There’s a massive amount of crazy talk about ‘proportionality’ right now, centering on criticism of Israel for their bombardment and invasion of Gaza.
I instinctively was quizzical when the issues was first raised, and want to take a few moments to talk it through and suggest why I think it’s an absurd notion – as it is frequently misused in the blogs and newspapers. International law seems pretty clear on it (and shockingly reasonable).
Proportionality also came up during the Iraq war when the issue of Iraqi dead vs. US dead in the 9/11 attacks was raised.
Okay, Mr. Bush…NOW are we even for 9/11? Or whatever reason you went into Iraq?
And somehow it felt very Old Testament to me; kind of well, you killed my brother, raped my sister, and stole 50 sheep. So I’ll kill your brother, rape your sister, and steal 50 sheep and we’ll call it even.
And as I read the commentators talking about Israel and Gaza – here’s Dennis Kucinich:
[The Israeli attacks] do, however, “increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of conflict,” because they are a vastly disproportionate response to the provocation, and because the Palestinian population is suffering from those military attacks in numbers far exceeding Israeli losses in life and property.
So, in essence, Israel is allowed to kill as many Palestinians as Palestine kills Israelis. With all due respect to Cong. Kucinich, that’s nuts.
Look, if someone attacks my wife and I with a knife, and she’s armed with a shotgun – she’s not obligated to put the shotgun down and go get a knife. A threshold of deadly force allows me to use whatever force is necessary and available to stop the threat (i.e. if she could have stopped the threat with a Taser, but didn’t have one, she’s not a bad person).
Actual international law is clear in saying pretty much the same thing.
When international legal experts use the term “disproportionate use of force,” they have a very precise meaning in mind. As the President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Rosalyn Higgins, has noted, proportionality “cannot be in relation to any specific prior injury – it has to be in relation to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression.” In other words, if a state, like Israel, is facing aggression, then proportionality addresses whether force was specifically used by Israel to bring an end to the armed attack against it. By implication, force becomes excessive if it is employed for another purpose, like causing unnecessary harm to civilians. The pivotal factor determining whether force is excessive is the intent of the military commander. In particular, one has to assess what was the commander’s intent regarding collateral civilian damage.
So we have three questions to ask when judging this: Is it in response to a deadly threat? Yes, even though folks like Glenn Greenwald seem to think that letting Hamas kill a few Israeli citizens a month is kind of a Jizyah. Is it specifically intended to end the threat while taking reasonable steps to minimize civilian casualties? Yes, again. And is it likely to end the threat? Here we move into more treacherous ground.
Because in reality, the support for Hamas, and Hamas-like positions in Gaza is deep and wide, based both in Hamas’ demonstrated willingness to brutally kill anyone who doesn’t support their positions and in the generation-long indoctrination of Palestinian youth that we’ve funded and permitted to happen.
So can Israel accomplish anything with this attack? Because if not, morally, it is certainly questionable.
Marc Lynch raises these questions in a post at his home at the excellent new Foreign Policy blog. (My goal for Winds, by the way, is to be a single-A or double-A farm team for sites like FP)
I spent the morning at a lecture organized by GWU’s outstanding Homeland Security Policy Institute’s Ambassador’s Roundtable Series featuring Israel’s Ambassador to the United States Sallai Meridor. It was a profoundly dismaying experience. Because if Ambassador Meridor is taken at his word, then Israel has no strategy in Gaza.
On the other hand, there’s this fascinating post over at Kings of War:
Following a link of a KOW reader teegeegeepea I ended up on his rather interesting blog Entitled to an Opinion where he has posted a fascinating presentation by an Israeli intelligence scholar-practitioner Isaac Ben-Israel Fighting New Terror–Theory and Israeli Experience. I think it’s a better guide to Israeli strategy in Gaza than anything else that I’ve seen lately. The gist of it is this:
In general, the underlying idea is: each system has its own critical point. If I know where it is, I hit this point and destroy the whole system. If I do not know this, I will have to go on hitting different components of the system until I accidentally hit the critical point. The more components I damage, even without hitting the critical point, the closer is the moment when the system disintegrates.
