I read Part 3 of Wrights article with glee
while he and I differ slightly (and I think hes done a much better job of laying out his arguments than I have done)
we fundamentally agree that the enemy we are facing is a contagious mindset
a meme
to which Ill add that this meme is rooted in a philosophical tradition here in the West…which must be addressed.
Ill follow up with an amplification of his points, but want to first address Eugene Volokhs response to him.
Here are some key points made by Volokh:
But I think Wright is missing an absolutely fundamental point: Trying to get people to love us — especially the sorts of people who might become suicide bombers, or even cheerleaders for suicide bombers — may actually make them love us less. The problem with appeasement isn’t some abstraction about honor or sticking to one’s guns. Appeasement is often in a very basic way counterproductive.
So the brutes end up having a competitive advantage over the nice guys (or, to be precise, more of one than they had before). Either the nice guys will turn brutish, or the nice guys will be overrun by the brutes, and it is the brutes, not the nice guys, who will reproduce their brutal culture of terrorist threat. Evolution will help the fittest survive — except in the policy structure that Wright recommends, the fittest (the ones whose interests we’ll treat with the most concern) are the ones who are the most likely spawning grounds of terrorists.
What then, should be done, given the risk that small groups could kill millions of Americans? I don’t know the answer to that. But I am pretty sure that while technology may have magnified the power of small groups (for good and for ill), it hasn’t repealed basic laws of human nature: Behavior that is rewarded, as I mentioned, gets repeated. The violent appeased come to demand more and more of the appeasers, and come to have more and more contempt for the appeasers. And to the extent that willingness to murder becomes an effective weapon in deterring us, the result will be more groups that choose to use that weapon against us.
I have a couple of responses.
First, that he would be right if in fact Wrights point was to lavish the potential terrorists with love, instead of threats of violence. But my take on Wrights point is more subtle. He says:
The Philippines escapade resulted from taking the phrase “war on terrorism” literally and thinking of the enemy as a finite group of warriors, rather than a contagious mind-set that may spawn new warriors faster than you kill the old ones. We mounted a “show of force”something that may work when you’re trying to intimidate a potentially aggressive nation but that may backfire when the enemy is, in part, Muslim resentment of American power and arrogance. This suggests Policy Prescription No. 4: In a war on terrorism, applying force inconspicuously makes sense more often than in regular wars.
He also suggests:
Policy Prescription No. 2: The substance of policies should be subjected to a new kind of appraisal, one that explicitly accounts for the discontent and hatred the policies arouse.
and
Policy Prescription No. 3: The ultimate target is memes; killing or arresting people is useful only to the extent that it leads to a net reduction in terrorism memes.
And here he is right on the key point. While you could (and Volkh does) interpret Policy #2 as appease them, and some of the actual points made by Wright lead you there, the substance of what he says is simple: our deeds and policies have both physical and psychological reactions. We need to think through the psychological ones carefully, and make sure that the reaction in that sphere doesnt outweigh the physical effect.
Number 3 is useful because it lets us decide to target the origins of the problem, rather than the symptoms. Now here, as in first aid, we must be aware that the symptoms can kill us, and that they need to be managed. But the simple fact is that the costs of terrorism are so low, relative to the costs of defending effectively against it, that we will be bankrupted (forgetting the moral and political consequences of a tight terrorism defense) if we allow it to continue. We must both find ways to defend ourselves, and simultaneously find ways to carry the attack to the sources of the problem
which may require a war where the weapons are ideas.
Number 4 is critical. It is about the difference between bluster and threat. Because we can effectively turn the whole of the Middle East to a glass plain, we expect our to be respected and our desires to be obeyed, or at least considered. But because of the (literally, if youre a Believer) apocalyptic nature of our response, its also clear that theres a pretty high threshold for triggering it.
On the other hand
does anyone else remember the story in the 80s about the Russian response to a kidnapping of one of their embassy staff in Beirut? This was when Western diplomats and journalists were being kidnapped and held hostage fairly frequently. The story was, and I remember reading this in the paper at the time, that the Russians had sent over a spetsnaz team, who kidnapped members of the clan who did the kidnapping, and sent several of their body parts in lieu of cash to the kidnappers
who promptly released the hostage, and never took another. We parked aircraft carriers off the beach and sent a bunch of negotiators.
