Abu Aardvark has a post up on the farcical Egyptian elections coming up next week.
This blog’s community is – appropriately, I think – concerned about the potential for the violent and radical themes within Islamism to become a truly bloody worldwide movement. The problem of course, is that the ideological engine for that movement is fueled by the politically and culturally repressive governments we support in the Middle East in the name of ‘stability’.
One thing I liked about what Bush was doing is that for a moment in time, he made it clear that an unsustainable quasi-stability built on the backs of the citizens of the Middle East – and generating pressure for the movement that risked tearing much of the world apart – was no longer our top priority. That, to me is a feature, not a bug in Bush’s policy.
As Bush has been getting his political ass kicked, a new, pro-stability consensus has emerged as we re-engaged Egypt and the Saudis. It looks like ‘professionalism’ to some, and like disaster to me.
We can’t be rid of the shined-shoes Warren Christopher crowd soon enough. They got us into this mess, and if we follow them, we’re going to wind up far far deeper in the woods.
I found Marc’s post highly informative and interesting. I had one small quibble with it. I sincerely wish that he’d laid out a few alternatives to our support for “Baathism on the Nile”. Our support for Egypt’s government has been a bipartisan one for 25 years. Should we withdraw our support? Support the opposition? What opposition? What?
This is a frequent problem I have with Arabists. They don’t like what we’re doing. They don’t like the opposite of what we’re doing. They don’t present an alternative for what we’re doing or, if they do, there’s little likelihood of it having much effect in other than geological time.
Preach it, brother!
Dave, I think we ought to be doing a lot of talking to TPTB over there behind the scenes. Take Musharraf, for example–what are we telling him behind closed doors? My preference would be, let them save all the face they need with their own public, as long as we can see credible movement in a helpful direction.
Is that happening here? Beats me…
You were bringing something valuable home here, till you got mugged by your own prejudices.
There was a genuine realization (in the Administration and its friends) that befriending autocrats had long-run costs, but the “forward strategy of freedom” was never much more than words — inspirational rhetoric for the Administration’s domestic supporters, another verbal stick with which to beat Iran and Syria, and very modest support for very modest initiatives in US-friendly states from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. The people who said the words never acknowledged the price to be paid for detaching from the autocrats in any serious way, or showed any willingness to pay it. Commitment was always shallow, always liable to be swept away by the first adverse turn of events.
As Bush has been getting his . . . ass kicked, a pro-stability consensus has emerged . . .
The kicking of Bush’s arse has little to do with it. First, as stated above, there never was much real commitment to the “freedom strategy”. Second, since it was announced, the Palestinian elections, the rising popular status of Hezbollah, the declining popular status of the Jordanian monarch, etc., have reminded the Administration how much it has to lose from a democratic turn. Finally, the Administration’s new priority is containing Iran, with assistance from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the dictator of Egypt, and any other Arab autocrat who’ll come to the party.
‘professionalism’ . . . the shined-shoes Warren Christopher crowd . . . they got us into this mess . . .
First up, the “they” who supported the autocracy – friendly stance included pretty much everyone in US politics that had anything to do with it, human rights groups and leftists excepted. Second, in the present instance, where’s the evidence that the old guard or the career professionals are pushing for a Mubarak-friendly stance against “neo-conservative” political-level resistance? You don’t hear Dick Cheney say demanding free and fair elections in Egypt, you see him jetting round western Asia lining up the autocrats behind US power-political objectives in the good old same old way.
I don’t believe it’s the United States’ business to dictate Egypt’s internal affairs, but I do believe it’s in its interests to show itself a friend to democracy there, and that this episode is likely to flush what’s left of its pretensions on that score down the toilet.
David Schuler complains that “the Arabists” don’t make constructive suggestions, and makes none himself. Here are three. (1) National governments are always quietly doing each other little favours, many of which are favours only to the governments and not to their respective peoples. The US can ease up on doing such favors to the government of Egypt. For details, see a foreign policy professional. (2) The US can loudly and publicly dissociate itself from Mubarak’s anti-democratic initiatives, rather than mumbling about “positive and negative developments”. (3) It can announce that it will be seeking input into the development of US Egyptian policy not from the government only but also from the (small, weak) liberal opposition and more importantly from the Muslim Brothers.
Dave Schuler has it right.
The Middle East is a region where you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t (so why not make as much money off of it—as the Realists and their European friends, so pragmatically insist…). And so the legion critics of US policy have the luxury of criticizing at both ends. Oh, the absolute joys of being a critic (no doubt, more in sorrow than in anger!!!) of the US….
Perfectionists, all of them….
As for Egypt, Mubarak has for a long time believed that he has the US over a barrel. US policy has since Sadat’s demise, been engineered to convince the US that it has a sturdy, stable “understanding” with Egypt. That Egypt and the US speak the same language. So to speak….