And there is a certain connection between “q” – which is the percentage of component interconnection – and “Q” which describes the probability of the whole system collapse.
In reality, my own belief is close to this. That the intention is to degrade Hamas effectiveness – military and other – by hitting as many high-value nodes as possible.
What effect will that have? I’ll argue, simply, that the belief is that given time it is likely that Hamas will collapse. And so the issue becomes kicking the can far enough down the road to see if Hamas will simply collapse.
I’m not sure that’s probable – possible, certainly.
And so we have a hard question of moral calculus , whether this kind of limited action with the toll it will take (of Palestinians as well as of Israeli soldiers) is worth the marginal improvement in conditions and the possibility Hamas will collapse down the road. It’s not a simple question.
And asking it is something that Israel has to do, because – to go back to my homely analogy – the fact that my wife has a shotgun in a confrontation with a man with a knife, even if he is clearly the aggressor and in the wrong, places a especial obligation on her to do everything reasonably in her power to keep from having to shoot him.
I am by now means an expert on Israeli history, arms etc; but I think Glenn Greenwald actually makes a pretty valid point when he says that Israel has a right to protect themselves (in exactly the way they have)…. but it’s not going to accomplish anything.
Look at Lebanon, the mission to destroy Hezbollah has actually made them more powerful, better armed, with more political power inside the Lebanon government.
I’m not sure what Israel can do (and to be honest, I’m not exactly sure what they’re doing right now). I don’t think we’ll really know how moral/successful they are until we see what’s accomplished, and the damage done to reach that accomplishment.
If Hamas is not critically (and irreparably) damaged in the process, the whole operation is probably a loss.
“And there is a certain connection between “q” – which is the percentage of component interconnection – and “Q” which describes the probability of the whole system collapse.”
This theory is correct in as far as it goes, but it’s not like we are blowing up buildings. Hamas is an organic institution capable of growing or rebuilding. This introduces a time component to the equation based on the ability of the system to repair itself.
So if we assume that r is the percentage of component integration that can be built in time t, and d is the degredation of the system in time t, then:
q1 + r – d = q2
If d <= r, then the probablity of collapse remains low. And I don't think we should neglect what 'collapse' actually constitutes. A collapse here means a collapse of will - of the desire to continue fighting. How much damage would it take to get Hamas to contemplate peace? This is the problem with the theory of limited warfare. Typically a superior force engaging in limited warfare does not have the will the carry on until the system fully collapses. Instead, the superior force ends up committing the minimal possible force, such that d < r. It then begins a Claustwitzian escalation of force, but instead of carrying this escalation through to victory it tends to continue it only until d is just barely larger than r. At that point, it notices the degredation in q and the resulting degradation in the capabilities of the opponent and acts as if this is victory in and of itself. Limited warfare is based on the theory that opponents can be 'chastened' into accepting the status quo ante bellum. But human emotions are unpredictable and it is very difficult to intimidate an opponnent into changing their mode of behavior. When intimidated, humans tend to act 'irrationally'. A rather large percentage of people don't scare easily. Instead, they typically get angry, harbor grudges, and plot vengeance. So when d is withdrawn, the effect of r takes over again, and q begins to reconstitute. Often the cycle just keeps repeating. In normal Clauswitzian escalation there is an expected hardening of the two sides where with each escalation they are willing to throw a greater and greater percentage of their resources into the conflict and to perpetrate greater and greater violence against the enemy. But 'terror wars' don't appear to work that way. The intensity of the warfare is generally so low that the superior side rarely becomes hardened. And on the side of the terrorists, by definition, the strategy of terrorism is based on jumping right to the end of the normal Claustwitzian escalation of war in an attempt to shock and terrify the foe with displays of the depth of your commitment to victory. Of course, terrorism fails to work for much the same reasons that limited warfare fails to work - people are hard to scare, act unpredictably when you try to inimidate them, and terror simply doesn't do enough damage to overwhelm a societies ability to repair itself.
