Commenter Abu Frank is one of the folks whose challenges to Joe’s and my thinking are most welcome in the comments here. As I’ve noted, one reason I do this is to sharpen my own arguments, and if there was no one to sharpen them against…
Yesterday, he commented, in response to my post on an Op-Ed in the LA Times that I felt ‘blamed the U.S.’ for Saddam’s intransigence. Here’s his first (and core) comment, in it’s entirety:
Armed Liberal:
Why are you letting this bunch of old news upset you? Meisler’s article isn’t saying anything new to anyone who’s been following the story.
What’s your counter-claim?
(1) that the US didn’t do what Meisler says it did (send signals that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam, and use UNSCOM as a cloak for its own intelligence gathering)?
(2) that even if it did, those actions didn’t create disincentives to Saddam to cooperate with the inspections?
(3) that even if they did create disincentives, they were only minor?
(4) that even if they created major disincentives, Saddam’s non-cooperation was not the USA’s fault?
If (4), that doesn’t contradict Meisler; he doesn’t discuss the law or morality of the situation, just the power play: “Hussein never had much incentive to cooperate”, not “It’s all our fault”.
I don’t agree with him – even though I still think it was a ‘damn good argument’, and the issue I have is found not so much in parsing the historical record as in deciding how we want to view that record.
I can sift the record and find connections from and to almost anything; I have to judge which ones to give primacy and call causes.
Part of my objection to the modern philosophical interpretation of history is found in Fackenheim’s ‘Metaphysics and Historicity’, which I quoted over at Armed Liberal a long time ago. The relevant quote looks like this:
And from historical self-consciousness there is but one step—albeit a long and fateful one—to a wholesale historical skepticism: to the despairing view that history discloses a variety of conflicting Weltanschauungen, with no criterion for choice between them anywhere in sight [A.L.: except essentially artificial and arbitrary ones, per Derrida]. But when events move as they do today, this step is easily taken.
Just how commonly it is in fact taken may be illustrated by a review of three typically contemporary attitudes. The first is what may be called skeptical paralysis. Here historical self-consciousness has led to two results: to the insight that wherever there has been great purpose, there has been great faith; and to the loss of the capacity for commitment to such a faith. Hence there is paralysis which recognizes itself as paralysis and preaches doom.
Which pretty closely maps to what I’m seeing in Abu’s argument. There are conflicting narratives that can be built around our interactions with Saddam, which certainly supports Abu’s point. But…
…the act of building and accepting those narratives it itself not without consequence. By coincidence, Joe just linked to a great Norman Geras post on Arendt and Eichmann. In it he says (forgive the long quote, and do go read the whole thing):
I also have a wider theoretical misgiving about the emphasis on perpetrator normality: this is that it runs the risk of permitting the sociology and psychology which is involved in trying to understand what happened to displace the ethical perspective. Let us return to Arendt’s writing. On the face of it she was unambiguous about Eichmann having to bear the moral responsibility for his deeds. From a moral point of view she dismissed the notion that, in similar circumstances, others might have acted similarly to him. As though addressing the man himself, Arendt declared:
there is an abyss between the actuality of what you did and the potentiality of what others might have done.
But in explaining Eichmann, his mentality, his normality, Arendt also speaks of his committing crimes
under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.
If it is well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel it, though, mustn’t this at least mitigate the degree of his moral responsibility?
From an interpretative point of view I think we are bound to stick with Arendt’s assignment of full responsibility to Eichmann, since she is so clear and emphatic about it. On the other hand, I believe that all the talk, in the relevant literature, of the normality of the perpetrators carries a danger of encouraging us to think: well, because of these psychological pressures, these social mechanisms or administrative structures, those patterns of internal rationalization and so on, what the perpetrators did is ‘understandable’. But isn’t there a sense in which, as Primo Levi wrote, one must refuse to understand? Or one must say: each and all of the factors – social, psychological or whatever – that tempted or pressured you, they are understandable; still, you made a choice or choices which you should not have made and which others did not make – you crossed the line.
