Wretchard points me at the new Fred Kagan plan (pdf) for winning the war in Iraq. It’s a very good read, and better because it meshes well with what Phil Carter wrote in Slate a few months ago.
Kagan suggests the obvious – that we can win the war if we choose to, i.e. if it is important enough for us to do so. He suggests a variety of reasons why we should consider it so, none of which will be news to readers here:
Withdrawal will not end the pain
* Regional ripple effects will require continued U.S. involvement
* America will likely have to re-engage within a few years on much worse terms
* There will be no “decent interval” – withdrawal will take place under fire amidst growing violence and atrocities
The plan is fairly detail-rich, and maps well to Carter’s plan – which requires that we get troops out of camps and into the streets. Read them both and judge for yourself.
Yes, it will involve more casualties, and yes, there will be more fighting. But aversion to casualties can’t be the sole strategic razor we use to slice into this problem. I don’t think I’m alone in thinking that we will bear (and cause) far more suffering in the medium and long term if we choose to quit in Iraq.
In the face of the conventional wisdom that the war is lost and Iraq a quagmire of violence and despair, Iraqslogger reprints a blog post outlining the economic vitality happening under the media radar – economic growth that is wholly consistent with what I’ve heard directly from Iraq and which simply can’t coexist with the level of hopeless violence that is the typical view of Iraq we’re asked to accept.
This all paints a very strange picture of Iraq. If we assume that the country is indeed operating with a high level of violence and chaos, it’s really remarkable that the economy seems to be so strong at the same time. Does it make sense that Iraq can build new houses, import cars, and build cellphone towers and networks while bombs are going off and they have trouble keeping power supplied to their cities for more than eight hours a day?
Iraq has essentially become the modern equivalent of the Wild West, where danger and opportunity walk hand in hand every day. People who are willing to take the risks and spend a third of their company budget on security can make a lot of money, and the people of Iraq are working hard despite hardships and making a living by taking advantage of the opportunities created by rapid change. For the most part it is not the United States or the Iraqi government which are driving economic growth in Iraq. Most of the growth is homegrown and in direct response to the failures of those governments. People have had to take their welfare into their own hands.
It’s an interesting post, and one well worth reading and thinking hard about as we debate this issue in the coming year. Big points to Iraqslogger, by the way for reprinting it. I criticized them for seeming nakedly biased, and my criticism may have been premature – I hope so.
The question is moot. By voting Democratic, America WILL get a withdrawal and defeat in Iraq by Al Qaeda. Leading inevitably to a nuking of one or more American cities. This much is abundantly clear.
Pelosi, Murtha, Reid, Conyers, etc. have too much committed to their base to do anything but withdraw as soon as possible from Iraq and turn over the country to Iran and Al Qaeda.
America voted for Neville Chamberlain and that’s what they will get. “Peace in our time.” Until the nuclear fire ends a city’s life.
And to think I was just criticized on the other thread for being a moonbat.
Mr. Rockford, I think a strong case can be made for the invasion of Iraq enabling North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. With the USA army tied up in Iraq, it is no longer in a position to offer a credible threat to either of those two countries without sacrificing Iraq (which Bush made clear he was unwilling to do).
Having the significant portion of your forces tied up in a war only peripherally related to the base conflict is a great strategy (for the *other* side).
When I was correcting math papers, the word “obvious” was often a marker for locating the mistake in the argument. Here, too.
Let’s start with my version of obvious: Fred Kagan’s judgment is already somewhat suspect. In this case, what I find missing is why the 30,000 increment will make any significant difference. When we first went into Iraq, and passions were lower, experts in occupations were talking about commitments on the order of 300-500,000 troops and civilian occupation personnel. Kagan/Armed Liberal have moved from the statement that we can win the war if we want to, to the compound statement that we can win the war if we want to with the armed forces we have available. Leaving aside all strategic and geopolitical considerations (which are many), the italicized clause seems to me to be the heart of a serious problem. Furthermore, an insoluble problem does not become soluble just because it is critically important (assuming for the sake of argument this is true of Iraq).
I don’t know about Armed Liberal, but Kagan should understand my stating that Iraq is becoming the American Syracuse Expedition.
Everything Kagan says is right, altough he only alludes to the need to take the reconstruction projects seriously without spelling out exactly what that means.
I think Bush is going to pursue something similar to this, however the problem is politics being what they are a more compromised version with likely be adopted, which will be a disaster.
I forsee the extension of tours and permanent increase in military manpower (which are Kagans 2 most important pillars imo) being cut from the final product, which will make everything else moot. The democrats are certainly a factor in this, but honestly Bush has shown himself to be completely averse to making these kinds of tough decisions in the past, i dont see why that will change. He will eek out a compromise with the Dems that will be just good enough for us to lose with.