Hmm… that was a much longer post that appears to have been cut off.
And I don’t really feel like rewriting it.
The idea that Hamas is the ultimate problem is the ultimate flaw in the strategy. Witness their democratic election by the Palestinian people.
If we were invaded and the enemy concentrated on taking out key Democrats and DNC bases of power, how effective would that be?
Israel’s major misconception is that they are fighting terrorist organizations as though they were somehow separate from the Palestinian and Arab cultures as a whole. Hezbollah was a foriegn entity in Lebanon and Israel failed at this objective abysmally. Why should they believe it will work against the indigenous Hamas?
Mark B, isn’t Hezbollah uninvolved because it is currently rebuilding and consolidating its power from the previous conflict? Maybe this is a bit of a whack-the-mole strategy, but when surrounded by hostile forces, it may be important to keep them off balance.
Again, at this point, I would prefer the U.S. have as little to do with the Israel-Gaza-West Bank situation as possible.
Clearly, Hamas has been sending hundreds of rockets. That MUST be responded to.
On the other hand, “as is point out here”:http://ta-nehisicoates.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/01/flawed_analogy.php
_Israel controls the entrances and exits, as well as access to necessities such as power and water. Mexico has not spent the last three or more years under an American aerial and sea blockade. Moreover, Israel’s impressive victory in the Six-Day War turned the West Bank and Gaza into one ethnic unit. In the peace agreement signed by Egypt and Israel in 1979, the Gaza Strip remained in Israel’s hands. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, signed in September 1993, determined that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are one political entity. This means that as long as the West Bank is under Israeli occupation, so too is Gaza._
Now – it makes NO SENSE that the Gaza Strip and Gaza should be considered as one unit, you can’t really have two separate land areas, be considered one country.
Much better then, to have full demarcation of what is Palestinian land area – and I think, two “countries” – and Israel land areas. Without the Israeli blockades. And with settlers removed.
Then – if Hamas continues to send rockets – the “what if Mexico send rockets into El Paso?” becomes a correct analogy.
Also here –
“We also frequently hear the claim – what would America do if it came under rocket fire from Canada or Mexico? Again, there can be no justification for rockets targeting Israel’s south, and of course America would respond if it were under fire from Canada or Mexico. But let’s at least complete the analogy and here is that bigger picture. Gaza constitutes under 6 percent of the ’67 territory in which a Palestinian state is supposed to be created (Gaza, West Bank, Palestinian East Jerusalem), about 94 percent remains under occupation so under our scenario 94 percent of Canada or Mexico would have remained under a 40 plus year American occupation with settlements and roadblocks, and with the “liberated” 6 percent still under siege. Now I like the Mexicans and Canadians as much as the next person but is it totally inconceivable that under such circumstances some of them would have formed hardline armed groups that would even become very popular and use that 6 percent of territory to launch attacks against America? I will leave it to your imagination. ”
On the other hand, the international response of ‘OUTRAGE’ is completely and totally hypocritical.
Where was the outrage when Hamas basically declared war on Fatah, killing their way through the Fatah ranks? Lots of people died. The outrage? None.
Where was the outrage, for the last year, as rockets rained down on Israel? The outrage? None.
At some point also, one would think, the Palestinians would realized they are being used like a trick, by Syria, Iran, others in the Arab world, to provide money to Hamas and others, to simply COMPLICATE life for the Palestinians. These countries don’t really care about the Palestinians. But they’ll give them money, and encouragement, to fight and die, against Israel.