I think that in judging history, particularly political history, we have to keep in perspective the moral issues; we have to be willing to keep in mind that what we’re watching isn’t chess, and that there is a moral balance which must be weighed. And I simply can’t weigh Hussein’s desire to hold on to power as the moral equivalent to Clinton’s or GWB’s intent to remove him.
Clearly there is an argument to make about diplomatic strategies and the tactics of negotiation – and the need to leave an opponent an out in order to get them to comply. There are also counterarguments to that about the trustworthiness of the other side, and whether they are worth negotiating with at all.
Agreed that Abu Frank raises good points. On your earlier thread on the LAT op-ed, he asked:
You can believe that the US left Saddam little incentive to cooperate, and still hold that Saddam was the bad guy. If that’s your position, your attitude to Meisler’s article is not “Bullsh*t!” but “So what?”
My thoughts on Abu Frank’s question are narrower than the issues raised in the main post here. They focus on op-ed author Meisler’s effort to set the terms of the debate. He says “The United States corrupted the process of inspection.” This follows from to certain implicit premises:
1. That resolutions, sanctions, and inspections were like contracts entered in good faith;
2. That the terms of these contracts defined the limits of the conflict;
3. That respect of Iraqi sovereignty should have been the key US goal.
1. There is overwhelming evidence that the Ba’athists never had any good-faith intention of honoring the letter or the sprit of the Gulf War armistice, and from the onset, they never did. This pattern of behavior preceded most of the American actions that Meisler cited. It extended beyond Ba’athist non-compliance on WMDs.
2. There were always issues beyond whether America provided the Ba’athists with enough carrots or too many sticks. Examples? Try Arabs, Marsh, or al-Islam, Ansar, or Nidal, Abu.
3. Meisler’s faith in the primacy of national sovereignty doesn’t do as well when put out in the open. Meisler may live in a nice neighborhood with decent neighbors, where a 9-1-1 call brings help quickly. The other 9-11 reminded some of us not to apply this analogy too broadly.
Abu Frank’s “So what?” suggestion is unjustified because Meisler’s trying to rig the debate by hiding his premises. His op-ed keeps the focus on American misdeeds, as if that should be the main story. While misdirection from the Amazing Kreskin’s is entertaining, LAT subscribers would do well to keep phrases like industrial shredder and Yusef Ramzi in mind as they read their paper.
AMac hits the nail on the head. Abu Frank puts all the onus on the US for the failure of the sanctions to cause Saddam to disarm. He states the US did not intend to end sanctions as long as Saddam was in power, implying the US did not act in good faith with the UN resolutions, but also assumes that Saddam would have reciprocated the US good faith gestures.
We know that Saddam did not. Therefore whatever the US incentive/nonincentive was is moot. Saddam had already chosen to violate the agreement and no amount of coersion on the U.S. behalf would have changed anything.
Noah Millman of Gideon’s Blog put it perfectly, I thought.
The chief neo-conservative insight in foreign policy is that the internal character of a regime determines its foreign policy
Yes. It is an insight that is usually overlooked in public dialogue.
Furthermore, the internal character of a regime often determines the response of its people to events – which is another really tragic truth here. My sense is that no one really realized just HOW brutalized Iraqis and Iraqi society were by the Hussein regime. It will take time for them to emerge from that but encouraging signs are already beginning to show, here and there.
We are only now coming to really understand the degree to which Saddam emulated Stalin, his hero, in creating paranoia, habitual lying (even to oneself) and a suppression of the most basic of human feelings among those who served close to him. It’s incredibly difficult to negotiate with those who not only are not engaging the negotiations in good faith, but who are also so very detached from any objective reality with regard to the consequences of actions.
Good catch, AL, to challenge this op ed.
A.L.
What was acceptable before 9/11/2001 was no longer acceptable afterwards.
The events of 9/11/2001 were Saddam’s death warrant.
It is as simple and as profound as that.
Robin Burk:
You wrote
My sense is that no one really realized just HOW brutalized Iraqis and Iraqi society were by the Hussein regime.
