Over at Crooked Timber, John Quiggin condemns the recent fighting in Najaf.
But what possible moral justification can there be for the two bloody campaigns against Moqtada al-Sadr?
If the figures reported by the US military are true, nearly 2000 of Sadr’s supporters have been killed by US forces (1500 in the first campaign launched by Bremer just before his departure and another 300 in the last couple of days). This is comparable with plausible estimates of the number of people killed by Saddam’s police state annually in its final years.
Boy, there is so much that I think is wrong about this post.
One interesting thing about modern thought – and I won’t necessarily characterize it as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ but instead ‘modern’ – is that the only calculus you can legitimately use is a very crude one. How many alive or dead? The ultimate measure of any policy becomes did it save lives?
There are at least two colossal problems with this.The first is that it ignores the question of whether there are values worth dying – and killing – for. Poland, France, and the UK could have avoided all those deaths in WW II, if only they had simply surrendered. If only President Lincoln had commanded the forces holding Ft. Sumter to simply strike the flag and come home.
You get the point.
It is clear, on one hand, that people often kill for trivial and shameful reasons. It is equally clear, to me at least, that we must sometimes kill for honorable ones.
The second problem, and sad fact, is that we can never know whether we saved lives or not – because events in the world of politics and warfare are ‘wicked problems,’ and so can’t be rerun like computer models with different assumptions.
Doonsbury today has a strip in which Mike has a daydream. He dreams:
“George Bush never became President!
“Not only that, we never invaded Iraq, killing thousands of civilians and turning it into a vast, new staging ground for terrorism!”
“And get this – it says we didn’t torture and kill prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo!”
“And look! We’re not hated around the world!”
“Nope! The American people are far more secure! And haven’t been polarized by a war that has cost nearly 900 U.S. lives!”
As a sidenote, it may be the case that it would be worth re-electing Bush for the simple reason that it might force Trudeau into retirement. On the other hand, if he were to promise to retire if Kerry were elected, he might sway my vote that way…
But back to my point. How does Trudeau know? How does one estimate what the world would look like in an alternate present? And, more important, when one runs his alternate present forward into alternate futures, what do they look like?
We’re dealing in a world where we can count our costs, but have no idea how to measure the benefits. And that’s one of the biggest failures, I believe, of the Bush Administration. They haven’t made it clear what we’re getting for the costs we’re bearing (as they haven’t been as clear as they should of what the true likely costs are).
Quiggin goes on:
These people weren’t Al Qaeda or Baathists, they were (apart from the inevitable innocent bystanders) young Iraqi men who objected to foreign occupation. Sadr’s militia is one of a dozen or so similar outfits in Iraq, and there are hundreds more around the world, quite a few of which have received US support despite having a worse record than Sadr’s. Moreover, there was no cause at stake that justified a war – the first started when Bremer shut down Sadr’s newspaper and the Sadrists retaliated by taking control of some police stations and mosques. The current fighting seems to have had even more trivial causes. It’s the willingness of the US government to send in the Marines that’s turned what would normally be noisy disturbances into bloodbaths.
You know, it’s always us causing the mess. But let’s skip that and point out that one of the primary criticisms of the occupation by war opponents such as Quiggin has been that we have not established order; that we have taken a country that was oppressed – but stable! – and knocked it backward into chaos and horror. Well defeating chaos and horror sometimes involves defeating – which means capturing, killing or otherwise rendering ineffective – those forces that would promote it. Sadr could have chosen a political route; instead he built a militia, and with it, took territory.
That territory is being retaken. One would think that if a pacified, orderly Iraq – and just possibly a free one – is the goal, this would be seen as a good thing. But instead, let’s blame the Marines for creating a bloodbath.
Let’s blame Lincoln and Churchill, too.
It’s even worse in one way:
The left has been whining for over a year that Bush didn’t send another 100,000 troops to Afghanistan to “finish the job” by suppressing the warlords who control most of the country outside of Kabul. Do they think that could have been done without killing thousands of those warlords’ followers? If warlords running independent fiefdoms and ignoring the central government is a bad thing in Afghanistan, why is it not a bad thing in Iraq? And how can Bush be criticized for doing in Iraq what he is criticized for not doing in Afghanistan?
I was surprised by this post of Quiggen’s. He’s usually a thoughtful guy, but this one seemed like it could have been written by Noam Chomsky. I think the only way you could think Sadr deserves a fair shake at this point is if you haven’t been paying attention.