However, as far as Egypt is concerned, yes, they’ll take the billions that the US has poured into Egypt (with Israel’s encouragment) to make it more financially “stable” (that is, prevent it from being more of a basket case than it already is—though one might wish to hum, “where, or where has that money gone?”) as well as its parallel: to ensure that it be more militarily “reliable”—that is, not (or less) belligerent toward the Zionist Entity—so US policy fervently hopes, believes, and ultimately, prays…
And yes, Egypt will accept all that American military aid geared at rebuilding, resupplying, training and maintaining the Egyptian armed forces—making it into a formidable force, all things being relative—to defend Egypt against all of its bitter enemies on its southern and western borders!!.
But one should understand that EGYPT IS NOBODY’S WHORE (no, sirreee!!!) and that Egypt (i.e., Mubarak) will insist on doing what Egypt wants, etc., etc.
And so the ground is being carefully prepared for the next major conflict between Egypt and its Zionist enemy, a brewing, smoldering conflict that has been carefully nurtured by the Egyptian regime; a trip wire that can be touched off at any time, by any American action, such as pressuring Egypt politically or threatening to withhold or limit the billions in danegeld that has been proffered over the last decades—or any future regime change (whether it be Mubarak fils, as planned, or the MB, or even perhaps the military) that would to a greater or lesser extent affect Egyptian stability, or any “Israeli provocation” (read, any move to counter Hamas, Hizbullah or the PA—or any imagined Israeli outrage such as murdering Egyptian POWs, let’s say), and for which resuming hostilities against Israel would be the usual stopgap “nationalist” distraction.
Yup. Over a barrel. (And Mubarak is one of our “friends.” On the other hand, he doesn’t go global, radicalizing and distorting Islam and inflaming religious passions like, um, some of our other “friends”….)
In my own defense I know nothing whatever about Egyptian politics and I turn to to experts like Marc Lynch to help inform my opinion rather than run off at the mouth without any basis. Emphasis on what we shouldn’t be doing doesn’t help me much in that.
One of the links in the article makes these suggestions:
bq. _NYT op-ed says “Washington should help independent groups organize in the event of such a vote. Dissenting voices are essential if there is to be any hope of free debate and democracy in Egypt.” O NYT op-ed writer, are you aware that most independent groups in Egypt hate the US and its policies in the region? Or that such help would be automatically be labeled as foreign intervention? *Rather than suggest interventionist solutions (i.e. ones that involve interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs), how about lobbying for the severing of diplomatic relations or military aid programs or any other measures?*_
I’m not sure the severing diplomatic relations is a good way to promote democracy worldwide. Cutting military aid would be interesting, but I believe that you can only leverage the aid for so many things and we’re already using it to leverage for peace and economic reform (both possibly more important to the long-term prospects for democracy in Egypt).
Back to the Aardvark post . . ., there seems to be something fundamentally lacking in Egyptian society if rule changes can’t be adopted to by the opposition with a week’s notice. It suggests a weak non-governmental institutions. It shows the flaw of an opposition built around an illegal religious party. That a moral scolding from an unpopular U.S. government is the only hope suggests either an unrealistic appraisal of the situation or simply a desire to scold America for not doing more to democratize the Middle East.
Sorry, but I can’t agree. I’m convinced (until I actually see a stable, durable democracy there that doesn’t elect fascist theocrats) that Middle Eastern democracy is an oxymoron closely akin to Louisiana education and Italian government. To paraphrase Strother Martin in _Cool Hand Luke_, “Theah ah some cultuhs you just cain’t reach.”
Yes, stability in the Islamic world is extremely important.
Smoking, half-melted, glowing rubble is pretty stable.
Re Meislin @4: Given the excessively high-flown rhetoric of the “forward strategy of freedom’ and the excessively cynical response to the Egyptian referendum scandal, the “legion critics of US policy” should indeed “criticise at both ends”. The inconsistency isn’t in the critics, it’s between the US Administration’s professions and performance.
Re Shaw @6: The beginning is good sense, the end is nuts. The difference between Egypt and a western democracy is not that here, opposition parties can prevent a dictator from railroading a major constitutional amendment through a corrupt electoral process within seven days; it’s that here, they don’t have to.
The earlier point is probably right, that the Administration can’t reasonably exert (given its other interests) the degree of pressure required to induce the Government of Egypt to cancel the referendum. That doesn’t excuse its failure to speak out even candidly let alone forcefully. It should be able to say that it regrets the Government’s actions, and sees them as destructive to law, justice, and freedom. With the right words, and actions suited to them (see bottom of #3), it would not prevent the changes, but it would increase their political cost to the Egyptian government, decrease their political cost to itself, and strengthen rather than weaken its standing as a friend to democracy in the Middle East.
Re Schuler @5: In defence of Abu Aardvark, he’s done more than anyone else to raise this as an issue in the English-language blogosphere; furthermore, his expertise is less on the private diplomacy than the public diplomacy side of the issue, where he’s made his views reasonably clear.