(Thirty) Two Short Articles About Iran

(Sorry, I just love the Glenn Gould movie)

So I broke down and subscribed to Foreign Affairs. I want to learn what the smart folks (like Dan Drezner, who has an article in the Marc/April issue) are thinking and writing about. I acknowledge my lack of expert knowledge and think it’d be good to hear what expert have to say.

So this month, along with Drezner’s article, there’s a lead article by Ray Takeyh on Iran, in which he argues strongly for detente. He argues, in fact, for the inevitability of detente, because of the strength of Iran.

In order to develop a smarter Iran policy, U.S. leaders must first accept certain distasteful facts – such as Iran’s ascendance as a regional power and the endurance of its regime – and then ask how those can be accommodated.

OK, there’s some things to think about in that.

But – no where in the article is there anything about the demographic issues or the potential collapse of Iranian oil revenues – and the political implications that presents for the “endurance of its regime”. Now it may be that those issues are overblown; there are certainly arguments to be made.

But I’d say that it’s pretty difficult to talk about Iran and our long-term strategy with them without dealing with these issues – or at least raising and dismissing them with some arguments that hold some weight.

And it’s difficult for me to sit down and accept the authoritay of someone who is a Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign relations and author of ‘Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic’ when he tells me that Iran is an unstoppable force in the Middle East and doesn’t deal with the reasons why Iran may either be a hollow power – or why it may be motivated to be aggressive within a specific window of time. If this is what the leading experts are doing – heaven help us all.

Then Noah Pollak sent me a note announcing the new issue of Azure, the magazine he’s involved with.

In it, David Hazony (editor in chief of the magazine) has an article on ‘The New Cold War’ in which he details the issues in containing Iran.

By most measures, Iran is an easier mark than the Soviet Union. It does not yet have nuclear weapons or icbms; its Islamist ideology has less of a universal appeal; its tools of thought control are vastly inferior to the gulag and the KGB; and its revolution is not old enough to have obliterated the memory of better days for much of its population. In theory at least, it should be much easier for the West to mount a similar campaign of relentless pressure on the regime – from fomenting dissent online, to destabilizing the regime through insurgent groups inside Iran, to destroying the Iranian nuclear project, to ever-deeper economic sanctions, to fighting and winning the proxy wars that Iran has continued to wage – in order to effect the kind of change of momentum needed to enable the Iranian people to bring their own regime down the way the peoples under communism did in the 1980s and 1990s.

This article cuts closer to my presuppositions and beliefs than Takeyh’s; it stands as a counter to his arguments about the inevitability of Iranian power with an argument about the necessity of countering it.

But it’s more in the nature of a polemic than an analysis.

And the question, of course, is whether it’s the right polemic. And some analysis would help make that case. Or Takeyh’s.

15 thoughts on “(Thirty) Two Short Articles About Iran”

  1. Iran became a regional power under the Shah with massive military and economic development made in partnership with the West. Rising prosperity and unmet political aspirations led to his ouster. Now what? Since 1979, the economy has shrunk 30% while the rest of the world’s economy has doubled. Its military power has been crippled by war and isolation from the West. Politically, its an immature regime at best, incapable of overcoming its religious and ideological distinctiveness.

    Iran is not ascending, it has descended from the ranks of regional power with its nuclear ambitions a hail Mary play to reverse the tides. But the clock is ticking. . ..

  2. Both Saddam and Iran have used their oil wealth to build a considerable war machine and make trouble. Trouble in both cases included using military power to spread their influence further, bringing even more oil (and wealth) under control. Classic imperialism, though with variations.

    The only solution that will last, that is realistic, is to separate the miscreants from their unearned oil largesse. Seize the oil fields, liberate them, internationalize them, something. Don’t let the would-be conquerers even get started.

  3. CIA World Fact Book has Iran’s birth rate at below replacement level, at around 1.8. Interesting.

    Of course Iran has very little in the way of projecting conventional military power, but that ignores that conventional military power can be trumped by:

    *Deniable para-military proxies, namely Hezbollah, giving global reach.