After talking to a lot of anti-war types, i’ve come up with the following analysis. Its the clean hands imperative. It goes like this, there will always be killing and bad things in the world, and chances our whatever bad things have happened America is mostly responsible for anyway. Any action that we take could conceivably create such a situation, and hence we should rarely if ever act assertively in world affairs. Yes the killing will go on, but our finger prints will not be on it (although it is still permissable to attack political enemies for not doing enough to prevent such things).
Imo, this is moral cowardice, but then that is a value laden judgement. Ignoring evil has always been morally wrong according to the judeo-christian values, but it is also a huge part of the progressive movements underpinning, as well as the entire impetus for marxist revolution. Am I my brothers keeper? The anti-war lobby makes the strange case that in fact we are not, and that every death caused by our actions is reprehensible and cannot be balanced on the scale of how many lives are ultimately saved. Moreover, in cases where America has either national interests and/or historical culpability in creating the situation, we are morally bound _not_ to interfere. I still havent got my head around that reasoning.
Incoherent? You bet. Progressives have a major problem right now, they believe they are founded on scholarship and logic. The fact that their position has become paradoxical and untenable hasnt settled in yet except in a few cases (Chris Hitchens). The result has become a sort of hyper-isolationism with a strong appeasement aspect that looks utterly cynical in the face of the most reactionary nations in the world. One would think leftists would be pressing _harder_ than conservatives for revolution in places like Iran and Saudi Arabia. But that would make sense.
AL: Sheesh, can Quiggins even read? To anyone that’s been following Sadr’s uprising and the Army of the Mahdi this is such an obvious development– Al Sistani is out of Iraq for medical considerations so Najaf is flaring up again. Muqtada is nothing if not opportunistic.
Al Sistani is out of Iraq for medical considerations so Najaf is flaring up again. Muqtada is nothing if not opportunistic.
That’s not how I view it. Mookie tried to kill one of the other clerics (al-Najafi, I b’lieve), so Sistani cleared out for safety reasons while they take Sadr out. I read somewhere that Sistani went to Beirut first, not London, so I tend to view the health story as a convenient cover.
praktike: I saw a still snap of Al Sistani on FOX news– he looked awful, grey and near death– I guess I swallowed the hudna! Thanks for setting me straight! 🙂
BTW I really enjoyed your links to Al Sistani’s interpretations– I quoted you at LGF. 🙂
I have a much more cautious view of killing to do good than you do AL. How many millions have been killed by those who thought they were doing good, and how much good has been done as a result? Of all the wars and revolutions that have been started with noble (proclaimed) intentions, how many have relieved more suffering than they have created?
Killing may be necessary in self-defence, as in WWII or in cases, such as Rwanda, Sudan and (probably) Kosovo, where the alternative would be to let many more people die. But it should be a last resort.
In addition, I support the overthrow of dictatorships when it can be achieved with no or minimal loss of life. Like you, I reject the idea that “stability” is worth more than freedom or human lives.
Coming to the campaign against Sadr, I start from the factual premise that this was a “war of choice” launched by Bremer, designed to eliminate Sadr as a political force before the handover to Allawi. When Sadr resisted the initial push against him, the chosen strategy was not to negotiate peace, but to kill as many of his armed supporters as possible in the hope of weakening his position.
Hence, it amounts to starting a conflict that has already cost thousands of lives (and will probably cost thousands more before it is done) in the hope of securing some increase in “stability”. To turn your argument around, if you support this kind of trade-off, why didn’t you support leaving Saddam in power?
A second point I was trying to make is the way war cheapens life. When this war began, there was a lot of talk about how the US side was trying to minimise casualties even among the Iraqi armed forces.
Now, as the discussion following my post has shown, there’s a general view among supporters of the war that it’s desirable to kill anyone who is willing to fight against the occupation, even if they had no quarrel with us before the war and would have no quarrel with us if we left.
If you support “humanitarian war”, this ought to be a big concern.
John, I’m genuinely curious how – setting Iraq aside – in a world increasingly filled with failed ex-colonial states who are in a continual state of low-level civil war, you would propose to create enough stability to create a civil society without suppressing at least some of the armed ‘tribes’?
And if you don’t, what do you expect conditions to look like in those countries?
…and then take those answers and project them back to Iraq, if possible.
A.L.
