Hezbollah ‘Experts’

I’m watching the events in the Middle East like the rest of us, and trying to put them into some kind of order in my own mind. Expect a post Monday…

But in the meantime, I have to ding Laura Rozen, over at the Prospect. She interviews Mark Perry, “co-director of the Conflicts Forum, a Beirut-based nongovernmental organization that has, over the past three years, put former senior American and British policy-makers and intelligence officials in talks with Hezbollah and other militant political Islamic groups in Lebanon”:

Q: We’ve been hearing the theory that the timing of Hezbollah’s Tuesday kidnapping of the two Israeli Defense Force soldiers was planned well in advance and with coordination from Tehran or Damascus. Can you speak to that?

Oy vey. There are a lot of people in Washington trying to walk that story back right now, because it’s not true.

Hezbollah and Israel stand along this border every day observing each other through binoculars and waiting for an opportunity to kill each other. They are at war. They have been for 25 years, no one ever declared a cease-fire between them. … They stand on the border every day and just wait for an opportunity. And on Tuesday morning there were two Humvees full of Israeli soldiers, not under observation from the Israeli side, not under covering fire, sitting out there all alone. The Hezbollah militia commander just couldn’t believe it — so he went and got them.

The Israeli captain in charge of that unit knew he had really screwed up, so he sent an armored personnel carrier to go get them in hot pursuit, and Hezbollah led them right through a minefield.

Now if you’re sitting in Tehran or Damascus or Beirut, and you are part of the terrorist Politburo so to speak, you have a choice. With your head sunk in your hands, thinking “Oh my God,” you can either give [the kidnapped soldiers] back and say “Oops, sorry, wrong time” or you can say, “Hey, this is war.”

It is absolutely ridiculous to believe that the Hezbollah commander on the ground said Tuesday morning, “Go get two Israeli soldiers, would you please?”

Mark needs to get out and talk to his Hezbollah buddies more, because Lebanese blogger Raja was watching Nasrallah on Lebanese TV and says:

Update 31: Nasrallah says that Hizballah has been working on this operation for five months.

Um, Mark? Over to you, Laura…

46 thoughts on “Hezbollah ‘Experts’”

  1. Truth be told, I would actually like to believe that. That would mean that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran didn’t plan this and didn’t think that now was the time to strike. Perhaps Israel did believe that it could no longer sit back, and left the soldiers as bait, knowing that Hez couldn’t control itself, and Israel could justifiably respond with force.

    I doubt Laura’s version, though.

  2. It can be both – long-term planning and a target of opportunity. It is common to make your luck.

    Note the focus on this event in isolation from a similar event in Gaza. That says much about the author’s biases and blindness.

    Once is happenstance. Twice is suspicious. Three times is enemy action.

    Reread Michael Totten’s recent threads on Israel and Lebanon. We knew this one was coming, and where it was coming from.

  3. Mark Perry’s quote:

    bq. “…trying to walk that story back right now…”

    Quite so.

    If the necessary conclusion is “Moral Equivalence, don’t you know,” Perry’s got the walkback to fit. Or, per Tom Holsinger, he could have read “Michael Totten’s post,”:http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/008525.php from last April, full of foreboding.

    Naw…

  4. She makes it sound like Hezbollah was practically forced to seize those soldiers. Either that, or Hezbollah was set up – yeah, that’s it, they were set up!

    Oy vey indeed.

  5. Joe & Marc,

    It’s not just anti-Israel bias. This is an entirely new conflict – Iran vs. Israel. Lots of Arab vs. Israel experts will lose their reputations here due to inability to perceive that this is a new situation, and that both sides have different rules of engagement than what the experts are used to.

    The Persians are playing the Arabs for suckers, which is traditional, only they are also playing non-Arab lefties and their ilk for suckers too. The latter are likewise unable to perceive that this is a new conflict.

    And it will end only when Iran’s mullah regime is destroyed like Saddam’s.

  6. Glen Wishard: If you read the interview <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=11724>, you will see I do no such thing. In fact, my response to Perry’s description of what happened Tuesday is to raise the point you raise: “But, you make it sound like a dog with a squirrel, like there’s no free will. Like the temptation for Hezbollah to kidnap the Israeli soldiers because there was an opportunity suddenly on Tuesday was somehow irresistible. Why did they have to go get them?”

    As to the original question by Armed Liberal of Nasrallah’s seeming boast that the kidnap had been planned for months, I have passed it on and if I get a response, will pass it along.

  7. FWIW, Addendum:

    Perry responds: “The fact that Nasrallah says it does not make it so. He is also quoted as saying that ‘we saw an opportunity and we took it.'”

  8. I am not making a speculation in a vacuum. I have spoken with Hezballah officials for many many months, understand their command structure, and was privy to more private discussions about their view of the border situation. The readers here should investigate the numbers of incidents in the recent past (18 months) in which Israelis and Hezballah militia have danced around the border feinting and faking, trying to gain advantage.

    That is to say: if anyone thinks that Hezballah planned an operation for Tuesday morning and then found, quite by coincidence, that an Israeli patrol just happened to be there, unprotected and uncovered from supporting fire they simply don’t understand how conflicts work. Mostly, good operations happen by accident. Long term planning? Hezballah has been trying to kidnap Israeli soldiers for years — it is not a recent phenomenon.

    I think it also useful to respond to the paint them all with the same brush routine of the Bush Administration: Iran is behind it all. Oh please, do we really think Iran calls Hezballah and tells them what to do? Only people who report on the region from Bethesda would think such a thing.

    And I am not a card carrying member of the left and I am not lying on behalf of my terrorist friends. I am attempting to provide a more rational explanation than those that I have seen, which repeat well-worn and false mantras.

    And for the record: I am a Republican.

  9. The planning, if it existed, could have been of the nature “at the first instance that conditions X, Y, and Z are met, go!” And of course militaries tend to get into routines, so smart Hezballah commanders may have noticed a pattern and prepared to exploit it. Teams could (and would) have trained to execute the plan when the observed conditions were met. (The fact that Hezballah “led them into a minefield” might be an indication that a rehersed script was in place. OTOH, it just might have been a guy on the ground making a good snap decision.)

    BTW, dollars to donuts by the end of the week Israeli Special Forces capture at least one Iranian “Advisor” in South Lebannon. (I doubt those anti-ship missles come without strings attached.)

  10. Laura –

    Sorry. I meant Perry, not you.

    Perry: “… I am not lying on behalf of my terrorist friends.”

    You know what? I believe you, and yet I don’t care. Nor do I care which of your terrorist friends (Nasrallah or “Hezballah officials”) are lying to you.

    “And for the record: I am a Republican.”

    Were you a Republican when you were an “advisor” to Yassir Arafat (six feet of dirt be upon him) and if so, what did you advise him about? Golf and school vouchers?

    No free coffee and donuts for you. Go sit in the back of the bus with Pat Buchanan.

  11. Mark Perry,

    From Michael Totten’s April 28 piece linked above:

    “Iran has moved into South Lebanon. Intelligence agents are helping Hezbollah construct watch towers fitted with one-way bullet-proof windows right next to Israeli army positions.

