My mom wanted to listen to Brad’s radio show, so we played the mp3 last night. Listening to it, I was reminded both that I’m too damn polite for radio, and that I have some unfinished business with Dave Dayen. We went back and forth on the subject of the evil subprime originators vs. Fannie and Freddie and never got to finish the point.
Brad suggests that no one cares; but I do because the responses to housing mortgage policy are going to be critical in the next Administration, and I think we need to be approaching this issue with wide open eyes.
Let’s start with the issue D-Day and I were disagreeing on when Brad rescued him. Here’s the Washington Post:
In January 2007, as years of loose mortgage lending were about to send the nation’s housing market into devastating decline, Fannie Mae chief executive Daniel H. Mudd wrote a confidential memo to his board.
Discussing the company’s successes, Mudd said one of Fannie Mae’s achievements in 2006 was expanding its involvement in the market for subprime and other nontraditional mortgages. He called it a step “toward optimizing our business.”
A month later, Fannie Mae outlined plans to further expand its activities in the subprime market. The company recognized the already weak performance of subprime loans but predicted that they would get better in 2007, according to another Fannie Mae document.
Internal documents show that even late in the housing bubble, Fannie Mae was drawn to risky loans by a variety of temptations, including the desire to increase its market share and fulfill government quotas for the support of low-income borrowers.
Since then, Fannie Mae’s exposure to loosely underwritten mortgages has produced billions of dollars of losses and sent its stock price plummeting, prompting the federal government to prepare for a potential taxpayer bailout of the company. This month, Fannie Mae reported that loans from 2006 and 2007 accounted for almost 60 percent of its second-quarter credit losses.
So let me pull out the section on “what happened” from the Milken Institute slide deck I link to above and let’s dig a little further into this.
Dave and Marcy Wheeler were taking the “Fannie had nothing to do with this” position. I countered with “I’ve got this 92-page Powerpoint from the Milken Institute that says otherwise…”
Dave immediate dismissed it, saying “Did Fannie or Freddie make subprime loans?” And while I went to get the appropriate slide from the deck to show him, we moved the conversation along – because according to Brad, no one cares.
But I do, and I’ll suggest that we all should. because they did, and further because of who they were and their position in the financial ecology, what they did was dramatically more important than what any other single institution chose to do.
So let me cherrypick from the entire deck (which you can download here as a pdf) and present what I see as some key points.
First, here’s the residential mortgage market. Note that subprime and delinquent loans (set out in the next two slides) are a relatively small part of the market.
First subprime:
Note that less than 10% of loans outstanding are subprime, and that represents roughly 5% of the total housing value in the US.
Next, here’s the state of the market today:
Note that 66% of the houses in the US have mortgages. Of those, 9.2% are in arrears, and 2.8% in foreclosure – which compares with approximately 50% who were in the same state in the Great Depression. That 9.2% represents 6% of the homes in the US, and the 2.8% represents approximately 1.8% of the housing stock in foreclosure.
Here are slides from the section of their presentation on what went wrong. Let’s go through them and let me try to fit an argument:
The first slide in this section:
This shows the assets and MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities) of Fannie and Freddie, in comparison to the entire residential real estate assets of commercial banks and savings banks – the scale of Fannie & Freddie become fairly clear.
Next we have the escalating leverage within Fannie & Freddie.
Look at how the asset/MBS ratios changed from 2003 to 2006.
Now look at the impact on the solvency of the two institutions:
The righthand set of columns for each – with the assets marked to market – show how the debt/equity ratio of Freddie and Fannie deteriorated from 50 – 60X (one dollar of equity for every 50 – 60 dollars of loans held on the books) to 167X and 255X, respectively – and insolvency.
Now this insolvency has two cascading problems; the first of which is the sheer scale of the two organizations (see above). The other is that securities of Fannie and Freddie were largely held by banks and other financial institutions. Here’s an article from Bloomberg on August 22:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s $36 billion in preferred stock was downgraded to the lowest investment-grade rating by Moody’s Investors Service, which said the increased likelihood of “direct support” from the U.S. Treasury may devalue the securities.
The ratings were lowered five steps to Baa3 from A1, New York-based Moody’s said today in a statement. Moody’s kept its Aaa senior debt ratings on Fannie and Freddie stable and affirmed the subordinated debt because the Treasury will likely make sure the companies continue to make interest payments in any bailout.
…
Regional banks including Midwest Bank Holdings Inc., Sovereign Bancorp and Frontier Financial Corp., may have the most to lose. Melrose Park, Illinois-based Midwest has $67.5 million, or as much as 23 percent of its risk-weighted assets, in the preferred stock, while Philadelphia-based Sovereign owns about $623 million and Everett, Washington-based Frontier about $5 million.
