So, I’ve been Thinking About This Whole War Thing

So obviously, the main issue (other than “what’s for lunch”) that I thought about while riding on my trip was the war. In my mind, it is centrally the broader “war” between an aggressive sect of Islamic radicals and the governments that have a symbiotic relationship with them. The battlefield in Israel and environs, Iraq and Afghanistan is the most visible front in the war – today.

What I want to do it set out in a fast pass the issues that I’ve been chewing over, and then try and return to the key ones in greater depth to talk about them – hopefully with my thinking and questions amplified by yours. It’s obvious that this is a time that requires more than a bit of serious thinking for people on all sides of the issue, and none more than folks like me – those who supported the invasion of Iraq and must now step back and look at the situation – which is neither as good as we’d hoped nor, I still believe, as awful as it is painted in some corners – and think hard about where we stand today.

So I want to start with questions and sketches of answers. Note that the answers may well be contradictory – it’s definitely true that I am conflicted and that I hope in my blogging in the next little while to dig into those contradictions.1. Why does the war matter? Does Islamist terrorism deserve the high level of attention and concern that many people are showing?

Contra Glenn Reynolds, who says at Instapundit:

To read some blogs today, you’d think that this was the 9th century, with camel-riding Jihadis ready to descend on helpless American towns, swinging unstoppable scimitars. It’s not that way; it’s more like the Ghost Dance or similar movements borne of frustration at losing, movements that do their damage all right, but that are doomed to fail. I don’t mean to understate the threat, which is real enough. But it’s not on the order of the Cold War, you know, and we won that one.

Not so much, Glenn. I believe that state-facilitated terrorism does potentially present a serious enough risk to the health of the US – to our global primacy politically and economically – that it fully justifies the level of concern. This isn’t just a symbolic war – it’s one with real material risks that we must confront.

Let me divert for a moment to talk about what I mean when I say “state-facilitated terrorism,” above.

To me, it is the difference between Oklahoma City and 9/11 – a difference of scale so profound that it becomes a difference in kind. As I’ve written before, the psychological/philosophical reaction to modernity that I call “Bad Philosophy” is certainly present in the West, and we will certainly feel flashes (maybe literally) of pain from it. But the scale of attack that is likely to be mounted by a domestic terrorist group is substantially smaller than the one that could be mounted by a terrorist group with state support – which implies larger amounts of money, easier access to weapons, a place where they can be housed or train without fear of arrest or attack, and the ability to manage or forge identity.

The next post will set out some scenarios which I believe could be plausibly carried out by a cadre of 10 committed terrorists with 20 – 50 ‘helpers’ and a reasonable amount of cash. From my point of view, the risks they impose are strong enough that they deserve to be treated as far more than a nuisance.

2. If Islamist terrorists are such a big risk, why not just go to war and conquer or kill them?

Well, first and foremost because it would be flatly wrong (to launch a full-scale war with the Islamic world) at this stage of the conflict. There are too many paths that lead to a less-violent (note that I don’t say nonviolent) solution, and we have the moral and practical imperative to use the lowest level of violence that we can. The risks I outline in 1) above are just that – risks, not prophecy.

We have to live in the world, and like it or not, as I tell my sons, that means you have to accept that you are sharing the table with people you may or may not like or be happy with.

That doesn’t imply that they can stab you with their dinner knives with impunity. But it does suggest a more-tolerant vision than I think many of the “bomb Iran now” advocates may have of our role and place in the world. That tolerance is our strongest weapon, and we should be using it to wage ‘soft’ war to go with the ‘hard’ one our troops are fighting today.

The basic principle is well-set out by Abu Aardvark:

A smart campaign against al-Qaeda and the jihadist fringe should drive a wedge between them and mainstream Muslims. It should demonstrate the absurdity of al-Qaeda’s claims about a Crusader war against Islam. Even today, the vast majority of Muslims reject al-Qaeda’s theology, tactics, and goals. We should be trying to keep it that way instead of trying to do al-Qaeda’s work for it.

This is a good variant on my favorite Clint Smith quote…

“You better learn to communicate real well, because when you’re out there on the street, you’ll have to talk to a lot more people than you’ll have to shoot, or at least that’s the way I think it’s supposed to work.”

The post after the scenario one will set out what I think are the shortcomings of what we’ve done to date in this sphere.

3. If you want to “talk” with the Islamists, doesn’t that undermine point 1., above? Aren’t you denying the real risk we face?

No, I don’t think so. Look, the goal of war is the bend the enemy to our will – not necessarily to kill him or enslave him. We want the Islamic world to behave well – to pursue national, racial, cultural, and religious goals in the time honored way that the gentle nations of the West have done so for – decades – since World War II. Seriously, we want to change the behavior of a variety of states and change the direction of a large number of people in several societies.

And winning – bending them to our will – implies a mixture of seduction and threat. The threat is simple, and present always – we could if we chose, follow Duncan Black’s prescription in which

…it’s you fuck with us a little bit and YOU NO LONGER LIVE BITCHES!

The problem is that until we decide we’re willing to kill “them” all – or kill enough of them to cow the rest into submission, we’re left needing to convince them that making peace with us – on terms acceptable to us – is worth their while. That something is in it for people on the other side.

Wouldn’t we rather sell people on rights, laws, freedom, and prosperity – on ‘democracy, sexy, whiskey!’ then fight them?

We’ve done a truly crap job of that selling, and to me that more than anything else is the core and abject failure of the Bush Administration.

Why aren’t we trying to seduce them with what the West has to offer? What are we doing to win the average person in Egypt over to our side? Hell, what are we doing to keep the average person in Des Moines on our side?

Doesn’t it seem – when we have the weapons at hand to confidently state that we can demolish their societies and reduce the survivors to sustenance in a weekend – that we have the responsibility to try and talk them out of committing ‘suicide by war’??

4. So how’s that Iraq thing working out for you, then?

Obviously badly. Worse strategically, I think than tactically – in that I remain convinced (admittedly with little evidence except my own perception of how we are being told what is going on and a sparse overlay of demographic facts) that things are brutally tough in Iraq right now – but not horrible.

The numbers of deaths don’t approach the levels of the Lebanon civil war, and aren’t vastly (they are 3 – 4X) above the peak murder rates we saw in California in the 1990’s. Again – that’s not good news – but neither is it a scene of ongoing pitched street battles with massive casualties.

But even as I’m somewhat optimistic tactically, I am a total pessimist strategically. My justification – and I believe, under all the layers, the justification of the Administration – was to shock the other governments and actors in the Middle East, primarily the Iranians and Saudis, into modifying their behavior and support for the Islamist movement. We hoped that Iran would act like Libya did.

Didn’t happen, unfortunately. There are a lot of reasons that are no one’s fault, and a lot of blame to parcel around for the reasons that are. It was clearly not a risk-free move. By threatening, we risked hardening the positions of those who weren’t afraid of us.

By squabbling – by overtly acting out within our political class and our public intellectuals – we make it transparently clear to the enemy – who does read our media – that we’re not so sure about this fighting thing.

And so those who oppose us are made stronger both because we aren’t doing as Abu Aardvark suggests and driving wedges within the Muslim world (meaning we aren’t seducing people away to join our side), and because while our soldiers are steadfast and resolute, our polity isn’t (which gives our enemies the clear impression that we can be defeated).

So the “undecided” Muslim populace and leaders see a brutal enough West to be repellent – but one insecurely questioning it’s own brutality enough not to be terribly frightening.

5. Why bother? Why not just sit down and work something out that makes the other side happy?

Because I don’t see that as being very easy, for good reasons and bad ones.

The alternative to changing their behavior is that we change ours – by tolerating their primacy in a number of areas. Thucydides talked about that a bit:

Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honours. You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude.

I would rather bend the Islamic world to our will then bend to theirs, for the simple reason that I like ours better. They fly use our hospitals, not vice versa. The life of the poor here – or even of the stained middle class – is far better than the life enjoyed there. We don’t – as a state – execute gays, teenaged girls who are raped, or force women into servitude.

People here can question authority – rather vigorously – and don’t get thrown in jail. We can worship – or not worship – as we please.

It isn’t just because I am an American or a Westerner that I support one side in this conflict, and don’t see myself as impartial. It is because I genuinely believe that the values of the West are better, and worth defending.

I don’t delude myself enough not to believe that many people see our Western power as tyranny – and in some ways it has been and it is.

But the choices offered are not between the tyranny of Western values and institutions and an idealized freedom, but between the tyranny of MTV and Citibank that of the burqua, public stoning, and the Ministry For The Protection Of Virtue.

