I’m probably as tired of writing about them as many of you are tired of reading me writing about them, but what can I say, someone’s got to do it.
I’d laid off this column in the LA Times Opinion (annoying registration required, use ‘laexaminer’/’laexaminer’) this Sunday, because I thought everyone else would cover it.
But no one has, and it’s me alone, standing between idiocy and the Internet.
You know how it’s all our fault? Here’s a serious commentator – the former U.N. correspondent for the LA Times – who suggests that Saddam’s failure to comply with the UN inspectors – and therefore avoid war – was, of course, the fault of the US Government.
…one factor, just as important as the others, has been overlooked. U.N. inspections were undercut from the start by U.S. policy.
American officials boasted continually that the United States would never allow the United Nations to lift economic sanctions, imposed after the Persian Gulf War, as long as Hussein remained in power. As a result, Hussein never had much incentive to cooperate with the inspectors. If the U.S. carried out its threat, sanctions would remain no matter what he did.
The United States corrupted the process of inspection.
…
But Iraqi frustration with U.S. policy may have been a significant factor in the decision by Iraqi officials, representing a weak and humiliated government, to preen and bluster and stand in the way of Butler — foolish and dangerous behavior that bolstered the view that the Iraqis had a lot to hide. When the new presidential commission investigates the flawed intelligence about Hussein’s WMD, it should not overlook the U.S. role in the subversion of inspections.
You know, at some point this kind of misjudgment of the world is no longer a matter of politics, but a matter of psychology.
The United States is not the omnipotent parent we all need to rebel against, and yet complain about when it can’t magically solve our problems without pain.
Perhaps one reason for nobody else commenting on it is nobdy saw it because of that damned registration process for getting info from that site. What are they doing wityh that data?
I stopped linking to such places several months ago, because they’re a pain in the butt, and I don’t like giving them the hit traffic in any event.
The other reason is that the indictment indicts Clinton and Albright.
Who, in this analysis, come off looking more positive to me that they usually do. “Even if the son-of-a-bitch appears to comply, we won’t trust him or deal with him.” I agree with that. Yay, Bill!
I guess it’s surprising that no right-wing kooks picked it up and said “told you so! It’s all Clinton’s fault.”
Armed Liberal:
Why are you letting this bunch of old news upset you? Meisler’s article isn’t saying anything new to anyone who’s been following the story.
What’s your counter-claim?
(1) that the US didn’t do what Meisler says it did (send signals that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam, and use UNSCOM as a cloak for its own intelligence gathering)?
(2) that even if it did, those actions didn’t create disincentives to Saddam to cooperate with the inspections?
(3) that even if they did create disincentives, they were only minor?
(4) that even if they created major disincentives, Saddam’s non-cooperation was not the USA’s fault?
If (4), that doesn’t contradict Meisler; he doesn’t discuss the law or morality of the situation, just the power play: “Hussein never had much incentive to cooperate”, not “It’s all our fault”.
Abu Frank, contra your point 5, it seems to me that “it’s the US’ fault” is Meisler’s point. His quote: “…one factor, just as important as the others, has been overlooked”
His analysis is condescending. As in, The only actor with free will in this drama is the United States. Therefore, if something goes amiss, the important thing to do is discover and arrange the facts so as to uncover the chain of causality that leads back to US guilt. I.e. your points 1-4.
In other words, “I had no choice, the (American) devil made me do it.”
If you don’t think this is a common refrain in the Illiberal Left, read more Chomsky.
As noted in a different context, this is a religious view of current events, not subject to falsification. In a sufficiently complex system, there will always be a series of facts to indicate that the US is the culpable party.
Now wait just one bloomin’ minute here. You are not standing alone! You have a bellicose woman standing beside you. Click on the URL at my name.
Hhhmph. I did a slightly more comprehensive commentary than you did, too! 😛
And I’m happy to hide behind your skirts, too!
A.L.
Carefull there, A.L.
Don’t be mentioning skirts until you read the following article. 🙂
AMac:
contra your point 5, it seems to me that “it’s the US’ fault” is Meisler’s point. His quote: “…one factor, just as important as the others, has been overlooked”
So? He’s talking about factors, not about blame, which is all I was saying there. You can believe that the US left Saddam little incentive to cooperate, and still hold that Saddam was the bad guy. If that’s your position, your attitude to Meisler’s article is not “Bullsh*t!” but “So what?”
The only actor with free will in this drama is the United States. . . In other words, “I had no choice, the (American) devil made me do it.”
Even Iraq, weak as it was, had choices; even the US, strong as it was, had to make choices. One choice the US had to make was whether to use the sanctions as an incentive for Saddam to disarm, or as an instrument to keep him contained (or preferably, get him deposed); Meisler claims, correctly, that the US chose the latter. KK (and AL?) considers this slander; I think a lot of US citizens, at the time and now (Pouncer?), would see that choice as fully justified.
I wouldn’t normally take aim at KK’s skirts from the confines of this blog, but as long as AL’s hiding behind them, I’ll feel free to do so.