Which was the effective response?? And, in the context of who we are and want to be, how do we duplicate the effect of the effective response? Im not exactly sure, but it involves small, quiet, probably lethal actions in lieu of the large and loud actions we tend to take.
Date: 09/11/2002 00:00:00 AM
More chatter ?Discussing the possible secretive, small lethal actions that we could take against terrorists is interesting when viewed as an idea for fiction, but if I try to imagine actually doing these things, in reality, I have to admit that it makes me feel kind of ill. While the idea of trying to make these intolerant fundamentalists ?like us? is unthinkable (it wouldn?t work ? they would hate us for it and we would hate ourselves), this kind of secret warfare is almost as bad. If we?re trying to hide what we?re doing, it implies that we?re ashamed of it. And if we were enlisting nasty characters to do our dirty work, we should be ashamed. To target the members of Hamas, the Israelis need to use informers, but they are conducting the actual ?hits?, or arrests, out in the open. They have every right to be targeting those men. We?re fighting a particularly rabid brand of violent, intolerant fundamentalism. That?s nothing to be ashamed of. We should be as open as possible about what we?re doing.
Date: 09/12/2002 00:00:00 AM
What’s needed is attacking the entire Islam-meme from the inside.How? Here’s my idea for “the Meme Bomb”We should stage “Miracles of Fatima” in backward mountain paths throughout Islamdom.Employ Industrial Lights and Magic/David Copperfield techniques/equipment to project an angry angel Gabriel to unsuspecting Islamic shepherds/goatherds. Have Gabriel scream and rail against “false prophets” and say that “Allah is very angry” about them killing Jews and crashing planes into buildings.Stage these “appearances” in six or seven very remote regions on the outskirts of the muslim world. Through the six degrees of separation, word will quickly spread.Modify the meme, use their own superstitions against them, and soon, Islam will tear itself apart from the inside.QED.PS: Getting caught doing this would probably not be a good idea.
Date: 09/10/2002 00:00:00 AM
I don’t think kidnapping bin Laden’s family, chopping them up, and sending them to some cave in Pakistan is going to do a DAMN thing.These people are FANATICS. By definition, they do not give a damn about their own personal safety or the safety of those around them. The Russians also tried these tactics in Afghanistan — worked pretty good there, huh? Those home demolitions the Israelis have been doing for twenty years or so — those are sure working!And what happens when your Delta team gets ass-backward information and butchers up some innocent people? Also, are you willing to chop up children and women? Hell, if you’re going to kill innocents, why just reserve it for men? It would be far more effective if you killed their children, no? And torture — how about torturing them to death? We could tape-record their screams and send them along with the body parts. How about a video! Now THAT would be frightening!Once you start going down this road against a determined enemy, you will not be able to stop. If America ever takes this path, I’m moving to Canada. I don’t want to be a citizen of a country or pay taxes to a government that would do that kind of thing.
Date: 09/10/2002 00:00:00 AM
Mary, Many corporations already carry out what are essentially military operations, usually by funding right wing death squads or militias. Unfortunately, they see terrorists as less of a threat (and as a much harder target) than union organizers and environmental activists. Look at the activities of iol companies in Nigeria and of many large corporations in Colombia (where thousands of union members have been killed in the last few years). It’s a lot more cost effective to kill easy targets out in the open, like Chico Mendez in Brazil, than it is to kill well armed and trained foes. Don’t expect corporate-run military ops to do anything but enhance the bottom line.
Date: 09/11/2002 00:00:00 AM
William ?I don?t know how much blame corporations can take for the violence in Nigeria and Columbia. When anti-corporate types compare a thief like Ken Lay to a mass murderer like Osama bin Laden, it makes you wonder if they?re exaggerating about other things.Of course if you?re looking for someone to do targeted assassinations, you?d look for someone who has had some kind of experience. You wouldn?t try to recruit the local librarian. If corporate thugs are half as nasty as you assume, then they just might be appropriate. If they thought the investment would eventually enhance the bottom line (or if they were offered incentives) they might be enthusiastic.AL was just asking about ?small, quiet, probably lethal actions? that could be effective against terrorism. What exactly should be your response when someone has threatened to kill you? Should your response be large, loud and violent, or quick and to the point? Or should you just do nothing and hope that nothing bad happens? There are all sorts of responses, and not many of them are nice. It doesn?t hurt to explore all the possibilities.Henry ?The torture practiced by Arafat?s PA, by the Saudi government, and by Saddam Hussein has already proven to be absolutely cruel and useless. As the Palestinian tactic of targeting schoolchildren has already proven, killing innocents only makes an enemy?s resolve stronger, not weaker. Using the same cruel tactics that are used by the fanatics who wish to kill us would never work. On the other hand, Israel has been targeting and arresting the leaders of Hamas. According to some reports, they?ve arrested or killed about 98% of Hamas leadership. Now the Palestinians are talking about peace..