Our side – and yes, there is an ‘our side’ – is more than worth defending. The question is, as always, how.

I’ll close with two more Clint Smith quotes:

“You know the last words most [killed on duty] street cops ever say? ‘I’m gonna go in there and kick his ass!’ The word for that is suicidal aggressiveness.”

“If you carry a gun, people call you paranoid. That’s ridiculous. If I have a gun, what in the hell do I have to be paranoid about?”

The point, to hammer it home, is that right now we are equally at risk from suicidal aggressiveness and passivity. And that we are carrying guns (lots of them) and so what the hell do we have to be paranoid about? Calm assessment of the threats and the appropriate reaction to them makes a whole lot more sense.

50 thoughts on “So, I’ve been Thinking About This Whole War Thing”

  1. Marc,

    I recommend a book here:

    The American Way of Strategy, by Michael Lind. Amazon has crashed so I can’t give you the URL.

  2. Armed Liberal, and the like-minded, what would it take to convince you that this is about Islam?

    Actual tapes of Muslim hijackers repeating Allah hu Akhbar while they deliberately crashed their planes? Because we’ve got those. Global rage by Muslims over mere cartoons? Because we’ve got that. Openly cruel joy by Muslims globally over the worst attacks on America ever, and solidarity with the killers on about any occasion involving the killing of Jews? Because we’ve got that too. Would it take that fact that five years after 11 September, 2001, not a single one of our so-called “Islamist” foes have been read out of Islam by general consensus of the Muslim nation, because nothing that they do or say contradicts any essential article of faith? Because such is the case. And so on.

    Will you really say: “All the evidence we have seen and heard on and since 11 September, 2001 would not be enough to convict as our enemy a cult of a thousand largely unarmed cultists worshipping some foul and obscure idol, not in my eyes, so it’s only consistent that I also refuse to see Islam as the enemy.”

    Or does your answer boil down to: “That would be enough proof for me if our enemy was some mad little religion led by someone like Jim Jones, and I was sure we could put it down with ease, but since Muslims are so numerous and since Islam is what it is, I prefer to deny that the evidence against Islam is sufficient to define it as an enemy”?

    And if so, how un-formidable would Islam have to look before you would weigh the evidence and draw conclusions normally, according to facts, rather than according to special rules that apply because the enemy is too numerous and cruel for its enmity to be acknowledged? Would half a billion be enough to change the rules, or is it the full billion and more that changes them? Do armaments figure much into this, and could a large enough Iranian nuclear arsenal render Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent speech to the United nations sane?

    If you know that there is a transition point, but you don’t know even to an approximation where it is, fair enough. We are up against something mad and awful. It’s hard even to think about.

  3. 1. Why does the war matter? Does Islamist terrorism deserve the high level of attention and concern that many people are showing?

    Because they may get us. We are facing a dreadful enemy, one that we dare not lose to, and, globally, we appear not to be winning.

    Threats include the demographic challenge, the defection of internationalized elites who can sell out our pacified and infertile populations without personal consequences, creeping Islamic domination, and jihad, including both “irregular” and highly, innovatively irregular modes of war, and the nuclear jihad that the Islamic Republic of Iran is aiming at.

    We haven’t demonstrated a winning counter to any of these threats. You can look down on people who chant “Death to beauty! Miss World is sin!” and slaughter hundreds to enforce their hatred of beauty, but Nigeria is still balanced on a knife edge. Look down at the Janjaweed all you want; they are still winners.

    It doesn’t matter what we think we could do, if only we could get to grips with the enemy on our preferred terms. It only matters what happens. And what happens, over and over, is not good.

    That we have an easy time dismissing our foes as weak and not to be fought doesn’t make us safe, it only makes us as much fools as any European knights would have been who had a slight opinion of grass-fed little Mongol ponies compared to the mighty grain-fed European war-horse.

    2. If Islamist terrorists are such a big risk, why not just go to war and conquer or kill them?

    We can’t, not yet and maybe never. We don’t have the political strength for such a project. (And – what can be accomplished on the basis of imploding populations? That is both an issue of politics, culture and will and a raw, practical issue.)

    Our enemies know this, just as the North Vietnamese knew they could fight all-out for victory, sure that though we had nuclear weapons we would never use them.

    The difference is that Islam has the strength and the implacable intention to end us, so this time we can’t quit and live, even though we still don’t have a proven alternative to our losing pattern.

    However, to the extent that we can aim at ending or at least diminishing our true enemy, Islam, we should. It does not have a right to be here, it is not a good thing. People should find different identities.

    I think it makes no sense to fight Islam while presuming its legitimacy and respecting its sensitivities. I think that’s as foolish as it would have been to fight the Nazis while publicly revering the Fuhrer/Prophet (pbuh), talking up the great and peaceful philosophy of National Socialism/Islam, and respecting National Socialist/Muslim feelings on touchy topics like losing in battle (as in the first battle of Fallujah).

    If we choose never ever to fight Islam, Islam will still fight us.

    3. If you want to “talk” with the Islamists, doesn’t that undermine point 1., above? Aren’t you denying the real risk we face?

    We have already said our piece, and Islam has already given us its ultimate answer.

    …while the screaming children were rounded up, a teacher rushed up to a gunman to remonstrate. He appeared to be listening to her pleas. “Have you finished?” he asked. As she nodded, he shot her dead.

    I am finished too. There’s no more talking with them to be done.

    I think it’s a bad joke that anybody thinks they could have something more persuasive to say than could be seen in the eyes of children marked for jihad slaughter.

    And this is by no means an isolated incident: I could have used examples with Jewish blood instead of Russian, or in the Philippines instead of North Ossetia.

    It’s not about the victims and what we say or what we concede or how we should be better. It’s about Islam.

    The proper answer to Islam – not to human beings, I am not advocating slaughter or genocide, but the proper answer to Islam as a dominating doctrine – is “No! You die!” And this answer must have a practical character, and be as relentless as our foe.

    4. So how’s that Iraq thing working out for you, then?

    It sucks. Our doctrine makes no sense that I can see, and we have suffered tens of thousands of casualties and wasted massive amounts of money on a nation – if it is a nation – that is not our friend anyway.

    Even so, I don’t blame Bush. Though he may have made certain moves on the basis of mistaken ideas, there were not necessarily attractive alternatives.
    * Did we have to get rid of Saddam Hussien? Yes. All restraints on him would have collapsed if we had not, so it was then or never, and “never” would have been bad for us.
    * Did we have to get involved in running Afghanistan and Iraq? Yes. Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were not captured, and had we quit while they were free we would have lost and been seen to lose by the bloodthirsty global Muslim mob. Had the army been more successful and achieved the desirable goal of capturing or killing key enemy leaders – but the army did its best and was not successful. It’s the fortunes of war, you can’t always get what you want.
    * Did we have to try to convert these places to democracy? Yes. They had to be run somehow while we hunted for the key targets, and what aim other than democracy could have been truly acceptable to us? Besides, this was a grand and noble goal, befitting the great nation of America, and an aim with such a huge payoff if it worked that it was worth going for even if the chance of success was small. It had to be tried.

    And I think that we could not have lived with ourselves if we had never seriously tried democracy. A bad phase of the big war is coming. When we fight it, at least those of us who are sane enough not to believe we went into Iraq to steal oil will know what would have happened if we had tried to head this off, because we did.

    Unfortunately, Bernard Lewis’ theory that we have to give Muslims freedom or they’ll destroy us has run into a problem: they want our kind of “freedom” about as much as they want Sister Leonella’s forgiveness.

    Sometimes there’s no avoiding it: the bad guys score some free hits while you figure out how an unfamiliar monster works and learn that things you think “should” work don’t work.

    On the good side, we are becoming educated. The second battle of Fallujah was conducted far better than the first, though it was also dreadfully late.

    But we still let Muqtada al-Sadr walk around alive, after promising we would put him behind bars or six feet under, which tells me we have not learned enough.

    My guess is that the war is not yet lost, but it’s getting worse, and we are close to defeat, and unless at some point we learn to crush our enemies not abase ourselves before them, it will be too late and defeat will no longer be possible for us to avoid even if we wise up.

    5. Why bother? Why not just sit down and work something out that makes the other side happy?

    We can no more appease our real foe (the “paper program” of Islam) by giving it stuff than you can appease a chess playing computer by giving it some pawns or pieces for free.

    We are up against something truly awful. It has marked us for death as a civilization.

    If you don’t get why we shouldn’t go along with what will make the enemy happy, you need to watch Muslim decapitation videos over and over and over till you have fully internalised the spiritual character of what we are up against. This is what they want for us. This. Exactly this. And again. And again. Till there is not an atom of denial left in you.

