Over at Arms Control Wonk a discussion on Russia’s – surprisingly – hardening line on Iran’s weapons programs.
I suspect that the main driver, however, is the remarkable shift in U.S. politics in the aftermath of the November 2007 Iran NIE. The NIE‘s headline finding that Iran abandoned nuclear warhead and weaponization in the fall of 2003 has eliminated the possibility of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities for the foreseeable future. This frees up Russia and other countries to toe a harder line against Iran without worrying about legitimating U.S. military action.
If this interpretation is true, it means that the litany of pundits and commentators complaining that the NIE plays right into Iran’s hands have it exactly backwards: by effectively taking U.S. military action off the table for now, the NIE makes it easier, not harder, for countries like Russia to send Iran a stronger signal about its enrichment program. After all, Russia (and China, for that matter) do not want Iran to develop the capability to deploy nuclear weapons; until the Iran NIE, however, this concern was counterbalanced by a worry that the United States might launch another war in the Middle East.
Interesting. I can see some strong counterarguments, but want to do some thinking first.
Say, rather, that increasing signs that American interest in the Central Asia/Middle East regions is on the wane has wizened the Russians up to the dangers of increasing Iran’s strategic power.
When we were actively building bases in Uzbekistan and invading Iraq, they were very chummy with the Iranians in order to preserve their influence in the region. Now that we’re out of Uzbekistan and quibbling with NATO over sending an extra measly battalion to Afghanistan, the Russians are recognizing the change in the correlation of forces in teh region.
The NIE is probably a piece of that, but I think the expectation that President Obama would give Iran a free hand w.r.t the Gulf Arab states is a bigger influence on Russian thinking.
I agree with Ray, and I’ll add something else.
Mark Bowden in Guest of the Ayatollah points out that Iran picked a fight with the US, at the same time it faced danger from the USSR and a possible invasion by Saddam. Which happened during the hostage crisis in 1980.
Iran has a habit of picking multiple fights, particularly ones it need not pick, out of Islamic fervor and internal politics. The hardest hardline people win the most.
Likely, Putin thought (idiot) he had a “deal” with Iran — help with nukes and they lay off the Chechnya stuff. Ask Ronald Reagan how that works out. Probably the Iranians THREATENED Putin. They have a habit of doing that. They have had experience of threats working for them since 1979. Iran is unlikely to change until they get Germany May 1945 experiences.
Does Iran have the men, material, and ability to seize power in Central Asia? No. They’re pressed to kill US soldiers and Marines in Iraq, while dealing with internal revolts. BUT … they are in competition with AQ and the ability to hand off a nuke to Chechens to nuke Moscow is enticing I’m sure to some factions in Iran.
Also enticing — doing the same to say, Copenhagen or London to establish Iranian rule over Europe. And Putin has THAT territory staked out for himself.
I think Obama fully intends to be the first president to visit Ayatollah-ville and give them a Ramsey Clark tongue-bath in person. It might almost sober the Russians and Europeans up to pre-Reagan levels.
The Russians are merely positioning themselves in order to protect their lucrative industry in the field of nuclear fuel production and trade. Not hard to see why the Iranians remain intent on mastering the fuel cycle, fulfilling self-sufficiency in the industry. The Iranians have even promised that they will someday soon enter the market with discount pricing.
It is very interesting that you still use the term “Iran’s [nuclear] weapons programs”. This term could have previously been used because there were some doubts about Iran’s past activities. This is no longer the case. Using the term “Iran’s [nuclear] weapons program” without proper justification demonstrates prejudice rather than logic.