Sadly, the Western press did realize it and kept us in the dark to preserve their access. Kind of makes you wonder–
But if salt loses its savor with what will it be salted?
With kind words (for which I thank him), Armed Liberal drags the argument out to philosophical depths where I’m reluctant to venture; I’ll try to draw it back to the factual shallows.
One preliminary remark; if AL interprets “not the law or morality, just the power play” as advocating moral nihilism, or attributing it to Meisler, that was not my intention. On what the intention was, more later.
Now before AL vs myself, some words on AMac vs Meisler. Elsewhere AMac accuses Meisler of writing as though “the only actor with free will in this drama is the United States. . . [Saddam] had no choice, the (American) devil made [him] do it.” And it’s true that Meisler says little about Saddam’s actions or choices in this article. But in a 1998 article Meisler has Saddam provoking crises, raising the stakes, foolishly calling the US bluff. Has Meisler’s outlook changed between 98 and ’04? Has he forgotten now what he knew then, that Saddam has free will, that the US is not invariably responsible for everything? No, where they overlap (namely, in describing US policy) the two articles are fully consistent. The change is in topic: the 98 article is a broad situation appraisal, the 04 article focuses narrowly on overturning an article of the conventional wisdom, that Saddam “could have had sanctions relief at any time by giving up his weapons”
AMac now accuses Meisler of smuggling in premises such as the primacy of national sovereignty, in order to insinuate that American misdeeds should be the main story. No! In effect Meisler says “Here is a factual proposition, concerning US policy towards the sanctions, that should commend itself to you regardless of your position on (e.g.) national sovereignty; how it affects your position on (e.g.) US moral supremacy is up to you.”
In short, Meisler (in the current article) is narrowing the issue, and decoupling it as far as possible from other issues (both factual and moral — which closes off the “preliminary remark”). He’s “controlling the debate” not by “hiding his premises” but by choosing his topic. And I have reason to defend that strategy when he employs it, because it’s mine also.
“well, because of these psychological pressures, these social mechanisms or administrative structures, those patterns of internal rationalization and so on, what the perpetrators did is ‘understandable’.”
I can “understand” a rabid dog, I might even stipultate that its actions may beyond its
own control, however if I see one approaching me
and or my family, I will not hesitate to put a
bullet between its eyes.
Understanding can be taken to ridiculous extremes.
Thanks, Abu Frank (5:11 am). I’ll respond, but I hope not to draw the discussion too far afield from A.L.’s more philosophical points.
Contra your assertion, Meisler took the dreary, illiberal, American Devil party line. Hence this sentence, “The United States corrupted the process of inspection.” Perhaps you would have chosen a value-neutral word; Meisler didn’t. These aren’t value-neutral words either: mass graves, Qusay, 600 disappeared Kuwaiti POWs, Oil-for-Palaces, suicide-bomber bounties. Readers can link to the op-ed and judge for themselves.
That said, I largely agree with the proposition that the armistice terms would have been difficult or impossible to accomplish. Meisler is wrong in asserting that American misbehavior is at the root. The core problem is that it is impossible to know with reasonable certainty what is going on in a closed society. The current intelligence failure (WMD stockpiles that aren’t) is the latest of a string of such failures and surpises: 1991 ignorance of Ba’athist nuclear progress, 1995 ignorance of the success of Ba’athist deception programs, 1998 ignorance of anthrax stock destruction, 2002 ignorance of al Samoud missile program, 2003/04 ignorance of the location of billions of Saddam’s US dollars.
The point is not that knowledge was sometimes gained via UN inspections, at other times through Saddamite defectors, “national technical means,” or by luck. Instead, it’s that uncertainty remained until Iraq was overrun by US forces. That’s what established the ground truth.
Meisler is either stupid or coy not to make this point; he’s not stupid, and your cite of his earlier articles shows he’s not ignorant either.