John,
Yet again, you fail to account for the nature of Sadr’s militia, its crimes, and its proposed political project. Are you suggesting that Iraqis and the West should allow Sadr’s murderous, illiberal gang to subvert the drive to liberal democracy? If not, how does your condemnation of Iraqis to another dictatorship fit into your general moral reasoning?
If you (and the left in general) are not willing to select from, or make moral disctinctions between, a set of political programs – fascism, marxism, theocracy, liberal democracy – should we take your arguments seriously?
AL, I would apply something like the Powell doctrine. Before you intervene, make sure that you have the kind of overwhelming force needed to achieve your goals immediately and without signfiicant resistance. If this kind of force isn’t available, make your goals less ambitious. In Darfur for example, it looks as if the best that can be done with military force is to protect refugee camps – stabilising the general Sudanese situation will be achieved, if at all, by negotiation.
Applying this to the campaigns against Al-Sadr, there’s no reason to suppose that a group with a following in the millions, and a leader who asserts he is happy to do for the cause, as did his father, can be “crushed” or “destroyed” as Mark and others seem to think, at least not without truly massive bloodshed.
The April campaign illustrates my point. On US figures, the death toll was over 1000, and nothing at all was achieved. In my original post, I suggested the same would be true of this campaign, and I see no reason to change that prediction. Even if Sadr is killed/captured, that will only make things worse.
John,
Your new argument seems to make a different point altogether. In prior arguments you suggested that the US was not justified in engaging in combat with, and killing, Sadr’s militiamen. When confronted with the counter-argument that Sadr’s militiamen might justifiably be opposed, you changed your view.
Now you are making the militarily point that it is futile to do battle with Sadr. Your argument seems to be based on (1) Sadr’s stated willingness to fight to the death and (2) the amount of fighters available to him. With respect to (1): many petty Arab thugs proclaim their willingness to fight to the death, but most, in practice, do not. In any case, Sadr’s psychological disposition (coward or martyr) isn’t relevant to arguments for the removal of a man dedicated to preventing the establishment of Iraqi democracy. If he really will fight to the death, then that just gives the Marines useful intel. With respect to (2) you will have to provide more evidence of the inevitability of a Coalition/Iraqi military defeat for this point to be persuasive.
jinderella-
I was wrong about Sistani, according to Omar.
Quoted on LGF, tho — now that’s interesting.
“AL, I would apply something like the Powell doctrine. Before you intervene, make sure that you have the kind of overwhelming force needed to achieve your goals immediately and without signfiicant resistance.”
Just to clarify, that’s a somewhat distorted version of the Powell Doctrine. There’s nothing at all in it about “immediately and without significant resistance,” which is fortunate, because that would pretty eliminate all possible miltitary action anywhere. The 1991 Gulf war certainly did not meet that discription.
See here:
Okay, back to you folks.
Actually, I have a further couple of comments.
“In Darfur for example, it looks as if the best that can be done with military force is to protect refugee camps – stabilising the general Sudanese situation will be achieved, if at all, by negotiation.”
That’s a hell of a thing, though, to leave a population that genocide is being committed upon with only the “comfort” of being shipped into protected camps to die in. Or, say, these camps are made models of excellent living, and disease and hunger are more or less eliminated. How humane is that? And how many will be left after negotiation, and under what threat would the Sudanese government be moved to be other than quite happy with that situation?
I can’t help but put these sorts of discussions in historical context, and imagine someone suggesting during the 19th Century that it was a damn shame about the way the U.S. government was treating the Indians, but the most practical solution was to make sure the reservations wouldn’t have cavalry coming through and killing people, and eventually negotiations will provide the solution.
I also have to imagine, as a Jew, the application of this to the classic in the 1940’s, of course.
But we could take it back to the Boer War, or jump it up microcosmically to Srebenica.
I agree, John, that proportionality and practically have to be considered, and I’m not proposing a specific plan, myself. I’m just mentioning what springs to my mind involuntarily, to also consider.
“Applying this to the campaigns against Al-Sadr, there’s no reason to suppose that a group with a following in the millions….”
Millions? Do you have some sort of cite for that order of magnitude? Do you have some source for the notion that, at most, more than several thousand people might fight for Sadr? Even, say, one hundred thousand (which would certainly be problematic, to the least, to be sure, but I’ve read nowhere anyone intimating that such a thing is remotely in the cards)?