    We can wise up, like the passengers and surviving crew on United 93 did, and fight and maybe win.

    Or we can buckle our of fear of what we’re up against – 1.3 billion Muslims, a 25 year war and all the other boasts that are often made and meant to soften our spines and are generally effective in doing so – and we can take the easier route in the short run, like someone destined for a starring role in a Muslim decapitation video opting not to resist abduction because the immediate odds look dispiriting. If that’s the option we prefer, then we’re stupid and we’ll die.

  4. Yes, of course. But what do you do about the 50% of the U.S. and the 80% of Europe who have no idea what you’re talking about?

    [‘Mahomet in Hell.’ At gringoman.]

  5. First, I must confess to skimming some of the above text. So I’m a bozo, sue me.

    Calm, clear, coordinated reasoning is the only thing we have going for us, no matter what the reality is on the ground.

    As neither a Democrat or a Republican, I support the Iraq mission and still do. (But it’s not a war. Terms matter.) We have a national policy that is causing our kids to die overseas. I hate that. But we also have a national policy that lets tens of thousands die each year from smoking, millions from being fat, and a few people from shooting themselves accidentally in the head. National policies are like that.

    To hear some, the fear is almost palpatable. Yes, there are real crazy people who are working towards getting nuclear bombs who hate us and want to kill us. News flash — these people have been around forever. To hear some others, our biggest problem is that we’re mean and people don’t like us (I oversimplify). News flash for you guys — the crazy people will keep upping the stakes until we react. That’s just reality.

    I think there is a calm, rational way of looking at the various situations on the ground and making coordinated decisions about how to approach them. The sad thing is, however, that democratic politics is nowhere near that nuanced. Especially with an election coming up, the voices just get louder, sillier, and more extreme. We need to think that every day is 9/12, but we need act and think in a toughtful manner at the same time.

    That’s my plea for “stop arguing and try to help us all work our way through it” for today.

  6. Jim, I certainly continue to think the war is damn important – what in what I wrote suggests that I don’t? Let me know and I’ll clarify.

    David – the unarguable fact that there is a class of terrorists which is Muslim does not suggest that all Muslims are terrorists. (Rapists are men, therefore all men are rapists…not.)

    And a (seriously) nice set of responses to the questions…but please take a closer look at mine before you assign me a position.

    A.L.

  7. I don’t know AL: central to your argument is that it’s either beat them, or they’ll one day impose Sha’ria here in the homeland.

    Why does that argument pass with so little challenge in this blog? Because some Al Qaeda whackos dream of world domination?

  8. AL, I think you’ve got a bit of a contradiction here. From point 2:

    first and foremost because it would be flatly wrong (to launch a full-scale war with the Islamic world) at this stage of the conflict.

    At this point you’re treating war as a violent operation, which is the default/generally accepted view. However you expand your conception of “war” in point 3:

    Look, the goal of war is the bend the enemy to our will – not necessarily to kill him or enslave him. We want the Islamic world to behave well… And winning – bending them to our will – implies a mixture of seduction and threat.

    You’re essentially saying that war should be composed of operations using both hard and soft power, a combination of Clausewitz and globalization (which flies directly against the multiculturalism credo of our European allies, but I’ll leave that for later). However, this doesn’t mesh with point 2; first you say we shouldn’t be at war with the entire Islamic world, but then you suggest we should wage a “soft” war against the entire Islamic world. Which is it?

    I realize that argument may look like a mere bit of terminology sophistry. But it reveals a very important problem with the concept of “soft power” with which many have become recently enamored: soft power cannot be consciously wielded.

    Bush cannot go on TV tomorrow and say “Our next attack in the WoT will be to provide free MTV to all Muslim nations. We will also be distributing millions of Star Wars, Sopranos, and Desperate Housewives DVDs into the most xenophobic areas of those nations. We will do all this in an attempt to shakeup core Islamic values and drag them into modernity.” The United States cannot have a stated policy of “cultural subversion”, both because it is not politically feasible and because acknowleding such a goal will instantly discredit the operations in the eyes of the “targets”.

    Wouldn’t we rather sell people on rights, laws, freedom, and prosperity – on ‘democracy, sexy, whiskey!’ then fight them?

    Yes, but what if they aren’t buying? Surely you’re not in the Keynesian camp that believes demand is primarily a function of advertising–how do we decrease the price of our product to make them want it more? And if “democracy, sexy whiskey” is just another tactic in the WoT then doesn’t that break the buy/sell metaphor, which is based on the traditional capitalist assumption that all actors must freely choose to engage or not to engage in transactions?

    We’ve done a truly crap job of that selling, and to me that more than anything else is the core and abject failure of the Bush Administration.

    As I’m sure you’re aware, Bush has been pushing democracy and freedom since the very beginning–to the point that some hawks have begun to get annoyed at his emphasis on democracy over strategic victories. What more could Bush realistically do to push the “soft power” of Western culture, become a spokesperson for Nike or Budweiser? Deputize Howard Stern to go into Iran and undermine their culture? Establish a secret Department of Cultural Propaganda to carry out clandestine counter-culture activities within Muslim nations? More importantly: given that the last reaction to such cultural intrusions was a global jihad movement, why would Bush even want to attempt such moves?

    Look, I don’t want to downplay the potential power of Western culture to assimilate other cultures and encourage modernity. But if such a thing will happen, it will have to happen on its own; it cannot be coordinated in a top-down manner from the Administration, and it cannot be done as part of a planned war effort. You can not publicly “force a meme”, so to speak; and if you try the backlash will offer severely different consequences than what you hoped for.

  9. Wasteland — it’s either beat them now, with minimal loss of life through humiliating defeats; or …

    Lose an American city or three and mass slaughter on a gargantuan scale that settles the matter permanently.

    That’s the stakes for which we are playing. So says Samm Nunn’s Nuke Prevention NGO, and the Bulletin of Concerned Nuclear Scientists. Both of whom (along with Perry, Clinton’s Defense Sec.) view a nuking of an American city inevitable in the next decade. By Muslims of course.

    Why is Japan and Europe so peaceful? Because both places lost generations of young men and were left with a profoundly feminized landscape, demographic wise. It’s likely that the current (very unusual for Muslim terms) ability of women inside Iran to make ANY voice heard is due to most of the young men of the Iran-Iraq war generation being slaughtered.

    Eventually it will come down to this. [Many commentators miss the obvious; the difference in outlook in life between Europeans and Americans is that Euros got the full measure of the Somme and Auschwitz and Stalingrad; while the US was mostly spared].

    Muslims world-wide, without ANY opposition at all internally, have made their position clear: A. World-wide Caliphate run by Muslims that kills all non-Muslims or converts them by force. B. The world looking approximately like the Taliban’s Afghanistan as their model of the future.

    If you wish to avoid this, fight or submit. Your choice. I would rather fight to minimize loss of life and avoid nuked American cities and nuked Muslim nations. But that’s just me.

  10. Wasteland has something of a point in the sense that its simply not plausable that our Islamic overlords will be calling out to prayer Iowans and Texans at the threat of the scimitar. Thats never going to happen, and he is correct to point out that that doomsday scenario is often floated in the more reactionary circles.

    But i’m glad the Cold War came up, because in fact all signs point to the likelihood of a new Cold War emerging around us. A few days ago I described the utility of nuclear weapons in becoming the de facto hegemon of a region by virtue of being unassailable militarilly. That is obviously Iran’s gameplan, and if you look at the alliances Iran is forming around the globe things start to look bleak. We are worried about suicide bombers taking out the local Circle K, when the more strategic threat is Iranian missiles tipped with nuclear warheads parked in Venezuala.

    So what? Didnt we win the last Cold War? Heck, weren’t those the good ol’ days? I think we have a dangerous fondness for the Cold War, it seems kind of quaint and unthreatening in retrospect. MAD is bulletproof right? Thats a dangerous way of remembering things. Even against (for most of the era) a reasonably technologically comparable USSR with a rational leadership and goals that didnt include initiating armageddon, there were still some horrifically close calls. Millions died in the quasi-wars and occupations, pawns of the superpowers. Going there with the Iranians and their croneys is not a good option.

    The left is frightened of a United States unchallenged and unbalanced by other powers. They ought to consider whether they can pallate the alternative which is an alliance akin to a superpower led by the ultimate unprogressives that make the most rabid Christian extremists look tame running a sizeable portion of the world. Everything the hard core left pretended they believed Bush was is exactly everything Ahmadinejad unabashedly screams that he is. The threat isnt so much what happens here at home, but what happens the world over.

