Rev. Sensing has a post up that mirrors what I was going to write about nuclear deterrence.
I’ll be honest enough to say that I don’t know enough – yet – to know what impact the new agreements really will have; that’ll take some time.
But for myself, I kinda liked bipolar nuclear deterrence – and I think we’ll all miss it.
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I’ll admit to not having thought deeply about this, but that’s mostly because I didn’t consider it that important.
Does anyone actually believe that in the event of a biological attack on US soil that kills (say) ten million people, and can be provably traced back to another national government, we’re actually going to be bound by anything? That we would not, in fact, nuke them until they glowed?
I don’t.
Neither does anyone in any position to authorize those things against us. As such, it’s fairly meaningless except as diplomacy. I never saw the point in people freaking out over Bush’s nuclear posture, post 9-11, either, and for exactly the same reason. When we’re attacked, we’re not going to open the filing cabinet and see what the policy response is; we’re going to do something and rewrite the policy later.
If anything, the current posture seems like an attempt to place nuclear proliferators (Iran, of course, we’re looking at you) strongly in the crosshairs by keeping them on the short list of “legitimate” nuclear targets, thus reducing the incentive to have nuclear weapons in the first place.
It’s not going to work, of course, but it doesn’t seem actually harmful, unless you think we’re actually bound by it.
MV:
I do.
On the evening of 9/11, did you stand and listen to someone sneer about how America had it coming, how it was time somebody knocked us off our high horse? I did. (And I don’t even go to Obama’s so-called church.)
Do you ever listen to those people who talk about humanity as a “disease”?
Do you think those people are so marginal that they will never be in a position of power? I used to think so.
Is Sensing saying “War is hell, therfore we should have more nuclear weapons?” I think that’s what he’s saying.
I generaly agree with MV’s post that this treaty is no big deal, because, as I understand it it doesn’t materially affect the balance of nuclear deterrence.
The rationale for MAD (mutual assured destruction) levels of nukes is to deter an existing adversary who could actally wipe us off the map. Don’t do it, because it would be suicide! Today, the much bigger threat is fewer nukes in the hands of the wrong people, like Iran, and Pakistan, and roaming stateless terrorists. If we can have cooperation with the Russians on nuclear arms control, that makes it easier to work together to keep them out of the hands of the Iranians and others. So any treaty that increases cooperation between Russian and the U.S. on this issue is fine by me.
No, Ronald, what Rev. Sensing is saying is this:
And I’m sure that’s what he’s saying, because that’s what he said.
The creation of caution and uncertainty is a major feature of diplomacy in general, not just nuclear deterrence.
The red-diaper babies in the White House understand this like they understand deer hunting, economics, and the basics of common courtesy. And their diplomatic results bear ample witness.
Does anyone actually believe that in the event of a biological attack on US soil that kills (say) ten million people, and can be provably traced back to another national government, we’re actually going to be bound by anything? That we would not, in fact, nuke them until they glowed?
I agree. What I wonder about though is bio/chem attacks on US allies and treaty partners.
The new policy appears to open a lot of ambiguity in how we would respond to those attacks.
Glen:
Yes, I read that. War is hell, so we should have more nuclear weapons because this will deter war. But the pictures are not reassuring as to man’s rationality when it comes to war, are they. The point that we can avoid the ravages of war by arming ourselves to the teeth with atomic weapons, as a general propositon, i.e. not in context of specific deterrance of another nuclear state, strikes me as madness.
We have more than sufficent nuclear weapons now to blow Iran to Kingdom Come. I don’t think that deters them from pursuing nuclear weapons. We’re going to need cooperation with the Russians and Chinese to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran and others.
The Iraqis and Iranians fought themselves to a standstill. I presume we could accomplish regime change there, as we did in Iraq, anytime we chose, before or after a nuclear strike. Indeed, Michael Totten’s Iranian expatriot guest advocated as much the other day. There is no need to resort to atomic annihilation.
Red diaper babies?? Strategic nuclear policy, I venture, has no connection to health care policy, TARP, extension of unemployment insurance, or whatever else you might be thinking of here.
The good news is that nothing will come of this initiative except wasted money, time, and some antique political theater. An international nuclear summit (including Vietnam and Algeria!) which will be a forum to bash Israel, after which Obama can tell Israel, “I’m the only thing standing between you and the pitchforks.”
