Phil Carter has a piece up in Salon Slate about where we are in Iraq and what to do. Everyone ought to go read it. Period.
What? You’re still here?
I’ll try and comment when I get some time, but the short form comment is that he’s absolutely right.
Smart commentary from a guy who has been there, and done that, and wants to win. Thanks, Phil.
Good thoughts, I agree.
Slate not Salon.
The starting point has to be a political solution at the top. Until there’s a national government with the support of major factions the loyalty of Iraqi soldiers and police, and their motivation, will be in doubt.
Either the Iraqi government can reach such an agreement or it can’t. If it can, the country may be salvageable. If they can’t then we are wasting our time. It’s time to find out. Give them 90 days to work a political deal that major Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish groups can sign off on.
Deal or no deal. Deal, we stay. No deal, we redeploy.
Great idea, and good article. I can’t speak for the rest of Iraq, but we are doing most of that in Anbar. There are probably as many (or more) combat outposts, firm bases, in Ramadi as there are police stations. The DoS does need to get more involved. The only DoS officer I heard about was in Fallujah. I don’t think he did a lot of travelling.
Westhawk at westhawk at b-log-spot.com has a different take. His view is that we should encourage the Shias and Kurds to ethnically cleanse Iraq of Sunnis, since it will happen anyway, will end the conflict, and make clear the consequence of picking fights with the US.
After the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR crumbled, I remember reading a comment an observer made about the behavior of newly-liberated Russians. He said that if you’re a mean, starved wolf-dog, and you’ve been chained up and mistreated for years, once the chain is removed you *will* behave like a mean, starved wolf-dog. You’ll run around snapping and yapping and snarling and acting tough.
Later, when it becomes apparent that the chain will not be reapplied and you’ll have to fend for yourself, that behavior may change. But not to be surprised when initially all Russians spreading out into the world were snapping and yapping and snarling and acting tough.
I’m beginning to think that we need to allow the Iraqi’s to go through this phase, too, before we continue to introduce them to democracy. They just aren’t to a point yet where they can pay attention to the lessons we are trying to teach them, because it’s still more important to them to snap and snarl and act tough, and wreak vengeance on each other.
I don’t know that we need to withdraw entirely, but I agree with Mr. Carter that we can’t win this war for them, nor can we teach them civility at the end of a bayonet.
They are supposed to let us know when they want us to leave, but it seems to me that now it’s equally important that they need to let us know when they’re ready to learn. As long as they’re blowing each other up with great glee and beheading and torturing with greater gusto, I’d say they’re too busy to concentrate on any more refined lessons.
So be it. Their decision and I say we bow out until that decision is reversed.
…and after we are gone and they are fighting amongst themselves, Iran will declare that that in the interest of restoring order to the region, they will invade the chaotic and defenseless country and exact revenge for the Iran-Iraq War and then impose their own Islamic governement.
When we leave, we should at least leave our weapons there for them to defend – or kill – themselves.
If Iran were to overtly invade Iraq, wouldn’t that push the “to nuke or not to nuke Iran” meter decisively over the edge?
Lets think about letting Iran take over Iraq. Ok now lets see how long it takes the Saudies to Scream Help us Mister Wizzerd…..I know its dumb and childish but it would be Funny!!!!!
#8 from RD: “and after we are gone and they are fighting amongst themselves, Iran will declare that that in the interest of restoring order to the region, they will invade the chaotic and defenseless country and exact revenge for the Iran-Iraq War and then impose their own Islamic governement.”
I find this a less than intimidating prospect on many grounds. First, I don’t think it will happen, though nobody knows. Second, if it happens I’m pretty sure it will be a military disaster for Iran. American air is too strong. Third, the only way Iran could do this is by walking through the Iraqis in a way that shut air out of the contest and required Iraqi cooperation in effect. If that works, I’ll be mildly surprised that Arab chauvinism didn’t spark more hostility to Iranians, and I’ll accept that “voting with your feet” counts too. Fourth, Iraq is going to have a (Shi’ite) Islamic government anyway.
America couldn’t return to the fray to defend its client after the supposed negotiated end of the Vietnam War, but that was after America had hung on defending South Vietnam till its economy went sour and its internal politics were brought to the brink of ruin.
There is no need to do it that way.
Eventually, if the Americans keep taking casualties from doing what amounts to unnecessary charity work for a population that generally approves of attacks on Americans, the politics of that will get so sour that it wouldn’t be possible for the Americans to back out of the Iraqi killing pit and retain the option to return to the fray if need be. But we’re nowhere near that point now. I think if America pulled out of Iraq over the remainder of 2006 and 2007, America might retain a real political option to fight again if need be.
#8 from RD: “When we leave, we should at least leave our weapons there for them to defend – or kill – themselves.”
The point is moot.
As the Americans back out, the enemy, that is Iraqis, will loot their bases and celebrate victory over the infidel. I know of no evidence that Iraqis love Americans more than they love the British.
