I consider Phil Carter one of the two or three smartest people blogging about foreign and military affairs. So I’m completely puzzled at this:
Update V: David Frum, a former Bush Administration speech writer who now pens a ‘blog for the National Review, has an interesting take on the Clarke allegations from the perspective of someone who served in the same GWB West Wing.
bq.. “I have yet to read his book, but I have studied his interview, and I think I understand his argument.
Clarke seems to have become so enwrapped in the technical problems of terrorism that he has lost sight of its inescapably political context. One reason that his line of argument did not get the hearing in the Bush administration that he would have wished was that he did tend to present counter-terrorism as a discrete series of investigations and apprehensions: an endless game of terrorist whack-a-mole.
The Bush administration thought in bigger and bolder terms than that. They favored grand strategies over file management. Clarke may have thought that he was dramatizing his case by severing the threat from al Qaeda from its context in the political and economic failures of the Arab and Islamic world.
Instead, his way of presenting his concerns seems to have had the perverse effect of making the terrorist issue look small and secondary – of deflating rather than underscoring its importance.
And this propensity continues.
The huge dividing line in the debate over terror remains just this: Is the United States engaged in a man-hunt – for bin Laden, for Zawahiri, for the surviving alumni of the al Qaeda training camps? – or is it engaged in a war with the ideas that animated those people and with the new generations of killers who will take up the terrorist mission even if the US were to succeed in extirpating every single terrorist now known to be alive and active? Clarke has aligned himself with one side of that debate – and it’s the wrong side.
p. What’s Mr. Frum saying? Is he saying that Mr. Clarke’s allegations were right, but that he just wasn’t articulate enough to sell his agenda to the President? Is Mr. Frum, who was part of the White House political apparatus, saying that Mr. Clarke’s real failures were political — not factual? Did the Bush Administration really ignore a national security threat because one of its advisors couldn’t find a way to sell the problem politically? If true, this statement by Mr. Frum is a damning indictment of the entire White House and National Security Council, and it indicates a near-total breakdown of the national security process. The idea behind the NSC staff, intelligence community, Joint Chiefs, and all the other systems in the national security process is to professionalize the decisions of the President in this area — not to politicize them. Now comes Mr. Frum, saying essentially that the White House ignored its in-house expert on terrorism because he couldn’t package it well enough.
No, Phil, that’s not it. What Frum is saying is pretty obvious, and echoes what a lot of folks (including me) have been saying; that the notion that 9/11 was caused by an isolated group of bad actors – and that the appropriate response is to capture (or kill) that select group of bad actors – is just wrong. It’s the doctrine that the Clinton team followed pre 9/11, and which they executed pretty darn well.
It was wrong.
Frum is arguing that the alternative to ‘whack a mole’ is to unplug the mechanism which keeps popping moles up, and that to do that, you have to change state behavior – a political act and a political decision. Clarke isn’t being criticized for not playing office politics enough in selling his message, he’s being criticized for selling a message which ignored the geopolitics of what is going on.
I can’t believe that Phil doesn’t see that (note that this doesn’t suggest that he necessarily has to agree with it, just that he’s busting Frum for making a different argument than he’s actually making).
But that wasn’t Phil’s question. He was asking if the Bush Administration ignored an urgent problem because the way he approached the question didn’t fit with the administration’s preconceptions.
The other problem with your counter is that it presumes that fighting terrorism was a pre-9/11 priority for Bush, and that Clarke would have been listened to if he’d put the plan in a larger context. I don’t think there’s any evidence to support that.
A.L.:
Too much centrifugalism and too little centripetalism is making even the best of us stupid.
It’s actually pretty darned irrefutable that 9/11 itself was caused by a group of bad actors, isolated or not.
Let’s not forget that it was, in fact, caused by a group of people with a unique combination of experience, fanaticism, financing, and expertise.
So I think your take is dead. wrong.
Kevin:
I’d say that it’s not a matter of “preconceptions” as “paradigm.” The dysfunction is that they have a details expert who, because of his specialization, is wedded to an inappropriate paradigm (which Frum describes as “whack-a-mole.” When tasked with the mission of looking for ties between AQ and Saddam that, by virtue of his paradigm (rather than any real empirical evidence, as Dan Darling observes), he felt the task beneath him, so simply didn’t perform. Apparently Clarke’s tunnel vision was so extreme that he even gave credence to the theory of a McVeigh/Qaeda link (while dismissing out of hand the notion af a Saddam/Qaeda link because it would necessitate a paradigm shift).
It seems to me that the most alarming aspect of the Bush team’s terrorism strategy was that they kept this fellow on the payroll for so long.
praktike –
Everything humans do is done by individual groups of humans. But we also look hard at the conditions under which they live and operate – which is kind of a fundamental liberal/ conservative distinction, now that I think about it – and the environment in which Al Quieda grew: nurtured by state actors, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, with assistance from other actors, including Iraq and Syria, and funding from all of the above – is what’s at issue.
One group believes in changing the environment, one group believes in catching the bad guys. That’s the debate.
I’m on one side, you’re on the other. You say I’m wrong – but the facts so far suggest the opposite. The unarguable facts are that Clarke & Co. did a damn good job of chasing down the Cole and WTC I terrorist actors. But that didn’t do much to weaken the organizations, though.
A.L.
In 2002, Clarke should have come out pointing finger at the Bush adm., instead of acting as its mouthpiece. He should point out Bush’s incompetency, he owed the Sept.11 victims’ families at least that. He also owed the American people for speaking up. After all, we are still in danger of being attacked. He has an obligation to wake the country up if the Bush Adm. was so reckless. He should have quit in protest of the Iraq war if it was so wrong for the country. May be the country could pause and not be pushed into the War by the Bushies. My conclusion is Clark cannot be trusted, he is an unprincipled self-important bureaucrat. He was either unprincipled in Aug. 2002 when he made those background briefings, and did not try hard enough to prevent the Iraq war, or he is unprincipled now, trying to hawk his book. If the Clinton adm. didn’t take his advice in eight years, why should the Bush adm. take it without questioning it, and adopt his recommendation in eight months? He should have been fired by Clinton for his advice in Somalia, his advice in hitting a Sudanese pharm. company, his advice in not taking BinLaden from the Sudanese, and his failures in the first World Trade Tower bombing in 1993, in Kobar Tower, in Tim McV’s Oklahoma disaster, in USS Cole. He was the counter-terrorism head in those years. He should be charged with dereliction of duty or incompetency. If head should roll, it should have been his. If Clarke blew the whistle in 2002, he might have lost his job, (he still has his pension for having survived in the bureaucracy for 30 years), but kept his credibility and integrity. Now, he has his money from the book and may be gratitude from JFK(erry), but … May be those other things are only important to fools.
