Frequent commenter Ziska has been drilling me on the issue of terrorism as opposed to legitimate warfare. He has drawn several parallels to wars of national liberation, and our discussion has moved from Algeria to Eire, and from India to Sri Lanka.
Others have joined him in criticizing the distinction I make, which seems very clear to me
.but obviously not to them.
So I thought Id take a stab at a broad discussion of legitimate vs. illegitimate uses for force, and what I perceive to be the tragic, if moral, consequences of legitimate warfare versus the equally tragic and immoral consequences of terrorism.
First, and foremost, let me dwell on the tragedies involved. Innocent people die, are maimed and wounded, have their lives shattered irrecoverably. Whether they are killed by a stray Allied bomb in WWII, a cannon shell in a besieged city in one of the sieges of the 30 Years War, a Palestinian bomb in Tel Aviv, or an Israeli tank shell in Gaza. Some starve because the crops have been ruined or irrigation systems destroyed or livestock killed; some die from treatable diseases because hospitals have no power or are inaccessible. Each of these tragic stories represents an individual noncombatant who did not deserve to die.
But the reality of human existence is that innocents die. The earliest human stories
for example, the ballads of of Homer
talk of the tragedies that befall humans at the capricious whim of the gods.
Our civilized society has little appetite for this, and we have erected structures that ostensibly protect the innocent, in international law and custom. Not everyone follows those laws and customs, however.
So lets talk cases.
During World War II, German and Allied forces bombed each others cities; the stated reason for Allied bombing was:
The deployment of the air forces opposing Germany was heavily influenced by the fact that victory was planned to come through invasion and land occupation. In the early years of the war, to be sure, the RAF had the independent mission of striking at German industrial centers in an effort to weaken the German economy and the morale of the German people.
source: THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY (authors J.K. Galbraith, among others)
The German justification was somewhat different:
I believe this plan [raiding RAF airfields] would have been very successful, but as a result of the Fuhrer’s speech about retribution, in which he asked that London be attacked immediately, I had to follow the other course. I wanted to attack the airfields first, thus creating a prerequisite for attacking London . . . I spoke with the Fuhrer about my plans in order to try to have him agree I should attack the first ring of RAF airfields around London, but he insisted he wanted to have London itself attacked for political reasons, and also for retribution.
I considered the attacks on London useless, and I told the Fuhrer again and again that inasmuch as I knew the English people as well as I did my own people, I could never force them to their knees by attacking London. We might be able to subdue the Dutch people by such measures but not the British.
Reichmarschall Hermann Goering, International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 1946.
Notice two points of difference: the Allied strategy was set to a) weaken the fighting effectiveness of the German Army by collapsing the industrial economy that supported it, and secondarily weakening the morale of the German people. The German strategy was out-and-out retribution
a lashing out at the British people, and secondarily, if at all, attacking their means to wage war.
The Hague convention of 1923 states:
Bombardment from the air is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, the destruction or injury of which would constitute a distinct military disadvantage to the belligerent.
In general, we understand and support attacks which logically support weakening the ability of belligerent soldiers to fight. The allied raids on the ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt may have destroyed whole neighborhoods, but they can be justified as attacking a target of military importance (precision machines need bearing); similarly the Allied attacks on steel, oil and nitrate production necessary to produce weapons gasoline and explosives, as well as the roads, waterways, and railroads necessary to transport them and the food needed to support an urban industrial economy.
The Allies did not limit themselves to militarily useful attacks, however. Dresden and Cologne certainly were not. But the other stated purpose was to attack the morale of the enemy, and realistically, satisfy the emotional need to damage the opposing state. How well did they work?
The Survey has made extensive studies of the reaction of the German people to the air attack and especially to city raids. These studies were carefully designed to cover a complete cross section of the German people in western and southern Germany and to reflect with a minimum of bias their attitude and behavior during the raids. These studies show that the morale of the German people deteriorated under aerial attack. The night raids were feared far more than daylight raids. The people lost faith in the prospect of victory, in their leaders and in the promises and propaganda to which they were subjected. Most of all, they wanted the war to end. They resorted increasingly to “black radio” listening, to circulation of rumor and fact in opposition to the Regime; and there was some increase in active political dissidence — in 1944 one German in every thousand was arrested for a political offense. If they had been at liberty to vote themselves out of the war, they would have done so well before the final surrender. In a determined police state, however, there is a wide difference between dissatisfaction and expressed opposition. Although examination of official records and those of individual plants shows that absenteeism increased and productivity diminished somewhat in the late stages of the war, by and large workers continued to work. However dissatisfied they were with the war, the German people lacked either the will or the means to make their dissatisfaction evident.