  11. I’ll agree with you, Mark, that the nostalgia for the Cold War is a little overdone. The nuclear threat was real and dangerous then, too.

    And Jim, I’m not sure to which NGO refer, but Nun (with Lugar) created the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, by which we spend a lot of money to try to help FSU counries secure their fissil materials.

    If you know the facts around nuclear security (and the lack thereof) then it’s easy to come to the conclusion that you cite. I too think that it’s likely that somebody will pull it off someday… and I tremble at the consequences.

    Unfortunately, the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and there’s no jamming him back in. I’m a little leary of arguments that we must go to war with Iran – perhaps with tactical nukes – or we’ll be prey to nuclear suicide bombers.

    But this?

    JR: “Muslims world-wide, without ANY opposition at all internally, have made their position clear: A. World-wide Caliphate run by Muslims that kills all non-Muslims or converts them by force. B. The world looking approximately like the Taliban’s Afghanistan as their model of the future.”

    Come on Jim. That’s crazy talk.

    First, we all know that’s absurd, even if there are some Islamic whackos who think otherwise.

    Second, those few don’t equate to “Muslims world-wide.”

    So why the hyperboly?

  12. Wastelandlive – no, I serously doubt that shar’ia would be imposed here.

    But we face the risk of a successful set of terrorist acts which would almost certainly change America’s role in the world. We might not impose shar’ia here, but me might wind up tailoring our policies to suit China because we had no choice.

    That doesn’t excite me very much.

    A.L.

  13. Marc, first of all, congrats on a serious take on the issues, though I have one serious objection (below). But I also have one quite serious question:

    And….????

    What concrete steps would you propose in order that we prevail? All I can sift out of the above is that we should be a lot more directed and strategic about public diplomacy and communication. Granted, and lot a more blunt, too. But doesn’t it seem there’s an inherent limit to the effectiveness of government organs in that regard? We’re in a world where milbloggers are more effective than PAOs, and where the average Iraqi is going to pay more attention to the actions of our troops than any pronouncement out of the DOD. You saw exactly what happened to an attempt to get friendly stories into Arab media, and precisely who lined up in opposition to it.

    This you would set against a threat that will have its hands on nukes in five years, and on bioweapons in fifteen, if not countered? I’d say that has a credibility issue, and we don’t get replays.

    I’d also argue that our ‘soft power’ is already largely engaged, and further that it was one of the CAUSES of the war. You don’t have to look too hard at jihadism to see (in part) a hideous version of Toffler’s Future Shock. The images of the freedom, wealth and (yes) decadence of the West and globalized capitalist civilization are tremendously appealing to some Arabs and Muslims, and completely repugnant to others. More of same isn’t going to persuade the latter otherwise.

    The quibble: I think your analysis of core strategy in Iraq is seriously flawed. I ca’t believe anyone vaguely competent would believe that shock alone would bring down a civilizational level entity. Ask the shade of Hitler how Barbarrosa came out, or the ghosts of Tojo and Yamamoto about Pearl Harbor. Or bin Laden about 9/11, for that matter. Great that we flipped Libya, but Qaddafi had already had one visit from the Sixth Fleet, and can read a map as well as you or I. Pakistan and AQ Khan I read differently. The whole story is as yet untold, but the image of a cocked 1911 pressed against a presidential temple comes to mind.

    Further, if that was the core mission, then we shouldn’t have have used precision in the assault, and certainly wouldn’t trade off so many force multipliers to try and stand up a democracy in Iraq. We should have gutted Iraq like a trout, and left the smoking rubble for others to contemplate.

    I won’t dispute that there was an undoubted amount of pour encourager les autres in OIF, but other goals certainly seem to fit as well or better with the execution:

    – Attempt to light a democratization and human rights backfire against jihadism. (I have some doubts re efficacy there, but that’s how we are playing the game.)

    – Secure strategically placed bases near the geographical centers of gravity of the adversaries

    – Knock off a known mass murderer, an active adversary, who was politically exposed.

    And even in the worst outcomes:

    – Cut the Gordian knots (kick over the applecart?) of Shia/Sunni and Arab/Kurd/Turk. DEstabilize a Middle East and Islam that had become pathological.

    – Battle harden a military that had too many accumulated peacetime ills (ahem – procurement – ahem)

    You can argue about effectiveness of any of those, but they seem to fit how the ‘feet are moving’ rather more than a one-time shock attempt.

    And, yes, I’m aware that I’m now obligated to write up my own piece.

  14. Wasteland has something of a point in the sense that its simply not plausable that our Islamic overlords will be calling out to prayer Iowans and Texans at the threat of the scimitar. Thats never going to happen, and he is correct to point out that that doomsday scenario is often floated in the more reactionary circles.

    Our would-be Islamic overlords wouldn’t even have to set foot in this country in order to do this, not if their scimitar is a nuclear one anyway.

    Even a nation as large and powerful as the U.S. can be effectively conquered by terrorists with demonstrated nuclear capability and the ability to smuggle nukes to their targets undetected – if the terrorists play their hand right.

    The idea is conquest by blackmail: First, smuggle a couple dozen nukes into cities across the U.S. – or if you don’t have that many nukes, at least create the impression that you do – and threaten to detonate one every day until the U.S. and state governments agree to basically become arms of the terrorists. That means not just changing our foreign policy to suit them, but also to implement shari’a law domestically and formally acknowledge Islamic supremacy as well. For good measure, also threaten to detonate all the nukes at once if the either the gov’t or private sector tries anything funny.

    When refusal means a six-figure death toll each day for an unknown number of days, outright resistance means a seven- or even eight-figure death toll simultaneously, and either either of the above also means a devastated U.S. economy, how could our government reasonably respond other than to capitulate?

    I’m not afraid of terrorists. I’m not even afraid of nuclear terrorists. I am very afraid of nuclear blackmailers.

  15. Hmmm…

    “Change America’s role in the world.”

    Well, that is certainly the enemy’s stated goal. But does it really equate forcing us to live according to their system?

    AL: “I would rather bend the Islamic world to our will then bend to theirs, for the simple reason that I like ours better. They fly use our hospitals, not vice versa. The life of the poor here – or even of the stained middle class – is far better than the life enjoyed there. We don’t – as a state – execute gays, teenaged girls who are raped, or force women into servitude.”

    I don’t see it.

    If it’s true, for example, that “they” wish or were able to “bend us to their will” – right here in the good old US of A – including their law, their health care, and their social mores, then the only possible response is to declare total war.

    But AL… reasonable men know this is not the case. That is why we’ve hardly mobilized, let alone launched a total war.

    I wonder why the gross gap between the rhetoric and the action?

    And – OT – did anybody else read this weekend’s Washington Post?

  16. We’ve done some things right and a lot of things wrong. Which is ok, mistakes are inevitable. What is not ok is that we have failed to either recognize or rectify our mistakes, and that is a killer. Rumsfeld is busy proving his pet ideas instead of throwing everything plus the kitchen sink at Iraq. Seriously, can even the most rabid pro-Bush supporter argue that we have strained every possible fiber of American power and resources to win in Iraq? How about 50% even?

    Here are the lessons so far:
    A.If you’re gonna pick a street fight or accept an invitation to one, you better fight as if your life depended on it. Otherwise some little runty guy is gonna clean your clock.

    B.Fighting a war isnt running a hardware store. Just in time/Just enough resources are not acceptable. Wars are won by applying overwhelming resources as quickly and creatively as possible. Rummy is the only one keeping score in his little ‘look how much i get for how little’ game. How much better off would we be with half a million troops in Iraq for the past 4 years but bemoaning how uneventful their tours are.

    C.Alexander knew how to wield power, and make no mistake that is what we are doing. The vast majority of us are worried about ourselves and our lives. Part 1 is to give the average Joe his life 99% as it was before you got there. Part 2 is to come down like a mountain on fire if the generocity of part 1 is taken advantage of. Look at Fallujah, it provide positive and negative examples. We were right to give them some immediate autonomy. We were right to prepare to make them regret biting that hand of friendship. And then we failed to follow through and its been a disaster in Anbar ever since. Had we dropped the house on Fallujah like we ended up _having to do anyway_ a year later, many things would be far far different. The single most important lesson is that if you decide to go into the game of nation building/occupying, you _must_ be respected if not feared. Being ‘nice’ is a tool, not a state of being.

  17. Ah, I always enjoy your pieces, A.L.

    We indeed do have the gun, in all ways. Check this out: “Sizes of World Religions”:http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html

    Guess this is why crusades became so popular back in the day. (Not that it really works strategically.)