A.L.
You are going too far in suggesting that the “facts” support your view of the way to prosecute the War on Terra. What are these “facts”?
The idea that you cannot go chasing all over the globe whacking down individual terrorist cells is probably correct, although I’m not 100% sure that you can say this. For example, what happens if you just scale up this approach (“The Clinton Approach”) 100X? $150 billion might be able to subsidize that.
And, the seeming “alternative” that you are so wedded to, attack states that sponsor terrorists to deny them a refuge or other forms of material support, appears to make some sense in a “Big Strategy” kind of way.
But the obvious problem becomes the fact that America simply cannot credibly threaten to punish all states that might or do harbor terrorists. The success of this strategy then turns on intimidation. Nations must believe that we can or will invade if they play on the wrong side.
But herein lies the major weakness. There is no way to predict that this “message” will be received with the intended purity or power. And in fact if done wrong, as I have argued at length is how Bush is proceeding, the opposite may in fact be true…terrorism is inspired to grow. Even if states like Libya give in (putting aside for the moment the shakiness of that assertion), terrorists will always be able to find a niche to fluorish in.
This is a bigger world than the one where the “Bush Doctrine” can be successful in.
One group believes in changing the environment, one group believes in catching the bad guys. That’s the debate.
I’m on one side, you’re on the other.
Wrong.
I’m not on the “other side,” and nor is Clarke. That’s a very disingenuous way to frame the debate, and you know it.
In fact Clarke talks an awful lot about ideologies and conditions in the book and in interviews. And he, like me, believes that invading and occypying Iraq was not the proper way to ameliorate these problems.
Reasonable do disagree the means to the same end, as you will admit.
But my point is that this spin about a “broader strategy” instead of an aggressive go-get-’em apprach is nonsense. You must go get them. That is fundamental and it should have been priority number one.
should read “Reasonable people can and do disagree on …”
Respectfully, I don’t regard “sending a message” to other states is the primary reason for invading state sponsors of terrorism so much as it is removing very dangerous threats to US national security. In the case of Afghanistan, leaving the Taliban in power was not an option because they were tied at the hip to al-Qaeda and almost certainly would assist them in attacking us again.
The same thing goes for any other government that knowingly and willing provides al-Qaeda with safe haven. Attacking such nations or otherwise dealing with is not a public relations statement but rather a reaction to threats against US national security.
there’s a link out there on intapundit or oxblog in which Rice talks presciently about AQ and Bin Laden BEFORE Bush was elected..if I’m nt mistaken
In fact, the “message” we inadvertently sent to Al Qaeda by invading Iraq instead of finishing the job may have been “We don’t understand you, our intelligence isn’t very good, and we suffer from the mistaken notion than that a unilateral occupation of an Arab country will undercut our support in the Arab world.”
er “your support in the Arab world”
praktike,
In fact, no. Read the Zarqawi memo again–I believe the message he received was far more along the lines of “We sit in the center of Arab power; your efforts to dislodge us are futile and call the world’s attention to your impotence.” Remember his fear that the Al Qaeda-backed insurgency was “suffocating?”
hmmm…that’s a fair point, but (a) Bin Laden didn’t write that memo.
Remember, the FLN lost the battle but won the war.
praktike,
Well, bin Laden may or may not be dead, and in any case, was not known for controlling the operations side of al Qaeda–my point is that bin Laden wouldn’t have been in a position to write a similar memo. If he’s alive, he would probably RECEIVE such a memo as a mid-action report from operatives on the ground, like Zarqawi. So saying that bin Laden didn’t write the memo strikes me as a bit of a non sequitur.
I don’t see parallels between Algeria and Iraq. The “Iraqi” insurgency is funded and supported by several sources, most of whom are external to Iraq, and the remainder are predominantly Baathist (led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, IIRC). Insurgencies only work when they have a broad base of popular support. This one doesn’t, and will therefore fail.
Back to your main point, however. Your charge is that our operation in Afghanistan was incomplete, and therefore sent the message that we weren’t really serious. What efforts on the part of the coalition in Afghanistan would have sent a different message? The shreds and tatters of al Qaeda’s central structure that survived the Afghanistan operation are believed to be in either Iran or northern Pakistan. An American-led invasion of either country would be, well, complicated, but as far as I can tell, launching another invasion would be the only way to put the Afghanistan offensive on a more aggressive footing.
You know maybe I’m stupid, but from where I sit I see the Iraq War as an amazing success. All over the Islamic World, including places like Libya and Pakistan, even Syria, change is occurring that was unthinkable over a year ago. But what do I know? Maybe it’s just like the old story about the guy walking in on his wife with his best friend, “Who’re you going to believe? Me or your lying eyes?” Beats me.
hmmm…your arguments are stong, samuel barnes…first let me clarify what I meant by bringing up bin Laden. Think of Douglas MacArthur in Korea–he wanted to do all sorts of aggressive things that might very well have triggered a nuclear war. And when he came back to the U.S. to push his argument before the Senate, it became clear that MacArthur had not thought through the larger geopolitical ramifications of his ideas. If you read his testimony, you see plainly that he was not thinking at a high enough strategic level.
Now, with Zarkawi, he may well be right about the local struggle in Iraq, but the core leadership of Al Qaeda (and I used bin Laden as a convenient shorthand) has to look at the larger picture. And I think it furthers jihad to have this pagan force that is occupying an Arab country in the Middle East, and basically by itself. Zarkawi isn’t clued in to this, necessarily. He just wants to win on a local level.
Moving along …
I didn’t mean to imply a perfect fit betweeen Algeria and Iraq. Indeed, as you point out, there are differences. We are not France, for instance. Nor are we torturing people or practicing a form of aprtheid, as the French did. And Algeria’s Arab population was far more internally unified than Iraq’s, with its fractious ethnic rivalries.
But it gets murkier when you say that the insurgency is bound to fail.
I think it’s certainly inarguable that the insurgents themselves will not assume power, it’s also true that they can create a lot of chaos and goad the Americans into taking draconian measures that will undermine their support.
So while the population doesn’t support the Ba’athists per se, it’s also true that the Sunnis want the occupation to end, that the Shi’ites, that the IGC is seen as unrepresentative, etc. And the overwhelming majority of Arabs now suspect our motives. The Zionists! The oil!