    *Nuclear weapons.

    Iran in 1993 and again in 1994 hit Buenos Aires with bombings by Hezbollah. Eventually the Argentinians charged several Iranian officials including the then PM (the “moderate” Rafsanjani) with the crime of killing over 200 Argentian Jews (the worst mass slaughter since the Holocaust of Jews). As Steyn points out Iran can hit Argentina (or the US) any time but can Argentina hit Iran? No.

    Nuclear Weapons + Hezbollah = Iranian ICBMS capable of hitting any city on the planet.

    Given that Iran has demands that are incompatible with the existence of the US: genocide of Israel and destruction of the US as a nation, this is unacceptable.

    Therefore the US MUST strike Iran, strike it hard, and strike it so that the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons does not exist.

    As a matter of self-defense.

  4. I think its possible to overstate the importance of oil to a thugacracy like Iran. Like Jim says, Iran exerts power through foreign terrorists and nuclear amibitions, neither of which require oil wealth to effectuate. It can’t readily use oil wealth against the world since 75% of government revenues are dependent upon it.

    Oil wealth is lessened by an economy run by the type of idealogical statist that one would expect:

    bq. _For the period 2003-07, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that if oil prices remain at their present high level, real GDP will grow 5.9 percent annually on average, while it forecasts that if the oil price declines to $30 per barrel, real GDP can grow at 5 percent annually thereafter. In other words, the oil windfall is expected to result in less than 1 percent more growth per annum. Despite the flood of oil money, government policies are such that the IMF warns the Iranian budget will fall back into deficit within two years even if oil prices remain high._

    bq. _Iranian government spending has led to several years of growth, but it has barely dented the country’s long-term economic problems. While reported unemployment fell last year to an 8-year low of 10.3 percent, job creation remains insufficient to absorb the 700,000 young people entering the job market each year. The IMF forecasts that even if oil prices remain at their present high level, unemployment will increase. In its 2003 report, the usually understated World Bank summed up the “daunting unemployment challenge” with strong words: “Unless the country moves quickly to a faster path of growth with employment, discontent and disenchantment could threaten its economic, social, and political system.”_

    bq. _Economic frustration feeds social problems. The Iranian government acknowledges that two million people—or 2.9 percent of the population—use narcotics; other estimates place the number at five to six million. Divorce is also on the rise; one study found that 30 percent of newlyweds get divorced within three years. The poor economy is also driving prostitution. While officials estimate Iran hosts 300,000 prostitutes, there have been a number of corruption scandals involving judges and government social workers involved in procuring young girls. Instead of enacting reforms to encourage job creation, the political elite is more comfortable with rising emigration rates, despite the brain drain’s long-term erosion of Iran’s economic vibrancy._

    “Could Sanctions Work Against Tehran”:http://www.meforum.org/article/1068#

  5. In assessing Iran’s nuclear weapons and how that nation would act with nuclear weapons as a shield and sword, it’s instructive to examine how Iran has acted without them.

    In 1993 and 1994, Iran attacked the Israeli Embassy and Buenos Aires Cultural Center respectively in Argentina. To what end? What Benefit? What accrued in Iran’s favor?

    The answer is nothing but the opportunity to kill Jews. While Malaysia and Brunei might engage in vulgar anti-Semitism, you don’t see them sending secret agents who could be caught to kill Jews in Latin America for no good reason. Absent Iran’s constant threats to nuke them, Israel poses no threat to Iran, is not even remotely near Iran, and has no interest nor manpower to even remotely threaten Iran. Indeed Israel by acting against the common enemy Saddam Hussein would rationally be worthy of some quiet co-ordination instead of attacks.

    In the case of killing Jews, Iran’s “rational moderates” like Rafsanjani disregard Iran’s rational interests for … killing Jews. Even when Iran’s national interests are measureably hurt for no gain.

