democrats will help us round them up.
Democratic revolution is as potent a weapon as cruise missiles in this war.
I don’t have a lot to add to the wise comments above.
I do want to make this point:I think the American administration in Iraq made its biggest error in immediately dismantling the entire Iraqi army.That resulted in a lot of disgruntled,professional soldiers being thrown out on the street in a country with little job prospects or welfare support.
The rebuilding of the Iraqi military is not important because the Iraqis are better soldiers than the Americans;it is desperately important in order to give the class of career officers the sense that they have a place in the new Iraq.
First, to Mike Ledeen,
I find nothing in what you write that I can disagree with. My post was not designed to address the strategic issues. I was thinking of the tactical issues on the ground, as you highlighted them. IMHO, Bush’s grand strategy is to address the issues of democracy and accountability in the Arab world and in Persia that you have rightly addressed in your columns. He (and Rice as well, I suspect) has most definitely come down on your side of the ledger.
This is one war that will only be partly won on the ground. Like the Cold War before it, it is a war of ideas. You win the war by changing the rules of the game and fighting on a terrain of your choosing, not the jihadist’s.
Second to JH-yes bring back the Army. However, one Iraqi poster who wrote to Zayed’s “Healing Iraq” blog has pointed out that much of the old Officer Corps was unreconstructed Ba’athist Sunni. Vetting is most necessary in this regard. But yes, bring them back.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
Oh, goody. Michael Ledeen, that great fan of Ahmed Chalabi, the charlatan who told us (1) he had a large following in Iraq just waiting for the toppling of Saddam; (2) that his defectors could (for a cash price) tell us all about the WMD, which bogus information we proceeded to act upon; (3) whose information has been re-evaluated by the DIA and found mostly worthless; (4) who was cut off financially by the State Department and the CIA because of suspected improprieties and (5) whose associates in Iraq are engaging in profiteering tells us that Chalabi has democratically-minded cousins in Teheran and Damascus who can help us there too! If we send in the Marines. And a lot of money.
[BTW, you will recall that Michael Ledeen participated in the plan to sell arms to the Iranian mullahs, using the profits to fund the Contras. Perhaps they would already have been overthrown without his generous assistance.]
I think dismantling and rebuilding the Iraqi Army was the right thing to do despite the cost.
You had an organization with some very bad habits. Such organizations are not quickly rebuilt with a new policy manual. Kicking every one out and then interviewing those that wish to rejoin is solid policy even if it seems to hurt the war effort in the short run.
As to supporting the Iranian and Syrians who wish for freedom – yes. The question is the timetable. Do we have another 10 or 20 years for the people to become strong enough to overthrow their tyrants? Doubtful.
I think an invasion of Iran is in order. Syria is already checked by Israel and poses no serious threat. Especially since the lack of Iraqi oil revenues will be weakening Damascus over time (months).
Pulling troops out and regrouping is a great way to go after another enemy country in 2004. I’d pick Iran because politically they are so close and after the student demo fizzle of the last summer may be open to a little push from America.
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq. It is starting to look like a real estate venture.
Reducing troops in Iraq may be a prelude to another operation in 2004. (troop reductions in Korea and Germany too. This is a prelude to something and that something is not a reduction of the military budget)
I am not at all unhappy about the American troop reductions in Iraq. The Iraqis are picking up the slack. They will pick up more slack the more responsibility they have. Real responsibilty. Because daddy is no longer there.
As to Iran Contra – more could have been done to weaken the Sandanistas by ending drug prohibition than by putting Ollie North in charge of cocaine importation.
The same goes for our current war in Colombia against the FARC. I guess we are still too stupid to learn from alcohol prohibition.
Let’s just put Ghofindar in charge of the whole thing!
But seriously folks, I’m trying to square the planned troop withdrawals with the new Democracy doctrine outlined in Bush’s big speech.
If Bush feels like national security is his big political advantage–he’s said recently that he will campaign by telling voters that America is safer now because of his leadership–then by withdrawing he’d be saying that he’s making us more secure, or at least not making us less secure.
He’d be saying either that the “flypaper theory” worked and that it’s time to go home, or that it’s no longer valid and that there are greater monsters to slay elsewhere. Or, he’d be saying that having too many troops there makes America less safe.
Or, he’d be declaring “victory,” which we all know is years in the making. And there won’t be a moment when we’ll know that the Middle East is going to make it–it will be a long and sometimes frustrating process of setbacks, small victories, and societal change.
But I think you’d got Bush pegged wrong if you think that he’s signed on completely to the PNAC agenda. He’s a guy who had a wakeup call on 9/11, and has been scared shitless that it would happen again on his watch, and rightly so. I don’t think he’s a true Wilsonian; I think he’s instinctively isolationist, but with a manichaen worldview.
manichaean
Wow, Lazarus, you really hit all the liberal hit points against Ledeen. Doesn’t it make you proud to complete your checklist? Do they give you a star for such a bravura performance or merely an attaboy.
A.L.:
What concerns me about both of today’s WaPo OpEds here and here, and similar views I’ve see recently, is that they reflect the fact that the insurgency in Iraq is strategizing around our election schedule and its “hurry up” imperatives… because that’s apparently what we’re doing. And if that’s the case it might be better to pace things according to an Iraqi election schedule. In other words one of the worst things you can do is to fail to take strategic risks when your plan is starting to dive. If there really is a danger that we’ll pull out of Iraq prematurely perhaps we ought to first give the Iraqis an opportunity to vote on it. Such a referendum would decouple the strategy from the US election schedule, and place it in Iraqi hands. It would also compel the Governing Council to earn their legitimacy, and would set up the kind of cathartic struggle that is recognizably associated with the “birth of nationhood.”
And if we, and the Iraqi liberals, lose, we come home and start digging trenches. Deep ones. Sometimes you just have to take a risk, to get the glory. Or perhaps just making the suggestion is a bid for sobriety.
Andrew, I’m going to start with your debating tactics, which remain at their usual level. Rather than deal with any of Michael Ledeen’s points in a substantive way, you bring Chalabi into the argument as your refutation. In a context in which it is, frankly, irrelevant.
Your one semi-valid riposte was the Iran-Contra point. Though it’s easily defeated by simply saying “yes, and he’s working to undo that… how about you?” And it STILL doesn’t deal with Ledeen’s central point – that this is a regional war whether the USA likes it or not.
It would be nice if you would engage people in future on the topic of discussion.
Which brings us to Mr. Chalabi, since you’ve raised the issue.