    Here’s what one officer said:

    This is now Iran’s front line with Israel. The Iranians are using Hizbollah to spy on us so that they can collect information for future attacks. And there is very little we can do about it.”

    Given the circumstances, your statement:

    “I think it also useful to respond to the paint them all with the same brush routine of the Bush Administration: Iran is behind it all. Oh please, do we really think Iran calls Hezballah and tells them what to do?”

    is comparable to a continued belief that Richard Nixon was framed for Watergate.

    Saying that Iran is not necessarily behind this, and that Hezbollah is capable of such actions on its own, would have affected the weight given your other opinions, but not your credibility.

    But you didn’t do that. Instead you shot yourself in the foot. Like I said,

    “Lots of Arab vs. Israel experts will lose their reputations here …”

  12. #13 Tom,

    What many have failed to notice is that it is Arabs vs. Persians. Israel is important in so far as it is a tool the Arabs can use against the Persians.

    Israel is a tool of the Arabs. Which makes America their tool too.

    As you point out: a new alignment. Lots of reps will get lost.

  13. And I’m laying out a marker:

    While there seems to be general agreement that Hezbollah’s fomenting of war with Israel is at the orders of Iran’s mullah regime, questions have been raised as to why this is happening now. As Michael Ledeen and a few others have noted, notably Michael Totten, this sort of thing takes months to plan.

    Trent Telenko and I believe the timing is simple – it serves Iran’s purposes to have significant on-going strategic distractions for the U.S. and Israel during Iran’s nuclear breakout.

    I mentioned in my January Winds of Change article, The Case For Invading Iran, that Iran’s mullah regime will have a “window of vulnerability” during the interval between their first nuclear test and completion of the test series when they have test-proven plutonium implosion-type nuclear missile warheads.

    Iran’s incitement of Hezbollah is a means of protecting itself during this vulnerable period.

    We will know for sure that this is going on if a dribble of rockets with chemical weapon warheads are launched at Israel from Lebanon, and maybe Gaza, in the next month, all by not especially undercover Iranian forces.

    If that happens, Iran’s first nuclear test should follow 30-90 days later.

    Hopefully I will be wrong about this.

  14. Haha! Experts should stay in their little cloisters. Seems WoCs Mark P. has a more informed imagination than the Conflict Forum’s Mark P.

    I was going to wish Mark P. luck in Beirut but after looking at his former employer’s list of clients–Algeria, Croatia, and Rwanda–I think I’ll hold off until I see an example of competence.

  15. Wow, Arafat too. You do get around, Mark. I must say. I was googling and saw you wrote “Grant and Twain”!?! Given my above quote I have to admit that was a very competent book to say the least. A real page turner. One of the best I’ve read in the last couple of years. Though I did have to laugh a little at the quote from Torquato Tasso.

    Oh, I almost forgot…g’luck in Beirut.

  16. Laura Rozen and Mark Perry,

    I think that Hezbollah has recognized a certain world-weary naivete in Mr. Perry and taken advantage of it. Be that as it may, Mr. Perry and Ms. Rozen have shown some real class by contributing to this discussion.

    Mark Perry and Michael Totten–two radically different views of Hezbollah. One of them is entirely wrong.

    Perry’s “careless Israelis got themselves kidnapped” story doesn’t mesh with what Totten wrote in “the post cited by Tom Holsinger (#13).”:http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/001132.html It doesn’t mesh with open-source narratives of what transpired. Here’s blogger and terrorism expert “Bill Roggio’s synthesis”:http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07/imad_mugniyah_likely_behind_th.php

    bq. Hezbollah carefully planned and selected the personnel for this operation, and executed with precision. The attack began with an artillery barrage along the Israeli frontier. An IDF outpost, with well trained Israeli troops, was overrun, and Hezbollah had the time to take the two wounded Israeli soldiers hostage. The land mine used to destroy the tank during the Israeli follow-up raid into Lebanon was deliberately set to catch the IDF while pressing forward, and large enough to destroy a well armored main battle tank. The Israeli search and rescue combat team took heavy fire once they crossed the border. Hezbollah laid a trap for the IDF.

    More of Totten’s descriptions of Perry’s negotiating partner for peace “here;”:http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/001116.html and “here’s his L.A. Weekly piece.”:http://www.laweekly.com/news/news/guess-whos-coming-to-iftar/42/

    Alas, wishful thinking–even boots on the ground, been-there-met-them wishful thinking–is not the same as cogent analysis.

  17. Guys, I think there’s an interesting window here into the thinking of people who do things like this for a living, and so are among those who shape our national reaction to events like this. I’d be cautious about tossing around simplifying signifiers like “leftist” or such.

    For those here who maintain a fairly Manichean view of things, it’s useful to take our assumptions out into the light of day occasionally and polish them a bit just to see how they are doing in the face of facts. Let’s do that – and see if we can engage Mark in doing so as well – and see what happens.

    A.L.

  18. AMac has the right of it, as is often the case:

    bq. “Be that as it may, Mr. Perry and Ms. Rozen have shown some real class by contributing to this discussion.

    “Class” isn’t the exact word, but I do appreciate and respect their willingness to step in the ring here.

    bq. Mark Perry and Michael Totten–two radically different views of Hezbollah. One of them is entirely wrong.”

    Bingo.

    But my confidence in Mr. Perry coming out ahead is not rising as this thread continues.

  19. I was not going to respond to the claims made here, because I had said my piece — and thought I would let it go at that. I respond now only because I feel the need to counter the claims made by Mr. Roggio, who is cited here as an expert who knows a great deal about Hezballah. I would note that much of what we are talking about can be checked and cited — and that it is possible to believe things because they appear to be true, and are taking as conventionally true by many people. But I believe it is important to check even the things that we know, to determine whether, in fact, we really know them.

    Here is Roggio’s statement on the mastermind behind the abduction of the Israeli soldier:

    “The sophistication of this attack indicates Imad Fayez Mugniyah, Hezbollah’s chief of military operations was directly involved. Mugniyah has a long history of successful military and terrorist operations across the globe. Mugniyah has a history of conducting similar snatch and grab operations against the Israelis. He was responsible for capturing three Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, and the abduction of an Israeli colonel in Kuwait in 2000.”

    Mr. Roggio sounds well-informed and, indeed, Mr. Mugniyah does have a long history of nefarious and violent operations aimed at American interests. But what I call the “tell tale” phrase in the report is indicative of the kinds of conflation that I think we need to be very careful about. The phrase is “the sophistication of this attack indicates.” Indicates? There is also a falsehood in the report: Mr. Mugniyah is not the head of military operations for Hezballah, and he never has been. The sources that Mr. Roggio uses in his rather lengthy discussion of the operation (The New York Sun — quoting Michael Ledeen — a Frontline interview with Larry Johnson, Mike’s Blog and terrorism expert Magnus Ranstorp who commented on Mugniyah in the press but who also serves as an expert for Mr. Roggio’s blog), are not that impressive.