Typically, he’s estimated at having a few hundred hard-core followers, and some thousands who join him when he was calls for them, depending upon the circumstances. Max numbers I’ve ever seen have been under ten thousand. Of course, I’m not over there and polling, so I claim no sure knowledge, which is why I ask if you have a cite, John.
“Killing may be necessary in self-defence, as in WWII or in cases, such as Rwanda, Sudan and (probably) Kosovo,”
Kosovo was a war of self-defense? And Iraq isn’t? You would have to jump over the huge mountain of evidence of Saddam’s WMD programs and harboring of terrorist groups to conclude Iraq is a war of choice, and you still won’t have made a case that Kosovo isn’t a war of choice.
“In addition, I support the overthrow of dictatorships when it can be achieved with no or minimal loss of life.”
Oh well, so much for the 10 million murdered by Hitler, eh wot? What a dreamworld you live in. As Orwell said, pacifists are objectively pro-fascist, and your rules for just war are so unrealistic they might as well be pacifism.
Can you point to any murderous dictatorship of the last 100 years that was “overthrown with no loss of life,” or that didn’t depend on said dictator dying of illness and old age and hopefully a slightly less oppressive dictator coming in?
I thought it was entirely obvious that a word or two fell out of John Quiggins’ sentence, and that he meant “or in humanitarian cases, such as….”
“Oh well, so much for the 10 million murdered by Hitler, eh wot?”
I will be very surprised if John Quiggins doesn’t regard WWII as a “war of self-defense” since he mentioned it, you know, in the sentence you quote, Judith, as “a war of self-defense.”
Perhaps you are arguing that the U.S. should have gone to war with Hitler in 1939, however, or some other case, which is certainly an old historical debate (and one in which I’d certainly not have argued with, if you time traveled me back to then).
“Can you point to any murderous dictatorship of the last 100 years that was “overthrown with no loss of life….”
If you mean “no significant loss of life,” that’s easy: the majority of Eastern European regimes in the past twenty years. I’d certainly agree, however, that such cases are more the exception than the rule, and that saying that it’s more moral and humanitarian to only support such resistances is highly questionable.
John Quiggin:
The April campaign illustrates my point. On US figures, the death toll was over 1000, and nothing at all was achieved.
Al-Sadr and a good chunk of his forces survived. Killing all of them would have achieved far more.
And yes, war cheapens life. No kidding. So you fight to win, because the longer it is drawn out for, the worse it is for everyone.
Now, as the discussion following my post has shown, there’s a general view among supporters of the war that it’s desirable to kill anyone who is willing to fight against the occupation, even if they had no quarrel with us before the war and would have no quarrel with us if we left.
I expect al-Sadr’s men had a serious quarrel with us before the war, but that’s beside the point. Pulling out to save the lives of scum like the Mehdi Army strikes me as cowardly and short-sighted. And even if you disagree, that’s how our enemies would read it. Being seen as weak in the Arab world will get you killed.
The alternative of staying, but leaving the Medhi Army intact is to allow the Iraqi police to take care of them, as they will. In case it isn’t clear, the Iraqi forces will kill far more people destroying al-Sadr’s militia than the U.S.M.C., and they’ll probably torture survivors, and perhaps even family members, in the aftermath.
That is the battleground. It’s how Arabs have tended to fight, and as Winds of Change has noted, some things are still the same. In regards to al-Sadr, he’s going to be killed and his militia destroyed. If we do it, less people die. I think that’s the humanitarian option.
In addition, I support the overthrow of dictatorships when it can be achieved with no or minimal loss of life. Like you, I reject the idea that “stability” is worth more than freedom or human lives.
I think you’re suggesting that allied/friendly lives are of the same moral worth as the lives of those who’ve declared war on us. Is that a fair representation of your sentiments?
AL, there’s a debate on the number of armed followers Sadr has going on over at CT. But given that the US & Iraqi government already claim to have killed or captured 3000 in the two campaigns, it’s clear that either this figure or the earlier estimates you mention are way off the mark.
As regards the number of supporters, his main support base, Sadr City in Baghdad has a population of 2 million. There’s no easy way of assessing how many of those people actually support Sadr, but the number is obviously large. Look at the opinion poll evidence cited by 67 per cent of Iraqis have a favorable opinion of Sadr
Gary, I wasn’t claiming that my view is exactly the same as Powell’s. In particular, the original Powell doctrine only allows for intervention on national security ground whereas I support humanitarian intervention if it can be made to work.