If you’re interested in this phenomenon, you might do well to examine the end of World War II in the Pacific theater. Certainly there was a nuclear weapon or two involved (in fact, precisely two), but it’s interesting to see how the various Japanese leaders rated American military threats and their own domestic problems.
It would be incorrect to say that the Japanese surrendered because of an incipient civilian rebellion. On the other hand, it would be totally correct to say that worries about possible domestic rebellion (due to food shortages) absolutely informed the Japanese leadership that was responsible for the decision to surrender.
In short, “cause the enemy as many problems as you possibly can” is a valid strategy. Their strategic outlook may not match what you think their strategic outlook should be. Attempting to strike a critical point precisely won’t work if your opponent doesn’t consider that point critical. (“Oh no, we’re taking civilian casualties! Make sure the cameras are rolling.”) But conversely, the opposition may consider certain points critical that you’re completely overlooking.
“And with settlers removed.”
With Gaza, that was done. Israel forcibly moved out its own people.
The rockets didn’t stop. The preparations for war didn’t stop.
The problem with the insistance that Israel make concessions is that Israel has never gained anything from concessions of any sort. Gaza can be viewed as an experiment. Clearly, the experiment has failed.
There was only one chance at peace in the middle east. In the mid-90’s the Palestinian people had become wearied of war, of strife, and of the failed promises of the militants. Israel and Palestine were increasingly acting like neighbors and were being united by economic ties. Eventually, this would have been the basis of a lasting solution. Clinton destroyed that chance when he helped enable Yassir Arafat return to Palestine. The Clinton legacy for me will always include a barefoot Albright running after that murderous syphalletic boy bugger and begging him to sign a peace treaty, and him refusing her and declaring war. The Clinton legacy is installing a terrorist as head of state, and turning over the schools, media, and police of Palestine to a terrorist.
And I thought Egypt controls the checkpoints on their borders with Gaza…
Marc
A.L.,
Well, there is control and access from the Egypt side, and then control and access from the Gaza side.
You may be right – Israel USED to control all checkpoints, on the Gaza side – but I think that has changed in the last few years. Up to recently, in the agreements, Israel had control from the Gaza side. I don’t think the agreements have changed, but the situation on the ground may have changed.
Clearly, from the Egyptian side, they aren’t letting through Palestinians now.
I still believe Israel patrols and controls the coastline.
Which only leaves, really, as I understand it, the “offical” main paved crossing from Egypt to Gaza, which, on the Gaza side – AT ONE POINT, was controlled by Israel as well.
I wouldn’t mind some more information on this, actually. Educate me!
Celebrim,
However much of your comment is true/untrue – all of it could be true – doesn’t actually refute the point the “facts on the ground” of what I pointed to in my comment. Is it true that Israel controls 94% of what “should” be a Palestinian state?
Another thing – in the hypocrisy of the Arab states towards Israel – if the concern for the “Palestinian people” were so great, then a LOT more pressure would be put on Jordan – which I believe has been repressing the majority Palestinian population for quite awhile.
That’s another reason why I consider the situation so intractable. The Palestinian uprising are USEFUL IDIOTS to the other Arab states.
In that sense, I’m interested in Israel protecting itself, but in such a way as to not be the “villain of the piece”, when by any neutral standard, the arab elite in other countries treat their internal populations (or in the case of Jordan, Palestinian populations) as bad or worse, with no hint of protest.
I think there are three intertwined issues here, the moral, the legal and the strategic.
The moral we have the least use for unless we recognize some universal morality. It might be nice to lecture the Jews and the Muslims on Catholic Just War theory, but would that be useful or comedic. Israel, through its courts, has developed proportionality doctrines by which perhaps it should be judged. I am sure Hamas has given serious thought to these issues as well.
The legal is being rendered absurd by the internationalist, who are playing games with terminalogy, asserting certainty when international law is vague, and taking inconsistent positions to soot the moment. In reality, the legal is only relevant because it is the strategy of one party.