    Mr. Roggio goes on to say that Mugniyah is in Lebanon. He is not. US intelligence officials are not searching for him in Lebanon, but elsewhere. There is also a rather lengthy piece on Mr. Roggio’s blog about Hezballah-Hamas cooperation, as well as how Mugniyah has pieced together an alliance of convenience between the organization using the Hamas representative in Lebanon as a go-between. With the exception of Mr. Mugniyah, of course, I have met the people he is talking about and what he says and what I know do not jibe.

    So let us go on then to the explanation of the operation that Mr. Roggio gives:

    “Hezbollah carefully planned and selected the personnel for this operation, and executed with precision. The attack began with an artillery barrage along the Israeli frontier. An IDF outpost, with well trained Israeli troops, was overrun, and Hezbollah had the time to take the two wounded Israeli soldiers hostage. The land mine used to destroy the tank during the Israeli follow-up raid into Lebanon was deliberately set to catch the IDF while pressing forward, and large enough to destroy a well armored main battle tank. The Israeli search and rescue combat team took heavy fire once they crossed the border. Hezbollah laid a trap for the IDF.”

    All of this is true — Hezballah did carefully plan and select the personnel for this operation. But then, they do so for every operation. I don’t know about the artillery barrage, as I have been told it did not happen by IDF personnel, but I suppose they could be wrong. It seems unlikely to me, as the people that Hezballah captured would not be where they were during an artillery barrage. But them, like I said, I could be wrong. The one thing that strikes me about the Roggio paragraph, however, is that he attributes the destruction of the tank to a large anti-personnel mine — which cannot possibly be true. A large anti-personnel mine is not an anti-personnel mine, but an anti-tank mine. The distinction is quite stark and important, as it would give Hezballah a capability and sophistication that I have always argued they have.

    Now then, what exactly is my point? I suppose it is this: I certainly respect Mr. Roggio’s expertise and he has seen a lot of the world. But he is interested in assessing blame, and I am simply attempting to find out what happened. I do not have any doubt that Hezballah receives arms from Iran and consults with the Iranian leadership. That Hezballah might be a strategic ally of Iran is not really in question — it happens to be true. I just don’t find it particularly damning. That they would use weapons supplied by Iran is not of particular moment to me: Israel uses American weapons. So what?

    It may be that Hezballah is a puppet of Iran, that it takes instructions from Iran, that the kidnapping was planned in Iran, that it was done at this particular time for political purposes having to do with Iran. The kidnapping may be a part of a nefarious plot in which Mr. Mugniyah is the cartilage holding Iran, Hamas, Hezballah and al-Qaeda together. But I don’t believe that, it does not mesh with my experience in the region in talking with these people, and there is no factual basis for making any of those assumptions. Al-Qaeda is a quite different organization than Hezballah, and those two are different entirely than Hamas. There is, in fact, strong reason to believe that the organizations do not coordinate their operations — that reason being there is no evidence for it.

    Differentiation between the organizations is quite important and I think this country, my country, has run itself into a lot of trouble in the world by conflating the goals of all of them. Hezballah and Hamas officials have actually been threatened by al-Qaeda takfiris for running in democratic elections, and al-Qaeda leaders hate Iran because, being Shias, the Iranians are apostates. It may well look like everyone is acting in concert from where we are sitting, but Michael Ledeen saying so, or any other terrorologist saying so, doesn’t make it so — and our believing it will not prove it.

  20. Mark Perry is wrong. Because he doesnt knows enough to say this:

    “Oy vey. There are a lot of people in Washington trying to walk that story back right now, because it’s not true.”

    Mr. Roggio cannot say with certainity what he says also. But he has an advantage Hiballah is sometimes very calm. It might that they only spotted a weakness in Israel complacency. It might that Hamas called for an hand (and that linkage could only be possible with amen from Iran and Syria), or that Iran said to Hizballah that open season is on and troubles are necessary.
    WE DONT KNOW

    The last paragraph of Mark Perry is the worst of all.
    Al-quaeda has no problems being allied to anyone like Hitler and Stalin to eachother, the islamic fundamentalist didnt have any problem being allied to USA to fight URSS.
    Talk is cheap and the fact that Al-qaeda did criticied Hamas doesnt change the fact that operatively they work to the same side. Many of the talking between extremist organisations is just turf protection.

  21. Small? nitpick in citation provided by Mr. Perry i dont see any reference to an anti-personel land mine.

  22. #23 Mark,

    I belive a person in Damascus (didn’t catch his name a day or two ago) claimed he had the power to negotiate for all three captured soldiers. i.e. with respect to the soldiers he represented Hamas and Hizbollah. Also Hizbollah has been proclaiming “solidarity” with the Gazans.

    Confusion, disinformation, reality? We will have to wait until the books are written. And even then…..

  23. Michael J. Totten at July 15, 2006 09:00 AM,

    at

    Michael Totten

    asked if Lebanon should have restarted the Lebanese Civil War to prevent what is happening.

    My resopnse is: Israel is now fighting the Lebanese Civil War for the Lebanese. They will do it their way. It is unfortunate that non-Hezbollah citizens who might other wise have been hurt by a civil war are being hurt by the Israelis.

  24. Mr. Perry (#23):

    You remarked (Perry quotes in italics throughout):

    bq. Now then, what exactly is my point? I suppose it is this: … [Mr. Roggio] is interested in assessing blame, and I am simply attempting to find out what happened.

    As I and many other have argued in this forum “simply attempting to find out what happened” has to be the starting point for any understanding of current events—and one that we return to often. So, happily, I am in agreement with your sentiments.

    Not so happily: we all have blind spots when it comes to Inconvenient Truths, and you are liberal in demonstrating some of yours. A common practice in discussions such as this is for a participant to make claims that are inaccurate or out of context, and leave it to his or her interlocutors to do the work of finding links and correcting the record for less-well-informed readers (or those who haven’t finished their Sunday morning coffee, in this case). With a little luck and a sufficient number of red herrings, the conversation may not advance to take those awkward aspects of reality into account.

    Strange as it seems, I don’t intend to impugn your motives, which I assume are honorable. But purity of heart does not excuse the conduct I am describing. As an example, I will comment on your remarks in #23 above on “Roggio’s description”:http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07/imad_mugniyah_likely_behind_th.php of the circumstances of the kidnapping.

    Perry wrote:

    bq. I would note that much of what we are talking about can be checked and cited — and that it is possible to believe things because they appear to be true, and are taking as conventionally true by many people. But I believe it is important to check even the things that we know, to determine whether, in fact, we really know them.

    We agree on the appropriate standard.

    bq. Hezballah did carefully plan and select the personnel for this operation. But then, they do so for every operation. I don’t know about the artillery barrage, as I have been told it did not happen by IDF personnel, but I suppose they could be wrong. It seems unlikely to me, as the people that Hezballah captured would not be where they were during an artillery barrage. But them, like I said, I could be wrong.