I, too, would prefer to see Ahmed Chalabi in Baghdad rather than Saddam Hussein, and was happy to lend my support to the INC as one of the few groups in the world dedicated to ending Saddam’s regime. To take that position publicly put its members in real danger, and that has to be recognized. If they were not ideal, they were a cut above the rest and have provided real assistance on the political front. Read Kanan Makiya’s articles about the people in Iraqi opposition, and maybe you’ll see the human dimension more clearly.
If that makes me a bad guy in your books then so be it. Meanwhile, I sleep better at night knowing that the Iraqis will take it from here, and that Chalabi’s future will be in their hands going forward.
It’s also fairly clear that Chalabi has been the victim of an orchestrated smear campaign, backed by many of the same Arab journalists and organizations Saddam bought during his years in power. Bill Clinton was the victim of an organized campaign too, so that fact doesn’t prove Chalabi’s innocence… but perhaps a bit more humility and respect might be in order.
As would debating Chalabi himself in a more relevant context.
Praktike,
Ghorbanifar will only take charge if he gets his ten percent.
Sometimes, the only way to move a man is if he gets a cut of the swag.^_^ But seriously…
I didn’t think Bush was reflexively isolationist even before 9-11. Whatever the case, I’m sure that 9-11 disabused him of any notion that the BushBaker stability narcotic was a cure for what ails us. That’s why I think his speech was extremely important. It was a shot over the bow of all the regimes in the area that we finally had come to an understanding that things had to change for the peoples of the region, by hook or by crook, as Number Two once said to Number Six.
A lot of this becomes a war for the middle and merchant classes. For instance, Mubarak sits atop a squalid political order that we Americans have abetted with our grants-in-aid and our arms (dirty little secret: the M1-A1 is being manufactured for use by the Egyptian Armored Corps in Egyptian factories, iirc under licensce.).All those aimless Egyptian young men who got free college in return for their support of the Nasserite order have to have something more to hang their hat on than what passes for political debate at the local mosque on a Friday night (basically, the mullah screams “Jew” at the top of his lungs and points at a picture of Bush…). Bush understands this intuitively, as do most of the people around him.
Remember the Rummy memo? Remember that one of the things Rumsfeld asked was how to we reduce the number of people going into the madrasses to take Semtex, Islam and You (101, 102, and 103)? That’s what this is all a piece of, I suspect. I’m not arguing that the Administration has its entire act together. I am arguing that this is the result of a long, drawn out strategic argument that, thanks be to God, appears to have ended with the right conclusions.
Change the potential outcome of the game by changing the game itself.
Strangely enough, I might go so far as to say that it is Michael Ledeen and his people who have won the argument. For instance, if you read Friedman as I do to find out what the Current Wisdom is among the Lexus and The Olive Tree Crowd, then you can see that the argument is going Ledeen’s way, not Brent Scowcroft’s.
Only, please, let’s not invade Iran right now, okay? Stupid, stupid, stupid.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
Chris, you may be right.
And I’m certainly all for democracy.
But I’m a little cynical about putting a “shot over the bow” to somewhat-democratic Iran while winking and nodding to autocratic Egypt and very autocratic Saudi Arabia.
I think that soft power, not military action, is the way to go here. It’s going to take time, which, many here will argue, we don’t have. Well, you just don’t build democracies overnight, and you can’t build them by force. So in the meantime, we need to get better intelligence and work with our allies to root out threats.
And if it’s true that the administration is changing its outlook, then it better broaden its understanding of terrorists beyond simply labeling them as “evil.”
Yes, they’re evil, but why are they evil?
You can’t just say that “some people are born evil,” because that leads to absurdities–so there are more evil people per capita in Syria than in Switzerland? Well, why is that?
I sincerely hope that this new doctrine is serious, but I also hope it reflects a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of the beast.
>But, above all, support the Syrian and Iranian
>people, help them bring down the regimes. Once
>the mullahs in Tehran and the Baathists in
>Damascus are gone, the terrorists who now find
>safe haven, staging facilities, money,
>documents, weapons, and professional
>intelligence assistance from the terror masters
>will be isolated, and the newly-freed Iranian
>and Syrian democrats will help us round them up.
>
>Democratic revolution is as potent a weapon as
>cruise missiles in this war.
Mr. Ledeen,
With respects, on this you are wrong.
Tyrannies survive unless they are killed by outside invasion or there is a moral collapse of will via corruption at the center.
Syria is set for an Islamist take over due to the corruption of its security/regime protection forces. The recent killing of a Iraqi suicide bomber who turned out to be a Yemeni with a Syrian pass port makes that clear. It looks like Syria has its own version of North Korea’s “Tony Soprano” corruption problem. See:
http://windsofchange.net/archives/002967.html
Either this Yemeni got that pass port via low level or high level corruption. If it was high level corruption, then Al-Qaeda has bought a large faction of the current Syrian regime. If it was low level corruption, then the Regime Security Forces are corrupt and blind. Either way, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood can operate inside Syria to over throw the Alwite Muslim ruling class in just the way it is operating in Saudi Arabia despite getting funded by some of princes of the Al-Saud clan.
The collapse of the July 9th movement in the face of the Mullaocracy’s Regime Security force crack down in July 2003 means the regime has the will and control of its security forces necessary to kill as many of its domestic opponents as needed to stay in power. It must and will come to blows with American ground troops.
I wrote on this in July 2003 here:
Iran: It Will Come to Blows
http://windsofchange.net/archives/003760.html
…based on the writing of David Warren here:
http://www.davidwarrenonline.com/Comment/Jul03/index152.shtml
…and Steven Den Beste here:
http://www.denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2003/07/Wegottahavethebomb.shtml
And Joe Katzman’s current link from the Watch side of Winds of Change here:
“Riding Into Tehran On Winds of Change”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A15266-2003Nov8?language=printer
Where I saw this:
Last June, thousands of students took to the streets in protest against government policies. But the numbers did not shake the system, and many were arrested in the following months. The demonstrations have waned. Some Iranians say that by loosening social rules and cracking down on student leaders, the clerics are gaining the upper hand.
Ghoroghi sees the religious establishment he opposes as increasingly pragmatic. “They will bow to changes and developments — they’re not like the Taliban,” he says. “These people are political. They want to stay in power.” Yet there are hard-core militants in the security services and Islamic societies who gird the establishment, he says, “people with whom you can never hold a dialogue.”
…makes clear that the people of Iran are going to sit this one out and wait for the American Army to put paid to the Mullahs. This clip from Warren’s column shows why:
But from what I can make out, the regime not only did not fall, but was not close to falling. For the first time in months, there was in fact a show of force to protect government buildings, by the regular police and army. It was a risk to call them out in large numbers, but they were following the regime’s orders, for the most part. The Iranian military was also employed beating the skies over Tehran with helicopters, as a way to intimidate the people.