And the left can drag out their old skull masks and harass innocent people in the street about evil nukes, just like the good old days.
Why would Russia and China “cooperate”? Russia in particular benefits from an unsettled world where it can indulge in its ancient pastime of selling weapons and offing politicians it doesn’t like – as well as making the world safe for dictatorship. China wants places to sell stuff and doesn’t mind the US being distracted by chimeric attempts to stop tinpot dictators getting nukes – and China will happily sell them everything they need – and has the same goal that Russia does of making the world safe for authoritarianism and rolling back democracy wherever possible. Russia and China both love Iran in particular: it’s a massive Western headache that can be used to gain advantage elsewhere, like Cuba and Venezuela, while the West isn’t paying attention.
And while both have plenty of enemies who would love to light off nukes in their capitals, they figure they’ll just deal with it if/when it happens.
Treefrog, #5:
I agree. What I wonder about though is bio/chem attacks on US allies and treaty partners.
The new policy appears to open a lot of ambiguity in how we would respond to those attacks.
Fair enough. But I think the knife cuts both ways: There has always been the dark muttering that the United States isn’t going to risk a nuclear exchange over, say, Paris, no matter what our public documentation says.
Not all ambiguity is bad, either– an ambiguity that makes the decision space intractably large for our adversaries is a good thing. (Of course, it’s hard to do that without making our allies’ decision space intractably large, too, so it’s not unmitigated goodness.)
At the end of the day, what we write, say, and publish in these documents just isn’t that meaningful to military reality. Diplomatic reality, sure. But not military. And behind the diplomatic posturing, all of our enemies and our allies know that, because they are not fools.
Traceable attacks are really beside the point. It is correct that we would deal with each on its own merits without regard to what our stated policy is. Of course.
The damage is in our stance to untraced attacks, and in this we are going in the entirely wrong direction. The best way to deter rogue regimes from even developing WMDs is to set a policy holding all rogue regimes equally and instantly responsible for any unsourced attack. Instead we are sending a message that North Korea has nothing to fear if Iran arms some 3rd party with WMDs. In face Iran has little to fear. That may have profound implications.
“Here”:http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/73180.htm/ is an article from 2005 by Dimitri Trenin, an authority on Russian strategic thinking. He outlines some of the complexities of Russian politics and thinking on nuclear issues. He suggests that Russia is committed to non-proliferation, but more ambiguously than the U.S.
With respect to Iran:
I wonder why Sensing refrained from going over the top in his opposition to the Nuclear deal?:):)
AL:
*But for myself, I kinda liked bipolar nuclear deterrence – and I think we’ll all miss it.*
If you are referring to MAD, has not existed since the fall of the Soviet Union, when it was shown that the state of the Russian Nuclear deterrence capability could not survive sufficiently after an American First strike and could not therefore support their side of the MAD strategy.
From that point we have held an overwhelming first strike capability, which by default resets our strategic doctrine to what it was before MAD which was First Strike Capability against a Nuclear power. I am not sure whether this agreement changes that at all.
A first strike by any major Nuclear power would only assure their total destruction. our main threat now is loose nukes, and it seems that this is what the strategy is trying to address.
MV:
*Does anyone actually believe that in the event of a biological attack on US soil that kills (say) ten million people, and can be provably traced back to another national government, we’re actually going to be bound by anything? That we would not, in fact, nuke them until they glowed?*
*I don’t.*
Nor, do I. Nor, would anyone in their right mind.
RN:
*The rationale for MAD (mutual assured destruction) levels of nukes is to deter an existing adversary who could actally wipe us off the map. Don’t do it, because it would be suicide!*
Since no one in the World can live up the implied Promise that they could assure our destruction even after absorbing a first strike, then your point is is made even stronger.
In the event of a non-nuclear nation launching I biological attack, they would have to believe:
1. We would not launch a Nuclear attack because we were nice guys and lived up to our word, no matter what, or
2. We would not flatten their country by conventional or biological means, and
3. that they would find someone who would shelter them.
I think that would be a tough sell.