So the right lesson isn’t about corrupted process, it’s about **the inherently uncertain and failure-prone nature of intelligence-gathering in dictatorships.** The Western Allies learned this lesson in 1945/46 in occupied Germany. We’ve largely forgotten, and alas, Meisler is an untrustworthy teacher.
Rectal-cranial inversion in progress.
“If you’re going to shoot, SHOOT! Don’t talk!” – Tuco in _The Good, the Bad and the Ugly_.
Saddam’s regime trained non-Iraqi terrorists to hijack airliners before 9/11 at a camp near Salman Pak, Iraq, which had been visited by UN arms inspectors looking for WMD. The 9/11 hijackers used techniques which were supiciously similar to those taught at Salman Pak.
Everything else is icing on the cake.
The Bush Administration hasn’t made this case for a whole bunch of reasons, rectal-cranial inversion (rci) included. IMO three factors here are more important than rci.
1) Bush is not paying much attention. His administration is rife with lack of supervision from the top. He sets general policy, makes the big decisions and doesn’t follow up with details like supervision.
2) Some of his people don’t want to go there because doing so would threaten them due to their past failures.
3) Power and influence within the Bush Administration is far more important to everyone there than anything pertaining to the outside world, given President’s failings in supervision and follow-up.
AMac:
The United States corrupted the process of inspection.
You’re hanging a lot on one sentence out of the whole article. You could equally read it as equivalent to the nearby sentences “U.N. inspections were undercut from the start by U.S. policy” and “Hussein never had much incentive to cooperate with the inspectors”. You’ve already pointed out that on your moralizing interpretation it doesn’t match Meisler’s ostensible premises (in a generally coherent article); together with the absence of moralizing elsewhere in the article, that makes a fair case that your interpretation is wrong. But in any case, I might be willing to let you have that one sentence, as long as I have the rest of the article.
the right lesson isn’t about corrupted process, it’s about **the inherently uncertain and failure-prone nature of intelligence-gathering in dictatorships.**
We should have a conversation about that at some suitable time; it might be more substantial than this one.
Well, since no one else wanted to touch it:
“I can “understand” a rabid dog, I might even stipultate that its actions may beyond its
own control, however if I see one approaching me
and or my family, I will not hesitate to put a
bullet between its eyes.
Lead is not a cure for rabies.
Or,
“But isn’t there a sense in which, as Primo Levi wrote, one must refuse to understand? Or one must say: each and all of the factors – social, psychological or whatever – that tempted or pressured you, they are understandable; still, you made a choice or choices which you should not have made and which others did not make – you crossed the line.
If I must refuse to understand evil, then how can I prevent evil things from happening?
Related to: Do all human beings have a capacity for good and for evil? That Eichmann sould bear the responsibility for his choices is rather unarguable. The question is whether he was unique in them; whether not all, but some — more that one, anyway — people would have made similar choices in his place; whether, should the conditions which influenced his choices arise again, someone else might choose similarly. If that is so, then it is the conditions which one must understand and seek prevent or to alter from re-occurance. If it is unique to Eichman alone, this descision, then all that is necessary is the belief that he or she or one or I is not Eichmann, and thus will never make Eichmann’s choice.
So, do all human beings have a capacity for good and evil?
Did Eichmann believe he was evil? That is to say, did Eichmann believe he could be Eichmann?
I have the feeling that I haven’t expressed myself very well, here. But then, I also have the feeling that Mr. Katzman would consider me an iditorian.
Armed Liberal:
It’s overdue to address your head posting.
If I understand right, you’re willing to concede that what Meisler says is more or less right, as far as it goes; but you think he was wrong to say it; alternatively, he shouldn’t have said it unless he said a bunch of other stuff at the same time; whether because it’s wrong to examine out just one thread without considering the broader context, or because a purely realpolitik discussion may dull our moral sensibility, or because understanding (comprehending) Saddam’s decision-making may seduce us into understanding (condoning) his decisions. [I shouldn’t have to guess at this, right? It should be clear from the post?]