But the broader problem is, why invade a country and put a distinctly American stamp on an occupation of said country at the same time you want to convince the Islamic world that a war on terror is not a war on Islam? Why set up a political equation that strengthens Shiite radicals like Sadr? And why not maximize your chances for having your new constitution seen as legitimate? Have we just enabled, by force of arms, the ascendance of a Sunni theocracy?
Your stronger point, I think, is in wondering whether we would have the same problem if we were to have a larger footprint in, say, Waziristan. I think the same risk of inflamation applies as with the Iraq adventure, but not the same benefits. If you think about it, which was the larger and more immediate threat? Saddam or al Qaeda? Hindsight is 20/20, but one has to admit that dealing Al Qaeda a death blow would be a powerful benefit. Moreover, we were already there, so most of the blowback type of effects would already be incorporated into a more vigorous effort to get Al Qaeda.
I don’t deny that a democracy in the heart of the Arab world would be a powerful thing. But I also believe that good change happens much more slowly than bad change, which can be catastrophic. There’s a misapprehension among many that progress is inexorable; I’m not sure history bears that out. Just look at Iran circa 1979, Cambodia in the 1970s and 80s, etc. Our presence in both of those places had incredible distortive effects.
So I don’t think you can make the case that Iraq justified the stripping of resources from Afghanistan and merited a non-multilateral invasion and occupation. I think one could make a very powerful argument that, upon finishing the job in Afghanistan, it was time to go to NATO and take out Saddam once and for all. But I think one can really defend, especially given what we now know, the need to go in so early and with such hostility from world popular opinion.
And finally, I’d like to make one point about world popular opinion. It may be “wrong” or “morally backward”–as some here often argue–but it must be taken into account, because it has real consequences in the real world, and its effects are non-linear.
Bush’s response seems to be that you can get rid of the moles by blowing uo the entire golf course.
Or is it more like, while we were working on a global strategy to eliminate moles they destroted the golf course.
Or maybe you should try making clear statements instead of cute anologies like that idiot Reagan.
praktike,
I don’t have the numbers lined up, but you are aware that the Afghanistan operation was not a large-footprint invasion from a military standpoint, right? That was the whole point with the Special Forces/Northern Alliance strategy. I just don’t see the either/or implication with regard to “finishing Afghanistan” and “invading Iraq.” (Unless by “finishing Afghanistan” you mean continuing operations onto Iranian or Pakistani turf–which I’ll get to in a moment.)
An ancillary benefit to the Iraqi invasion was the flypaper strategy that Zarqawi was bemoaning. The point of the strategy was to draw off al Qaeda’s (and related terrorist organizations’) resources so they would be unavailable elsewhere. This means that the benefits are not merely limited to gains against terrorists with a parochial interest (like Zarqawi), but also have a spillover effect in the wider war. Sure, Zarqawi was probably begging for more resources, but the effect is that the higher-ups in al Qaeda (from their perspectives) either have to grant him those resources (flypaper success!) or pull out and take the loss of Iraq as a major hit to their prestige.
One of the major pieces of evidence that the insurgency is failing is the shift in focus from attacking American/coalition troops to softer civilian targets. That is a tacit admission that killing American troops was not a successful tactic in terms of getting us to cut and run. Targeting Iraqi civilians is a strategy aimed at quashing cooperation with us, but it has the side effect of driving a wedge between the terrorists and the civilian population.
The Iraqis as a whole don’t hate our troops. Quite a lot of them don’t like being occupied, but they know that life now is immeasurably better now than under Saddam, and 71% of them expect life to be even better a year from now. Frankly, the situation over there looks promising, and with hard work and patience, I think the result will be something to be greatly admired–not perfect, of course, but very, very good. The next major test point will be the handover of sovereignty this summer. I am optimistic, but we’ll see how it goes.
Now, as to invading Waziristan. Saddam was an enemy of the U.S., so removing him neutralized an adversary and may make us an ally. Musharraf is at least nominally an ally of the U.S., but invading Waziristan would force him to move decisively against American forces or be deposed by his own people. I think your reference to MacArthur is somewhat ironic, too, since Pakistan was well-known to have nuclear weapons, and Iraq was not. Moreover, Pakistan fits into the power relationships of South and East Asia in awkward ways (regarding India and China, in particular). If push came to shove, and we really had to invade Pakistan, we could, but the repercussions would substantially outweigh those involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
I perfectly agree that the real-world effects of action ought to be a consideration. Nor do I think that international public opinion should be blithely ignored. However, what the citizenry of any other country thinks places a far-distant second to our security requirements. Should another country attempt to impede actions that promote our security, that attempt will be weighed and remembered, as is proper.
P.S. We could not have used NATO to take out Saddam. France and Germany are both NATO members, remember? The obstructionist tactics they used in the U.N. Security Council would have been duplicated in spades within the context of NATO.
The Kosovo operation under Clinton ensured that NATO will never be in charge of another military operation again. I doubt we will eliminate the organization any time soon, but it’s a dead letter, militarily speaking.
praktike-
I talked about Afghanistan –
A.L.
Isn’t one of the primary supporting sources for the contention that Clinton’s response to earlier Al Qaeda attacks was the totally wrong approach, and only emboldened Al Qaeda by making them think we were ‘weak’…
… the writings and speeches of Osama bin Laden himself? That whole “weak horse, strong horse” routine he’s infamous for?
If Osama himself gets up and says ‘I thought the Americans were pussies who could be safely attacked because of what Clinton did’, then shouldn’t that be a nice big finisher to the argument?
I know I’m late with this, but in case anyone is still following these comments…
I read Phil Carter for a while, then took him off my bookmark list because he’s almost always wrong and too long. He completely misunderstands David Frum’s plain English meaning, which as you report it in the main post.
But, in order to not end on a negative note, the best daily analysis of all this comes from Wretchard at http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/
And that’s not me, or anyone I know. Just the best, bar none
Sam – I hope your optimism about Iraq is well-placed. I sometimes share it, and reading your comment is encouraging. I guess we’ll just have to wait and see.
I do want to clarify some things about Afghanistan, as it seems my comments here were muddled.
I’m actually not talking about rebuilding — I think we learned a lot from Somalia about the limits to what we can reasonably accomplish under feudal/tribal systems. Nevertheless, I am troubled by the resurgence of the heroin trade. I wonder where the profits are going?
I agree that our footprint in Afghanistan has been relatively small, and there are certainly good parts about that, as A.L. points out (and I’ve agreed with him before about that, IIRC).