Details are still not clear, but I believe the most effective step the regime took was a bold and broad midnight sweep, on the eve of the Wednesday anniversary, that netted many of the student leaders. At least five dozen of the more prominent are known to be in custody now. The combination of the boldness, with the waiting for the most effective moment to strike, suggests to me that the regime is neither as stupid nor indecisive as the more optimistic opposition sources have suggested.
And by getting through Wednesday with less outward trouble than Tuesday, the regime was further able to deflate and demoralize its opponents. The Shah put up a less impressive fight in 1979; in the end he wasn’t willing to massacre his own people in order to stay in power. Whereas, the recent ministrations of the ayatollahs’ goons is communicating to the country that, this time, they can expect no decency whatever.
For my part I said the following about Warren’s article:
Like the victims of any other modern tyranny that has the will to live, the Iranian people cannot free themselves. We have no time to wait for further events on the ground in Iran to play out given Iran’s nuclear, chemical and bioweapons programs.
It is time to activate all of the heavy divisions of the National Guard.
Now it looks like the Bush Administration is acting on that threat, but without the National Guard Heavy Divisions playing a combat role. The clue is via its withdrawal plan of Regular Army forces. I saw in the Early Bird Clipping service a story titled, “U.S. Plans for Marines to Return to Iraq.” This passage suggests something is going on other than a cut and run:
“Some units that will return home in the next rotation will not be replaced. This includes a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, as well as the 173rd Airborne Brigade. As a result, the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq is likely to fall to near the 100,000 mark next spring. That compares with about 130,000 there now.
Also coming home in the next rotation will be the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas, and the 1st Armored Division from Germany.”
I have been thinking about our troops rotations for a bit. A drop from 130,000 to 100,000 troops suggested to me that Rumsfeld was recreating a strategic reserve of ground forces.
Then I read somewhere Thursday or Friday on the Early Bird that 37% of that 105,000 strong force is going to be Guard/Reserve. Add in the Marines rotating in with two Stryker brigades and it looks like the majority of the Army heavy forces and 18th Airborne Corps going to be out of Iraq. Now add into the mix Bush’s Democracy speech on the need to remake the Arab world democratically (that included a hint to the Egyptians that they are going to suffer an involuntary regime change). A horse of a different color emerged for me.
First, take six months of down time, catching up higher schooling, rebuilding equipment and spares stockpiles for these returning units. Then take another six months of training to bring those Regular Army combat units back up to peak fighting pitch. You then see a window of opportunity for a new American ground campaign opening up. In so many words, the Navy isn’t the only service planning on major surges of forces to forward deployments. Rumsfeld isn’t rebuilding a strategic reserve, he is building a Strategic Invasion Force. I think we are going to have to plan for a “pizza watch” on the Pentagon to start just in time for the final days of the 2004 election campaign and running through the early winter months of 2005.
We are looking at an operational pattern similar to what was used for ground forces in the Pacific theater of WW2. America wins a victory with combat forces, replaces them with other troops to mop up, rebuilds the combat forces for the next operation, and then strikes again. Except Arab Tyrannies are bigger, and thus the operational pauses between invasions are longer, than Pacific atolls.
This is where Yglesias, Reynolds, Armed Liberal, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan’s lack of study in military history makes itself clear. None of them can recognize a pattern of military affairs that just screams at me and some of the members of my e-mail ‘list of usual suspects.’
If the trigger is pulled for another Mid-East invasion, the strategic deployment will happen very rapidly because we have bases in Iraq and a secure sea port in Kuwait. Flip a coin as to whether the target will be Iran or Syria. Lots of American Ground Forces in Southern Iraq means the target is Iran.
Note on “Pizza Watch” — US Military planners and troops are noted for ordering pizza and other such foods when they are up late preparing for an operation. The pattern is well known to restraunts and military dependents the world wide. It is rumored that Dominos Pizza places outside Ft. Bragg can tell you which units are on alert via which barricks and how many they deliver pies too.
Trent –
This is an interesting analysis; let me leave one simple question for you as I consider it.
What would be the leading publicly available indicators that this is what we’re doing, as opposed to drawing down our forces and simply demobilizing the Guard units?
A.L.
Praktike,
We do not disagree. “Soft power” is what will do it over the long run. Using “soft power” emphasizes our greatest strength: the cultural pull of our ideals and our economic system. Change the game, and you change the rules.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
On Ledeen: Has he ever discussed what sort of error in judgment caused him to sell arms to the Iranian mullahs? Or has he turned against them for completely arbitrary reasons?
On Chalabi: The “smear” campaign against him has something to do with the fact his intel was bogus (remember the sitcom performance his “scientist” put on for Judith Miller, pointing to WMD sites on the ground where nothing ever turned up?). He and/or his associates ripped us off, and according to the New York Times, somehow Ledeen and Wolfowitz (and you, if you want to take credit, I guess) were so entranced with this convicted swindler that you didn’t even prepare for the possibility that the occupation would be more difficult than he told you. It’s amazing (and unfortunate) that to this day, you view the falsity of almost everything he told you about WMD, about his popularity in Iraq, about his movement’s organization in Iraq, and about how easy post-Saddam Iraq would be to organize (official estimates as optimistic as 30,000 troops by Fall 2003 and $1.7 billion American total expense for reconstruction), and you are still defending him. He told you that Saddam was a monster, and this was true, as if we didn’t already know. Great. There’s probably one true statement in the average 4-1-9 spam, too.
If we have such fine exile allies for Iran and Syria, I can’t imagine what price we shall pay in blood.
Nobody’s correct all the time, but as long as you and Ledeen don’t even acknowledge your mistakes, excuse me if I don’t find your scenarios very persuasive.
Trent: The Pacific atolls didn’t have populations eager for us to leave. Show me the math that we can occupy Iraq during an invasion of Iran that would raise the Shiite community against us as one, plus invade and occupy Iran.
Andrew, you get the troops you need two ways. First, you move troops from quiet areas to where the trouble is. Second, you pad your forces with Iraqi security people. You need them as interpreters and for their knowledge of local custom, anyway. Armed Predators can do quite a bit, particularly at night, when their IR sensors make it practically impossible to hide movement in the desert.
I noticed that the troops going over include a brigade of Stryker LAVs. They should be outstanding at border security. They’re faster (and cheaper to operate) than track-laying vehicles, and a lot tougher than humvees, if they get into a fight. The open desert country in western Iraq is tailor made for them.