On Darfur, it would be great if the world would commit more resources so that more suffering could be relieved. But even so, it’s far from clear that a large-scale military intervention would be the best choice. I think a more modest military intervention aimed at securing some areas, while spending a lot more on food and medical aid, would be a better choice.
And this is true in spades for the case of Iraq. For the $100 billion plus that’s been spent there, we could have saved millions of lives in poor countries, following the plans of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health.
Both comments above should be addressed to Gary. Sorry about that.
I think a more modest military intervention aimed at securing some areas, while spending a lot more on food and medical aid, would be a better choice.
Putting international troops at the gates of ghettoes strikes you as a plan worth considering?
Those troops aren’t going to stay forever, either. Then what? More slaughter. So basically, your plan would delay the slaughter until it is politically unfavourable to keep troops in Sudan, and then let the Janjaweed to finish the job.
Here’s a more permanent idea: send the 101st Airborne and a carrier battle group to wipe out the Janjaweed.
Actually, a division is a bit much. A brigade could probably handle it. The Janjaweed strength is thought to be ~25,000. Camel-borne, untrained Arab tribesman are no match for soldiers.
“AL, there’s a debate on the number of armed followers Sadr has going on over at CT.”
Hi, John. I’m not Armed Liberal. It’s true that I play on what passes for the leftish end of the field at WoC, of late (mostly I play on my own blog, which I invite you to peruse, and which CT links to [and I’ve commented sporadically at CT since it started, and in turn, Ted Barlow occasionally links to me), and that that’s a bit silly since I’m a liberalish centrist eclectic, but that doesn’t make me either armed, or AL. I’m not making his argument; I’m simply picking up on some points in the conversation. I mention this in a spirit of clarification, just as you understandably want your name spelled correctly.
“Here’s another poll showing that 67 per cent of Iraqis have a favorable opinion of Sadr.”
Without quibbling about the accuracy of polls and their problems, I’ll note two things: at best, they’re a slice of what people think that day, and that’s often extremely dependent upon events and knowledge of that day; “favorable opinion” hardly translates into “I will go into battle for him.” I plan to vote for John Kerry, but I’m really not planning to pick up an AK-47 as part of the process.
This, among many other stories, tends to give credence to the view that the politico-military situation in Iraq is considerably complicated — something no one is arguing against, to be sure — and that the idea that Shi’ites, or even all of the poor of Sadr City automatically support Sadr’s acts of violence is one of many questionable notions. Sadr City has 2 million people; not even one hundredth of that number is engaged in armed resistance.
“But even so, it’s far from clear that a large-scale military intervention would be the best choice.”
I’ll agree that it’s not clear to me at this time; I’ve followed the situation in Darfur with considerable attention for many months, and have posted on it dozens of time, and I’m not putting forth any sort of broad plan, myself. What’s clear to me is that leaving the situation in the hands of the regime is not acceptable.
As to the ultimate worth of the Iraq invasion, my judgment is that the jury is still out, and we won’t have a sure idea for several years. My feeling is that if Iraq comes out by then with a stable, peaceful, reasonably democratic, regime, then it will likely have been worth it. If not, perhaps not; other possible scenarios abound in which it would clearly not have worth it.
I’m making no predictions how it will turn out, and never have; I’m slightly hopeful at present that it will wind up for the best, but I’m not convinced it will, and never have said I was, though I did very cautiously, reluctantly, initially support the invasion. I also stupidly never dreamed that the Administration would have botched the post-war scenario so sweepingly awfully, and that was an error on my part.
“Both comments above should be addressed to Gary. Sorry about that.”
No problem; thank you for catching that on your own while our messages crossed.
Apologies – all my posts above are to John Quiggin.
Colt: “Actually, a division is a bit much. A brigade could probably handle it. The Janjaweed strength is thought to be ~25,000. Camel-borne, untrained Arab tribesman are no match for soldiers.” You are so right! Here’s what the Economist says in their March 27th “Rwanda:10 years after” special–
“Romeo Dallaire, the UN’s soldier on the spot, said it would have taken only 5,000 troops… [to stop the killing]. Others think more would have been needed, but most agree that a determined military intervention would have saved lives.”
The awful thing is, we seem to have learned nothing from Rwanda. Early military intervention could have prevented hundreds of thousands of deaths at minimal cost. Are we too late in the Sudan, even now? 🙁