One of AMac’s charges is somewhat similar, that Meisler should not have made the point he did make, without also making a certain other point. Maybe AMac’s reason gets closest to the real source of discomfort; that Meisler leaves the impression that American misdeeds are the main story, that American misbehaviour is at the root.
This IMO is almost entirely wrong. There’s room for broad synthetic treatments, and single-issue pieces, and everything in between. In Meisler’s case, a single-issue approach was highly appropriate: because attacking a well-entrenched article of the conventional wisdom, he needed to concentrate his fire to give his attack sufficient force; because that focus let him state his point not just with force but with nuance (pointing out ambiguities in the Administration’s position rather than exaggerating its intransigence); because the falsehood he refuted had some influence over events not only before the invasion but even now.
More generally, the single-issue approach has a lot going for it.
* It’s hard to have a productive discussion on a broad topic with someone of very different views. Issue links to issue to question of evidence to factual judgement to value judgement, in a conversation that’s every ramifying but never progresses. A broad range of discussants, a broad topic, or a productive discussion — pick any two.
Against demands that Meisler broaden his focus in the interests of balance or the broader view or moral clarity or whatever:
* He’s already provided the most appropriate kind of balance for his topic, taking care not to overstate his point but pointing to the ambiguities in the administration’s position and the limited period within which it was operative.
* There is no single “broader context”; that depends on the reader’s interests. For AMac apparently the “broader context” is the moral balance between Bush and Saddam; for another person it might be pre-war allied intelligence performance, or the effectiveness of sanctions as a policy instrument, or whatever.
* What the single point implies in the broader context (whatever that is) depends on the other beliefs judgements values of the reader. AMac (surely) and AL (probably) see Meisler’s article as casting a moral slur on the US. But Pouncer, for one, in the previous discussion, sees it otherwise; he sees US behaviour as described by Meisler as fully appropriate; and there’s reason to believe that many of his compatriots would judge likewise.
* While understanding the actions of wicked persons may have its dangers, the dangers cited arise mostly from understanding via empathy. That’s not in point here; we’re dealing here with reconstructing strategic calculations. It’s not “How could he bring himself to do that?” but “How did he figure that course was in his best interest?”
* Further to the above, refusing to understand the strategic behaviour of your adversaries isn’t really an option.
* To some extent, I think, AL and AMac are reacting to straw men in their own minds. They think of various tenets that might perhaps by threatened by Meisler’s thesis; they reassure themselves that some at least are still sound; they feel that they’ve saved themselves from Meisler when really it’s from their own fleeting anxieties.
The way to react to Meisler (if you allow that he does make out his point as far as it goes) isn’t to try and guess which pillar of your faith he’s attempting to undermine, and then rush to shore it up. His point is a narrow one, and there’s a long path from it to any broad conclusion. The right reaction is to identify which of your beliefs were supported by the proposition that Meisler refuted, and then to reassess them. Which beliefs are affected, and how much difference the reassessment makes, depend on the individual.
[I admit to a suspicion that in meditating on Fackenheim and Geras, AL is subconsciously postponing the more mundane task of reassessing his position in the light of new evidence (or old evidence re-presented).]
More concretely: I take Meisler to refute the influential falsehood, that “Saddam could have obtained sanctions relief at any time by giving up his weapons”. How is that falsehood influential? Currently you see it used to support such propositions as that Saddam believed he had WMDs and that he deliberately deceived the West into believing that he had WMDs. It’s a large part of the case for those propositions, so refuting it seriously undermines them. It also feeds into somewhat broarder propositions such as “Everyone believed Saddam had WMDs” or “Under the circumstances, Western intelligence performed well”; but it’s a much smaller part of the story there, and for many people it won’t make much difference to their overall assessment. It’s an even smaller part for even broader propositions such as “The Iraq War was justly fought” or “Tyrants must be preempted”.
In short: Meisler has clarified one small piece of a large puzzle (or collection of interlocking puzzles); the appropriate response is not to denounce him for “idiocy” or bad faith, but to accept his contribution, reassess your own positions, thank him, and move on.
Abu, you speak and think well.