But I was speaking more about really making sure we take out the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, with some likely incursions into Waziristan. I think Musharraf will look the other way, and I think he’s probably already looking the other way on a number of things that we’re doing in Pakistan. Surely, the limited amount of help he’s given us has come with great personal risk, but at the same time he owes us his life wrt that car bombing attack that our technology foiled. And I have no doubt that he owes us, bigtime, for reacting as mildly as we did to the “revelations” about Khan’s proliferation efforts.
The good news is that it appears we are going to finish the military job relatively soon. We’ve got a forward base set up on the border, and the rumors are flying.
The bad news is that we could have done so a year ago as a logical continuation of the Afghanistan war. That is, not declare victory prematurely, get distracted by Iraq (and divert Arab linguists, special forces, etc.), give the Islamic world the impression that we’re at war with Islam as a whole, and then come back to finish matters. And now we’ve get a military that is stretch very thin. How capable are we of responding to a major military crisis right now?
Maybe everything will turn up gumdrops and lollypops in the end, and I’ll eat some crow. But I suspect that it won’t be clear exactly what’s going on.
As for NATO, I think they’re actually in Afghanistan right now, so I’m not sure what you’re talking about. I think it’s pretty hard to determine what could have happened wrt Iraq if a different administration with better relationships and more apt diplomacy had been in charge. There was already a lot of water under the bridge at that point…the fact that Bush was so hated by European voters by then surely had a lot to do with our problems. Who knows if France and Germany could have been brought on board? I don’t think 100% confidence on either side is warranted, yet I remain retrospectively optimistic that a different set of inputs could have produced a different set of outputs.
Anyway, it was pretty damn hard to get NATO to act in Yugoslavia, too, but eventually they came around. And guess what? There were problems with it, but it wasn’t nearly the disaster that you folks make it out to be. In the end, we achieved our military and strategic objectives without too many casualties, and the slow and arduous process of putting things back together is ongoing. It’s not a major drain on us, genocide is no longer occuring, and the region is relatively stable. And Milosevic is going to be away for life.
Consider the big picture. We don’t want to completely “finish the job” in Afghanistan. Otherwise, we’re not welcome anymore. As it stands now, we’re needed and we keep a robust miltary presence. Next, we occupy Iraq. And that’s the big, bold gamble (gotta love it). If we can turn Iraq into a semi-ally, something like Kuwait, we can also keep a good military presence there. And last I heard, there is a growing student movement in a certain country sandwiched by these new American bases – the real enemy. If Bush wins, it could work. If Kerry wins, it will unravel.
Dan,
Now you’re getting a little whacky on me.
“Respectfully, I don’t regard “sending a message” to other states is the primary reason for invading state sponsors of terrorism so much as it is removing very dangerous threats to US national security.”
Have you not argued previously that the only valid approach to fighting “state sponsored terrorist” is a “credible threat of force”? And isn’t Bush’s “boldness” in action one of the reasons you support him? Because if the primary reason is removing threats, we certainly cannot affort to commit our military to very many at one time. We simply don’t have the resources to make this approach viable.
“The same thing goes for any other government that knowingly and willing provides al-Qaeda with safe haven. Attacking such nations or otherwise dealing with is not a public relations statement but rather a reaction to threats against US national security.
What level of “threat” should provoke a military invasion-type action? If the bar is as low as it is for Iraq, we’ll never be able to keep up.
In other words, Dan, if we’re not sending a message first and foremost with military action, it is nearly worthless as a strategy to fight terrorism on a global scale.
praktike:
“Anyway, it was pretty damn hard to get NATO to act in Yugoslavia, too, but eventually they came around. And guess what? There were problems with it, but it wasn’t nearly the disaster that you folks make it out to be. In the end, we achieved our military and strategic objectives without too many casualties, and the slow and arduous process of putting things back together is ongoing. It’s not a major drain on us, genocide is no longer occuring, and the region is relatively stable. And Milosevic is going to be away for life.”
Reuters :
“Solana Says Kosovo Albanian Parties Need Purging
Kosovo Albanian political parties must purge themselves of extremists suspected of helping to direct anti-Serb violence that rocked the U.N. protectorate last week, the EU’s foreign policy chief said on Thursday…”
i knew that was coming…hence “relatively”
Praktike:
As others probably have pointed out, the fact that Milosevic will probably do life in a Dutch prison does not alter the fact that Operation ALLIED FORCE was a systemic disaster. Targeting had to be approved by a combined staff, one that included the Greeks and the French, who had conflicting interests. Intelligence was passed on to the Serbs by French officers.
It was a near disaster. NATO might do some peacekeeping gigs, but it will never perform a major military operation again.
And the dire consequences of NATO involvement of targeting were…a bit of a delay in the eventual outcome. No disasters.
And among the benefits of NATO involvement were that NATO countries had a significant invesment and interest in ensuring the eventual success of our efforts in Yugoslavia. And low and behold, they’re now carrying the load there. We have less than 5,000 troops in the region, I believe.
But that [Whack-a-mole] didn’t do much to weaken the [terror] organizations, though.
Looking at Madrid, Bali, and so on, I don’t find it obvious that the Iraq War has either. The Afghan War deprived a transnational terrorist movement of bases, infrastructure, materiel, and volunteers, and that much-derided law enforcement response has made progress in seizing those cash assets left in the West. The Iraq War? Al Qaeda had no physical assets there, so perforce we didn’t destroy them. Al Qaeda doesn’t publish recruitment figures, so it’s hard to tell if the Grand Drain the Swamp Strategy is working. There’s an argument to be made that the Iraq War has cowed the neighboring states, some of which were disinclined to support Al Qaeda in the first place. Even if this is true to some extent, the bang for the buck (and coffin) seems weak.
Vesicle Trafficker:
“Have you not argued previously that the only valid approach to fighting ‘state sponsored terrorist’ is a ‘credible threat of force?'”
Not necessarily, as the diplomatic route when possible tends to result in less people ending up dead. However, talk without a willingness to act upon it is just that … talk.
“And isn’t Bush’s ‘boldness’ in action one of the reasons you support him?”
Boldness is a personal quality and as I don’t know Bush I can’t comment on it. I support Bush because I believe his policies to be correct with respect to the war on terrorism, under which I include Iraq. More to the point, I would note that the number of governments that he has successfully altered or forced to shift policy without the contribution of US military forces (Liberia, Georgia, Libya, to a certain extent Pakistan) is greater than those in which he has employed our troops against standing governments.
“Because if the primary reason is removing threats, we certainly cannot affort to commit our military to very many at one time.”
