There’s been a discussion on Sharon’s attack on Rantisi by David Adesnik on Oxblog, as well as Michael Totten, Dan Simon and Martin Kimel. I’d been meaning to comment on it, and jumping into this discussion seems like a good place to start.
I think the attack (the unsuccessful helicopter attack by Israel on Abdel Aziz Rantisi, one of the political heads of Hamas) was charitably, a bad idea. In fact I think it was colossally stupid…It was a bad idea for two reasons:
First and foremost because while the drama in Israel and Palestine is written in the blood of the residents there, it is being played out for an audience of three.
The United States, the EU, and the Arab states. When these three drama critics make up their minds, we will have peace – almost regardless of the desires of the residents of the area.
The PA is funded by these three, and Arafat stays in power by distributing the loot. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the multiplicity of splinter groups are funded, primarily by the Arab states. They are also funded, both directly and indirectly by the EU, as well as by the rising Arab population in the EU (who act as the Irish population of Boston and the Northeast did and does in supporting the IRA) and to a small extent by the Arab population of the US.
“No bucks, no Buck Rodgers,” is how Tom Wolfe once described the space program.
I’ll suggest that martyrdom on an industrial scale is also an expensive proposition, and that subsidizing the infrastructure that proselytizes, recruits, equips, and delivers terrorists – and rewards their families when they have committed their acts – is the driving engine of the intehfada.
“No bucks, no booms,” is the way I’d put it.
What needs to happen – and what I believe is primed to happen, given the facts on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq – is the slow drying up of the resources that support the terrorist infrastructure.
The PA is slowly lurching toward financial transparency, and the intense pressure of the US on the EU, and the concerns of the EU about terrorism have the potential to show results in managing the PA’s own cash flow.
The Arab states, who have this year seen anti-Western terrorist acts on their own soil, are beginning to take some tiny steps toward limiting their cash subsidy of Palestinian terrorists.
By launching what was widely perceived as an unprovoked attack on Rantisi, Sharon allows himself to be cast as the heavy in this little drama, and made it possible for the forces that succor the terrorists to justify acting just a little more equivocally for just a little while longer. And the resources that feed the terrorist infrastructure – from the schools that teach hate, the media that broadcast it, the recruiters who find the candidate terrorists, to the terrorists themselves – who often admit they are doing it for the glory and financial security of their families – those resources will flow for a little while longer.
The second reason it was a bad idea is practical and tactical; if you have to fight, you always want to choose the time of the fight to your advantage. If your opponent is getting relatively stronger, act sooner. If the opponent is weakening in relation to you, wait. The politics within Palestine, and the politics between the Palestinian terrorists and their sponsors are complicated and chaotic. But all appearances are the that people whose opinions count are stepping away from Hamas and Hezbollah. The Iraqis aren’t writing any checks these days. The Iranians have their hands full. The Saudis are reviewing their positions.
Now much of this doubtless is dissembling, and I don’t doubt for a minute that the diplomats are good at telling us what we hope to hear.
But I don’t see anything that suggests that the ties between Hamas/Hezbollah and their sponsors in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the EU will be stronger in three months than they are today.
So attacking Rantisi three to six months from now wold have offered three advantages:
First, it is narrowly possible that they could have grudgingly accepted the roadmap and agreed to move toward a political solution (sure, I could win the Tour de France this year, too…). Not likely, but barely possible. I lost $5.00 Sunday night to someone who pulled the only card that would save their hand at the river (last card dealt in seven-card stud)…a 1 in 52 shot, and it came across.
Next, waiting weakens Hamas/Hezbollah as their funding is reduced and their legitimacy challenged by opposing forces within the Palestinian proto-state. They rely not only on a core of committed soldiers, but on a wider group of ‘casual combatants’; street kids up for a fight, a collection of the momentarily enraged, all financed by people whose career options are limited to cart vending and terrorism. Some of those may begin to see other options.
Finally, waiting strengthens Israel’s claims on the U.S., as it is seen as complying with yet another peace plan in the face of violent rejection by the other side. Right now, more than at any time since the Suez crisis, the opinion of the U.S. matters.
Sharon’s no idiot; no one in a position like his is. And he certainly has access to information that none of us out here in the safety of the Blogosphere have. But I’m hard-pressed to put together a logical or moral justification for the attack.
I’m sure some readers can suggest a few…
As I pointed out in my blog posting, these exact same arguments were raised against Sharon’s original isolation of Arafat during Operation Defensive Shield. Declaring Arafat “irrelevant”, it was claimed at the time, would only salvage his declining credibility among both the Palestinians and the international community. In fact, Sharon’s aggressive decision had the opposite effect, further eroding Arafat’s stature over time, and ultimately leading to his coerced appointment of a prime minister with a more moderate reputation.
As with Arafat, why not also with Rantisi?
Because Arafat is one of the key causes of the conflict, and has been so for his entire career. I have nevetr believed that Arafat was interested in a genuine state or peace with Israel; he’s one of the kleptocrats, and the resource he loots is the suffering of the Palestinian people, which he mines for billions a year in support.
And, more important, because when Arafat was being isolated, the Talib and Saddam Hussein were in power and the U.S. was a ‘toothless giant’.