— Strategic Bombing Survey
So it appears that the goal of demoralizing the enemy seems to have had some effect. The interesting thing is that the bombings in England seemed to have the opposite effect, of infuriating the population and strengthening their will to fight. I might suggest that part of the difference lay in the magnitude of the attacks, meaning that while the attacks on Britain were damaging, they did not represent a force overwhelming enough to call victory into question (there were certainly other issues
of national character, political leadership, the perceived legitimacy of the government, etc.), while the devastating attacks by the RAF and then the Americans certainly would have had to make the average German question the viability of the war enterprise.
Finally, you cannot talk about aerial bombardment without talking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
There are three broad questions: 1) were the attacks on nonstrategic targets legitimate at all? 2) should we have demonstrated the bomb first? and 3) to what extent was racism toward the Japanese people an element in making us more willing to bomb them?
Serious books have been written on these subjects, and will be for the foreseeable future. Ive read a few of them. My father was also a cryptographer in Army Intelligence in WW II, stationed in India and Burma, and then Japan after the war, and he and I had some extensive talks about it. Heres my (personal, inconclusive) take on these three questions:
1) were these attacks legitimate?
Yes, to the extent that the attacks on Cologne, Dresden and Tokyo were also legitimate. Part of the enterprise in national war is to both destroy the fighting ability of the enemy, which can be done both by destroying the men and equipment in their armed forces, and in a modern industrial society, by destroying the economy that supports them. In addition, the effects on morale both of the enemy and of the attacker must be considered. Fights are won, in no small part, on emotion. My personal judgment, is that in the context of a global war like WW II, strikes against enemy population centers were not unjustifiable. By hastening the collapse of the enemy as an effective fighting force, they may have saved combatent lives on both sides lives in offset to those non-combatant lives the bombing cost.
Ill address the combatant vs. non-combatant issue later.
2) should we have demonstrated the bomb first?
There has been a lot written and discussed about this; about the effect of an announced demonstration over Tokyo Bay or an unoccupied islet. It strikes me as a nice idea, but we are far removed from two things: a) the uncertainty that was widely present at the time about whether the bomb would actually work, or would simply produce a conventional explosion and shards of U238; and b) the genuine emotional hatred in effect at the time, which feeds into:
3) was racism the key to using the Bomb in Japan?
Yes, but. But we would have used the Bomb in Germany if it had been ready in time. But it was racism that cut both ways. The level of cultural misunderstanding between the Japanese and Western politicians and military is probably matched by the level of misunderstanding between the militant Native American tribes and the European immigrants. The Japanese military was to the American view, insanely no, suicidally brave, and equally insanely cruel. The Western military was to the Japanese view cowardly and weak. From talking to my father and to other men of his age who fought the Japanese (and my fathers battles were quite cushy and non-life-threatening), the real differences in the warfighting styles, amplified by the propaganda machines, led to real and deep feelings of fear and hate. Had this picture of the Japanese not been pervasive and again, Ill state that it had its roots in real cultural differences, amplified and played up by propaganda I wonder what we would have done.
The Germans were, on the other hand, perceived as fellow Westerners, and even the knowledge of the extermination camps did not drive them out of that place. But according to contemporary documents, the fear that the Germans were close to a bomb, and the certainty that they would use it if they had it, I believe would certainly have led to the use of the A-bomb in Europe if VE day had been sufficiently far away.
So, in summary, Im trying to justify the collateral death and destruction on civilian, nonmilitary targets in WW II as a part of a larger war plan, and in the context of those intentions, legitimate.
Remember that criminality (and hence morality) depends in large part on intentions. The dead are just as dead. But when we judge the living, we have to judge them in large part by what they meant to do.
Next, nuclear war and Homeric war.
Date: 09/24/2002 00:00:00 AM
At random: The supposition that the Palestinians are attacking because of the occupation by Israel is false. First, they want to destroy Israel entirely. Thus, Israel’s offense is existing. This has been a crime since 1948 which the locals have been attempting to fix.Second, when Jordan illegally occupied the West Bank in 1948, nobody minded. Surprised?I don’t see racism as a cause for the use of the atomic bomb. The decision maker was Harry Truman. Nobody else. And unless you can show Truman was thinking racism when he made the decision, there is no case.There was a great deal of hate toward the Japanese, and it doesn’t stop with Pearl Harbor. Ask anybody who fought them. They’re a lot less forgiven than the Germans.None of the horrors of which Allied propagandists accused the Japanese were false. They did it all and then some.In addition, the entire war was a lesson in what happens when you let an aggressor up easy, which is what happened to Germany after WW I.Nobody was going to settle for less than total, complete, shattering, smash-em victory.