GW:
*The creation of caution and uncertainty is a major feature of diplomacy in general, not just nuclear deterrence.*
It seems that this treaty and posture does this in spades. It appears to say if you have nukes or not complying with the NPT you are in trouble, but you might be in trouble anyway. This has to change thinking everywhere and would engender more caution and uncertainty
“We’re going to need cooperation with the Russians and Chinese to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran and others.”
*It will be unavailable.*
Would you think any differently if those recent bombings in Moscow were dirty bombs?
What makes you think that the Russians and the Chinese who have real problems with their Muslim populations are any less worried about loose nukes than we are.
I think your conclusions are hasty to say the least.
GW:
*The good news is that nothing will come of this initiative except wasted money, time, and some antique political theater.*
I doubt that it will garner anything less that 75 votes in the Senate, if not more after some political posturing.
Russia’s historic pattern is clear, therefore a quick, clear summary conclusion is justified.
Buckets of instant sunshine over Moscow and/or Beijing would open a new chapter of history.
One thing the Russians have over the West is clarity. They don’t need to sooth egos and placate constituencies and try to wring a public policy stance out of it. No wink wink, nudge nudge, but this is what we ‘really’ mean necessary.
I suspect they play a double game with us over Iran more because they believe that lining up with the West will be fruitless (because of Western fecklessness and unseriousness when it comes to using sticks) than for any other reason. Keeping good ties with Iran is profitable. Lining up with the West and then watching the united front wither and cheat has no upside. Hence the question, from a Russian point of view, isnt whether they should defang Iran, but whether there is any advantage is playing out the Kabuki the West (some of us any way) like to play out in situations like this. Rationally, the answer is probably that they can garner more from not participating. That doesn’t mean Russia might not be interested in a serious attempt to disarm Iran, if such a thing could exist and lines up with their other concerns.
#18 toc3: “Then why earlier do you say:
If there are dirty nuke attacks with no clear return address, I don’t know what Moscow will do.
Russia’s historic pattern is clear, therefore a quick, clear summary conclusion is justified.”
#6: Roland Nikles: “We’re going to need cooperation with the Russians and Chinese to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran and others.”
#7: David Blue: “It will be unavailable.”
The context of my reply was the general case.
“If, hypothetically, Moscow is radioactive ashes, what will the new government do?” is a special case.
“Sunshine? Buckets? Clear historical patterns?”:http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-party-line
Rascals Redux? Or perhaps Grozny Revisited….
Armed Liberal: “But for myself, I kinda liked bipolar nuclear deterrence – and I think we’ll all miss it.”
From an Iranian point of view, wouldn’t it make just as much sense to say: “I kinda like bipolar nuclear deterrence – and I wish we had it”?
Not that I think that’s why the ruling Iranians want the bomb. I think they’re religious fanatics. But perfectly sane Iranians would want the bomb too.
That, combined with the attitudes of China and Russia and the useless Europeans is why I hold out no hope for this situation, and why I have not criticized the Obama administration for not fixing this mess. (Or for running dead on the doomed challenge to the Iranian election results.)
I also wouldn’t criticize Obama’s revised talk on deterrence. The people he needs to deter decided long ago that the Great Satan is a big bluffer and its public postures can and should be disregarded.
I actually agree with them. Bits of paper won’t defend anything. Only tribal solidarity will. People have to look in each others’ eyes and see someone enough like them that they will defend that person and those like them. With that, a feeble promise to “consult” like the ANZUS treaty is worth something, without it even potentially mighty NATO is worthless.
While I don’t condemn Obama for the minutiae of documents America’s enemies will disregard a priori, or for not doing what is impossible, I do blame him for things like lousing things up with Great Britain.
But that was a done deal when he was elected, since he spent decades marinating his brain in a religious ideology where white folks’ greed rules a world in need.
And that election, and more like it to follow down the road, follow from demographic changes. From those changes have followed new social bonds. Basically: Saving Private Ryan out, Crash in. And it’s not stopping, in fact it’s speeding up.
That change in America’s constitution – its real, flesh and blood constitution, not the paper one – will have a decisive effect on who America respects and does not respect and who does and does not line up with America when push comes to shove, and thus what America can deter and can’t deter.
You can already see the difference in Barack Obama’s diplomacy. Different people get respect and lack of respect. People who didn’t get bowed to before now do get bowed to.