A.L.
The PR game is a rearguard action. I don’t think it’s winnable; too many people are too tired of “this cycle of violence”, and too ignorant of of the history and ideology, and too rational and well-meaning. Data is filtered so that it supports the gestalt of the perceiver. So no matter what time Sharon might choose to act against the “political wing” leader of Hamas, it would be the wrong time.
Israel can’t weaken Abbas’ 3-4% support, and she can’t make significant moves to lighten up on the Palestinians (which, in theory, would redound to his credit) while Hamas, PIJ, et al are on the rampage. The time to act against Hamas is now, earlier not later.
Certainly we’re seeing some triangulation, the differentiation of Hamas as a terror group with irredentist goals. I have noticed AP and Reuters stories which refer to Hamas, “whose goal is the destruction of Israel”, “opposed to peace and the roadmap”, and similar stuff. That seems new to me, and welcome. As do the EU responses to the French apologia.
Mean Mr. Mustard has an idea or 2 about this…
Alene –
My whole point is that it is more than PR; what matters in this drama is how the willingness of the true underwriters of this drama to keep writing checks.
When the checks stop, we will see a rapid decline in terrorism.
The U.S. military has given them one major reason to stop writing checks; that’s the kind fo PR I’m talking about.
A.L.
A. L.–
I hope the kind of PR you’re talking about is enough. Follow the money, and I’ll follow the English-language Arab press and Memri.
Alene
I’d like to commend this site for highlighting here and in other posts (i.e. humanitarian aid financing Pali terrorism) the financial aspect of this situation. I think you are on to something, and I haven’t seen it publicized elsewhere.
I also agree with your assessment of the Israeli attack on Rantisi. I do not dispute the right of Israel to respond to terrorism; nevertheless, Sharon’s actions were ill-timed, it would have been better to allow someone else to “play the heavy.” What I mean by this is, the action was immediately parlayed into, “Oh, it’s all Israel’s fault for retaliating.” I think when Bush condemned Sharon’s actions, what he was saying was, “give this fish a little more line to play. It will exhaust itself, and be easier to catch.” Sharon did not do this, and thus I think it DID delay what ultimately will be accomplished.
The two arguments against my own position are: 1)Israel’s right to defend it’s sovereignty, and 2)Israel may have had intelligence indicating that Rantisi was spearheading a major terrorist action (I’ve read of hints of same).
Nevertheless, if Israel can allow the US to play the heavy (hey, Pali’s, we’ve given you every opportunity to fulfill your word that you accept the roadmap and you haven’t, and now there are going to be real consequences…) and Abbas has been given time to either prove he is independent of Arafat, or prove that he is no different than Arafat and/or has no power to govern, any quasi-plausible arguments against “taking out the Pali’s governing structure” will have been effectively dealt with politically, and real progress could be made. And I’m talking a timeline of several weeks/couple months, not years.
And let me state that I, personally, believe these arguments have already been made (decades ago). But I think that the Bush administration is trying/needs to set up a game plan existent during it’s lifetime to have the political legitimacy to defend future actions. Sharon’s actions threw a monkey wrench into that, and I think that is the reason for the sharp tone of Bush’s initial reaction. Iraq set the stage by underscoring the Bush administration’s seriousness and willingness to deal with terroristic regimes, and I don’t think anyone can doubt that he plans to do the same with the Pali’s (and probably Syria next). But in light of the pre-Iraq war events (UN, France/Germany, etc.), and the post-Iraq war events (demands for WMD evidence, puffs re: impeachment, upcoming election), he has to carefully set the stage to carry out his plans. I think Bush not only believes that he was meant to be president at this time, I think he is very aware of how he will look HISTORICALLY, and he wants it documented that he worked as much as possible within a global political climate, while not flinching from making hard, unpopular decisions he feels are right.
I bet he goes to sleep at night thinking, “just give me a little time, WORK with me.”
That said, I fully understand the political and moral pressures on Sharon to act expendiently. I’m just not sure his actions are the best, given a long-term view.
Criticizing Sharon this only a few months after our own military attempted the assassination by cruise missile of the head of a sovereign nation is hypocritical at best. Personally, I hope Saddam and his sons were blown into tiny dictator bits but how is this justified and not the attempt to do the same to a leader of a group we ourselves classify as a major terrorist group?
The idea that there can be anything like a peace process while people like Rantisi are still drawing breath is the single greatest impediment to anything meaningful ever happening. Cut off all of Hamas funds would involve collapsing so many government and organizations that it would surely be cheaper to simply kill off the organizers. Without these leader the rank and file of assorted Palestinian terror gangs cannot long stand against a legitimate government. Of course, the first step in creating a legit government for them is to remove Arafat and anyone connected to him and PLO/Fatah and all their offshoots from any role in power. They can retire and live in peace or die. They cannot be the basis of a government that isn’t simply a revived ‘destroy Israel’ PLO.
Israel itself had these sorts of problems early on with internal factions among the Zionists fighting among themselves and vying for control but the got that sorted out pretty quick. THe Palestinians are nowhere near even attempting such because almost noone in power is sincere about peace as viewed by a Western perspective.