Date: 09/21/2002 00:00:00 AM
Eric:I’m sorry I wasn’t clear; the quote:Finally, I should note that your suggestion that “other issues…of national character, political leadership, the perceived legitimacy of the government, etc.)” might affect the legitimacy of the bombings is also unpersuasive, as such factors can only be relevant if you are intending to make some sort of “the ends justify the means” argument.Was meant to talk about why morale suffered or didn’t under bombing, not justify it.Seems like we’re disagreeing a fair amount on this; I’ll try and get the ‘combatent’ piece up today (under-6 soccer may interfere), and look forward to your comments.A.L.
Date: 09/21/2002 00:00:00 AM
A.L.,Ah. That makes things clearer and narrows our argument down nicely. Looking forward to reading what you have to write about civilians.Hope the soccer/kid shepherding was a blast…
Date: 09/21/2002 00:00:00 AM
Eric, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs probably saved tens of millions of civilian lives. The other plan was to invade Japan, while thousands of B-29’s continued to pound Japanese cities. This was expected to take several years. It would have terribly disrupted Japanese food supplies – and it seems likely that the Japanese Army would have starved last…Dresden can’t be justified that way, or any other way, IMHO. It sounds like the real motive was, “will this really work?” Which leaves only one moral difference between the Dresden planners and Dr. Mengele – Mengele wasn’t satisfied with just one experiment. The Dresden planners had their moral sensitivities temporarily numbed by the horrors of a long war, while Mengele seems to have been just plain evil.
Date: 09/22/2002 00:00:00 AM
I have been intending to put together a better answer, but it doesn’t seem to be happening, so here’s what I’ve got right now.Your definition of terrorism is not a problem — attacking civilians with no specific military aim other than terrifying civilians. I can understand, and accept, the whole idea about the difference between incidental civilian casualties and terrorism. What I doubt is that the Palestinians have crossed some threshold into a new phase of warfare, and that their methods are irrational. As far as I can tell, terrorism is the weapon of the weak (this has come up before) and has been used here or there in the past. The Palestinians can’t contend with the Israelis militarily in any other way, as far as I know. Their alternative is surrender (I just don’t see civil disobedience or passive resistance working; I’d be glad to be shown to be wrong).I also think that in this whole terrorism argument there’s a confusion of the active/passive roles. Israel and the US have just been sitting here minding our own business, and then BOOM! Finally we’re victims too! Israel has been very active in appropriating the Occupied Territories, whatever you call them. The US has been very active in remaking the world system. And Israel and the US have enemies.The whole question of legitimacy of warfare is a tricky one. Because if, for example, the Palestinian effort is illegitimate in the face of it, it doesn’t make any difference whether they’re killing policemen, soldiers, politicians, administrators, or high school kids. The Israelis will not love the Palestinians more if the Palestinians start killing only soldiers. As it stands, these are two enemy peoples, and anything the Palestinians do militarily will be hated by the Israelis. What we seem to be trying to do is to figure out a way to deal with this particular struggle in light of the fact that somewhat similiar struggles (eg. in Ireland) have led to legitimate states. But the Israelis don’t really think that way, because (perhaps rightly) they don’t accept anything at all of the Palestinian premise.
Date: 09/20/2002 00:00:00 AM
Howard — I don’t think a clearly-defined C&C is the mark of a “proper” military force. Does this mean that that Viet Cong wasn’t a proper military force? Also, suffice it to say that Israel has mobilized a far larger proportion of its adult civilian population for military purposes than most other states. Bombing nightclubs, bars, etc. kills young Israelis, and thus theoretically (and in a morally unjustifiable way IMO) reduces potential Israeli manpower for the IDF. As far as Palestinean anti-Semitism goes, this is true. However, if Israel was not in military occupation of the territories, much of this anger and hatred would not exist, just as much of the racial fury at the Japanese would not have existed without Pearl Harbor. To say that it is simple, unreasoning hatred without provocation is inaccurate, IMO.A.L. — The intifada has definitely weakened the Israeli economy by injuring tourism and foreign investment. Whether or not it has weakened the armed forces is questionable — it certainly has weakened Israeli civilian morale. I think it’s been highly counterproductive as far as getting Israel out of the Occupied Territories, but you can’t argue that the suicide bombings aren’t intended to weaken Israel. Destroying Dresden didn’t weaken the military or economic infrastrucuture of the Reich, because as a dictatorship it could simply ignore the civilian losses and devote money and energy to the military. My point is that civilian losses should be avoided whenever possible. It can only be justified in the case of error, IMO. I do not believe that specifically attacking civilian targets for purposes of weakening “morale” or lessening political support for certain policies is justifiable. The only possible exception I would make is in the case of a specifically war-ending event like Hiroshima & Nagasaki.