Michael, my motto is “Riyadh delenda est!”, because the job’s not finished, until the Saudis get done. I’ve no objection to taking down the Iranian mullahs or Assad and Co. first, but the Saudis are going to be a problem as long as they have more oil money than brains. BTW, I agree with you that democratic revolution is a powerful weapon, but it’s not sufficient by itself. If we can succeed in Iraq, it will weaken the grip of the regimes in Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, but we’ll probably still have to give them a push. Also, if we’re successful in Iraq, it will give us credibility with the other peoples in the region, if and when we occupy their countries.
I think Trent’s on to something, here. His comment about building a strategic invasion force and the timing of the rotations fits with something I’ve been saying — that troop rotation can be used to mask an invasion build-up. We’re rotating in mostly light forces and pulling out the “first team”. If, in a few months, we move the heavy elements of the original invasion force back as a normal “troop rotation”, replacing the light forces, we’ll have the kernel of an invasion force in place, and any light forces needed to flesh it out can easily (and quickly) be flown in, when the time comes.
Riyadh delenda est!
Cato:
I checked out Trent’s idea of an invasion force. I don’t see it, primarily because Iran is a much tougher target to deal with. Secondly, we have a problem on the Korean peninsula that cannot be ignored for ever.
The Stryker Brigades are a couple of army units, one attached to the 2nd Infantry Division, another an outfit that I think is attached to the 25th infantry. They are fast movers that will patrol the border, as I think Trent indicated. However, I don’t expect to see them in urban or built up areas, as a Stryker vehicle is RPG bait.
What’s news to me about the new deployment is that First Cavalry Division is going in as our heavy force, probably where Fourth Infantry Division is now. 1st Marine Division is being sent into the Triangle to do a lot of legwork. Only First Cavalry (which happens to be our premier armored unit) is really configured for offensive action. Now you could surge a bunch of divisions into Iraq in, say, a year, but I don’t see a huge appetite to settle scores with the mullahs on the part of the American people. We have a lot on our plate as it is.
The important thing to us is the regime’s WMD program. The Israelis want to deal with this, of that I’m sure. But I don’t believe they will want to go in alone. The problem with dealing with Iran’s WMD program is that they learned from the Iraqis. Saddam had all his eggs in that French-built reactor that Chirac sold him back in the Seventies. The Israelis pulverized it, and Saddam’s early WMD program was set back by a decade. The Ayatollahs have decentralized the program so that if one reactor or plant is hit, the entire program is not placed in jeopardy. In short: it can be done, but it is risky and requires exacting targeting, and the political willingness to make blood enemies of the Ayatollahs.
One last thing that no one I’ve read here so far has considered. Central Command will begin to refocus Special operations troops against Al Qaeda in the Northwestern Frontier provinces. As we bleed Al Qaeda in Iraq, I believe that the Theater Commanders will want to attack Al Qaeda’s central command structure at the same time we are attacking their forward personnel in Iraq. That’s the real message I take from the formation of Unit 121, a single Special Operations outfit that’s made up of people from both the Iraqi and Afghan fronts. I don’t believe we’ll be concentrating on unseating the mullahs in Tehran. I think we’re going to try and walk and chew gum at the same time.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
>What would be the leading publicly available
>indicators that this is what we’re doing, as
>opposed to drawing down our forces and simply
>demobilizing the Guard units?
We will know when the redeployment to the Iraq/Kuwait theater starts. Everything else is pretty much automatic as it is standard operating procedure to reconsitute a strategic reserve. The nature of the units being recalled is a major reason for my thinking this is an invasion force.
We have the whole of the 18th Airborne Corps coming home. As Cato noted above, We also have the 3rd Mech. Infantry Division home now with the 1st Mech. Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Cavaly regiment (brigade sized) set to follow.
These are not the units we would have in reserve if we were plainning for a war with Korea as mountain fighting requires the kind of infantry forces we have deployed for stability operations in Iraq.
I do think our poster Section Nine is wrong about the size of the force to militarily destroy the Iranian Regime. Shinseki’s 250,000 man Iraq force will be sufficient for that. The American Army has a “Martians in the War of the Worlds” superiority in fighting power over 3rd world militaries of any sort. The Iranian Regime Security Forces are going to be no better in fighting American military forces than the Fedayeen Saddam.
The reasons for this are technological:
What One American Soldier Knows, They All Know
http://windsofchange.net/archives/003914.html
…Organizational:
“US Military — Back To The Future”
http://windsofchange.net/archives/003914.html
…and also touch on the social nature and role of 3rd world militaries in their society.
This is from my post The Myth of Chinese Airpower:
http://windsofchange.net/archives/003628.html
All 3rd World States, including China, are a thin veneer of modernity stretched over a sea of abject poverty. This means they are literally one person deep in any given technological or organizational skill. The end result of this is that the average 3rd world regime looks something like this:
1) The dictator/ruling faction is in the capitol and is protected by the REGIME SECURITY FORCES from the Army.
2) The Army is located away from the capitol in the provinces chasing/producing rebels. The REGIME SECURITY FORCE have informers in the Army and visible political officers that watch units for disloyalty. The political officers also function to reduce the military effectiveness of Army units because militarily effective Army units are a threat to the regime.
3) The Air Force is split in two. There are the ground support aircraft in the provinces to chase rebels and there is a unit of air superiority jet fighters in the capitol with zero air-to ground attack capability. The pilots of the capitol protection jets are the best paid and pampered people in the military. They and their families live in grandly built government housing guarded by the REGIME SECURITY FORCES.
4) The air force headquarters is built in a huge high rise building in the center of the capitol city. Meanwhile the Army and REGIME SECURITY FORCE headquarters are built in bomb proof bunkers.
This is a great simplification. For example, there are always many seperate REGIME SECURITY FORCES, meant to watch each other, as well as the Army and air force. Saddam Hussein’s regime was a prime example of this.
The only organizational thing that worries me on the American Army side is this “Pentatomic Division” like reorganization of the 3rd Mech Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions that is scheduled to happen when both are at home.
My own view, for what its worth, mostly mirror Chris’. Could we theoretically take down Iran if we really, really needed to? Probably, even with the current strained state of the Army. However, I don’t see the political will being there in the U.S., unless the mullahs get very stupid suddenly and provide a deliberate provocation (like moving units across the border to support the more militant Shiites in Iraq). And I’m always suspicious of the idea that Bush will push through an intervention *somewhere* to get the rally-round-the-flag bump around November next year – that’s venturing too near conspiracy theory territory for my liking. Damping down the insurgency in Iraq would seem to be the smarter political move than doing something that even POTUS’ supporters would likely interpret as wag-the-dog were it to happen around election time.