Date: 09/10/2002 00:00:00 AM
Uh, Henry…note that I didn’t advocate the spetsnatz solution for us…”…in the context of who we are and want to be, how do we duplicate the effect of the effective response?”That’s the question.A.L.
Date: 09/07/2002 00:00:00 AM
While the spetznatz option is probably effective, it could generate a lot of negative publicity. Despite the many complaints against the US, we are still regarded as a moral nation ? restrained and somewhat predictable. That?s why they feel free to criticize us. But what could we do if we weren?t a moral nation?We wouldn?t use the spetznatz option, because of the negative publicity. Instead of sending pieces of people to different place, we could ?disappear? the members of a terrorist organization. Unpredictable, random and frequent disappearances would probably be effective. It would spread confusion through the organization, and there wouldn?t be any shocking photos appearing on the front pages of the international papers. You have to work hard to frighten terrorists, but it?s relatively easy to intimidate and impoverish the people who finance them.We have the prisoners at Gitmo to learn from. Even in a completely morals-free discussion, torture is out of the question, but psychological testing, finding out what they?re frightened of, what ?makes them tick? would be useful.We are somewhat predictable. Any action we can take to make unfriendly groups or nations think that we?re unpredictable would probably help in the fight against terrorism. We?re supposed to be afraid of the terrorists because they?re so unpredictable. But if we were unpredictable, and also obviously capable of carrying out a massive nuclear retaliation, we would appear to be more of a threat.Of course, we should always appear to be rational, moral and predictable in front of our allies. They?d be less likely to support us we didn?t. These supposedly amoral acts would actually result in fewer civilian casualties than traditional urban warfare ? and if you add in the costs for improved intelligence gathering services, they are probably cheaper than dropping bombs, gathering prisoners, and having to house them for a long period of time. They would, in fact, probably generate a lot less bad publicity.But we are a moral nation, and this is just talk. I read too many mysteries. Like those myths about black ops and plausable deniability, these ideas are not based on reality at all. Are they?
Date: 09/10/2002 00:00:00 AM
The secret would be to do things “under the radar” to the point where the bystanders who might be inflamed by our actions wouldn’t know what we were doing but that our enemies would. There’s a hypothetical involving bin Laden in Mecca on my blog (at bottom of long post on Wright article), and example of an action we’ve taken in real life that’s backfired. Two biggest problems I see with operating in secret:1) Actions taken in secret in the past have usually been for economic or parochial reasons, not for real national security ones (coups in Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc). When they come to light, these have often made us permanent enemies and contributed to anti-Americanism. Hard to be sure history won’t repeat itself. 2) Too big a temptation for politicians to trumpet latest success for political gain rather than to let things lie to keep from stirring up resentment
Date: 09/07/2002 00:00:00 AM
I think the key here is not to modulate the violence of our response to attacks upon us, but to package it better. Some people will always hate us; just write them off – chasing their approval leads to appeasement. The ones who count are the ones who can be convinced, either through fear of unmediated violence (the spetznatz option) or through reason (the Voice of America broadcasting why we chopped the bastards up in clear terms). But as soon as you let PR concerns drive military responses, you are deep into Clinton country.
Date: 09/07/2002 00:00:00 AM
It’s hardly news that being able to turn an area into a glass plain is irrelevant until you’re willing to do so and percieved as such. We’re not, and we shouldn’t be – doing so would make the viciousness of Russia’s spetsnaz team pale by comparison.I think the problem isn’t that our actions are loud and large, it’s that they’re often mostly bluster. What Volokh hints at and Wright, for all his nuance, misses is the value of having terrorists fear us. The spetsnaz team was an ugly and personal response. Ours may not need to be that ugly, but they need to be that personal, and they need to be real, not threatened.