    Even so, Christians cannot convert by the sword, and you are correct that our goal is to subvert the enemy. Overall, I am disappointed that Christians have been very minimal overall in their efforts to this effect:

    A famous scripture says “On this rock I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”

    A simple deception is at work here; this (even in the KJV, one of the most accurate, if not at times archaic bible versions…) implies a DEFENSIVE position. Prevail, if you think about it, is an active word– indicating that the church is to be assailed by hellish forces (whatever you consider that to be) but the hellish forces will not prevail.

    The key problem here is, from the original greek (which we may assume is closest to Christ’s words) ‘prevail’ was closer to ‘stand’ but more precisely, it can be understood as “The gates of hell shall not withstand it.” Its offensive.

    Lest a misunderstanding creep in here, note that Paul says: “For we battle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers in high places.” So this offensive stance is not directed at human beings, but at the hearts and minds of humankind. ‘Principalities and Powers’ is a phrase used by Paul to mean either demons, devils, demonic forces, lies, bad ideas, wickedness, etc. In a sense ‘lies’ and ‘demons’ are almost one in the same. Though, a when Paul refers to a lie born of man (and not inspired by Satan) he refers to it as an ‘Imagination’. The ‘high places’ referred to could be 1. The head– I.E. the mind, referring to imaginations or 2. The second heaven (or what-have-you) referring to the dwelling place of Satan.

    What I’m trying to say in a roundabout fashion is, it is Christianity’s responsibility to be a voice of reason– and also of love, faith and hope. Benedict was saying precisely this. He’s doing his job, the rest of us faithful need to do ours.

    This is our job in this war; And in every one. We’re not necessarily warriors in the physical sense– that’s not the goal– but since we are subject to the earthly authorities above us (as God has ordained) if we are called into physical battle then we will go. (–note, this is predicated on certain things. Rebelliousness as a sin exists only against an authority from God– and an authority from God (which represents not a person, but an abstract thing–) must be a terror to evil and a boon to good.)

    Paul gives a good picture of this:
    Belt of truth (knowing the truth, and as he puts it, [5] One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. (Romans 13:5) )
    Breastplate of Righteousness (being defended against evil through abstaining from sin or more specifically driving it out…)
    Gospel of peace (this refers to sandals/greaves – the word ‘Shalom’ adequately describes this concept, through truth and righteousness, being at peace with God, the world (the physical world) and men.)
    Shield of Faith (through faith not turning away from good. The metaphor is fiery darts being blocked by a shield. Think of when you watch T.V. and a bunch of ads keep splashing across the screen– faith in this way is like you saying to yourself ‘only 5 more minutes of this, not gonna be persuaded by this nonsense…’)
    Helmet of Salvation (ultimately, your most vital thing- your eternal life, is protected by salvation through Christ. So no matter what befalls you, you need not fear for the destruction of your soul.)
    Sword of the Spirit (with the Holy Spirit as a guide, you become equipped to fight back by speaking truth and destroying evil ideas and philosophies.)

    Please take note that there is an implied order, but more important is the implied reliance vis a vis the analogy of the armor.
    Without the belt, you can’t hold the sword, and the rest of the armor is due to fall off.
    Without the breastplate, you become vulnerable to wounds that could incapacitate you easily- the easiest thing to hit on a person is their chest.
    Without the shoes, you become immobile- you could easily step on a snare and be unable to walk or move or advance.
    Without the shield you must retreat in the face of a violent assault. (Or you cannot advance, leastways)
    Without the helmet you must hide your head, for fear of losing it –
    and without the sword you cannot attack.

    So note: neither the shield of faith nor the helmet of salvation rely on the belt of truth.

    I’m saying this (well, you all know I’m an odd one so that’s one reason…) because it is important- both the secularists and the Christians of the west have lost the power for some reason, to defend their ideas to begin with, and persuasively argue that their ideas are better.

    I know precisely now, why Christians hide in their churches- and the secularists in their academies and tall city homes and mansions and government halls.

    For Christians, without recognizing what Paul is telling us, we cannot take any kind of offensive stance at all. Missionaries are forced by circumstance to adopt the Armor of God- in the danger that many are, there is no other alternative for them. But the rest of us? We’re 1/3 of the world, and you’d think we were chopped liver.

    God, for us, wants this dynamic of us. In some sense, the world may be moving towards a situation where this may happen to us. It is already happening for the Christians (Copts for instance) who live on the edge of the Christianized world. It may not be unsimilar to the remnant of Israel- wherein only the most faithful remained because the rest either were killed in war, lost to plague, or gave up the faith under duress. (Think: Islam.) One question I heard asked was: Would you be willing to be the last Christian in the world?

    To all of us Westerners: would we be willing to be the last westerners? Is what we believe better enough overall that we would be willing to hold to it through sword, plague, famine? Chances are, 1. most people are too involved in their daily lives to even consider this. That’s okay. There’s work to do– 2. Those who hold a position (temporarily- for the position is temporary always) to make these things clear do not.

    The Christian analogy is apt because, What you are suggesting A.L. is one in the same- war- but one of the mind, of ideas, of culture. This is the purported war that every Christian is to engage in, every day of their lives. Many of us do too much of 1. above and slip into 2. when the time comes. As Christians we are all equipped to fight this war, and Westerners- all recipients of literacy (or nearly all) are _ALL_ equipped to fight the war of ideas. They just have to pick up the equipment, get a feel for it, see who’s fighting what battles, and get out there.

    – Again, this is not a call to militantcy- but a call to information warfare. They want to take it to us with bombs and guns and threats? We can take it to them where they are weakest: in their minds.

    Shalom.

  18. Second addendum: if you want to look at Romans, here is a decent link: “the Epistle to the Romans”:http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/k/kjv/kjv-idx?type=DIV1&byte=5015363

    It is mostly unburdened by commentary and other sorts of nonsense. The other scripture can be found here: “Gospel of Matthew”:http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/k/kjv/kjv-idx?type=DIV1&byte=4380943
    look for chapter 16, verse 18.

    Unfortunately, its not red-letter, so finding quotes is a little more difficult.

  19. #6 from gringoman: “Clarification (if needed.) My comment above was addressed to David Blue.”

    Thanks. Clarification is always good.

    #5 from gringoman: “Yes, of course. But what do you do about the 50% of the U.S. and the 80% of Europe who have no idea what you’re talking about?”

    Those who simply aren’t aware of the facts: talk with them.

    Those who have all the facts that they care to hear and have reached radically different conclusions involving a global conspiracy of Jews, neocons, Haliburton, the secret agents who took down the World Trade Center in a controlled demolition and so on – when they are only part of a 50% coalition at best, shut them out of governance as much as possible. Hugh Hewitt is right: there is a time for partisanship, and this is it.

    When they are part of an 80% coalition – my advice to a Jewish friend living in a part of Europe where Islam is advancing most strongly, shielded by political correctness, would be: “Get out. Take your whole family. Take any friends who are willing to go with you. Come to Australia, or go to Israel. Better yet, go to America.”

    Does that answer your questions?

  20. Your Nation bent Germany, Italy and Japan to your will in the 40s.

    Any chance of you recalling what you had to do first?

    Anyhoo, what WAS for lunch?

  21. This sentence is the one that jumped out at me the most in your article AL:

    “Why aren’t we trying to seduce them with what the West has to offer?”

    I think they are not remotely interested in what the West has to offer. They know exactly what the West has to offer and they reject it completely. One could argue it is a backlash against western values spread through globalization.

    Certainly we can try to seduce moderates with aspects of Western Culture that might appeal to them, while assuring them they won’t be forced to watch MTV.

  22. Wastelandlive – how about this as an outcome instead:

    Remove all Western influence from the Middle East and let us (the Islamists) rule there. Allow us to expand our influence via the sword into Africa, and via sharp elbows and words into Europe.

    They now control the votes of half the UN or more, billions a year in oil revenue, and they have values and interests inimical to ours.

    Is that an acceptable outcome for you (we’ll skip the likely Israeli response for now)?

    A.L.

  23. #8 from Armed Liberal: “Jim, I certainly continue to think the war is damn important – what in what I wrote suggests that I don’t? Let me know and I’ll clarify.”

    I didn’t think Jim was saying you don’t regard the war as important. Rather, I thought he was bolstering your case that the war is important, by presenting for consideration a pithy way of expressing the difference it makes.

    #8 from Armed Liberal: “David – the unarguable fact that there is a class of terrorists which is Muslim does not suggest that all Muslims are terrorists. (Rapists are men, therefore all men are rapists…not.)”

    Yes.

    #8 from Armed Liberal: “And a (seriously) nice set of responses to the questions…but please take a closer look at mine before you assign me a position.”