The “Pentatomic Division” reorganization will probably put some units out of a potential order of battle for longer than it would otherwise, but given the reportedly poor battle performance of many support units when attacked, it would seem a weakness that’s best remedied sooner than later – given the relative success of striking those rather than “speartip” units, its going to be the M.O. of USA opponents for the near future, I think.
(more on that at http://www.foxmarketwire.com/story/0,2933,100805,00.html )
Trent, do you know of a website that summarizes the current “who’s where” of Army and Marine units worldwide? I know the military is more cautious about this kind of info than it was prior to 9-11, but if there’s one out there like that, I’d be interested in the URL.
I’m willing to believe, for the sake of argument, that 250K troops can defeat the conventional Iranian forces. Iran has 65 million inhabitants. The Shia Iraqis abandon their modus vivendi and we have 12 million new enemies in Iraq. Our 40,000 British and other allied forces are withdrawn, because there is no support in their home countries for widening the war to Iran or Syria.
So this is 250K in Iran, 40K to replace the Brits, and let’s say 75K to handle the Iraqi Shia. The forces in Iran are tied down indefinitely against terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
That’s more than we have, right? “Begun, this clone war is.”
Hey, A.L., if you are still reading the thread. You said Clark’s plan needed revision? How about this??
[Calpundit on the speech. Summary: all hat no cattle]
It’s more than that, Andrew. Military prudence to deal with rotation, etc. has 2 soldiers stateside for every one on rotation. So if those figures are troops on the ground, multiply the number by 3.
Don’t see why the Iraqi Shia would become a problem in the Iran scenario, as they have no special attachment to Iran (and in fact feel that Iran should be 2nd banana to them in Shi’a Islam). But even without that 75k it’s still a lot of troops.
What Iran really requires is a serious program of subversion, coupled with open public and material support for the various factions of democracy movement there. We aren’t getting that, and even if we did, in the absence of a serious military threat a Tienanmen-style response to even mass demonstrations remains a real possibility. Trent’s assessment that the mullahs have successfully faced down the demonstrators is probably correct.
And so Iran’s mullahs cruise on to their rendezvous with nuclear capabilities.
I am coming to the belief that Bush’s failure to call a serious national mobilization (without a draft, and I believe this could have been done) immediately after 9/11 may prove in the end to be one of the turning points of the war – and not a good one. We’ll see.
As for Syria, their problem is that the country is run by minority (like, 10% minority) Alawites who are considered heretics by many Islamists. It now looks like Assad has lost control, however, as Islamism is a growing force in Syria. His dad would never have allowed that to happen.
So Assad could be taken down easily – one division could do it – but the aftermath would be a nightmare, and Lebanon would go to chaos too. As I’ve written before, I expect diplomacy to be the order of the day with Syria, however unproductive it may be. Now is not the time for that war.
Mr. Katzman, Bush doesn’t have the votes to break the caps that congress has put on the services. To do so would mean getting rid of the tax cuts. That is a price that Bush is unwilling to pay. If Bush wins in 2004, look for a major increase in the numbers of the services coming from the DoD. (Giving the huge increase of retirements from those who joined from 1980 to 84, there really isn’t much choice.)
Trent:
Yes, we have the superiority to engage in an initial thrust and conquest of Iran, but do we have the manpower, less the draft, to pacify the country, especially if a guerilla war breaks out in the Zagros Mountains. Dealing with the Ayatollahs through a program of agitprop and subversion? Why not? They’re trying to screw us, let’s screw them first.
Second, we have a full plate right now. Korea will have to be dealt with one way or another. That the Chia Pet has a bomb is almost beyond question: something must be done to implode that regime and take it down. I’m not sure that even the Chinese are comfortable with their Mad Hatter client having a bomb. Aside from the impending resurrection of the Nihon Kaigun (otherwise known as the Imperial Japanese Navy), the Koreans have presented Beijing with an enormous strategic problem. Hopefully, they will come to the same conclusions we have.
As to the draft. When the war began, I would have been more comfortable with a draft, but recognize that the war against Al Qaeda will be won by specialists, not draftees. Bush didn’t institute the draft because he wanted to save his tax cuts; he didn’t call for it because it would have done no good to defeat Al Qaeda.
But he should have done it anyway. Not doing so was a mistake, tax relief or no tax relief. We could use about five extra leg infantry divisions right about now.
However, as always, things will change. It’s the war against Korea that will be won by draftees, unfortunately. Kim’s regime is one of those that needs to do something radical to survive. Dictatorships almost always make the mistake of believing their own bullshit, sort of like Galtieri and the Falklands. Very few dictatorships have thousands of years of political moderation and statesmanship behind them as China’s does.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
“Yes, we have the superiority to engage in an initial thrust and conquest of Iran, but do we have the manpower, less the draft, to pacify the country, especially if a guerilla war breaks out in the Zagros Mountains. Dealing with the Ayatollahs through a program of agitprop and subversion? Why not? They’re trying to screw us, let’s screw them first.”
The lack of a draft is not what’s placing limits on our manpower. If we need more troops, we can get more troops without a draft. If Bush has the votes to bring back the draft, then he’s got the votes to raise the caps on the services, which is all that’s needed. That, and more recruiting ads, will do the trick nicely.
At best a draft is redundant (i.e., “drafting” people who would have volunteered anyway, as in WWII). At worst, it generates huge opposition to the whole war effort (as in Vietnam). If you’re interested in winning, the draft is not the way to go.
This is the first thing you’ve written I agree with wholeheartedly. Of course, one item on that agenda should have been tax cut cancellations to pay for a larger military and quasi-military (trained civilians for failed-state reconstruction, intelligence agents, crash Arabic-speaker recruitment, etc.).
Don’t just cite the official doctrine that only 1/3 of our troops are in the field. Count heads. The current military is simply not large enough to occupy Iraq and Iran at once. We seem to have our hands full with 130,000 troops with (we say) only the Sunni Triangle as a hot spot. The Iraqi Shia will revolt if we invade Iran, because their internal struggles are tiny compared to their shared desire to have the USA not controlling their affairs. (Compare, say, secular and religious Palestinians uniting for terror purposes.) That alone trebles the number of hostile occupied in Iraq, not to mention the additional burden of Iran.
Andrew –
That’s something I’m equally critical of Bush for; he keeps trying to shield us from the cost of the war, which keeps us from being emotionally ‘invested’ in it – and then is surprised when we doubt its value.
A.L.
Tagyrn,
You asked, “Trent, do you know of a website that summarizes the current “who’s where” of Army and Marine units worldwide?”