    “The Jerusalem Post,”:http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885976658&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull July 12:

    bq. In a meticulously-planned attack by the Hizbullah, terrorists infiltrated into Israel early Wednesday morning and fired anti-tank rockets at an IDF patrol along the western border near Zarit, killing three soldiers and abducting another two. Later a tank, sent in to search for the abducted troops, drove over a large explosive device. … The morning attack began at 8 AM, when Hizbullah launched a heavy barrage of Katyusha rockets and mortar shells at IDF positions and communities along the northern frontier. One rocket scored a direct hit on a house in Shtula.

    “The Washington Post”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200262.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200262.html gives the time of the start of the kidnapping operation as 9:05 AM.

    In other words, events unfolded precisely as Roggio described. Perry’s report that he apparently asked IDF personnel, “Did Hezbollah fire artillery rounds at the site of the kidnapping?” – is hardly a rebuttal. Either Perry (“it is important to check things”) doesn’t read the Jerusalem Post, or … Or what?

    Roggio wrote:

    bq. The land mine used to destroy the tank during the Israeli follow-up raid into Lebanon was deliberately set to catch the IDF while pressing forward, and large enough to destroy a well armored main battle tank.

    Perry wrote:

    bq. [Roggio] attributes the destruction of the tank to a large anti-personnel mine — which cannot possibly be true. A large anti-personnel mine is not an anti-personnel mine, but an anti-tank mine. The distinction is quite stark and important, as it would give Hezballah a capability and sophistication that I have always argued they have.

    A rebuttal of Roggio that is entirely in error, followed by a self-congratulatory non-sequitor.

    This leads me to some unfortunately unkind further remarks.

    bq. With the exception of Mr. Mugniyah, of course, I have met the people [Roggio] is talking about and what he says and what I know do not jibe.

    If there is a case to weigh Perry’s insights as heavily as Roggio’s (or Totten’s), Perry has not demonstrated it in the Rozen interview, or here.

    bq. I do not have any doubt that Hezballah receives arms from Iran and consults with the Iranian leadership. That Hezballah might be a strategic ally of Iran is not really in question — it happens to be true. I just don’t find it particularly damning. That they would use weapons supplied by Iran is not of particular moment to me: Israel uses American weapons. So what?

    Perry could continue by pointing out that Hezbollah is sworn to Israel’s destruction, as is Iran; that Hezbollah is a de facto sovereign state, having usurped the functions of the State in southern Lebanon, the Bekka Valley, and parts of Beirut; that Hezbollah has an Army that outmatches Lebanon’s and is raining an impressive number of long-range missiles upon Israel, that Hezbollah fires antiship guided missiles capable of sinking warships; that Hezbollah’s Utopian vision is indistinguishable from the Taliban’s. Et cetera. But again: so what?

    (I should note that I speak as an American who respects Israel, but sees the two nations’ interests as distinct, and sometimes in conflict. I’m concerned about American interests, and about Western civilization more generally. Still, Perry’s belief that the best policy option for Israel would be for it to embrace its aspiring butchers as partners for peace strikes me as bit, er, strange.)

    bq. … and al-Qaeda leaders hate Iran because, being Shias, the Iranians are apostates. It may well look like everyone is acting in concert from where we are sitting, but Michael Ledeen saying so, or any other terrorologist saying so, doesn’t make it so — and our believing it will not prove it.

    Skeptical readers can start by using Google to search “Iran al Qaeda connections” and “Iran al Qaida connections.” Focus on the primary news sites and the secondary sites with sober commentary and solid links; ignore the inevitable extremists and nutters. (Alternately, “here (at bl*gspot, via http://www.tinyurl.com)”:http://tinyurl.com/o72hj is a link to one of Dan Darling’s research notes on the subject, but Darling’s excellent contributions there and at Winds are harder to search.)

    Fifteen minutes of reading is enough to enable an evaluation of Perry’s snarky dismissal of ‘terrorologists’.

  25. This thread is absurd.

    Israel, with U.S. support, intends to resist calls for a cease-fire and continue a longer-term strategy of punishing Hezbollah, which is likely to include several weeks of precision bombing in Lebanon, according to senior Israeli and U.S. officials.

    For Israel, the goal is to eliminate Hezbollah as a security threat — or altogether, the sources said. A senior Israeli official confirmed that Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah is a target, on the calculation that the Shiite movement would be far less dynamic without him. […]

    Specifically, officials said, Israel and the United States are looking to create conditions for achieving one remaining goal of U.N. Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, which calls for the dismantling and disarming of Lebanon’s militias and expanding the state’s control over all its territory. […]

    If Lebanon as a first step takes over Hezbollah’s stockpiles, which included more than 12,000 rockets and missiles before the current strife began, then cease-fire talks could begin, the Israeli official said.

    “The only way a cease-fire will even be considered is if 1559 is fully implemented,” said the senior Israeli official. Lebanese troops must be deployed to take over positions in Hezbollah’s southern Lebanon strongholds to ensure that there are no more cross-border raids or rocket barrages into northern Israel.”[link from L. Rozen]

    Meanwhile Hezbollah’s popularity is up.
    Israel and the Bush admisinstration are using this as another excuse for what will be remembered as a great act of imperial overreach.
    This whole thing is pathetic.

    And for the record, I am a jew, not a republican, and not a zionist.

  26. Well, there is a lot here that I could respond to and perhaps should. I would begin by saying I appreciate the well-mannered response to my often counter-intuitive thinking and the otherwise courteous responses to which my opinions have been subjected.

    I will begin by noting that I was one of the political directors of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines for about eight years so know something about landmines; I don’t mean to be nitpicking, but a large anti-personnel mine and an anti-tank mine are quite different; it is not a matter of degree. That is not the subject of this entry however.

    I will repeat that, despite views to the contrary, I have no particular ax to grind. I do not abhor Israel or think that they are monsters and believe they certainly have a right to defend themselves. I am not asking them to embrace people who hate them — I am seeking a way for disparate political movements to engage with each other without shedding blood. This is not such a radical stance or leftist or anti-Zionist or anti-American. I find war (having seen some of it) boring, useless and counterproductive. While it may sometimes be necessary, even in the best of circumstances it causes more problems than it solves. The goal we seek is to have a war of ideas with our enemies without having a war. This is what happened in the Cold War — in which we talked with our enemies nearly every day. Not talking with our enemies now will yield defeat, not victory — in my estimation.

    Here is my viewpoint on this thread’s main currents, and I would like to return to my main point and perhaps explicate it a little more. To do this I will tell a short story.

    One of the times I was in Bethlehem (where I have spent a lot of time) I sat at lunch with two rather dignified Palestinian gentlemen. This was right after the US had gone into Iraq, but before Saddam was captured. One gentlemen turned to the other and said: “You know, the Americans have captured Saddam and taken him to Moscow.” The other gentleman’s jaw dropped — “how can you believe such nonsense,” he said. “Everyone knows that Saddam is in Birmingham, Alabama.”

    Now I don’t normally get into these kinds of discussions with Arabs because they are frustrating. And the reason they are frustrating is that they seem to be all alike. The commonly held view in the Arab world, even among normally smart people is that Israel never makes a move, never fires a shot, and never talks with anyone without first checking with Washington. “Israel is run by the US,” is a common refrain and nearly (I would venture to guess) universally accepted.