I concur entirely, which is why I am in favor of (in an ideal world, anyway) expanding the size of the military to better deal with the current threat environment, particularly with regard to having enough troops in reserve at any given time to fight a conventional war with North Korea.
“We simply don’t have the resources to make this approach viable.”
I disagree. Currently, the main limitation we have in terms of dealing with various threats is the number of troops – we’re already stretched too thin for a number of reasons, many of which I don’t regard as Bush’s fault to begin with. More to the point, the US military as it stands today was not designed with the primary intention of fighting a guerrilla war to begin with – one of the reasons why I think that our troops in commanders in Iraq have done such a great job with dismantling the Baathist remnants is so much of a tribute to them. New troops are being trained for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism duties to a far greater extent than ever were in the past and my own view is that our military will be much better at this in large part due to the lessons learned in Iraq.
“What level of ‘threat’ should provoke a military invasion-type action? If the bar is as low as it is for Iraq, we’ll never be able to keep up.”
I really don’t think that we’re going to agree on this because of the fact that you have to keep in mind that I regard a great deal more of the evidence for the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection than you do as genuine. To put it simply, if a nation-state is actively assisting al-Qaeda in its war against us then that nation-state should be party to any retaliation that gets dealt out. I really don’t see what’s so difficult about entertaining this position …
“In other words, Dan, if we’re not sending a message first and foremost with military action, it is nearly worthless as a strategy to fight terrorism on a global scale.”
I disagree, because there are some options where non-military or non-US intervention has successfully worked. In Georgia, Shevardnadze got tossed out by his own people and in Liberia we let the regional big-shot Nigeria due the bulk of the grunt work when it came to dealing with Taylor and his minions. This is where I think a lot of successful multilateral diplomacy has in fact occurred but is not acknowledged as such by critics of the administration.
Andrew J. Lazarus:
“Al Qaeda doesn’t publish recruitment figures, so it’s hard to tell if the Grand Drain the Swamp Strategy is working.”
Zarqawi’s letter stated that the insurgency is suffocating. I’d say that he’d definitely be in a position to know such things.
“There’s an argument to be made that the Iraq War has cowed the neighboring states, some of which were disinclined to support Al Qaeda in the first place.”
Libya would be disinclined to support al-Qaeda in any event because of the group’s efforts to overthrow Qadaffi during the 1990s. I myself view the Iraq War as a necessary step for reasons that you and I have discussed in the past, but I think it prudent to point this out.
Bobs:
Not yet, because the infestation is not epidemic.
But which of Arabia’s “friends” are letting them in on the fact that what you say is a possibilty under not-too-difficult-to-imagine circumstances.
The Golf Course is under new management.
I’m no rocket sciencetist but from where I’m sitting,what I see:
1-) Afghanistan is no longer under Taliban’s control.
2-) Iraqi resources is no longer at Sadddam’s whim.
3-) India and Pakistan are now in speaking terms.
4-) SA royals realizes their royal behinds are in jeopardy at the hands of their own subjects.
5-) Libya/Quaddafi now clearly understands the wrath of US when provoked.
6-) Kurds are raising their voices in Syria knowing US military is near and dear.
7-) Usual suspects tapped to cash cow (Saddam’s Iraq) at UN are shaking,not yet stirred but Bush administration will get to the bottom of it in the near future.
Just as ME brilliant minds thought they could dump Israel into Mediterrean,they found themselves cornered by a grand strategy by US and the Bush Administration.
Now it is up to each country try to choke out the terrorism disease living in their midst.
No need to show me to the door,I’ll get me coat now.
Bali – Oct. 2002
Iraq – Mar. 2003
See the problem here?
Dan;
“Not necessarily, as the diplomatic route when possible tends to result in less people ending up dead. However, talk without a willingness to act upon it is just that … talk.
You’re setting up a false dichotomy. The two alternatives are not War or Talk. There are many levels of intervention that fall well short of a full invasion but could involve a rather significant military effort. Nothing in your argument convinces me that all-out war with Iraq was neccessary or wise.
In addition, you are essentially rewording what I stated above, that of sending a “message” with military action, but in a softer form. By what other means will it become known that “talk” will be backed up with a “willingness to act”? Are you suggesting that we act in every case where we threaten to?
“I really don’t think that we’re going to agree on this because of the fact that you have to keep in mind that I regard a great deal more of the evidence for the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection than you do as genuine.”
That is true. But forgive me if I tend to regard the views of people like Richard Clarke, David Kay, Hans Blix or even Paul O’Neill as more reliable.
In most of these exchanges we have been focusing only on offensive strategies to dealing with terrorism. But I’m curious how you feel defensive strategies fit in to the picture? I regard Bush as being similarly preoccupied with military solutions at the expense of enacting public safety approaches that are needed to “harden the homeland”. It is baffling (infuriating, actually) to me as a citizen of this country and as someone who lives within 40 miles of the WTC that our government hasn’t been a lot more aggressive about this. This is not OT because we only have limited resources to do these things and clearly invading Iraq has taken priority over domestic security, no matter how you cut it.
I’d suggest NATO has failed in the former Yugoslavia, just as the UN has failed in Haiti.
I’m willing to entertain the suggestion that maybe the U.S. would have failed, too. But does that mean the problem is beyond solution? Or does it mean that there is, in diplomacy as in kitchens, a tendency for too many cooks to spoil the broth?
Perhaps a “mentor” country, acting unilaterally, can do better for a “protege” neo-nation, than have, so far, coalitions?
I still would like to see the French do better in the Ivory Coast. Maybe Canada can show the world how to fix Haiti. Would it be nice if Poland would adopt, say, Romania?
Just saying, there may be a place for one-to-one interventions instead of multi-lateral, coalition, consensus-of-nations-acting-under-existing-treaty sort of approaches.
Zarqawi’s letter stated that the insurgency is suffocating. I’d say that he’d definitely be in a position to know such things.
Dan: Even assuming this is true, AQ recruitment worldwide could be up.
Bali – Oct. 2002
Iraq – Mar. 2003
David: OK, scratch Bali and subtitute Morocco, May 2003. Point stands.
Pouncer,
A great misfortune in the world today is that the suggestion you make would rapidly be interpreted as colonialism.
Another is that the French may well have done as much as the can in Ivory Coast.