Go here:
http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/databases/wherearethedivisions.asp
Well, I don’t see any way around dealing with the Ayatollahs and the Chia Pet without significantly expanding the number of maneuver battalions in our land forces. I suspect that Bush has made the political calculation that he only wants to deal with Iraq and AQ for now, and leave the other two (Iran, NK) until after the election.
Assuming the economy expands significantly, as I expect it will, more cash will begin flowing into the Treasury to pay for an expansion. Right now, the talk is about expanding the number of trigger pullers that one can wring out of the Army system. This may have something to do with the Army division reorganization that one poster mentioned was going to occur to the 101 and the 3rd ID. While I commend Rumsfeld for thinking along these lines (as well as killing the Crusader and forcing the Stryker lobby to actually prove that Stryker can be the Tank of Tomorrow, which it cannot…), I would have been much more comfortable had we expanded the force by five divisions (legs, of course, or four leg and one Marine Infantry Division) early on. But Bush and Rumsfeld did not, and that is a mistake we must live with until the inevitable expansion takes place.
The expansion, when it occurs, will be Reaganesque in scope. Right now we have about ten divisions in the active service. We need fifteen. During the Cold War, we had twenty. One of the baleful effects of the nineties was a drawdown in the number of maneuver divisions and the young officers and senior noncoms that staffed them.
It’s the equivalent of losing the battle of Kursk. Thankfully, we don’t have the 15th Guards Tank Army knocking at the door.
Lastly, the great danger I see is the decline in absolute numbers of surface combat vessels in the Navy. Naval dominance has always been our ace in the hole. Now there is a strain as our force numbers hover around 300 ships.
That’s not enough.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
“I believe that he’s the only candidate whom I believe (today) is resolute about this whole war thing.”
Do you think Lieberman isn’t “resolute about the whole thing?” In his interview after the Rock the Vote debate, he mentioned the need to send more troops to Iraq — a very difficult thing to say in front of a Democratic audience.
I think Lieberman and McCain are on the same wavelength, here — we must do what it takes to succeed, and it will take real sacrifice.
It opens up the possibility that Lieberman is in some ways to the left of Bush on Iraq (wanting to internationalize the conflict), but in some ways to the right (being truly determined to succeed militarily).
He’s probably right on both counts, too.
Trent and I are in agreement. And I got here first. Ofcourse Trent’s analysis is way more detailed.
Way to go Trent.
I think what you’re talking about, Trent and Simon, is spectacularly unlikely.
First of all, there simply isn’t political maneuving room for another war. The current one is increasingly unpopular … and there isn’t currently a public awareness or acknowledgement of a compelling reason to take down Iran or Syria.
Think about the scenarios, politically speaking. If the president puts us on the ramp-up to another war before the election, he’d have to do so pretty quickly. The public has to be prepared and at least partially convinced, and all the military pieces have to be put in place.
If Bush does that pre-11/04, he takes a huge risk of losing the election. He *certainly* hands Howard Dean his pet issue — the president as warmonger.
Now, suppose they plan to do it post-election. If it quickly follows the election, the president still has to prepare the public, make the case for the war, put the right forces in place, etc. He would still have to start that process before the election. And he’s going to have to be open, ultimately, about what he’s doing. Presidents don’t put us on a path to war in the lead-up to an election without talking about it. (At least no president with any respect for his people would.)
There’ve been all kinds of theories on the left side of the blogosphere about the president taking us to war again pre-election. I’ve been telling the lefties for months now that that’s impossible. It’s amazing to me to find a conservative theory along those lines — and that some people believe it.
Andrew J. Lazarus,
You hit the nail on the head. We SEEM to have all our forces comitted.
Which is exactly the impression to give if a new attack is in the offing.
In fact all the nail biting and carping is just what is wanted prepratory to the next manuver. Which may explain why Bush is not answering his critics.
I’d take Iran. It is in very goodshape re: handing it over to the democrats there.
Thanks to Tom H. for the link.
I’m a little confused at to M.Simon’s point – the apparent overcommittment of troops is some kind of massive smokescreen to make us appear weak, while the forces are being ramped up elsewhere for Iran/Syria? Possible, I guess, but seems a little too cloak-and-dagger to be probable.
That is exactly the M. Simon/Trent claim. It’s especially brilliant how as part of the smokescreen they got Republicans like John McCain and Chuck Hagel to talk about the inadequacy of even our current level of troop commitment in Iraq. (You’ll recall that the US and NATO military officers who served in Bosnia and Kosovo also said we had perhaps half the required number of troops for reconstruction. They must have been briefed on Operation Smokescreen long ago.) Meanwhile, the press prints stories like
This looks like a disaster, but perhaps the whole story is made up, or they used special effects. The same thing with aerial bombing near Fallujah, with attendant civilian casualties.
William Swann is correct that the plan appears politically infeasible. I don’t see it as military feasible, notwithstanding the smokescreen claim. But, and I hope Mr. Swann is reading this, the Bush Administration is a great believer in bold, audacious action for its own sake. That’s what makes them, in M. Simon’s inimitable view, manly men.
Meanwhile, another Democrat weighs in with a real plan.
Again, I don’t ask this be compared only to Trent’s plan. Compare it to GWB’s platitudinous, detail-free speech at the NED.
[Calpundit on this topic.]
Do we have the capacity to defeat the Iranian Army? Almost certainly. Do we have the capacity to pacify Iran afterwards? Possibly, but it depends on how thoroughly we “beat” the Iranians during the invasion. If we completely destroy the die-hard elements during the invasion campaign, we actually have a pretty good chance of pacifying the country. Doing so would require a departure from the Iraq stragegy of simply letting Iraqi soldiers go home.
We would need to identify, isolate, and utterly destroy the die-hard elements. Have Special Ops units, with Air Force support, locate and kill the Mullahs. Use airborne and air assault forces to cut off the Revolutionary Guards’ retreat, and let the Air Force hammer them into snail snot. Don’t bother asking them to surrender. They won’t stay surrendered, so don’t give them the opportunity. Just kill them.
Regular Army units should be surrounded and required to formally surrender. Let them stay in POW camps, until we get things settled down.
Defeat the Iranian regular army convincingly, and exterminate the Mullahs, Revolutionary Guards, and other die-hards, as a warning of what we can do to any group that won’t cooperate.
That said, we have time to give subversion a chance in Iran. It will take the better part of a year to get our “invasion force” rested, refitted, and trained back up to peak capacity. If we can help the democratic forces take over, it would save a lot of lives, not to mention money and strain on our forces.
Riyadh delenda est!
Simon — I think you’re basically treating us like we’re something other than a democratic nation. It’s usually not possible in a democracy to “sneak up” on someone in terms of launching a major war … without preparing public opinion, discussing it publicly, building support, etc.