    Thank you. And what I think of your questions can be seen from the fact that I thought it a good exercise to answer them all myself. In other words: nice job. 🙂

    Your request is gracious and just and I’ll do my best, but of course misunderstanding is always hard to avoid. We can only try.

    If you think it’s news to me that only a miniscule fraction of Muslims are terrorists, I think you misunderstand me too.

    I think the enemy is a system.

  24. Mark B., while I’m rather in agreement with your conclusion – which I’ll paraphrase as ‘treat friends as friends, and foes as foes’, you’re repeating one hypothetical that’s been bandied about forever and doesn’t hold water:

    “…half a million troops in Iraq for the past 4 years…”

    You could perhaps have had that many troops there shortly after the initial invasion. (Before, logistical and force protection issues of staging that many through Kuwait were likely insurmountable.)

    What you can’t have is 500,000 troops in theatre for four years, because that implies a standing army of 1.5 million if you aren’t to wear out the force. We didn’t have such a force in 2003, we don’t now, and we aren’t building one. YMMV as to why, but it’s the fact that we have not put forward the will and resources to do so.

    We’ve gotten away with such a small standing force because we are extraordinary lethal on the tactical offensive. Give away our force multipliers in a tactically defensive occupation, and not so much. I think you’re arguing for changing that mode, and I tend to agree. Just putting forward an inplausible hypothetical doesn’t help the argument.

  25. “What you can’t have is 500,000 troops in theatre for four years, because that implies a standing army of 1.5 million if you aren’t to wear out the force. We didn’t have such a force in 2003, we don’t now, and we aren’t building one. ”

    Ah, but now we are back to why that is the case. Bush took office in 2001, 911 happened that fall, Iraq was invaded in 2003, it is now 2006. How many more division have we funded and built? None? Who’s fault is that? Back in the 80s we had 250,000 men stationed in Germany alone on average. In the late 60s there were over a million men stationed on foriegn soil at a given time. The argument that we cant field an army large enough to pacify Iraq is either total BS or if true certainly means we have far bigger problems to deal with.

    But the truth is that there was a deliberate decision made by Rumsfeld in particular to minimize the troop levels in Iraq, from the first day to the present. Its not even a secret. You cant take the minimum out of the ATM and then claim poverty.

  26. Andy (#26)
    “I think they are not remotely interested in what the West has to offer.”

    That sounds like a very radical statement. Medicine, the internet, cell phones, combat weapons?

    I think that the “they” in your statement is too large, and the “what the West has to offer” is too small.

  27. OK, I stand corrected. You are interested in ascribing blame.

    I’m not going to take on the issue of the practicality of funding, assembling the cadre, recruiting and standing up a force at least 2x the current size in two years (9/11 to OIF). Hopefully a competent milblogger will weigh in (are you around, Robin?) re that issue. I’ll grant that we could at least be in the throes of the task by now – five years on – if there was intent.

    So there’s not. Why? I find the notion that’s because of a bee in Rummy’s bonnet just too facile. Come on – his tenure and Bush’s are going to be judged by whether their acts lead towards eventual victory or not, rather than on whether they used minimal force and instituted BCTs. They’d have to be idiots not to see that, and they aren’t, the ravings of the left aside.

    So if there’s a logic of some sort behind not enlarging the military – with which we may neither one agree – what might it be? My guess: Iraq is a one-off, and has always been planned that way. We aren’t going to do any more occupations or hands-on democratization. We stretched the force once to give that strategy a chance, but we’re not retooling it a la Tom Barnett to make it a habit. The underlying clock of the war means we get one shot at doing this ‘nice’, and not only must we win, but win fast enough. If not, then it’s back to lethality, and the model is to create more multipliers for the force we have, not enlarge the establishment. Like I said, we don’t have to agree with it, but that fits the observed behavior.

  28. “OK, I stand corrected. You are interested in ascribing blame.”

    This has nothing to do with blame, we’re not dissecting the battle of Gettysburg here. This was _is still going on_ if you hadnt noticed. Might it not be wise to diagnose what has worked and what has gone wrong as a prescription for how to go forward? Ah, but not at the risk of ‘assessing blame’.

    “I’m not going to take on the issue of the practicality of funding, assembling the cadre, recruiting and standing up a force at least 2x the current size in two years (9/11 to OIF).”

    Lets not then, and neither should we pretend we need to double the current size of our military to have an impact in Iraq. For the sake of argument I could note that it has been a republican talking point since the Clinton years that our active duty military needs to be expanded from 10 back to 12 army divisions, which certainly could have been done in the last 5 years. Regardless, we havent added a single unit, much less half a million. Is it really all or nothing? Or is this administration not playing a totally insane game of claiming we dont need to expand our number of troops while at the same time claiming we cant send any more to where we need them?

    “I find the notion that’s because of a bee in Rummy’s bonnet just too facile.”

    True, its not the only reason, but without question it is the overriding one. Read “Cobra II”:http://www.amazon.com/Cobra-II-Inside-Invasion-Occupation/dp/0375422625 for an unbiased look at why the GW2 decisions were made and by whom. Again, _its not a secret._ Rumsfeld openly, again and again, has both demanded his commanders perform with the minimum of troops, as well as actively and intentionally withheld troops on his own authority (1st cavalry immediately after the shooting war which was intended to help stabalize the nation for instance, Tommy Franks didnt know until they were already sailing for the US). And again, i dont have an issue with mistakes, its the _refusal to correct or even acknowledge them._ This administration would rather keep letting bricks fall on their heads than admit walking under a construction ladder was a mistake, much less get out of the way.

    “So if there’s a logic of some sort behind not enlarging the military – with which we may neither one agree – what might it be? My guess: Iraq is a one-off, and has always been planned that way.”

    I hope the NKs, Iranians, and Chinese have signed off on that as well. The enemy gets a vote which is something Rummy has never seemed to quite get. I bash the guy (justly) but I should say i do respect his reenvisioning of the military, its got merit. But Rummy is a peacetime consigliere. He cant or wont adapt fast enough to the tides of war.

    Look, you’re trying to hold untenable ground here. It comes down to this- either we have the resources to handle Iraq or we dont, and if we dont we’ve got real big problems. If we do it is _inescapable_ that we havent used all of them. Not just troops- what happened to the vaunted american industry able to turn out a victory ship (or 10000 yards of high tension electrical cable) a day? When did Bush call the CEOs of our major industries to have them turn out flak jackets and uparmored humvees? When did he call for rationing of oil, or rally every able body to enlist? If there has been one consistant required of this war, it is that unless you are a soldier or family of a soldier nothing will be required of you. Can you possibly argue that we are giving anything like our best effort to win in Iraq?

  29. #32 from Tim Oren: “So if there’s a logic of some sort behind not enlarging the military – with which we may neither one agree – what might it be? My guess: Iraq is a one-off, and has always been planned that way. We aren’t going to do any more occupations or hands-on democratization. We stretched the force once to give that strategy a chance, but we’re not retooling it a la Tom Barnett to make it a habit. The underlying clock of the war means we get one shot at doing this ‘nice’, and not only must we win, but win fast enough. If not, then it’s back to lethality, and the model is to create more multipliers for the force we have, not enlarge the establishment. Like I said, we don’t have to agree with it, but that fits the observed behavior.”

    What’s wrong with that? It fits everything and makes sense.

    Operation Iraqi Freedom was supposed to liberate Iraqis, who were not really religious and just innocent victims of tyranny longing for freedom, to achieve their heart’s desire, that is a democratic Iraq.

    With minimal casualties, including few enemy casualties when possible, the tyrant was toppled.

    Then freedom was supposed to ring forth.

    Assuming the campaign was well founded (correct in its assumptions), how could we lose at this point? Only by being heavy-handed and omnipresent, making ourselves a target rather than a facilitator for freedom-loving Iraqis to solve their own problems. Or through taking lots of casualties, draining domestic patience.

    The obvious solution was the one implemented: a light footprint, with the highest quality of forces possible.

    And if that doesn’t work? It proves our hopeful assumptions were wrong and we need to get ready for an awful fight. We will need an army that kills people and breaks things. We will also need to be able to sustain the long war that will have become unavoidable, so reducing economic and political costs will be good.

    So reshape the armed forces, ramp up their technology as much as possible, test them to some extent, and let numerical expansion come later.

    In all this, I see no flaw in Donald Rumsfeld. I would have gone the same way.

  30. You seem to be trying to project your annoyance with Bush and Rumsfeld onto me. I am not trying to ‘hold ground’ on their behalf – that’s pretty irrelevant considering they are in office and neither of us is. I am trying to analyze what might be an underlying pattern that provides coherence to what’s occurring. I am trying to be, for the nonce, descriptive rather than prescriptive.