Date: 09/21/2002 00:00:00 AM
[sorry about the length of this]Finally, I should note that your suggestion that “other issues…of national character, political leadership, the perceived legitimacy of the government, etc.)” might affect the legitimacy of the bombings is also unpersuasive, as such factors can only be relevant if you are intending to make some sort of “the ends justify the means” argument.I agree with Walzer’s argument that the theory of the just ends of war and the theory of the just means of war are distinct and almost completely independent subjects. There are some tactics and strategies that can never be morally justified, regardless of the cause. And dropping a nuclear bomb on a city is one of them.
Date: 09/20/2002 00:00:00 AM
Henry:Are you suggesting that the V.C. didn’t have a strong command and control structure? because if so, you would be the first person I’ve heard make that case.The Viet Cong werethe antethesis of the Palestinian terrorists…not because they weren’t brutal (they were) or because they didn’t attack civilians (they did) but because at least their attacks were a part of a coherent (and ultimately successful) strategy.If Hamas acted like the V.C. I would still strongly oppose them, but might respect them, and would certainly support negotiations with them.If you’ve got any data to support your statement, I’d love to see it.A.L.
Date: 09/20/2002 00:00:00 AM
I would like to reccomend Richard B. Frank’s book “Downfall” to everyone who would discuss the end of World War II in the Pacific, and the decision to use atomic bombs.
Date: 09/19/2002 00:00:00 AM
Here’s the difference, for one, the Allied Forces were part of a cohesive military structure that had command and control. The Palestinian terrorists cannot make that claim. It is more of an alliance of free agents and few parts are answerable to any other part. Command and control is an essential element of true warfare.Furthermore, it is disengenous to say that “almost every adult citizen is either active or reserve military personnel.” That is a very wobbly number. Certainly, little children are not, and old ladies are not members of the Israel military in any way, but they have been clear targets of suicide bombers. Also, reservists and off-duty troops, in fairness, should be counted as civilians. The attacker has no real knowledge, in absense of a uniform, of knowing who is truly a civilian and who isn’t, so we must conclude that the attacks are clearly aimed at killing and injuring civilians. We also have clear evidence that the Palestinian attackers have an unreminting animosity toward Jews. While their were anti-Japanese racist in the U.S. military, by no objective standard can you conclude that the U.S. conducted its affairs through racist motives rather than purely military motives. Since the objective was clearly military, there is a clear distinction from the clearly racist, hate-motiviated attacks of the Palestinians.
Date: 09/19/2002 00:00:00 AM
But the SBS also concluded that German industrial war production continued to rise despite the enormous level of strategic bombing.Also … aren’t Palestinean attacks Israeli civilian targets justifiable by this excuse:” … strikes against enemy population centers were not unjustifiable. By hastening the collapse of the enemy as an effective fighting force, they may have saved combatent lives on both sides lives in offset to those non-combatant lives the bombing cost.”Especially given Israeli parliamentary democracy (where the Israeli voting public continues to support settlement expansion) and Israel’s citizen army (where almost every adult citizen is either active or reserve military personnel)? Especially on the part of groups such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which only seek to drive Israel out of the occupied territories?I don’t know. The suicide bombers are attempting to terrorize Israel out of the West Bank and Palestine by killing civilians. Firebombing Dresden and Tokyo was attempting to terrorize the German and Japanese populace into surrender by killing civilians. I have a difficult time seeing the difference here.
Date: 09/19/2002 00:00:00 AM
But Henry, my whole point was that they were defensible in the context of an overall effort which was primarily to defeat the armed forces, and to weaken the economy and resources that supported the armed forces.That simply isn’t happening in the M.E.You may say because it wouldn’t work, but obviously, neither are random attacks on civilians.A.L.