    This claim is not true, of course, but there are strong reasons for believing it to be true if you are an Arab. And here are the reasons:

    –Israel is a strategic ally of the United States;
    –Israel, in dire circumstances, can be helped militarily by the US;
    –Israel has a significant lobbying presence in Washington;
    –Most of Israel’s weapons are bought in the US;
    –The US has heavy investment in Israel;
    –US and Israeli leaders see eye-to-eye on the world’s problems and so, therefore

    “Israel doesn’t make a move without checking first with Washington.”

    The thing about the claim that is so fascinating is that it ought to be true, but isn’t. In fact, Israel does not check with the US or get permission from the US, but they do consult. They do not control our foreign policy and we certainly don’t control theirs. There is no US-Israeli planning body conspiring to control the Middle East. To suppose so is to misunderstand the nature of the relationship.

    I think that most Americans would find the claim that Israel and the US are in league to control the world to be ludicrous — and yet, that view is widely adopted in the Middle East.

    What is interesting about this, it seems to me, is that it is mirrored in such much of our interpretations of the region. Do we really think that Hezballah would abduct soldiers without orders from Iran? After all, the are strategic allies of Iran, right? And they receive weapons from Iran, right? And they have the same general strategic goals as Iran, right?

    So it stands to reason that the kidnapping of the Israelis was concocted in Iran, the weapons were shipped across Syria, and that the real goal here is to … whatever. Of course, when I confront Arabs with the argument that their view of the US-Israeli relationship is based on a misconception of how politics between the two nations work they look at me like I have three heads.

    How naive, they say, how could you be so naive?

  27. Mark Perry: You Lambast Mr. Roggio for confusing an “anti-personnel mine” with an “anti-tank” mine. Yet the words “anti-personnel” never entered into his post. All he said was it was a mine large enough to destroy a well-armoured tank. He did not say anything about its type, at least not in the passage you have quoted. The implication I understood from what he said was that it was a mine, designed to destroy a vehicle (i.e. not anti-personnel), and powerful enough that the vehicle could even be a Merkava and still be destroyed.

    I’ve heard of several IEDs in Iraq big enough to destroy an Abrams. A large enough dose of explosives will do that even without any sophistication. A 500lb (~200kg) general purpose aerial bomb, for example, buried under the ground and triggered when a vehicle rolls over ought to destroy any kind of vehicle you care to mention. So, I don’t see where Mr. Roggio is off-base, even if he is just talking about a simple explosive device here. But it seems to me, the way you are interpreting what he said is quite distinct from the way I am interpreting what he said.

  28. Mark Perry,

    Thanks for the response, and the continued civility. I enjoy reading your anecdotes; I think they are informative, even when my interpretation might differ significantly from yours.

    I offered readers some quotes and links in #28 to rebut certain statements you made in #23. I hope you comment on those.

    A more general point pertaining to the game of Chicken. In contests like Hezbollah/Israel, it’s to each side’s advantage to present its choices not as such, but as unalterable baseline facts, which the other side must somehow take into consideration and accomodate. In my opinion, you grant the fruits of such reasoning most often to Hezbollah.

    I look forward to your upcoming dialog or discussion with Armed Liberal.

  29. I am sorry for the confusion over my post on anti-personnel mines and would attempt a correction of understanding. It is quite right that Mr. Roggio did not say anti-personnel mine. He said “landmine.” Now landmines in the parlance of the trade are anti-personnel mines and do not include the class of anti-tank mines. So I simply assumed that Mr. Roggio meant anti-personnel mine, especially when he followed his description by saying that it was “large enough to destroy a well armored main battle tank.” Here it is: a mine large enough to destroy a main battle tank is not a landmine, it is an anti-tank mine. We learned the distinction during the campaign because it was not our goal to eliminate antitank mines, but to ban anti-personnel landmines.
    Why is this so important. Because Roggio speaks with authority on the combat art that Hezballah used and so it is important to be precise. I try to be and often fail, but just as often succeed. My point here was that the terms of art in this combat setting are crucial. So when Mr. Roggio uses “land mine” and “artillery barrage” and “deliberately set to catch” it lends a patina of credibility to what he says, because these are terms of art. Unfortunately, I found his terms of art misused — it was not a landmine but an anti-tank mine, there might have been artillery fire at some point either before or after (but, in any case, probably not a barrage — and besides, what kinds of “artillery?”) and “deliberately set to catch” lends intentionality to an event in which I do not think there was any. “Hezbollah laid a trap for the IDF.” That’s not quite right: Hezballah cadre killed and captured an IDF patrol and retreated through a minefield. An IDF patrol followed and were caught by the mines. The Hezballah militia was not caught, because they knew where the mines were. In what sense is this a “trap?”
    There is this footnote: Roggio may be completely right and I may be completely wrong. That is certainly possible. But my main point here (I again plead) is not about rightness or wrongness or even the facts of the particular combat operation. I am focused here on the structure of the explanation, as structures of explanation tell us a lot about whether people bring a point of view to their thinking — something which we all, me too, must work to eliminate in order to come to a better understanding of what we are dealing with when we talk about the war on terrorism.

    The character of the Roggio explanation seems to suggest a larger “concocted in Iran” scenario that clouds our vision of what is happening in the region, and confuses our description of what Hezballah is trying to do. Talking about Iran also, I believe, confused our understanding of what Israel is trying to do, as they have consistently talked about forcing the Lebanese government to provide control in the South. They mention Iran, but in passing — and have, in fact, taken it out of their strategic equation. It is the US, and not Israel, that continues to mention Iran in the context of the current conflict. We see this same explanatory structure in the attack on the Israeli vessel: the earliest version claimed it was done with an Iranian missile and later versions claimed that Iranian personnel schooled Hezballah in its use. I have always had doubts about these reports and have attempted to track them to find their origin — alas, in vain.

    Recently, however, I received this email sentence from a good friend and reporter with a major network now in the region. He asked me: “How on earth can a Chinese made anti- ship missile of limited sophistication ruin an advanced Israeli corvette — yet another example of the Israeli forces not being on their game.” His sentence was written because he is one of those few people who reject, with me, the “concocted in Iran” scenario of Roggio and others. The interception of the patrol near the border was not concocted in Iran (we now have “reports” of Nasrallah traveling to Tehran two months ago to plan the operation — and I’m pretty sure that soon we’ll have “confirmation” of it from “high level intelligence officials in Tel Aviv”) and Iran need not have been present for Hezballah to hit an Israeli ship. All that need have happened is for the Israelis to “not be on their game.” Partisans of Israel would love to believe that the IDF could not be caught with its pants down because we all know (don’t we?) that the vaunted IDF would never find themselves in such a position unless the nefarious, nasty, no-account terrorists in Tehran had underhandedly and unfairly “trapped” them when all that the IDF was doing was minding its own business and working for peace. We would also like to think that the IDF plays by the rules and that the killing of civilians is not a part of their strategy — but you have to wonder why grain silos in Beirut is on their target list.