    Iraq is not the war, it is one campaign in the war. It’s not a priori irrational to suppose that a campaign might be held to a budget of time and resources. A number of reasons will occur: Making sure a reserve is kept in hand. Taking a view that the conflict is as much economic as kinetic and trying to protect that front. And perhaps – and this is where we touch the matters that A.L., Joe, and Donald S raise – the judgement was made that there was only time for one try at victory by reform, and the resources allocated were the maximum the polity would support for a 21st century Wilsonian flyer in the face of the enemy. If so, I’d suggest that at least the latter portion was a shrewd assessment based on current events.

    That’s what I mean by one-off. The enemy bloody well does get a vote. We’re running a live-fire trial to find out if the desire for freedom and reform inside an Arab country can become a force multiplier that offsets our loss of kinetic power when we go into an occupation mode. And whether that can make a difference in time to avoid cataclysm. I would have to say the former is in doubt, and latter extremely dubious. Color me another gloomy hawk. If you haven’t figured it out, I completely agree with your statements re Fallujah, and from all accounts it sounds like the dogs should be let loose on Ramadi under the same principle.

    Suppose for a moment that I’m right about that underlying rationale. Then we’re already past a decision point that some are assuming still lies ahead. We’ve said – for analysts with eyes to see – to Iran, Syria, NK that next time there will be no occupation with our troops as targets of opportunity. Instead we will play from our strengths, smash what we think needs broken, and let others worry about picking up the pieces.

    Re the home front, we’re likely more in agreement than not. I’d start with my Strategic Energy Policy To Offend Everyone, but that’s a post, not a comment.

  31. #36 from Tim Oren: “The preceding was directed at Mark B., if it isn’t obvious. David B. slipped in.”

    It was obvious, but clarification is always a good idea and never does any harm. Thanks.

  32. “So reshape the armed forces, ramp up their technology as much as possible, test them to some extent, and let numerical expansion come later.”

    Later?! 2020? This is the problem- _there is no sense of urgency in this administration vis-a-vis Iraq and there never has been._ Go look up what Napoleon had to say about the importance of time.

    “In all this, I see no flaw in Donald Rumsfeld. I would have gone the same way.”

    No flaw? We have conducted this war perfectly? Now thats just flat out unbelieveable. As I said, i dont condemn what was tried, i condemn the lack of ability to make _timely_ adjustments to circumstances. All that small footprint stuff, yeh its a good idea. But when the Iraqi army evaporated, when thousands of jihadis began pouring in from Syria and Iran, when Americans were hung and burned in the streets of Fallujah, it should have become immediately apparant that _that wasnt going to work._

    Simple excercize in logic. Jihadis flood in across Syrian border riling up the Sunnis and causing all kinds of trouble. Apparant solution? Seal the border with Syria. Why wasnt this done? Not enough troops. Why not enough troops? Rummy decided on a small footprint. Why werent more troops rushed over? Rummy insistant we have enough troops. Anybody see the circularity in this reasoning?
    And how about land mining the border? Ohh, bad public relations. Oookkkkk, so whats the answer? Ignore the problem and hope for the best?

  33. Tim, I think we mostly agree. However- we have a long history of trying to fight a war via the ‘break everything and go home’ scheme and it looks great on paper but rarely works in reality. Law of unintended consequences at work. That is why Rummy’s theory is flawed. Fast is good, speed kills true. But that is only part of the answer.

    Sun Tzu made the point- you need the yin/yang of the elite with the mundane, the fast and the heavy, the infantry and the cavalry. Its fine to win the war with the shock units, and _maybe_ you walk away and thats the end of it. But it is wreckless to _expect_ that to be the end of it. Clausewitz takes the point further, you bring to bear _overwhelming_ resources so that when the law of unintended consequences bites you (and it will bite you) you have ample ability to address it. Maybe you dont end up needing it. Great! But its better to have too much than too little, and no soldier ever complained about having too much ammunition.

    I understand our resources are limited- but I dont understand and cannot countenance the argument that we have all these other things going on and hence cant devote overwhelming resources to a war that at the end of the day we chose. If that means stripping every garrison the world over and activating every reserve and NG unit _then thats what needs to be done._ War isnt pot limit pker, its no limit. We unfortunately dont get to chose what its going to cost us to be in the big pot. If we cant meet the bet we have to fold, and we all seem to agree thats not an option.

  34. #38 from Mark Buehner: “No flaw? We have conducted this war perfectly?”

    “In all this, I see no flaw in Donald Rumsfeld. I would have gone the same way.”

    I think we conducted the war poorly, but not in the bits I discussed just before saying that, not “in this”.

    Not that our mistakes mattered much, since the people who really determined its success or failure were the Iraqis. Had their desire for freedom and democracy proved the asset it was suppose to be, and had their religion been as irrelevant as it was supposed to be, the war would have been won easily long before now. Had reformist forces throughout the Muslim world seen their one and only real chance for reform and gone with it – but of course they are all empty vessels. There is no real Muslim reformist movement and never was one, it is just a bunch of rent-seeking complainers. Had the new Iraqi armed forces made a decent effort when first challenged, instead of refusing to show up for work, events might haver taken another course, but you can’t go back in time. (And if we could the freedom-loving Iraqi forces would just run way again.) And so on. That is what has mattered.

    I think the Secretary of Defence should first build a sharp and strong sword for the Commander in Chief to use. I think Donald Rumsfeld did that.

    Wielding the sword, doctrine … not so much. But I was not discussing that, just Donald Rumsfeld’s priorities in ramping up the capabilities of the American armed forces.

  35. Mark B.: No we don’t agree, and this phrase reveals it: “…a war that at the end of the day we chose…”

    Iraq is not a freestanding war, it’s a campaign in the war with Islamofascism, as I said before. We didn’t choose the war, but we certainly chose the campaign. That’s inherent in taking the strategic offensive.

    Choosing to start a campaign doesn’t mean you pursue it a outrance. Since you’re dragging in historical figures, let me reply in kind. Consider a campaign of the past called Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands). It wasn’t called ‘Operation Shoestring’ for nothing. It was started in the knowledge that the logistics chain and all supporting fires were sketchy and vulnerable. But in retrospect it was necessary to figure out how to fight the Japanese of that time. It was a giant, painful recon in force, and then we moved on to island hopping, rather than cleaning out every one of the Solomons.

    The point: Iraq is in large extent a recon in force, at the grand strategic level. David B. clearly outlined the strategic hypothesis above – though I suspect no one thought it would go down quite that way. But if the most optimistic “huddled Arab masses yearning to be free” notion turned out to be true, some intransigent governments could be knocked off quickly and a lot of pain averted. If the core hypothesis is on net false – enabling indigenous forces and free governments is not a force multiplier – then the only way to find out was to go try it, and see if it was a neocon fantasy or a noble way forward. But if it’s false, then you don’t reinforce failure, particularly at a strategic level.

    As to what I think is happening, it’s rather a guess. The fog of war has gotten thicker the last few months. We have few Yons or Roggios in the field, the MSM can’t be trusted, an OPSEC cloud has descended on the milbloggers downrange, and Iraqi factionalism has meant that even their bloggers’ postings must be parsed. But, on net, I’d guess we’re going to win the campaign in some fashion, but find that the strategic hypothesis is flawed. Flawed not in the sense that Arabs don’t want freedom, or that Islam is inherently and implacably hostile to self-determination, but simply that given the realities of the situation, with enemy voting and given dependency on domestic will, that strategy cannot succeed in time to avoid a nuclear or biowar endpoint. We can fight a Slow War to some extent, but not that slow.

    But even if the Iraqis decide through bullets or ballots to split into three, that will in turn destabilize Syria and Iran, not the worst thing. And we’ll learn another strategic lesson, that hanging onto the shreds of the Westphalian system as embodied in the legacy borders of European (and Turkish) empires is also a flawed plan.

  36. “The point: Iraq is in large extent a recon in force, at the grand strategic level”

    This smacks to me of post-event justification. I gravely doubt anyone in the Bush administration looked at Iraq as anything of the kind. You may be right, it may turn out that way, but that was never the intention at the time. Whatsmore, it harkens back to the question of why our military hasnt increased its manpower in any significant way in the interim.

    “But if it’s false, then you don’t reinforce failure, particularly at a strategic level.”

    _Even if_ that was true, one of the facts about war is that you dont always get to pick what is vital and what is expendible. Right now losing Iraq would be a vital blow to the war on terror, and i dont hear many people echoing your sentiment that it wouldnt be. _Winning_ may not be a vital objective, but _avoiding losing_ certainly is. With that in mind putting the resources necessary to win would seem to be the most logical way to avoid losing.