    In 1996 Iran attacked the United States by bombing the Khobar Towers where US Airmen slept, killing 19. This at a time when the US served Iran’s interest by tying down Saddam’s forces with the No-Fly zone.

    Iran stirred up trouble with Saudi who was also hostile to Saddam, by this attack. The attack was designed to force the US to leave, which would have left Saddam a free hand to attack Iran.

    Even with Saddam at their border the Iranians chose to attack the US.

    Finally, the nature of the Iranian Regime itself. During the flight from Paris to Tehran Khomeni said he regarded even Iranian Nationalism as “paganism” and could care less if every Iranian died. Only Islam and the Islamic Revolution concerned him, and this statement in various forms have been repeated by Khomeni, his successor Khameni, Rafsanjani, Khatami, and of course Ahmadinejad.

    Iran’s regime itself does not care about Iran. Only the Islamic Revolution. Which as Khomeni said was destined to conquer the world.

    From this I conclude that Iran with Nuclear Weapons would seek to attack the US (likely after nuking Israel via Hezbollah) by destroying major American cities. Thus we will get war with Iran regardless if we like it or not.

    Therefore the only rational course for us, ugly as it may be, is a first strike against their nuclear facilities and support structure for the same. Including power, water, and transport facilities. No power, water, transport = no ability to make Nuclear Weapons.

  6. Jim Jim Jim,again while I like Nukes as well as the next guy. Iran could be taken out with something as simple as a naval blockade and some dumb bombs on oil pipelines.

  7. The demographics of Iran tend to support your position on this, because the majority of Iranians at present are under 30 years of age. They have been exposed, albeit in a limited degree, to western influences, the internet and have tasted the freedom a new government might afford them. But when they have diplomatic victories like the one with the British sailor’s their regime is strengthened. We can’t allow victories like this if the regime is to be overturned.

  8. I am sorry, Mr. Takeyh is an idiot savant of State Department caliber. The US military could crush Iran in a few weeks using only conventional weapons. What the US cannot do at present is summon the will to do so.

    Israel posesses something like 200 nuclear weapons and would likely use them on Iran in the event Iran obtains nukes. If the United states does not act against Iran, it is virtually guaranteeing nuclear war in the mideast.

  9. “Israel posesses something like 200 nuclear weapons and would likely use them on Iran in the event Iran obtains nukes. If the United states does not act against Iran, it is virtually guaranteeing nuclear war in the mideast.”

    So why doesn’t the US act against Israel? Why do they get a pass?

    I know a lot of people around here think Israel is the 51st state or that the US is a giant kibbutz, but really now; why should Israel be permitted to enact preemptive nuclear war? What kind of “friend” does that?

  10. Israel is not an expansionist state and has no designs on her neighbors other than survival. Iran has vowed to eradicate Israel. That is good enough for me. Those demanding Israel commit national suicide are loons.

  11. “Israel is not an expansionist state and has no designs on her neighbors other than survival…”

    Ha ha ha…..that’s a pretty good one. What then, pray tell, are all those settlements in Arab territory?????

    Anyhow, what does that have to do with allowing Israel to be the first nation in more than 60 years to start using nuclear weapons in an act that could bring about global destruction – or at least severe harm to US interests – before its over?

  12. The last time I looked, Israel was a sovereign nation. You don’t seriously expect Israel to obligingly take a first nuclear strike. Perhaps you believe Ahmadingbat is not crazy enough to do it? You know if those pesky Jooos would just all, you know, die, the middle east would become heaven on earth.

  13. avedis – it’s territory the Arabs lost in a war they started.

    Israel is stupid for maintaining the settlements; the original justification was to provide defense in depth against tank attacks – which isn’t an issue these days.

    But if Israel wanted territory from the Arabs, they’d take it. As I’ve heard said, if the Israelis wanted war, they’d control the Middle East from the Sinai Canal to Baghdad. If the Palestinians wanted peace, they’d have it.

    A.L.

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