    But then, the leaders of Hezballah are not charm school graduates either, are they?

    Sorry, I intended to respond to Number 28 of this post and I will, but only to one point — and will not try to be snarky. Here is the quote from the Jerusalem Post that is cited as reinforcing evidence for Mr. Roggio’s post on the operation: “In a meticulously-planned attack by the Hizbullah, terrorists infiltrated into Israel early Wednesday morning and fired anti-tank rockets at an IDF patrol along the western border near Zarit, killing three soldiers and abducting another two. Later a tank, sent in to search for the abducted troops, drove over a large explosive device. … The morning attack began at 8 AM, when Hizbullah launched a heavy barrage of Katyusha rockets and mortar shells at IDF positions and communities along the northern frontier. One rocket scored a direct hit on a house in Shtula.”

    Is this really supporting evidence for Mr. Roggio’s description of the event. It seems to me it is quite different. Do we really think that the Jerusalem Post has sources inside of Hezballah who told them that this was “a meticulously planned attack.” Maybe it was, but the fact that the JP said it was does not make it so. I say there is no evidence that it was meticulously planned (or, at least, no more so than any other attack) and the Jerusalem Post does not provide any. I think instead that the IDF was embarrassed this happened so sent out a Lt. Col. to tell the press that this was a “meticulously planned attack.” What is he supposed to tell the press: “Well, folks, a Captain along the northern frontier really screwed up this morning and two of our soldiers were abducted and then compounded the mistake by driving willy nilly into a killing zone and all hell broke loose and — well, here we are. World War Eight.” I will give the Post a pass on the anti-tank rockets, because I don’t know whether that is true, and Mr. Roggio does not mention anti-tank rockets and Hezballah leaders have not mentioned them either. The Post goes on to say: “The morning attack began at 8 AM, when Hizbullah launched a heavy barrage of Katyusha rockets and mortar shells at IDF positions and communities along the northern frontier.” Is this proof of the “artillery barrage” (of rockets and mortars?) of which Roggio speaks and which, I think he clearly implies, preceded in the same area the operation that resulted in the abduction of two soldiers? Is Shtula near where the abduction took place?

    But I think a larger point should be made: why is it so important that Roggio (that this was intended and plotted and is part of a larger plan) is right about this and I (that it is more likely that Hezballah and Israel stumbled unbidden into this mess) am wrong? Why is it that we need to have a plot on the other side instead of an accident? And if I am right (and I am) what does it mean? I think it means that we can find a way out of this unintentional mess through face-saving measures and that it might be important to do so — because Israel cannot defeat or disarm Hezballah, and Hezballah sure as hell cannot destroy Israel. And pretty soon here, I would think, all that either side is doing is killing innocent people. And making the rubble bounce. This is a political problem that cannot be resolved through military means.

    That’s it for me — thanks for the time and your comments.

  30. Mark Perry (#33):

    Thanks again for taking much time to post a thoughtful commentary on what you see and why you see it.

    On some of the points you raise, “time will tell.” It is unfortunate that the media culture of this country (Europe and other places as well, I suppose) places so much value on bleed/lead and on immediate, breathless commentary, and so little on building deeper analyses. I almost never read lookbacks that say, “let’s check the scorecard and see how we/somebody has done over time.” I guess it’s largely a matter of ‘consumers’ getting what they want. Some of your major assertions, I suspect, won’t prove to be right–but that’s just my unsubstantiated Internet opinion, worth what it costs.

    But anyway, that is why it is so important that we figure out whether the hostage-taking was intended and plotted and is part of a larger plan, or whether it was that Hezballah and Israel stumbled unbidden into this mess. In that which description accords better with reality is one of the major determinants of what we (however defined) should do.

    Putting eggs into the basket of finding a way out of this unintentional mess through face-saving measures is a fool’s errand if the mess–by which I mean, here, the initial kidnapping and what followed on Hezbollah’s side–was not, indeed, unintended. (Obviously, the mix that is the mess today is “unintended,” but this is a trivial statement.) Your explanations are not persuasive on this point.

    bq. > Israel cannot defeat or disarm Hezballah, and Hezballah sure as hell cannot destroy Israel.

    That’s true, but for better or worse there’s more to it.

    bq. > And pretty soon here, I would think, all that either side is doing is killing innocent people.

    Well, whether or not that is all they are doing, it is, alas, certainly a big accomplishment of this war so far.

    That’ll be it for me.

  31. I think both Mr. Perry and his critics miss the essential issues:

    Regardless of the degree of control Iran does or does not have over Hezbollah, there is no doubt that Hezbollah has a large set of conventional forces and is waging conventional war against a state.

    Here we have a non-state organization waging war against a state, it’s as if the KKK waged war against California.

    The Geneva Convention only applies to terrorists and non-State actors held by Western Nations. Western soldiers in uniform are not entitled to ANY Geneva convetion protections, receive none, and the various “Human Rights” groups applaud this situation.

    Israel now knows that there can be no peace, no compromise, no “deal.” Hamas and Hezbollah are committed to their total destruction, the Last Jew in the Middle East strangled with the entrails of the last Westerner. This is nothing less than the War of Civilizations, as noted there can be no room on the Planet for both “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal” with Mohammed’s message from god that all men are not created equal and it is the duty of the Muslim to slaughter, enslave, or convert the kufr.

    Given these dynamics: 1. Non-State organizations possess all the attributes (principally, an Army) of a State with none of the responsibilies; 2. the one-sided and therefore useless nature of “International Law”; and finally the realization that 3. Westerners will not gain peace at all with Muslims and can only deter attacks through military action …

    We are leading in my opinion to a drastic set of rule changes. Magdeburg Quarter, in other words. Since the Israelis know they will be condemned as monsters anyway, that their enemies know no boundaries and are committed to their destruction, and that all other methods have failed; they will institute horrific measures out of desperation to survive. The first Iranian VX loaded missiles will likely provoke the natural reaction among Israelis.

    Yes Israelis are hostage to and will be killed in the thousands by Iranian and Hezbollah rockets loaded with VX in Haifa and Tel Aviv. The same is likely to be true to those in Beirut, Damascus, and Teheran.

  32. The art of conflict resolution requires the reduction of grievances. A good arbitrator will go so far as to lie to get the parties to reduce their interest down to the two or three manageable disputes.

    bq. _my main point here (I again plead) is not about rightness or wrongness or even the facts of the particular combat operation. I am focused here on the structure of the explanation, as structures of explanation tell us a lot about whether people bring a point of view to their thinking — something which we all, me too, must work to eliminate in order to come to a better understanding of what we are dealing with when we talk about the war on terrorism._

    For those of us who are merely interested observors, rightness and wrongness and the facts of the matter are everything when it comes to understanding the WOT.

  33. The rhetorical sophistry and semantic haggling is all rather unnecessary.

    Certainly, we already know, and have been informed by the media for years now, though in terms far less lofty and less fraternal than those purveyed by Mr. Perry that Hizbullah’s—and its patron, Iran’s—stated goal of Israel’s elimination is no better and no worse than Israel’s attempts to defend itself.