Dear A.L.-
I am still amazed that you are willing to attach yourself as a liberal to people like praktike. A person like praktike is such a mental powerhouse that he can do a full double pike half gainer in his own head. It has to be exhausting to work that hard to hold onto an illusion. How can we as Americans continue our fight for safety with people like praktike on our side, constantly sapping our own defenses?
i have known you for years and you have consistently been a “compassionate conservative.” Why are you so afraid of that moniker? Be Strong. Be proud to be a Bush lover.
Thanks, Mike. You’re a great guy. What do you know about me?
Vesicle Trafficker:
“You’re setting up a false dichotomy. The two alternatives are not War or Talk. There are many levels of intervention that fall well short of a full invasion but could involve a rather significant military effort. Nothing in your argument convinces me that all-out war with Iraq was neccessary or wise.”
While I recognize that this was done for entirely separate reasons than the terrorism dilemma, the US was engaging in significant military efforts with respect to Iraq for over a decade ranging from the no-fly zone patrols to Operation Desert Fox to arming the PUK and KDP. All of these activities had not succeeded in dissuading the regime from adopting anti-US policies and one could even argued that it encouraged them to do so because the regime believed that bombing raids were the worst that it was going to get.
More to point, at least part of the reason as to why I don’t think that you believe that an all-out war with Iraq was necessary or wise is because you don’t accept the same premises I do with regard to the Iraq/al-Qaeda link. If you did, I very much suspect that you would have supported or at least considered supporting the war. Similarly, if I did not accept the existence of such a link I would be extremely skeptical of the US-led invasion. So it would seem that we have reached something of an impasse on this particular issue, not that I think that that in of itself prevents us from having further debate on the topic.
“In addition, you are essentially rewording what I stated above, that of sending a ‘message’ with military action, but in a softer form. By what other means will it become known that ‘talk’ will be backed up with a ‘willingness to act?’ Are you suggesting that we act in every case where we threaten to?”
In terms of threatening military action unless a situation is resolved or steps are at least taken in that direction? Certainly. You don’t bring out that card unless you are prepared to use it, otherwise prospective opponents of the US will act under the belief that they can strike with impunity because all of our tough talk is just that, talk. If nothing else, it might make people think a little clearer before utilizing such rhetoric …
“That is true. But forgive me if I tend to regard the views of people like Richard Clarke, David Kay, Hans Blix or even Paul O’Neill as more reliable.”
Clarke argued in favor of such a connection in 1998 when he advocated an attack on al-Shifa and has yet to sufficiently resolve this apparent contradiction in his arguments. Praktike brought up the fact in another comments thread that in his book he says that Sudan may have hired Iraqi scientists to produce VX but does not even touch on the issue of Emad Husayn Abdullah al-Ani, the father of the Iraqi VX program who was allegedly involved with al-Shifa plant in Sudan at the time of the US. Now then, al-Ani was an Iraqi government official at the time and as such surrendered to US forces in Iraq in April 2003 and if he was passing on VX expertise to al-Qaeda he was almost certainly doing so with the approval of Saddam Hussein.
As for Kay, Blix, and O’Neill, I was unaware that any of them have even commented upon any connection between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda, but if they have I don’t see why such a thing would even fall under their area of expertise to begin with given that the first two are WMD experts and O’Neill was the treasury secretary so I find it rather bizarre that you would cite them as sources in this regard over other counter-terrorism folks who have come out against such a link.
“In most of these exchanges we have been focusing only on offensive strategies to dealing with terrorism. But I’m curious how you feel defensive strategies fit in to the picture? I regard Bush as being similarly preoccupied with military solutions at the expense of enacting public safety approaches that are needed to ‘harden the homeland.’ It is baffling (infuriating, actually) to me as a citizen of this country and as someone who lives within 40 miles of the WTC that our government hasn’t been a lot more aggressive about this. This is not OT because we only have limited resources to do these things and clearly invading Iraq has taken priority over domestic security, no matter how you cut it.”
The sad fact is, though no one in the government will admit it, that no amount of Homeland Security protection will be able to make the US completely safe – the twin experiences of the Intifada and the fact that the Chechens were able to place a huge bomb inside a Moscow apartment just this last week should drive this particular fact home in earnest. I am all for strengthening our defense at home, but I feel that a “Fortress America” mentality to be extremely at naive at best. I also don’t see how strengthening our own homeland defense is by its very nature inimical to undertaking military action abroad, such as in the case of Iraq.
Andrew J. Lazarus:
“Even assuming this is true, AQ recruitment worldwide could be up.”
Indeed. However, as you noted before the network does not publish statistics with regard to recruiting there is no way to know for sure. What is known is that the network has thrown all of its resources into attacking the US in Iraq and that thus far they have been unable to accomplish that goal according to the words of their own commander there. As long as that continues to remain the case, I’d say we’re doing fairly well in this regard.
praktike,
On Afghanistan: I’m concerned about the heroin trade as well. As far as I know, the warlords of northern Afghanistan (many of whom were our allies for pragmatic reasons on both sides) have traditionally used the poppy as a major source of funding. I think it could fairly be argued, though, that tasking our military/Special Forces/CIA with drug interdiction might not be an optimal use of resources at this time.
I don’t doubt that Special Forces/CIA people have been wandering around Waziristan for the past year or two–and I fully agree that Musharraf has been turning a blind eye to this state of affairs. My point, though, was that there is a huge difference between Special Forces covert action and a conventional land invasion by the Army and Marines. Musharraf CAN’T just ignore an operation of that magnitude.
“…not declare victory prematurely, get distracted by Iraq (and divert Arab linguists, special forces, etc.), give the Islamic world the impression that we’re at war with Islam as a whole, and then come back to finish matters.”
Come on, this is boilerplate sloganeering. We didn’t declare victory prematurely; we accomplished our stated objectives–the removal of the Taliban as a terrorist-supporting regime and the denial of Afghanistan as a base of operations for al Qaeda. The destruction of the command structure of al Qaeda was an additional objective part of but not limited to the Afghanistan campaign, so a declaration of victory there did not claim full accomplishment of that point.
Iraq was not a distraction, because our focus is not limited to al Qaeda. I know you are well-read in this area, so I won’t bother to rehash arguments that others have made better than I can. See numerous treatments of the subject by den Beste, for instance. The removal of Saddam Hussein has given a significant boost to our efforts in Libya, Israel, etc.
Iraq under the Baathists has historically been a secular regime, so any claim that Saddam’s removal promotes the idea of a “war on Islam” cannot be considered rational. Moreover, in countries like Egypt, where the Protocols of the Elders of Zion is widely believed to be legitimate, why should we be constrained by fears of irrational conclusions? Those who wish to infer evil motives from our actions will do so no matter what our actions are, so arguing that this should impact our policy is merely a recipe for paralysis, and must be rejected.