In any case, there is nothing we should do for Iraqis. They should do for themselves. I do not believe that they will value and defend things given to them by soldiers that a growing majority of them approve of attacks on. If they are to have things they will value and defend, those things must be build by them and by people whose lives they value.
Phil Carter: Despite having 140,000 troops in Iraq, our military is still forced to play a game of whack-a-mole with the insurgency and militias, (because it is accepting responsibility for something that only Iraqis can do, and that they have ample power to do if this was seen as an Iraqi problem rather than a problem of what Americans are obligated to do for Iraqis) because it cannot dominate the country enough to secure every city and hamlet. The U.S. military constitutes a thin green line capable of containing the insurgency when deployed, but it cannot be everywhere. (And though “containment” is not progress and victory can only be achieved by Iraqis.) The inability of Iraqi police and army units to retake Balad on their own demonstrates the continuing problem with the U.S. exit strategy of “standing up” Iraqi security forces so we can “stand down.” (The population is hostile, and the Iraqi armed forces consistently fail to achieve American objectives: what Americans want done in Iraq. Strengthening the Iraqi armed forces makes no contribution to solving this problem, because the roadblock has long ago ceased to be lack of material power. That would seem to be the problem.) Without a radical change of strategy, the mission in Iraq will fail. (Whose mission? Given that a growing majority of Iraqis approve of attacks on Americans, whose mission is this?)
A man who has been given a bee farm may say that he wants honey, but if he approves of his neighbours coming around and killing his bees, what he really wants more than honey is dead bees.
In this story, American and allied military forces are the bees, their bases are the beehives, the honey is everything the Americans and allied forces could and would do for the reconstruction of Iraq if they were unmolested, and Iraqis are the owners of the beehive.
Or, maybe they’re not the real owners, maybe this was just an unwise loan, typical of third world development projects that get looted by the locals, and the true owners of these busy and useful bees should take them back home. Or lend them out to potential friends, not enemies.
I would like Phil Carter’s article fine except that it ignores what seems to me to be the elephant in the room. I’ll even say thanks to him for writing it: thank’s Phil Carter.
But I think that given local attitudes, our whole project in Iraq has become like, say, an internationally funded national poultry farm project in Mali or some similar country, that just serves to provide free eggs and table fowl for the Minister of the Interior and his friends, till the vain enterprise has to be abandoned. Gifts like this are worthless to the recipient, no matter how much they cost the giver.
What might be of value is what the locals did for themselves, and were determined to defend themselves. If that’s a possible solution in Iraq – and it may not be – the only way to find out is to get out. The Iraqis think one year would be plenty of time for the unwanted Americans to get out of their country. Fine.
I also now think Jonah Goldberg’s idea of a referendum would be an excellent one. (link) He thinks it was a mistake to fight in Iraq but that doesn’t mean we should leave, I think that it was right to fight in Iraq but that doesn’t mean we should stay, but either way a legitimate process is important, and I think that since Iraqi public opinion is now decisive regardless of our further military efforts, if any, we might as well put responsibility where it belongs and try to concentrate the minds of the true arbiters of the remaining conflict.
I know that is kind of of-topic for Phil Carter’s article. But his article is about the bees working more effectively for the beekeeper who just wants them dead. And I don’t think that’s the solution.
Or, instead of a bee farm or a poultry project, a greenhouse might be a good image. (link)
Or a soccer stadium used for executions, not sports.
We can’t accomplish anything by giving people expensive gifts that they don’t value, or value only as means to ends entirely other than those we have in mind.
So delivering the gift of free American military power on tap more efficiently is irrelevant.
It has not escaped notice that the same polls that point to the advisability of American withdrawal point to the advisability of Australian withdrawal. (link)
However, I would not like Australia to withdraw and leave the Americans still fighting, but with less support. I would prefer all the allies to withdraw at the same time, after a referendum or some other legitimate democratic process.
In spite of this statement I think Phil is largely correct. He’s not really talking about a comprehensive change in strategy so much as a new way of achieving the strategic goal. However, the change is pervasive, and it’s also in line with the lectures I heard this afternoon on a panel discussion about building Iraq from the local roots up. (See CSPAN.)
It’s similar to what was done recently in Jordan. The government there was facing a significant challenge from the Islamists, but didn’t want to outlaw Islamist parties. What they did instead was to divide the representative districts into smaller political units. These smaller units, at the village or neighborhood level, elect their own representatives who are then responsible to their constituents for getting things accomplished that are of value to the neighborhood. The Islamists were simply too "global" to meet this challenge of local politics, and their popularity has started to decline.
I think a consensus is developing that we need to contrate of much smaller segments of society. But what it also means is that Iraq has to get rid of that dreadful nation-wide proportional representation that does nothing but build common-denominator identity politics based on religious factions. Carter doesn’t mention this in his piece, but I’m sure he agrees with it.
Now, if we can just get the press to understand…