I have learned, in following this thread faithfully for 48 hours.
Yet, the assertion: “Saddam could have obtained sanctions relief at any time by giving up his weapons” contains within it yet many linked assumptions, which in real-life show it could be considered as ‘true’ or as ‘false’, and is of little value in ascertaining the bigger picture.
To wit: “Saddam could have obtained sanctions relief at any time by somehow finding the courage within him to renounce years of ingrained behaviour”, or
“Saddam could have had sanctions relief by stepping outside Arab-cultural role-expectations and abdicating completely his position as tyrant-leader of Iraq.”
For Saddam to BE Saddam, he could never have been ANY of the above-mentioned people, but to ascribe Saddam’s choices to American policy, and pitch Saddam’s actions as if they were only couched in the matrix of America’s efforts vis-a-vis Iraq, seems like a subtle effort to vilify America when Saddam should be acknowledged as the key mover in Iraq.
Abu Frank,
Thanks for the thoughtful responses, to me (8:06am) and A.L. (10:05am). I’ll try to write more carefully, as the psychoanalysis and snide remarks in your posts (mild, but unusual for you) show that I’ve written in a way that is open to misinterpretation.
I agree with you and Meisler that:
–“Know thy enemy” is excellent advice.
–Using a reductionist approach of restricting inquiry to a few narrow points is an excellent way to analyze complex problems.
–Meisler’s core insights on the US role in the failure of the inspection regimes strikes me as important, insightful and fundamentally correct.
To which I would add:
–The difference between “understand the difficulties your enemy has” and “empathize with your supposed enemy” isn’t as great as it might be. Why do they hate us?” is either insightful or idiotic, depending on the, er, context of the question.
–Meisler’s key conclusion: the U.S. corrupted the inspections process. Meisler wrote that sentence, even if you (8:06am) minimize it. It strikes me as naive or disingenuous to thusly dismiss the writer’s agenda–this is an op-ed piece, designed to persuade.
–The meanings of Meisler’s analysis must depend on the roads not taken. As above, a narrowed focus is useful, but informed judgements aren’t made in a vacuum. Running through the op-ed is Meisler’s belief that inspections could have worked but for the US actions he describes.
–Did Meisler write this piece for some reason other than to expose the US’ corrupting influence? And what US course of action 1991-2003 would would have likely led to a better outcome than what we currently face?
–It seems to me that Meisler views world affairs through the lens of contract law. Similar views are widely held in Europe and on the American left. A quote from yesterday’s Financial Times, picked up by Instapundit: “’our great problem as Europeans is that we want to exit from history. Sometime after 1989, we developed the belief that barbarism could be refuted intellectually.’” Meisler stands squarely within this tradition of confronting, (or not confronting) barbarism exclusively by legalistic and intellectual means. 1938 and 1939 annals of the League of Nations are filled with earnest speeches. None of them resulted, or could have resulted, in actions that addressed the core problems of that era. Despite his perceptive telling of the story of sanctions, Meisler, again, is a poor teacher concerning the larger questions at stake here.
I haven’t jumped in here, simply because much of what I’d say is being said better by AMac…
A.L.
“Lead is not a cure for rabies.”
Two immediate responses:
[1] Neither is intellectual discussion or contract law.
[2] Yes it is, and a rather certain one at that. The “lead cure” is also a completely effective method of stopping the disease’s spread to others from the animal infected with it. Which is the principal threat of rabies.
Of course, the concept of “threat” has to be on your radar screen in the first place, in order for this to occur to you.
obliw:
If you have the ability to even consider that you may lumped in with the “Idiotarians”, you are, by definition, not one. You may hold opinions that are held by other Idiotarians, but you seem to exhibit an ability to change your mind when confronted by messy facts.
Joe: I agree- the “lead (Pb) cure” has prevented the spread of many “threats”.
AMac:
psychoanalysis . . . in your posts
Fair comment; psychoanalysis in debate is usually irritating and counterproductive, and that probably applies here.
I agree with you and Meisler [about various things]
At this point, I’ve got most of what I wanted going in.