And, of course, only Congress has the constitutional right to declare war anyway.
You see the president launching a major war — while are forces are already spread thin — and without a congressional resolution?
Name another instance where the U.S. launched a major war with no prior warning, debate, discussion, etc.
Mr. Swan,
Bush has demonstrated with Iraq that he has both the will and the power to take down the Iranian mullahocracy.
His Middle East Democracy speech is a signal that he has made a decision to sweep the rest of the Terror Master’s regimes from the board.
Remember the run up to the 2002 election included the run up to the Iraq invasion. The stark choice Bush presented is what powered the Republicans to a Senate Majority.
The time frame I laid out leaves the nation with an even starker choice of peace versus war in November 2004. It is a choice that the current crop of Democratic Presidential candidates — other than the increasingly unlikely Lieberman or Gephart (sp?) — will be on the wrong side of with the American public.
Swann,
Good point. As I recall Congress gave the President the Authority to fight the War shortly after 9/11.
Now if you consider Iran another battle in the war (as I do) no further authorization is necessary.
Think WW2. Did Roosevelt require a resolution to attack the countries of North Africa? (Torch) Sicily? Italy? France? Germany proper?
None the less if an incident is required one can be manufactured easily enough. Just humiliate them until they fight. Or we could claim nuclear proliferation (which they have admitted).
It appears that events are getting ahead of your conception of what is possible. May the same happen to our enemies.
I especially love the foces spread thin meme. Let us hope our enemies are of the same mind. Your attitudes are exactly what the war plan needs to succeed.
tagryn,
Reread your Sun Tzu. Appear weak when you are strong. Far when you are near.
There are two very basic books that one must be conversant with to discuss war tactics.
1. Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”
2. B.H.L. Hart – “Strategy”
And to understand America’s military doctrine very applicable to this conflict Col. Harry Summers – “On Strategy”
If you are more interested in Strategy you must study logistics, terrain, and politics. For grand strategy philosophy.
In strategy and tactics lies are necessary. In grand strategy only the truth will do. The Bush Democracy speech was grand strategy. As for the rest, if Bush is not lying and misleading he is not doing his job as a war leader.
Andrew Lazarus,
As a student of war I can tell you without a doubt the Democrats have no workable war plan. Zip. Nada. Lieberman comes the closest and he is wide of the mark.
What is happening in the world is an Anglo job. Bringing democracy to the world is the job of the anglos. No other nations have the culture or the philosophical underpinnings for it. The thing to remember is this: when a country wants peacekeepers who do they ask for? The French? The Germans? The Russians? None of them. First they ask for Americans.
Read Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” for some clue. He had it down 100 years ago.
And the French? 1/2 of them pined for fascism in the run up to WW2. They are still Vichy. Have a go at Casablanca (the movie) for a taste. The end of the movie is optimistic but I fear the French have reverted to form. 20% of them voted Fascist in the last election. And you want fascists sympathisers as partners? Why? In WW2 we needed them despite their fascist sympathies. No such excuse this time.
As I recall the Germans were the fascists in WW2. It is part of their psychology. A German is either at your throat or on his knees. We need them because? Their superior war fighting ability? Died with the Whermacht.
The former Soviets might have a taste for blood but their tactics are attrition intensive. Not too popular in Russia any more and a complete non-starter for Americans. We don’t like dying – our deaths or our enemies. Leveling villages to get at a few attackers is not our way.
Democrats are not deep thinkers when it comes to war. Disliking war is good. Disliking it so much that you do not understand it is bad. In that respect Clark might have a chance if he were not such a bad general. The McClellan of our age. A copperhead. Bah.
William Swann:
“There’ve been all kinds of theories on the left side of the blogosphere about the president taking us to war again pre-election. I’ve been telling the lefties for months now that that’s impossible. It’s amazing to me to find a conservative theory along those lines — and that some people believe it.”
The most advantageous time to attack is when your opposition believes you are unready. Since the left and right in America believe this it greatly helps the war plan.
I don’t necessisarily believe we are unready or unable. I put the probability of the next major battle at 60% in the next 12 months. Iran in 2004. We waited too long between Afghanistan and Iraq. We need to up the tempo.
With the stupids in Iran promising to destroy Israel as soon as they get the bomb I’d say a casus belli is already in the works. So nice of the Iranians to give us a hand.
Having coined the word “stupidfada” (look it up at LGF) I think I know a little about stupid. The Iranians fit the bill.
Simon,
IMO Iran is next, for lots of different reasons, but in 2005, not 2004. Our prospective invasion of Iran will likely be a major issue in the 2004 election.
And from my point of view, the stratgegies proposed here by Trent and M. Simon – ignoring for the moment the ‘military-strategic’ sphere (i.e. if this was a giant wargame) – are suicidal.
I’ve said it before, and I’ll keep saying it – as someone who has studied the history of war, rather than warfare – wars are won with will.
Bush’s recent speech is a step toward channelling and reinforcing American will; it’s not enough, but it’s a step.
The will to fight in Iran isn’t there.
That means that if we go in, we lose. We might not lose the immediate engagements against their conventional military. But we won’t have the bottom to stick out the consequences.
A.L.
A.L.,
I’d agree with you about any place but Iran.
The advantage in Iran is that they have the apparatus of democracy in place. Been doing it for years. Elected reps etc. They are thwarted by their clerics.
Iran would be much easier post war than Iraq.
We must take them out before they get nukes. There are about six or seven months before we must move. Plenty of time to heat up the rhetoric. And find a proximate cause.
What I would look for is a changing of the Naval guard. i.e. one carrier battle group relieving another would be a very good time. Add in a CBG transiting from the East Coast to the Pacific and the Naval elements would be in place. Also a build up of ground forces under the ruberic of withdrawal. It will not take a full scale Iraqi type assault. The Iranians will rise up.
The fact that so many pro-war people here believe it is not possible or unwise in my estimation raises the odds it will happen. I put it at 63% instead of 60%.
I have been wrong before but the Iranian nuke program is a problem.
Suppose the Israelis decide to take it out ala Osirak. And the Iranians start lobbing missiles at Israel. Across American held Iraqi territory. It might be enough. Or the Syrians heat things up with Iranian help. Or Iranian sponsored Hezbollah attacks a significant American target.
The psychological preparation for war need not be long in the face of an Iranian “provocation”.
A.L.,
I think you need to take a longer view. The Israelis took a big hit because of their “unprovoked” attack on Osirak. At this point every one (sane) is glad they acted.
America will take a much smaller hit because everyone has to do business with America. We are the global economic engine. We will be the subject of loud grumbling for three months. Then fait accompli.