  34. Mark, you say landmines means anti-personnel mines and that is the “parlance of the trade” though you do not note which trade. I suspect you mean the trade in which the International Campaign to Ban Landmines does business. If so, that is fine as a ‘techno speak” when you want to discuss issues with others involved with that trade. But I must point out that it is only the shortened version of anti-personnel landmines as indicated by that Organization, where they begin in describing that problem as “Antipersonnel landmines are still being laid today”:http://www.icbl.org/problem/what . Now that is a precise definition that fits well with both common vernacular and military tradecraft as well. The latter, military tradecraft, is how I deem Bill Roggio used it and I hazard to say, most everyone here takes it when Mr Roggio uses it.

  35. according to my commenters and some leb blogs, there was supposed to be a german-mediated prisonerswap last year that fell thru. that is when the attack plan started.
    hiz’b wanted to up the ante to get their prisoners back. they said that right away. but hiz’b was completely surprised that instead of another round of barginning they got WW III. Iran and the Arab league weren’t ready for this, let alone planning…
    that is why the UN and saud and egypt aren’t on board with israel-condemming…yet.
    hiz’b crossed the blue line.

    Israel and the US see this as an opportunity to get rid of hiz’b, or at least hurt them badly.
    did iran say it would defend hiz’b? no.
    condi say, “not at this time” for the ceasefire.
    israel has licence to take out hiz’b if they can.
    but the window of opportunity is small, just until the “arabstreet”:http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/07/arabs_watching_.html synchs up with “its leadership”:http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/07/arab_foreign_mi.html.

    and i think Samir Kuntar was the dealbreaker on the prisonerswap. the israelis have refused to trade him before.

    but we’ll prolly never know.

  36. Mr. Perry: OK, I understand what you’re saying. To me, someone who pays attention to these things but is not an expert, a “land mine” or “landmine” is simply an explosive device placed in or on the ground with some kind of triggering mechanism (pressure, magnetism, timer). I didn’t realize that there were any special meanings for the term. You may be right but I think Mr. Roggio is targeting his analysis at a lay audience who would not interpret it in the way you have. However, point taken, from now on I will only refer to anti-personnel mines as “land mines”.

  37. Mark Perry said this in his #33:

    bq. The character of the Roggio explanation seems to suggest a larger “concocted in Iran” scenario that clouds our vision of what is happening in the region, and confuses our description of what Hezballah is trying to do. Talking about Iran also, I believe, confused our understanding of what Israel is trying to do, as they have consistently talked about forcing the Lebanese government to provide control in the South. They mention Iran, but in passing — and have, in fact, taken it out of their strategic equation. It is the US, and not Israel, that continues to mention Iran in the context of the current conflict. We see this same explanatory structure in the attack on the Israeli vessel: the earliest version claimed it was done with an Iranian missile and later versions claimed that Iranian personnel schooled Hezballah in its use. I have always had doubts about these reports and have attempted to track them to find their origin — alas, in vain.

    But Edward Luttwak said this today in the Jeruselem Post:

    bq. Instead of passively awaiting the inevitable sanctions, Iran’s leaders decided to start a Middle East crisis of their own by organizing attacks against Israel. *Their aim is to discourage the US and the Europeans from starting another crisis against themselves* – financial markets and everyday politics in Europe especially can only tolerate so much conflict.

    and

    bq. IRAN’S MOVE was prepared in a series of meetings with its local allies, both Hamas of Palestine and the Hizbullah of Lebanon. *Khaled Mashaal, the overall Hamas leader* who remains safely in Damascus under Syrian protection, *traveled to Teheran at one point, where he received some $50 million in cash.*

    and

    bq. Hamas acted by increasing rocket attacks on nearby Israeli territory, and by launching a raid across the international border into Israel proper, in which two soldiers were killed and one was captured. That duly provoked Israeli retaliation, starting the Gaza end of the crisis Iran wanted.

    bq. IT WAS altogether more costly for Hizbullah to serve Iran’s strategy. While it retains a heavily armed, salaried and uniformed guerrilla/terrorist force of some 5,000 – its leader Hassan Nasrallah has been striving for years to build Hizbullah up as a legitimate political party in Lebanese politics, and the main representative of the country’s Shi’ite population. This effort was so successful that Hizbullah has two ministers in the current coalition government.

    bq. But there was a stringent requirement. To be accepted by other Lebanese, and to a degree even retain the support of its fellow Shi’ites, Hizbullah had to agree to join the Lebanese consensus on the absolute priority of reconstruction and economic recovery after years of civil war.

    bq. That meant avoiding a war with Israel.

    and

    bq. That is the condition that Nasrallah has now violated by ordering his men to attack an Israeli patrol nowhere near the Shaba farms and launch rockets into Israeli territory.

    bq. With that, Hizbullah has thrown away its political position in Lebanon because it is obvious to all that it is bringing destruction upon the country.

    bq. Evidently, Nasrallah felt compelled to serve Iran’s strategy. *Aside from the multi-million monthly subsidy it provides, Iran is the spiritual homeland of Hizbullah leaders and their more religious followers,* some of whom have studied in Iranian religious schools.

    So, we see a flow of multi-million dollar cash transfers from Iran to Hamas and Hezbollah, followed by attacks by both on Israel.

    Mr. Perry says we should ignore this as to:

    bq. “…suggest a larger “concocted in Iran” scenario that clouds our vision of what is happening in the region, and confuses our description of what Hezballah is trying to do.

    What is happening here is a Iranian financed war by proxy on Israel and Mr. Perry wants to pretend it is all Israel and America’s fault.

    We have a money trail for the means.

    We have the Islamist anti-semitism as the motive.

    And the Islamists are taking every opportunity to use the means that the Iranians have given them.

    Perry and those like him are the 21st century version of the “Peace at any Price” appeasers who gave power to Hitler from 1936 through 1939.

    They should be given no hearing as far as American policy consideration are concerned. No more than you would allow anyone suffering from mental delusions near a loaded gun.

  38. Stratfors Take:

    Special Report: Hezbollah’s Motives
    July 14, 2006 18 35 GMT

    Hezbollah’s decision to increase operations against Israel was not taken lightly. The leadership of Hezbollah has not so much moderated over the years as it has aged. The group’s leaders have also, with age, become comfortable and in many cases wealthy. They are at least part of the Lebanese political process, and in some real sense part of the Lebanese establishment. These are men with a radical past and of radical mind-set, but they are older, comfortable and less adventurous than 20 years ago. Therefore, the question is: Why are they increasing tensions with Israel and inviting an invasion that threatens their very lives? There are three things to look at: the situation among the Palestinians, the situation in Lebanon and the situation in the Islamic world. But first we must consider the situation in Hezbollah itself.

    There is a generation gap in Hezbollah. Hezbollah began as a Shiite radical group inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In that context, Hezbollah represented a militant, nonsecular alternative to the Nasserite Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other groups that took their bearing from Pan-Arabism rather than Islam. Hezbollah split the Shiite community in Lebanon — which was against Sunnis and Christians — but most of all, engaged the Israelis. It made a powerful claim that the Palestinian movement had no future while it remained fundamentally secular and while its religious alternatives derived from the conservative Arab monarchies. More than anyone, it was Hezbollah that introduced Islamist suicide bombings.