  37. “… that was never the intention at the time.”

    Someone forgot to invite me to the NSC meeting at which the plan was briefed. Evidently you attended.

    “This smacks to me of post-event justification.”

    And someone forgot to send me my Bushitler.com signon ident, so I never got the message on what I’m supposed to be justifying.

    Give me break. I’m trying to reverse engineer a plausible strategic backdrop in order to forecast what may happen next, and I’m openly admitting I have no special knowledge. You’re interested in bashing Bush and Rummy. Enjoy, but kindly leave me out of it.

  38. Unfortunately the ‘plausible’ part got left by the wayside. Was i in the meetings? No. But enough people that were have spoken at length (and written books) to know that what you are proposing simply wasnt the case. Its practically a conspiracy theory. Occam is choking on his razor.

    If you feel like it, google my name and see just what a rabid anti-bushite i am. Few people were as supportive of the Iraq war and this administration as I was. However, that doesnt mean im not going to call a spade a spade. Unlike you, apparently, im not holding my fire just to feel good about it. Whether its to tote the party line or just to sleep better at night imaging this is all part of some grand strategic victory in the making isnt really material. When things go wrong… and stay wrong, you call them out and you demand accountability. The day Bush leaves office and Rumsfeld is out you will here nary a peep out of me, _because i dont care who’s to blame._ I want to win, thats it, end of story. And i dont care who’s toes get stepped on in that pursuit. I dont b%^&% about Clinton because it is moot. Bush is still in office and Rummy is still his guy, hence they are accountable.

    I’ve had it with ‘my side’ telling me that closing ranks to protect people politically is our duty or the best thing to win this war. That is total BS. Especially when they convince themselves that obvious failures and failures in the making are just part of some grand scheme that will lead to inevitable triumph, and hence we shouldnt raise questions and demand results.

  39. Mark Buehner, you are talking very sensibly and I’d like to address some of our points of partial or complete agreement.

    I agree that nobody intended this war as a sighting shot. It was an answer to a bunch of real problems, like Saddam Hussein being close to breaking his box, and it was supposed to work. (Better than it has.)

    I don’t doubt that President George W. Bush believed and believes every word he said and still says about letting freedom reign, the transformative power of freedom, the universality of the hunger for freedom, and our need to keep believing in freedom.

    I agree with you that winning is vital. Even from the narrow point of view of building the most formidable armed forces possible, the soundest basis to build on is a winning tradition, when need be at the expense of an ideal structure for any future war. And of course we have a lot more at stake than just building ideal armed forces.

    And I agree with you that justification Donald Rumsefeld’s army transformation program without a numerical build-up has to include an argument that this was reasonable for Iraq. (I think such justifications can be given.) I don’t think it would be good enough to say: “Well how big a deal is Iraq anyway?”

    I do agree you need some idea what happens after your fast army does the job tactically. (You can exempt yourself from worrying about that. The Mongols did. But in moral terms we are the opposite of the Mongols and their default solution can’t be ours.)

    #39 from Mark Buehner: “That is why Rummy’s theory is flawed. Fast is good, speed kills true. But that is only part of the answer.”

    I’ve already covered most of the rest of the answer: “Let freedom reign!”

    Another part of “the rest” was keeping Iraq’s neighbors intimidated. At the time, I was greatly reassured that the Americans were doing the war so light and fast that they retained (what seemed like) a credible ability to punish Syria or Iraq for intervention in the reconstruction. I would have wanted to do the same thing.

    Deterrence failed. We are up against opponents that are very, very hard to deter. They will stand with their noses pressed right up against both barrels, say “You haven’t got the guts!” and go for a knife. (Muammar al-Gaddafi is atypically sane and sober in his assessment of the correlation of forces, almost Soviet in that respect. I for one will never mock him for his wise decision to spare his country the pain of deadly conflict with America.) Also, our domestic politics are such that our enemies could count on us being paralysed, and you can’t effectively restrain people by threatening them with what they know you won’t/can’t do.

    (I don’t think the Islamic Republic of Iran could have been threatened effectively under any circumstances, but I think perhaps Syria might have been, had our loyal opposition been, like, loyal. But you go to war with the politics you have.)

    #38 from Mark Buehner: Simple excercize in logic. Jihadis flood in across Syrian border riling up the Sunnis and causing all kinds of trouble. Apparant solution? Seal the border with Syria. Why wasnt this done? Not enough troops. Why not enough troops? Rummy decided on a small footprint. Why werent more troops rushed over? Rummy insistant we have enough troops. Anybody see the circularity in this reasoning?

    You have a point about the problem, and the plan going pear-shaped at that point, and actually it was worse than that.

    The Americans also had a large, unexpected problem: being stuck in an ugly game of “chicken” with Iraqis.

    Who defends the country? The preferred Iraqi solution was that the Americans sweat and bleed while they show up for paydays in the army but not for fighting, and also that the Americans respect their sensitivities by fighting under severe restraints. And if not, the war would be lost, a big humiliation for America! (The Iraqis were putting so much on the supposedly omnipotent Americans that accepting the burden unsympathetically proffered would have meant that the war would be lost.) The American solution was that the Iraqis come up to scratch, and if not the war would be lost, a big disaster for Iraqis! So the Americans at that point were reluctant to signal a willingness to do more and more, effectively accepting Iraqi terms that, however convenient for Iraqis in the short run, guaranteed defeat in the war in Iraq.

    I also did not want the Americans to build up their armed forces at this point. (Though maybe I was wrong about that.) I felt that if the Americans were numerous and active enough that the insurgents couldn’t put large units together and the Iraqi government could, then the Americans had enough bulk that the key issue was Iraqi will, and pressure should be kept right on Iraqis. And I still feel that.

    I don’t think Donald Rumsfeld did any “circular reasoning”. I think he just couldn’t say in front of the world, the President and the great American public what the conflict was with our so-beloved local allies, and why more American forces were likely to result in a reduced rather than increased total war effort. I mean, you can’t say that, on all sorts of grounds.

    And how about land mining the border? Ohh, bad public relations. Oookkkkk, so whats the answer? Ignore the problem and hope for the best?

    At this point, I have to switch to talking about this war I think has been fought poorly, with flawed doctrine. This ends the part where I see no flaw in Donald Rumsfeld.

    But he has still done a lot right. Just not everything. And unfortunately, not even all the important things.

    Still enough to eke out a win in some fashion, though, thanks to the heroic efforts of great, great armed forces.

  40. Herer is another point I wholeheartedly agree with:

    #43 from Mark Buehner: “Even if that was true, one of the facts about war is that you dont always get to pick what is vital and what is expendible.”

    Ain’t that the cruel truth.

    Here’s another.

    #45 from Mark Buehner: “If you feel like it, google my name and see just what a rabid anti-bushite i am. Few people were as supportive of the Iraq war and this administration as I was. However, that doesnt mean im not going to call a spade a spade.”

    I don’t need to Google. I believe you. Your attitude is forthright.

    #45 from Mark Buehner: “The day Bush leaves office and Rumsfeld is out you will here nary a peep out of me, because i dont care who’s to blame. I want to win, thats it, end of story.”

    Me too. I hope we win.

  41. We’re all three on the victory page. And there have been plenty of self-created problems in Iraq. I’ll pick on the old notion of unity of command. Fine if Bush wants to pursue CEO-style let-every-department-give-its-input decision making at home. But allowing those policy schisms to exist in the face of the enemy in the field has been a disaster. Pick one policy and stick to it, change it if facts indicate you must, but don’t try to play three games at once, and fire the ass of anyone who undermines. (I’ve been reading Bing West’s book on Fallujah, he’s pretty articulate on the topic.)

    I’ve already beat to death the notion that we will not – and I believe should not – have another go at reform-from-outside a la Iraq. There’s still a good chance to prevail in Iraq, and in due course have an ally we can be proud of – but it’s too slow a process to meet the need. David B. outlines some of the reasons why, which are likely to be culturally similar elsewhere in the ME. I’m for building up our forces, but assault troops, not occupiers.

    Another change we need is indirectly pointed out by David: “…he just couldn’t say in front of the world…” “you can’t say that, on all sorts of grounds…” Probably it was necessary to pussy-foot around re our real enemy and goals in 2003. The time for that has passed. Our people must speak plainly to each other to rally support, and our enemy must understand that we are awake and resolved. That can’t happen with weasel-words and self-censorship. High time that Bush finallly named the enemy a few weeks ago, and how thick the irony that it takes a Pope to say what we should have.

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