The #1 question for me is how does Bush fit it into his re-election campaign. If he can get the Iranians to do something stupid (not impossible) I see no problem.
Plutonium found in Iran. Powell steps up attacks on Iran.
Yahoo headlines.
Ladies and gentlemen:
The next phase of the war has begun. I’m bumping my estimate to 69% (why 69% and not 70%? I like it. ) 🙂
I should have given the nay sayers here more credit.
And my estimate is holding steady at about one tenth of one percent. About one chance in a thousand.
You guys are hoping for something that you really shouldn’t hope for — e.g., that won’t turn out well for folks like you.
Think, for a moment, about a certain analogy. I’m not sure how good this analogy is — you can decide.
In the four decades following WWII, the West, led by the U.S., fought a Cold War vs. the Eastern block, led by the Soviet Union.
This was a war. The Soviets were undeniably hostile and build thousands of nuclear weapons and pointed them at our cities. It erupted in “hot wars” on several occasions during those decades.
We’re now in another kind of perpetual war — a war on terror.
In both cases, the war becomes “hot” at times — actual military confrontations.
Now here’s the question. Was their ever a president during the Cold War era who fought three major “hot wars” in the course of a single presidential term?
If so, would that person have been reelected?
The American people recognized that the Cold War existed, and wanted us to fight it. But they wouldn’t have supported, say, going into Cuba, Vietnam, and Korea in the space of a four-year period.
I’m asking you to imagine the reaction of the American people to a president who pushes for three major wars in the space of four years — Afghanistan, Iraq, and then Iran. Especially when the second of those three wars is predicated mainly on a WMD threat that proves illusory.
Do you want to lose in 2004? You want your whole scheme of regional transformation to go down along with the Bush presidency?
That’s what you’re hoping for here, with apparent glee.
As is ususal, events are divinely indifferent to our predictions of them.
Since even evidence that blows against Trent’s thesis can be characterized as Sun-Tzu style deception, the thesis is not falsifiable. The only thing to do is wait – and see.
>The will to fight in Iran isn’t there.
A.L.
The will will never be there for Democrats. For most Democrats 9/11 never happened. That is why they are becoming irrelevant in national politics. That is also why Dean is so popular among them.
The question is whether Republicans and non-partisan Americans have the will.
For them, 9/11 happened, so it isn’t going to be a problem.
On the question of what non-partisan Americans think, check out this recent poll of independents.
Independents are more opposed to Bush’s reelection than the general public. 40% favored his reelection and 53% opposed … while, in the general public the numbers were 44% and 50%.
Mr. Swann,
When I see similar Bush poll numbers with a real Democratic presidential candidate versus “an unnamed Democratic candidate,” I might be worried.
As it is, Dean will be lucky to get more than Vermont and the District of Columbia versus Bush.
Aside from the fact that we could roll Iran without too big of a problem (it would certainly be more costly than Iraq), and aside from the fact that we just won’t have enough guys to hold the joint down, keep an eye on the 4th ID.
A couple of the big indicators will be the 4th ID and the XVIII Airborne Corps. We have to pull the airborne units out of rotation for a while, because they’ve been burning the candle at both ends. The 4th ID is critical, because it’s the Army’s showcase division and will be needed since strategic reserves would be at a low.
The fascinating thing was the decision to deploy the 25th from Hawaii. We must be pretty certain there won’t be a Korean war anytime soon if we’re pulling those folks.
All in all, though, one thing that everyone seems to have glossed over, is that in Iraq we had umpteen UN Resolutions giving us legal momentum to go in, in Iran we’ll have squat. As much as you can live with an amount of diplomatic opposition, going into another war without a very, very dramatic causus belli just won’t fly for a few more years. Add to that the problems that pacification could cause in Iran, I would be tempted to hold off until things looked a bit more propitious.
Now, if, heaven forbid, there’s another sort of 9/11-esque thing involving WMD, then all bets will be off.
First, I wouldn’t call Afghanistan a “major war”. The Taliban were routed by air power, a handful of Special Ops types, and the Northern Alliance. Our forces in Afghanistan are much smaller than in Iraq, because our strategic aims are simpler. All we’re trying to do in Afghanistan is prevent the Taliban/Al-Qaeda from using it as a secure base. If we can force them to keep moving, while we build up a decent Afghani army, we will eventually “win”.
Iraq does count as a “major war”, but the invasion campaign was a spectacular success, and we’re making progress in rebuilding the country. We obviously still have a lot to do, to supress the Saddamite resistance, but we’re making some progress there, too.
There’s a psychological component to this struggle, and the best thing that could happen, for our side, is a solid re-election victory for President Bush. The certain knowledge that America won’t abandon Iraq will convince the Iraqis that Saddam’s pals aren’t ever coming back. It will undercut the Saddamites’ morale and encourage the rest of Iraq to oppose them.
I don’t expect an invasion of Iran before the 2004 elections, at least not without some dramatic development. First, the timing would be too close to the election. The Democrats would go ballistic. There’s no way they’d support President Bush on the eve of an election. Second, I think we’ll give subversion a chance, first. A campaign to undercut the Mullahs would probably take at least a year to be successful.
Where things get interesting, is if President Bush is re-elected, and sometime in early 2005 the Iranian people decide to try to chuck the Mullahs out. If we’ve rotated the “first team” heavy divisions back into Iraq, all we’ll have to do is fly in enough light troops to relieve them of their security duties, and we’re ready to go. If the CIA guys time it right, we could have a powerful force in position just in time to support a popular uprising in Iran. Popular uprisings work better when a foreign power supports them.
Riyadh delenda est!
Now, if, heaven forbid, there’s another sort of 9/11-esque thing involving WMD, then all bets will be off.
One of the reasons for taking the war to the Middle East is to prevent that sort of thing from happening. The regimes in the region know that an American army is poised at their borders, ready to take them out, and they’ll be less likely to cooperate with Al-Qaeda efforts to obtain WMD, train for terror operations, etc.
Riyadh delenda est!
One thing which will be interesting is to see what happens with the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), the largest armed opposition force to the Mullahs at around 10,000 (& also on the State Department’s terrorist organization list). They were based mostly in Iraq and supported by Saddam, and their ideology is described as “a mix of Islam and Marxism.” There’s also the problem that a lot of the Iranian populace seems to hate the MEK as much as the mullahs, so using them in any capacity as a proxy might backfire on us.
I think I recall the U.S. taking initial steps during the war to disarm the MEK, but they’ve seemingly fallen off the map, despite the mullah’s continued insistance that the U.S. get rid of MEK.
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/mujahedeen.html
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/923454/posts