    Hezbollah had a split personality, however; it was supported by two very different states. Iran was radically Islamist. Syria, much closer and a major power in Lebanon, was secular and socialist. They shared an anti-Zionist ideology, but beyond that, not much. Moreover, the Syrians viewed the Palestinian claim for a state with a jaundiced eye. Palestine was, from their point of view, part of the Ottoman Empire’s Syrian province, divided by the British and French. Syria wanted to destroy Israel, but not necessarily to create a Palestinian state.

    From Syria’s point of view, the real issue was the future of Lebanon, which it wanted to reabsorb into Syria, or at the very least economically exploit. The Syrians intervened in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization and on the side of some Christian elements. Their goal was much less ideological than political and economic. They saw Hezbollah as a tool in their fight with Yasser Arafat and for domination of Syria.

    Hezbollah strategically was aligned with Iran. Tactically, it had to align itself with Syria, since the Syrians dominated Lebanon. That meant that when Syria wanted tension with Israel, Hezbollah provided it, and when Syria wanted things to quiet down, Hezbollah cooled it. Meanwhile the leadership of Hezbollah, aligned with the Syrians, was in a position to prosper, particular after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

    That withdrawal involved a basic, quiet agreement between Syria and Israel. Israel accepted Syrian domination of Lebanon. In return, Syria was expected to maintain a security regime that controlled Hezbollah. Attacks against Israel had to be kept within certain acceptable limits. Syria, having far less interest in Israel than in Lebanon, saw this as an opportunity to achieve its ends. Israel saw Syrian domination under these terms as a stabilizing force.

    Destabilization

    Two things converged to destabilize this situation. The emergence of Hamas as a major force among the Palestinians meant the Palestinian polity was being redefined. Even before the elections catapulted Hamas into a leadership role, it was clear that the Fatah-dominated government of Arafat was collapsing. Everything was up for grabs. That meant that either Hezbollah made a move or would be permanently a Lebanese organization. It had to show it was willing to take risks and be effective. In fact, it had to show that it was the most effective of all the groups. The leadership might have been reluctant, but the younger members saw this as their moment, and frankly, the old juices might have been running in the older leadership. They moved.

    The second part of this occurred in Lebanon itself. After the death of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, outside pressure, primarily from the United States, forced a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Now, do not overestimate the extent of the withdrawal. Syrian influence in Lebanon is still enormous. But it did relieve Syria of the burden of controlling Hezbollah. Indeed, Israel was not overly enthusiastic about Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon for just that reason.

    Syria could now claim to have no influence or obligation concerning Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s leadership lost the cover of being able to tell the young Turks that they would be more aggressive, but that the Syrians would not let them. As the Syrian withdrawal loosened up Lebanese politics, Hezbollah was neither restrained nor could it pretend to be restrained. Whatever the mixed feelings might have been, the mission was the mission, Syrian withdrawal opened the door and Hezbollah could not resist walking through it, and many members urgently wanted to walk through it.

    At the same time the Iranians were deeply involved in negotiations in Iraq and over Tehran’s nuclear program. They wanted as many levers as they could find to use in negotiations against the United States. They already had the ability to destabilize Iraq. They had a nuclear program the United States wanted to get rid of. Reactivating a global network that directly threatened American interests was another chip on the bargaining table. Not attacking U.S. interests but attacking Israel demonstrated Hezbollah’s vibrancy without directly threatening the United States. Moreover, activities around the world, not carefully shielded in some cases, gave Iran further leverage.

    In addition, it allowed Iran to reclaim its place as the leader of Islamic radical resurgence. Al Qaeda, a Sunni group, had supplanted Iran in the Islamic world. Indeed, Iran’s collaboration with the West allowed Tehran to be pictured among the “hypocrites” Osama bin Laden condemned. Iran wants to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and one part of that is to take away the mantle of Islamic radicalism from al Qaeda. Since al Qaeda is a damaged organization at best, and since Hezbollah pioneered Islamist terrorism on a global basis, reactivating Hezbollah made a great deal of sense to the Iranians.

    Hezbollah’s Position

    Syria benefited by showing how badly it was needed in Lebanon. Iran picked up additional leverage against the United States. Hezbollah claimed a major place at the negotiations shaping the future of Palestinian politics. It all made a great deal of sense.

    Of course, it was also obvious that Israel would respond. From Syria’s point of view, that was fine. Israel would bog down again. It would turn to Syria to relieve it of its burdens. Israel would not want an Islamic regime in Damascus. Syria gets regime preservation and the opportunity to reclaim Lebanon. Iran gets a war hundreds of miles away from it, letting others fight its battles. It can claim it is the real enemy of Israel in the Islamic world. The United States might bargain away interests in Iraq in order to control Hezbollah. An Israeli invasion opens up possibilities without creating much risk.

    It is Hezbollah that takes it on the chin. But Hezbollah, by its nature and its relationships, really did not have much choice. It had to act or become irrelevant. So now the question is: What does Hezbollah do when the Israelis come? They can resist. They have anti-tank weapons and other systems from Iran. They can inflict casualties. They can impose a counterinsurgency. Syria may think Israel will have to stay, but Israel plans to crush Hezbollah’s infrastructure and leave, forcing Hezbollah to take years to recover. Everyone else in Lebanon is furious at Hezbollah for disrupting the recovery. What does Hezbollah do?

    In the 1980s, what Hezbollah did was take Western hostages. The United States is enormously sensitive to hostage situations. It led Ronald Reagan to Iran-Contra. Politically, the United States has trouble handling hostages. This is the one thing Hezbollah learned in the 1980s that the leaders remember. A portfolio of hostages is life insurance. Hezbollah could go back to its old habits. It makes sense to do so.

    It will not do this while there is a chance of averting an invasion. But once it is crystal clear it is coming, grabbing hostages makes sense. Assuming the invasion is going to occur early next week — or a political settlement is going to take place — Western powers now have no more than 72 hours to get their nationals out of Beirut or into places of safety. That probably cannot be done. There are thousands of Westerners in Beirut. But the next few days will focus on ascertaining Israeli intensions and timelines, and executing plans to withdraw citizens. The Israelis might well shift their timeline to facilitate this. But all things considered, if Hezbollah returns to its roots, it should return to its first operational model: hostages.

  39. How about this, we want to get at Iran but europe and Russia wont support us. So we cook up a plan. We ask Israel to sen out troops on the border uprotect4ed, knowing that they will be attacked, knowing and allowing Israel to counter-attack. Eueope becomes concerned (all now at the G-8) and now supports us in our sanctions against Iran. Tell me it aint so and I’ll tell you that my conjecture is no differnet than yours

  40. “But all things considered, if Hezbollah returns to its roots, it should return to its first operational model: hostages.”

    As usual, StratFor shows an errie degree of prescience. I hope that the are wrong, but past experience with them means that I wouldn’t want to bet against them.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.