That being said, there is always the slim possibilty Bush will display some actual leadership and ‘double down’ as some are urging him to do. That is going to mean a great deal more personal attention paid to the nuts and bolts of reconstruction, which Bush has proved woeful at. His best option would be to assign a viceroy type to oversea both the military and civilian aspects of everything Iraq related, but again this would require political courage.
I made the mistake of posting before checking if Belgravia Dispatch were back up. And it is, with some of my points being made with greater eloquence and less bitterness.
“Surge” Query [suggests it’s another half-measure]
Saddam’s Death [dictator: looked composed and dignified; executioners looked like death squad thugs in their ski masks (probably were, too)]
Lieberman and the “V” Word [and the specifics, Joe?]
And that’s not all. Making up for lost time, I guess.
Andrew, I haven’t signed off on the 30,000 troop ‘surge’ as being a definitive answer. I took Kagan’s point (and you should read it and see if you agree) to be that we certainly do have the resources to prevail, if we choose to apply them.
We haven’t so far, which is in my view a catastrophic failing by Bush.
Take a look and let me know what you think when you’ve read the underlying piece.
A.L.
I agree with Andrew in regards to his question “How do we know that the extra troops are really enough?” but after that, he gets lost in the partisan name-calling swamp.
I don’t know enough to know how many troops we need. I can certainly make the observation that we didn’t have enough going in, and the experts say we don’t have enough to clear Baghdad, but after that, I must admit ignorance.
I have concerns that one group of experts is solving the problem of “How do we win with whatever it takes” and another set of experts is solving the problem of “how do we maximize our impact with the resources we have available”
Then I think the answers from one group are put into the mouths of the other group. It’s not a good way to have a national discussion. I keep wondering what it would take for the Pentagon to admit we need a draft. If the answer is “they’ll never admit it” then we have a huge freaking problem at the core of this democracry. I’m not saying we need a draft, I’m saying, institutionally, are we honest enough to even talk about troop levels that are required. My gut feeling is that we are not.
And I’ll say again, if we’re going to send kids in to get killed, we need to be prepared to do what it takes to win. To do otherwise would dishonor them.
I think more troops can work if they are put in the right place.
Iran.
The problem is not that we have taken on too much. The problem is we haven’t taken on enough.
1)We dont need a draft, we had a significantly larger all volunteer army during the 80s and our population certainly hasnt shrunk.
2)Attacking Iran isnt going to make Al-Sadr go away or the Sunnis settle down. Yes, Iran is making things worse, but no, if Iran disapeared tomorrow our problems in Iraq wouldnt be solved. Not to mention pulling the bulk of our resources out to deal with Iran, its just not a good idea. If we have to deal with Iran it should have nothing to do with assuming it will make Iraq more stable, becuase it wont.
3)For the knee-jerk critics- if you have already posited that nothing we can do can help us in Iraq, wasting time picking apart every new idea that comes out isnt particularly productive. Once you assume there are no winning solutions whats the point of reverse engineering why any particular one is specifically doomed?
Mark,
Going after Iran will certainly reduce the funding of the insurgencies. It may not be the total solution. It will help.
Besides, I think Iran has pretty good prospects re: a civil society.
I would handle Iran as a hit and leave quickly operation. Set up an alternative government, get out.
With our bases in Iraq there is no need to stay in Iran.
We are close enough to give them a body blow when ever they need it.
Such a move might put the fear of the Maker into the Saudis. And the Syrians.
The Middle East oil age is coming to a close. For the last 18 months Iran has been unable to meet its OPEC quota. Iran is in decline.
How we can win in Iraq, if we can win, whether we are wining, are all questions the answers to which depend on what one means by “winning in Iraq”, a protean phrase that shifts constantly.
Is winning stoping the violence, or at least bringing down to an acceptable levels?
Is winning allowing only an Iraqi gov’t which is allied to US interests.
Is winning merely stamping out non-Iraq-oriented movements, that are inimical to the West, such as Al Qaeda, regardless of the condition or state of Iraq or Iraq gov’t?
Is winning creating a climate in which Iraqi’s can be self-determinative, irrespective of US interests, e.g., a strong, stable central shia gov’t, religious rather than secular in nature, closely allied to Iran, supported by a small majority of Iraqis.
The debate about military and political strategy depends upon which of the above is selected,
If winning means eliminating Iraq as a possible future base of anti-Western terrorist groups AND if a chaotic, violent Iraq with a weak central government enhances the opportunities for such terrorist groups to take root in Iraq; AND if winning in Iraq also means eliminating the possibiliy of a strong central gov’t closely allied to Iran, then, it seems to me, only by making Iraq a kind of US colony and the gov’t a kind of puppet gov’t, will we be able to acheive victory. I doubt that, regardless of one thinks of the merits of such a course, anyone thinks the US is politically able to carry it out.