What major military crisis do you consider likely? If you mean Iran, our troops are right next door–on both sides. If you are talking about North Korea, a substantial conflict would be tasked to our Navy and Air Force primarily (South Korea has a big, competent Army), and our military footing is already guarding against a catastrophe there. If another part of the world erupts unexpectedly, we’ll do our best to respond appropriately. What more do you wish?
praktike,
On NATO: I said that NATO will never be _in_charge_ of another military operation again. NATO is not in charge of Afghanistan–it is a U.S.-led coaltion operation to which NATO troops have made a significant contribution. This is not a trivial distinction.
Last I heard, Milosevic got elected to the Serbian Parliament. Also, his trial at the Hague has been something of a circus. I think your optimism as to his ultimate fate is misplaced, but I’m willing to wait and see what the results are before making any final judgements. Who knows? Maybe the Europeans will surprise me and actually hang him–but I’m not counting on it.
Dan;
“Similarly, if I did not accept the existence of such a link I would be extremely skeptical of the US-led invasion.”
If this were true, then, I expect that you only came to accept the justification for the war after the fact, since leading up to the war this was expressely not amonst the major reasons cited by Bush et al. for attacking. It was WMDs…I don’t recall hearing a whole lot (anything, actually) about Al Qaeda depending on Iraq for their functioning.
“Clarke argued in favor of such a connection in 1998 when he advocated an attack on al-Shifa…”.
Clarke is opposing the invasion, Dan, not taking any action at all against suspected terrorists. What is so hard to understand about supporting limited action in cases where intelligence might not be perfect (is it ever?)? The response has to be proportional to the threat. I’m getting a little frustrated with having to point out the obvious here.
My references to Kay, O’Neill and Blix were not to claim they provided any evidence to support Al Qaeda/Iraq links for invading Iraq but rather that their combined revelations call into question the administration’s own stated purposes for doing so. To wit, there are no WMDs, Iraq was a target prior to 9/11 and for distinct reasons, and sanctions were working and could have been given more time. So you see, there are many reasons to oppose this war apart from the shaky (IMO) link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Apparently these do not add up to anything approaching even skepticism on your part for the war.
“The sad fact is, though no one in the government will admit it, that no amount of Homeland Security protection will be able to make the US completely safe.”
Dan, pardon my French, but this is crap. Once again, you are laying out a false argument only to shoot it down. No one is saying the homeland can be made completely safe, please don’t insult my intelligence or the intelligence of Americans who expect their government to carry out one of the main reasons for its existence. I am disappointed that you would use such a worn-out warmonger argument.
“If this were true, then, I expect that you only came to accept the justification for the war after the fact, since leading up to the war this was expressely not amonst the major reasons cited by Bush et al. for attacking. It was WMDs…I don’t recall hearing a whole lot (anything, actually) about Al Qaeda depending on Iraq for their functioning.”
Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Tenet, and most especially Powell at the UN all cited the al-Qaeda link as a key justification for going into Iraq, one of three (the other two being WMDs and human rights). Re-read Powell’s presentation at the UN and you will see that he devoted a rather large margin of it to dealing with the Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, in particular Zarqawi and his followers who had tried to carry out crude chemical weapons attacks in Europe in the months leading up to the war.
I’m likely in the minority position on this one, but I didn’t regard the Iraqi WMD threat as being one that couldn’t be deterred through conventional MAD. However, if you combine that WMD threat with ties to an organization that Iraq allegedly provided expertise and training to according to Tenet then we’re in a whole different situation because MAD means nothing to a non-state entity.
“Clarke is opposing the invasion, Dan, not taking any action at all against suspected terrorists. What is so hard to understand about supporting limited action in cases where intelligence might not be perfect (is it ever?)? The response has to be proportional to the threat. I’m getting a little frustrated with having to point out the obvious here.”
With all due respect, Clarke is inconsistent in this regard. If Iraq had no ties to al-Qaeda (as he claims in his book) then it is entirely rational to oppose the invasion. OTOH, if Iraq had a pattern of behavior with regard to providing assistance to al-Qaeda in the area of WMD as at least five specific pieces of independent evidence with regard to WMD would seem to indicate (al-Shifa, the al-Qaeda members caught trying to enter Saudi Arabia, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, and Moammar Ahmed Yousef), then it becomes clear at least to me that the problem is, simply speaking, the Iraqi regime. I think the difference here (other than that I regard these claims as true) is that I view removal of the regime as an entirely logical and indeed porportional response under the circumstances.
We could have simply bombed the Ansar al-Islam chemical weapons labs at Sergat and Khurmal and left it at that. Indeed, Pentagon plans have been discovered suggesting just that as the preferred course of action. However, what I believe the consensus emerged within the administration was is that this type of porportional response was simply not going to deter Saddam Hussein with regard to his desire to assist al-Qaeda in order to achieve revenge against the United States. So the Iraqi regime would have been left more or less intact (though, as Ken Pollack noted, the non-proliferation enforcement against the regime was already on the verge of collapse), but basically in my own view several years down the line another version of it would have re-emerged to threaten us or our allies once again. And in all honesty, I don’t think that that was a chance that we could afford to take.
“My references to Kay, O’Neill and Blix were not to claim they provided any evidence to support Al Qaeda/Iraq links for invading Iraq but rather that their combined revelations call into question the administration’s own stated purposes for doing so.”
You clearly do not regard the administration’s stated purpose for doing so as having a great deal to do with WMDs while I don’t see that as the key issue as far as determining whether or not we should have gone to war through the reasons that I outlined above.
“To wit, there are no WMDs, Iraq was a target prior to 9/11 and for distinct reasons, and sanctions were working and could have been given more time.”
I don’t deny most of this for a moment, though I will take issue with you strongly on the issue of sanctions given what has been learned about Saddam’s sweetheart deals with North Korea.
“So you see, there are many reasons to oppose this war apart from the shaky (IMO) link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Apparently these do not add up to anything approaching even skepticism on your part for the war.”
I could similarly make the claim that the case compiled to date, much of it documented on this very blog, with regard to the Iraqi/al-Qaeda link has yet to add up with anything even approaching acceptance on your part with regard to such a link 😉
In actuality, as I tried to make clear in my reply to the Forestas that you can find on this website I do find it necessary to justify the war in light of my own faith’s teachings, which has a far more stringent criteria than what seems to hold muster for many warbloggers.