The downgrade “puts a little more pressure on banks to record some sort of impairment charge on these securities,” Daniel M. Arnold, an analyst at Sandler O’Neill & Partners LP in New York, said in a telephone interview. “The more and more likely it becomes that the value of these isn’t going to return back to where it was,” the harder it is to avoid writedowns.
(emphasis added)
As I understand it, shares and securities of Fannie and Freddie were widely held in the financial sector, because they were considered such high-grade securities that banks wanted them to count as a part of their equity – the required capital they need to be able to continue to make loans or even just stay in business. Here’s a Sept. 12 press release from Central Bankcorp:
Central Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: CEBK) (the “Company”), parent company of Central Co-Operative Bank (the “Bank”), announced today that the U.S. government’s actions with respect to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) will adversely impact the value of the Company’s perpetual preferred stock investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
…
At June 30, 2008, the Company had five securities totaling $10.1 million of perpetual preferred stock of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had an unrealized loss of $799,000. The impact of the above actions and concerns in the marketplace about the future value of the perpetual preferred stock of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have caused the values of these investments to decrease materially, and it is unclear when or if the value of the investments will improve in the future. Given the above developments, on September 11, 2008, the Company concluded that it will record a non-cash other than temporary impairment on these investments for the quarter ending September 30, 2008, the amount of which is expected to equal the difference between the net book value of the securities at September 30, 2008 and the market value of the securities at September 30, 2008. As of the closing price on September 11, 2008, the market value of these securities was approximately $890,600.
If the investments were valued at zero and if the Company was not able to record a tax benefit for the loss, the resulting capital ratios would render the Bank adequately capitalized because the Bank’s total risk-based capital ratio would fall below 10%. The impact on the Company’s and Bank’s capital ratios would be as follows…
Note that the last paragraph is contradictory – the “resulting capital ratios would render the bank adequately capitalized because the Bank’s total risk-based capital ratio would fall below 10%” But it’s clear that holdings in Fannie and Freddie securities were widespread in regulated financial institutions, and that their capital ratios were at risk from the insolvency of these organizations.
Now if you’ll recall, this all started when I suggested, arguing with Marcy Wheeler, that Fannie and Freddie did have something to do with the meltdown. Dave Dayen countered with “do Fannie and Freddie make subprime loans?” And I was flipping through the deck, looking for this slide:
You’ll note that 61% of the loans Freddie had in its retained portfolio in 2006 were subprime, and a further 25% were Alt-A.
It’s the kind of thing you wish you’d had at your fingertips when you’re arguing in public…
As to Fannie, in 2006 the ratios were 46% subprime and 35% Alt-A.
I’ll send this link over to Marcy and Dave (as well as Brad) and see what they have to say.
Meanwhile, let’s continue with the Milken presentation.
Here’s another slide showing the insanely risky leverage of Freddie Mac in relation to other financial firms.
Here’s a slide showing the overall level of leverage at major investment banking firms.
Now, let’s shift focus to S & P and Moody’s. Here’s a table showing securities issued by rating – note the vast majority of all rated securities were rated AAA. Now on the right is a table of the MBS that were downgraded by rating. Over 50% of the issues MBS’ were downgraded.
I’d suggest that people have a lot of reason to be really, really unhappy with the rating agencies these days.
Here’s the way we magically created creditworthy value out of – noncreditworthy value:
Via financial engineering, we managed to create a lot of perceived value. The solidity of that value, on the other hand, proved not be so great.
Engineering took place on a lot of levels – fraud at origination existed as well. But overall, it hasn’t been that great – it looks like it was about $1 billion at peak to date.
Out of a total mortgage market of some $8 trillion, $1 billion in mortgage fraud is serious, but seems far from central.
As a final note, the question is whether the crisis is incomes-driven; i.e. that it was caused by declines in people’s incomes from job loss or wage reductions. Let’s look at their data.
Looking at this chart, it’s apparent that the biggest driver of foreclosure rate wasn’t job or income loss – it was home price collapse.
And now let me try and fit a theory to this. We had a speculative boom in housing (and commercial real estate) fed in large part by low interest rates and lax loan standards. That boom had to end sometime, and that time is now. Typically the damage would be limited to some suburban banks like Countrywide, but in this case the damage is throughout our financial institutions. Why?
The collapse of the boom is much more damaging than it needed to be, I’ll suggest, for two significant reasons:
Because the far-and-away largest institutions in the market, Fannie and Freddie, added risky loans to their portfolio while they were immensely overleveraged – putting them significantly at risk. But their securities were still treated as something other financial institutions could use as equity, meaning that they could in turn highly leverage them. So when Fannie and Freddie were shaken, the effects on the balance of the highly leveraged financial industry were vastly amplified.
This wasn’t the sole cause, and there are complex enough issues here that financial historians will be studying and debating this for generations.
But it’s vitally important to note the roles of Fannie and Freddie because the likely policy going forward will likely continue to rely on government market-makers and sources for mortgages, and if we don’t pay attention to what went wrong here, we’re likely to do it again.
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