Mark Buehner:
If Iran ceased to have a nuclear program and was placed in internal turmoil equivalent to Iraq, I would find the threat posed to the US over the next 5-10 years would be reduced to an acceptable level.
I really could care less if Iraqis get on with one another. Or to be more fair, I care no more than I do about any number of various conflicts around the world. I regret the human cost, but it’s not a problem that affects my safety and well-being. Iraq’s stability has become a US problem because 1) we made it our goal and a defeat encourages the enemy and 2) Iran through its actions and its rhetoric presents itself a direct threat.
Neutralizing the Iranian threat addresses both issues. Obviously directly neutralizing Iran addresses #2, but it also provides a faces-saving way to climb down from #1. Sorry folks, we wanted to make Iraq work, but our troops our needed elsewhere.
If Iran is supplying the insurgency in Iraq now, what do you think they will do if we attack them, particularly if we dont physically go in with overwhelming force to root out the regime?
Short of nuclear anyhilation anything we do to provoke Iran is going to cause them to redouble their efforts in Iraq. Why wouldnt they? They arent going to challenge us at sea or in the skies, it doesnt take Sun Tzu to figure out the simplest way to make us regret warring with them is to inflitrate Iraq with masses of terrorists and suicide bombers and blow up anything American or that deals with Americans. In the Iran-Iraq war tens of thousands of Iranians youths literally roped themselves together and charged Iraqi machine guns. We really want those masses of wanna be martyrs roaming the streets of Baghdad?
SG, you may be right but that is an entirely seperate debate. My only point was that attacking Iran would not have a positive influence over Iraq. That doesnt imply it doesnt need to be done, only that the idea that attacking Iran would have the added benefit of securing Iraq borders on lunacy.
Unintended consequences:
(1) By enforcing a long-term embargo on Cuba, we ensured Fidel Castro’s continued political dominance, making him now the longest-serving head of state in the world.
(2) By attacking and overthrowing the government of Iraq, while letting North Korea sit, we communicate loud and clear, “If you want to resist American domination, better get nukes in a hurry!”
(3) We attacked Iraq to pre-empt a presumed threat that turned out not to be real, causing massive chaos and casualties among the Iraqis. Suppose we pre-emptively attack Iran because of their presumed threat to us, causing massive chaos and casualties among the Iranians. There are plenty of arguments that the threat from Iran is not real. Suppose those turn out to be correct, as well. Who then becomes most vulnerable to the label “Rogue Nation”, and thereby strengthens the hands of Islamic militants around the world.
As I have said before, our country faces real and dangerous enemies. But our leaders are cluelessly flinging gasoline on the flames they are hoping to put out.
I was not just interested in a punitive expedition against Iran. I was/am interested in regime change.
Since Iran internally is on shaky ground, a punitive expedition and regime change expedition might look very similar. Oil socialism is not working. There is a lot of discontent. The right kind of punitive expedition could easily take advantage of that.
_”Since Iran internally is on shaky ground, a punitive expedition and regime change expedition might look very similar. Oil socialism is not working. There is a lot of discontent. The right kind of punitive expedition could easily take advantage of that.”_
Those are some assumptions piled on assumptions. If you are right and the regime really is ready to topple, one would think we could find ways to easily aid the internal opposition without firing a shot. If not maybe the regime isnt quite as precarious as you suggest. It does seem likely that the best way possible to shore up the regimes support would be to attack the nation. Havent we learned any lessons about half assing this kind of thing, not to mention unintended consequences?
Mark,
Some Iranians are asking why we are waiting.
Quantify ‘some’. What are their numbers? What positions do they hold? How many weapons do they have? How many followers? How much funding? What strategic positions are they willing to seize? Do they control any of Iran’s missile assets? Can they communicate with each other? Can they stand up to the Qods Force? The Basij? The Islamic Revolutionary Guard? How do they relate to the Ayatollah cabal? The goverment? Which towns can they seize? Which provinces? How many members of the Guardian Council or Assembly of Experts can they locate and neutralize? When can they be prepared to move?
Some. Hmph. You can find ‘some’ people willing to say or do just about anything. Some people are waiting for our own government to be overthrown I dont doubt. That hardly means its imminent.
Iran is a complex nation. Many of its citizens do indeed resent the current regime, and many would be glad to see true democratic revolution (or preferably reform). But many also support the regime, and sadly they have the guns, the training, and several hundred thousands trained fanatical troops at their disposal. This is not a regime on the cusp of being overturned, and any agression by the US is liable to rally the Iranians around the flag.