The strategic is murky. We don’t *know* Israel’s strategy. My own view is that Israel has minimalistic strategic objectives that it probably has already achieved, major objectives that it would like to achieve, but which are doubtful and objectives that it keeps to itself. My suspicion is that Fatah plays into these undisclosed objectives, but disclosing them would ruin them.
_”Mark B, isn’t Hezbollah uninvolved because it is currently rebuilding and consolidating its power from the previous conflict?”_
Hezbollah is uninvolved because they have no horse in this race. As much as they hate Israel (and they do), they really are a Lebanese organization. There is no upside in using their resources to help Hamas, and the downside is risking their position in Lebanon via internal or external forces.
_”Maybe this is a bit of a whack-the-mole strategy, but when surrounded by hostile forces, it may be important to keep them off balance.”_
If so, i think there are better options. Its the same problem as the Lebanon debacle. After your target list is exhausted, what do you do? And why not just hit your target list if that is your goal? Ground troops are just essentially smashing the ants that come out of the hive. The opportunity cost is high, Israel pays a heavy price every time a tank shell inevitably levels a room full of school kids being used as human shields.
_”We don’t know Israel’s strategy.”_
Assuming they have one that is viable, which given Olmert’s history i tend to doubt. This is exactly like the Lebanon war, the idea that if you smack the enemy around enough he will change his ways. It emboldens him in the long run. Divisiveness that hurts the enemys will to fight wins wars. Hamas was built to fight just the kind of fight they are in now, they can’t lose it, and even if they did it wouldnt stop the next group from taking their place.
The problem w/ the KOW scenario is how you destroy the nodes. If you use “cherry” teams inside Gaza you are always open to the Blackhawk Down Scenario if it goes bad. Extracting 150 rangers is easier than a 4 or 5 man squad when you’re prepared to do a rescue. Hellfire from a drone works as well. The downside to both is that they are pretty useless against armories and arsenals. That leaves the air attack.
It is very good against the fixed target/goal of tactical significance(leaders/rockets but not so much the strategic. You achieve the destruction of the target but unlike Nazi Germany or Britain Gaza isn’t big enough to move the noncombatants away from the battlefield(if Krauthammer is to be believed the Israelis called the families living next to arsenals and told them to move but where became the problem; witness the UN school). Then there is the serious question of would Hamas let its civilian population move anyway.
From a strategic point of view the bombings just provided more recruits and only eliminated so many high profile leaders.
The solution I think that would have been better would be to announce the resumption of assassination by drone or cherry activity, reoccupy land in Gaza proper to take away missile launching points and depth on the Egyptian/Gaza border to eliminate the tunnel resupply operation. To be a sitting target of low opportunity and high loss when it occurs is unfortunately part of a soldiers life but it puts the burden of action on Hamas while minimizing the opportunity to help recruiting for Hamas.
If the problem is that Israeli military force is insufficient to alter the situation, but HAMAS is still attacking Israel with rockets, isn’t that an argument for more force being legally required of Israel?
As of 2001, Israel controlled the Rafah border crossing, where Gaza looks like it meets the Egyptian Sinai. There were two (eastbound) exits after Israeli border control, one which went south right along the border fence until turning east at the corner of the Strip. The other went into Gaza, and I believe that there were Palestinian border formalities if you went in that direction. On the Jordanian border, the Israeli border guards looked through a one-way mirror over the shoulders of Palestinian border guards, for Palestinians entering via the Allenby Bridge. At Rafah, the Israeli presence was more overt.
There was also, of course, an Egyptian border facility on the other side.
There was a Palestinian attack on the Israeli facility in 2002 (2003?). I can’t imagine that with the increase in violence starting in 2001 the Israelis are less involved in the border than they used to be.