Re the Clinton administration record, KK claims that Albright was merely reminding other countries of some overlooked parts of the UN resolutions, and “telling the truth as she saw it”. This claim does not stand up well against a fuller record (as compiled e.g. here). The Clinton administration studiously refused to say explicitly, whether full Iraqi compliance would or would not lead to a lifting of sanctions (for an especially fine example, see Berger’s 1997 press conference); it dropped plenty of hints that sanctions would remain as long as Saddam.
KK also claims that “if Saddam had complied, at any time from 1991 on, with the full terms of the cease-fire, we would have had to lift sanctions”. This also fails to stand up against the record and the terms of the resolutions. It’s been many times remarked, by people on all sides of the issue, that definitive verification of Iraqi compliance with the disarmament provisions was a practical impossibility. There would always be more records to demand, more interviews to conduct, more holes to dig. Certifying Iraqi compliance would always require a judgement that at some point, near enough was good enough; and if the US objective was containment / regime change, why should it ever make that judgement? And that’s without getting into any of the other demands; as long as some Kuwaiti property remained unaccounted for (and it’s certain that there always would remain some), Iraq would be out of compliance.
Given that no one was going to hold a gun to the head of the US Ambassador to the UN and force him to vote “yes”, the real constraints on the US were entirely political: how much dissent would a “no” provoke, and what how would that dissent pan out practically. There might have been times when a “no” would have been politically difficult (Meisler elsewhere suggests that late 1998 might have such a time); but to say that at any time from 1991, the US would have had to lift sanctions, is a vast over-statement.
Abu Frank –
I think your arguments are wrong, but they are damn good arguments and to take them on will require some time on my part. Tonight was ‘buying rings’ night, and I have scattered meetings tomorrow – but I ought to get some time to reply in some depth.
A.L.
Armed Liberal,
Look closely at Abu’s arguments. They are all on shakey ground, when you catch the real drift…
And we’ll be standing by during your rebuttal, to cheer you on and make sure you nail him on all relevant points.
The only problem I see with Abu’s analysis is that Bill and Maddie were “wobbly” in the Thatcher sense of the term.
A related choice the U.S. (Bill & Maddie) could have made was to interpret Saddam himself as a WMD — a loose cannon, so to speak. They could have declared openly and forthrightly that the U.S. would continue to support sanctions, enforce “no-fly zones, and other military supervision over Iraq, and oppose trade and normalization; all unless and until Saddam stepped aside. In short, rather the way Bush has chosen to treat Palestine and Arafat.
~We will help the nation and the people develop; and when if the current failed leadership renounces power and we start fresh, unhindered by the mistakes of the past.~ Quasi-quote
That seems to be the subtext of the Clinton era policy, and not a bad one. But the great and subtle communicator couldn’t bring himself to be so blunt. The inarticulate schlub now enjoying the spin of the swivel chair in the Oval Office can barely manage to keep two words lumped together in a bumper sticker policy, but that policy is appropriate: Regime Change.
Which, again, makes sense to me. Had Saddam disposed of bio/chem weapons and pledged to avoid nukes, he STILL could have and would have been primary exporter of “conventional” bomb-vests to Palestine. (Has anybody forgotten the factory and warehouse of mass produced suicide bomb vests uncovered in the first few weeks post-war?) Or explosive-laden speedboats to reprise the “USS COLE” attack. Etc.
Resisting international “humanitarian” pressure to lift sanctions — coupled with continuing demonstrations of US/UK military command of Iraqi airspace — were good moves by Clinton and team. But these were undercut by his own compassion, and his passions. (The latter for Monica, leading his perhaps-justifiable strikes against Saddam to be interpreted by everyone, INCLUDING SADDAM, as “wag the dog” symbolism.)
That was Clinton’s big problem: Why should we believe and react to his warnings when he had so many obvious selfish incentives to lie? This is Shrub’s big advantage: We HAVE to believe in and react to his warnings seriously, because how can anyone convince a self-deluded moron to change his mind?
Pouncer:
Bill and Maddie were “wobbly” in the Thatcher sense of the term.
True I suspect of Bill. My guess is that his heart wasn’t really in the hard line against Saddam; that he held to it only because a softer line would have been untenable domestically. “Clinton … in a pre-inaugural interview . . . held out the hope that his administration would look on Saddam differently if the tyrant mended his ways. . . This . . . was roundly condemned, and the Clinton Administration . . . would never again be caught looking soft on Saddam.” (Meisler 1998)
I’m not aware of any wobbly behaviour by Maddie.
the great and subtle communicator couldn’t bring himself to be so blunt.
Besides any internal wobbliness, he had reason to avoid such bluntness; it would have undermined the sanctions.
[Saddam] STILL could have and would have been primary exporter of “conventional” bomb-vests to Palestine. (Has anybody forgotten the factory and warehouse of mass produced suicide bomb vests uncovered in the first few weeks post-war?)
I remember the vests, but as I read the reports they were intended for domestic consumption not export. Have you got any citations for the export story?