Let me just explain to you my position on two fairly common arguments against the war:
No WMDs – Entirely legitimate concern given the amount of emphasis placed on it, but I didn’t consider it applicable with regard to justifying the war to begin with. Based on what I’ve seen from at hand by Ken Pollack and David Kay, I am inclined to believe that this was far more of an intelligence rather than a concerted effort on the part of the administration to deceive the masses. I think that Chalabi for all practical purposes betrayed and lied to us and that his sorry ass needs to be extradicted back to Jordan for trial.
Pre-planned Invasion – I’m honestly not surprised with this, given that a number of people in the administration like Wolfowitz seem to have had it in for Saddam Hussein all along. I’m not terribly shocked at the fact that we had contingency plans to hit Iraq ahead of time given that I’ve seen plans drawn up here on base to hit Madagascar or Cape Verde should the need arise. More to the point, given that Iraq tried to assassinate a former US president I hope to God that we were ready and willing to hit them should the need have arisen.
This is not to say that I don’t have my doubts or fears somewhere along the line about backing the wrong horse in this regard especially given that this isn’t just “Risk” and a large number of people’s lives are on the line here, but the more the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection appears to come further and further into focus (as can be seen from the blatantly dishonest sophistry that two of the connection’s more prominent critics, by which I refer to Isikoff and Hosenball of Newsweek, have to go to in order to “debunk” it) the more I have come to believe that the war was justified on that basis, as I have argued at length here.
“Dan, pardon my French, but this is crap. Once again, you are laying out a false argument only to shoot it down.”
That was not my intent. I was simply trying to address your concern, which was (at least as I read your comment) that the preparation and subsequent war in Iraq had led to the administration becoming overly preoccupied with military rather than public safety solutions to terrorism here at home. I simply thought that this was a good thing to point out at the onset of any such discussion because, not to put too fine a point on it, it is often missed in previous discussions I have had on the subject.
“No one is saying the homeland can be made completely safe, please don’t insult my intelligence or the intelligence of Americans who expect their government to carry out one of the main reasons for its existence. I am disappointed that you would use such a worn-out warmonger argument.”
Warmonger, eh? Maybe I can work my way up to the level of neocon …
In any case, my point was that terrorism is unfortunately both relatively simple and relatively cheap and that even societies that are either extremely alert (Israel) or not too far removed from police states (Russia) still suffer mass casualty terrorist attacks. That being established as a core premise, I think that one of the best strategies for dealing with a situation is eliminating the network that enables such people to carry out such attacks to begin with, i.e. the military solution to terrorism.
With regard to what I would do as far as Homeland Security goes, most European governments created elite anti-terrorism units as a result of both the Munich Massacre and their own experiences with various ethnic separatists during the Cold War. A US version of MI5 would be an extremely beneficial agency for the government to create in the place of the current system that places dealing with domestic terrorism strictly under the jurisdiction of the FBI.
Dan- Most Americans couldn’t sketch out the precepts of MADD even when it was a policy option during the Cold War. Why should they be able to see how it wouldn’t deter stateless irregular groups?
Dan, you raised this issue, not me:
“I do find it necessary to justify the war in light of my own faith’s teachings, which has a far more stringent criteria than what seems to hold muster for many warbloggers.”
I’m just wondering what faith you are talking about that permits you to accept the unprovoked killing of 10,000 innocent civilians (including women and children) in the name of “national security”?
Except, of course, for the resources they saved for Madrid.
Honestly, what is the story about attacking Dick Clarke for apologizing not only on his own behalf, but for the entire government? Surely 9/11 is prima facie evidence that something in our counterterrorist operations failed? Isn’t the Madrid bombing at least strongly suggestive that invading Iraq did little to impinge on Islamoterrorists’ capabilities to slaughter Europeans?
Vesicle Trafficker:
“I’m just wondering what faith you are talking about that permits you to accept the unprovoked killing of 10,000 innocent civilians (including women and children) in the name of ‘national security?'”
Only 10,000? Surely all of the various anti-war body counts have gotten beyond that by now …
In any event, my faith is Catholicism and as such requires a formulation known as Just War before engaging in a conflict such as that which we waged in Iraq. As I said, see my reply to the Forestas back in the archives for more on this. I also think that you’re setting up a straw man argument here as I am arguing in favor of invading Iraq, not killing 10,000 civilians without provocation, but perhaps I am engaging in a category mistake here.
Andrew J. Lazarus:
“Except, of course, for the resources they saved for Madrid.”
Indeed. However, the “resources” in question are the remnants of the Tangiers cell of the Salafi Jihad that fled to Spain in order to evade the Moroccan authorities – in other words, a dozen or two individuals, several of whom were proficient in explosives training and one of which (Zougam) should have been under surveillance. That isn’t exactly indicative of a necessarily robust network – the lack of suicide bombers in particular is somewhat noticeable.
“Honestly, what is the story about attacking Dick Clarke for apologizing not only on his own behalf, but for the entire government?”
It’s politics, something that I try to avoid for reasons that I explained above to Vesicle Trafficker. Because of the polarization within the American electorate, Clarke strikes many Democrats as being forthright and candid and many Republicans as being treacherous and arrogant. Were he to speak critically of the Clinton administration and favorably of its successors, these positions would of course be reversed.
“Surely 9/11 is prima facie evidence that something in our counterterrorist operations failed?”
Indeed. I think much of that failure dates back to the refusal to understand what was being attempted in both the 1993 WTC bombing as well as Oplan Bojinka – the plots were basically written off as thwarted as soon as Ramzi Yousef was behind bars and little if any attempt was made to figure out who he was working for until 1998. To a certain extent even today, my own opinion is that entrenched worldview blinders is still preventing the global counterterrorism community from appreciating the scale of the threat – hence the lack of willingness to acknowledge the links between al-Qaeda and the Chechen or Kashmiri Islamists or to a much greater degree al-Qaeda and Iran.
“Isn’t the Madrid bombing at least strongly suggestive that invading Iraq did little to impinge on Islamoterrorists’ capabilities to slaughter Europeans?”
To a certain extent, European assylum policies, amongst other things, have made their nations targets or hubs for terrorist cells for many years. The lack that likes of Saad al-Faqih, Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, Omar Bakri, or Mullah Krekar still operate freely in Europe is in of itself indicative of this. The European governments were all more or less aware of this threat but did little if anything to prevent it. So after being dislodged from their Moroccan base, the Tangiers cell simply took advantage of the existing situation and struck. Hopefully the new EU policies will close these loopholes and enable them to better combat terrorism both in the Iberian peninsula and elsewhere in Europe.