Did Meisler write this piece for some reason other than to expose the US’ corrupting influence?
His immediate purpose I take it was to assert what in fact he did assert; that the US undermined the inspection process. As for broader purposes, the beginning of his article gives one strong hint; to improve understanding of Saddam’s non-cooperation, to undercut some of the bad inferences that people are currently basing on that. The end of the article gives a slighter hint at a broader purpose again; to suggest (not establish) that regardless of the rhetoric du jour, this was always about regime change not WMD.
It seems to me that Meisler views world affairs through the lens of contract law.
I’m not sure that Meisler would agree with that exact formulation, but I think you are getting at one key difference between Meisler’s broader outlook and yours.
. . . .
One of my main purposes going in was to affirm that Meisler’s case deserved to be addressed on its merits, rather than dismissed with abuse and “psychoanalysis”. I guess you’ve come most of the way toward that. As for the merits, we seem to be agreed that they’re substantial, too great for direct refutation. That being so, the most convincing response from the hawk side might be “embrace and extend”; you and AL and Sharps Shooter have already mentioned some of the materials that might be used for that. For me, if you do that consistent with the truth in Meisler’s article, I’d count it as a win, however dissimilar your broader conclusions from Meisler’s.
Good post, Abu Frank (1:44am). At the end, we still disagree about a lot, but we are able to agree to build cases based on facts-as-they-are. In the knowledge that, as facts emerge, they won’t consistently favor any one pre-conceived notion.
[Meisler’s] immediate purpose I take it was to assert … that the US undermined the inspection process.
…which he showed well, quoting Clinton and Bush officials. His next article might share his vision of what uncorrupted inspections would have looked like…though I doubt that his tastes will run in the direction of that fool’s errand.
…[and that] this was always about regime change not WMD.
Wide agreement on that point with this audience, I expect.
One of my main purposes going in was to affirm that Meisler’s case deserved to be addressed on its merits, rather than dismissed with abuse and “psychoanalysis”. I guess you’ve come most of the way toward that.
Um, thanks for the backhanded compliments, I guess. More substantively, the shortcoming in Meisler’s excellent analysis remains the incomplete and misleading context that he provides for his readers. “Embrace and extend” is, indeed, a good prescription.
On reflection, seeing this piece in the LAT rankled me in a way that it wouldn’t have, had it appeared in an outlet that is serious about portraying multiple aspects of complex issues. That’s a useful insight that comes from this debate, but one best held for another day.
Keeping in mind that the below is merely a metaphor, rather than a strict allegory:
I cannot argue against the supposition that shooting a rabid dog eliminates a present threat, and in that sense solves the problem.
But if I wish to do more than that, if I wish to eliminate the disease from a animal population, I have to do more that to shoot the afflicted. I have to understand the cause of the disease, its mechanisms of transmission, and set up preventative measures. Without knowing such things, the threat of rabies could strike again at any time, and I might not be able to get my gun quick enough. Best, of course, would be to discover, if I can, an innoculant. That I would call a cure.
I can cure mad cow disease by killing entire herds of potentially afflicted cattle, but I would fain choose other methods, if at all possible, as wholesale slaughter many thousands of almost certainly uninfected cattle strikes me as wasteful, pitiful, and tragic.
I am in no way arguing that one should not shoot the dog because the dog is diseased and therefore unccountable for his actions; such a position is truely idiotic.
obliw,
A quick thought as this thread’s getting “stale”.
Using analogies to think constructively about the “War on Terror” (or “Present Difficulties”) is often more difficult than it appears.
For example, what does “exterminating a rabid dog” map to in the real world? Shooting likely terrorists on the battlefield? Seizing US-citizen dirty-bomb suspects at American airports? Countering Qutbist ideas with Liberal Democratic ones? Killing every last person of an enemy polity and salting their fields, as Rome did to Carthage?
More useful, perhaps, to state propositions without metaphor.
BTW, I’ve enjoyed thinking about the points you’ve raised here.