What do you make of this? I’m not worried about what the world thinks becasue they really don’t care about Israel. But this certainly blows up whatever strategy the Israeli’s have because preventing new recruits should have been part of it.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5470047.ece
From Wikipedia:
Marc
The other big problem with the Israeli strategy is that Hamas is directed from Damascus, so eliminating the actual controllers isnt possible. What that means is that when the local rocket guru gets blown up, his apprentice just picks up his cell phone and calls the boss in Syria to find out where to pick up the rockets. This weapons system is so simplistic the ‘node’ idea just isnt very useful.
As far as the blockade, Israel is in a no-win situation. Hamas will clearly bring in as many weapons as it can given the opportunity (and mind you missiles have rained down on Israel during the entire period in question), so opening Gaza will result in more weapons being brought to bear. There is no rational way to believe otherwise, Hamas says as much. Hamas also continues to hold an Israeli soldier hostage, something Israelis take deadly serious. If you look at the way Egypt in particular lines up on this, NOBODY trusts Hamas and the conventional wisdom seems to be that until they are pushed from power no larger settlement is possible.
The question is Mark, how do you pull them from power? Will dropping bombs eventually pull them from power? Maybe (if there’s like a hundred left and they can’t consolidate anymore). But anytime you drop a bomb and accidently kill a young child, you’re going to have a father, or a brother or uncle or cousin who’s going to want revenge, and will go to Hamas in order to fight for it.
So even though Hamas technically has less governing power, it’s now grown in local support.
It seems like a catch-22 to me. Don’t kill them, they attack unhindered. Kill them, and that just rallies their local base. Give concessions, and they attack harder. Get tougher on sanctions, and you rally their public.
It’s a mess.
That pretty much sums it up. I’m not against going after Hamas, but i do prefer that its done with at least the _possibility_ of creating a lasting impact. I don’t have any faith that that is the case with Olmert’s administration or this plan.
I think the Israeli’s best results have always come with the stick/carrot approach. So the real problem is Palestinian support for the destruction of Israel. They have nothing to lose, so why not? You give them something, and show them that supporting Hamas takes that away, and then i think you have leverage, and a real alternative to Hamas and their ilk.
Ironically it was Sharon that pushed that agenda. Losing him at a critical time was a tragedy.
In general, the underlying idea is: each system has its own critical point. If I know where it is, I hit this point and destroy the whole system. If I do not know this, I will have to go on hitting different components of the system until I accidentally hit the critical point.
My grandfather, who worked for army intelligence in the Irish army under Michael Collins, used to say the same thing.
Isaac Ben-Israel’s Fighting New Terror–Theory and Israeli Experience has a lot of great info – thanks for the link.
But I’m wondering, if each system has its own critical point, if hitting that point would bring the entire enemy infrastructure down, AND if you’re not currently in an emergency situation in which you’d have to strike blindly at non-critical points just to survive, why not wait until you’ve gathered enough info to make a cheap, quick, and critical blow? Why waste time, money and perhaps lives flailing away at the ‘different components?’
oops – that first paragraph should be italicized, since it’s a quote
” There will never be peace until they love their children as much as they hate us” Golda Mayer
I think the Israelis wanted, to begin with, an international monitoring force with actual power to enforce
an arms embargo and then they would allow more aid to enter Gaza from THIER border crossings.
By the way, did the Arab/Moslem world protest the genocide in Darfur?
Marc, thank you for updating my knowledge about Rafah. I note that the same article states that
AFAICT, there is no way to re-open the crossing (at least, for entry into Gaza) without Israeli acquiescence.
AJL – why would that be? I can’t imagine that the Egyptians are taking orders from Jerusalem. I can imagine that the Egyptians are fed up with Hamas and the Palestinians are are willing to do only the minimum to assist them.
Marc
Marc,
Thanks for the pointer. To answer your question to AJL, if you read further in that article,
_The Rafah crossing was opened on 25 November 2005 and operated nearly daily until 25 June 2006.[1] Since that time it has been closed by Israel on 86% of days due to security reasons.[1] It was not opened for the export of goods.[1] In June 2007, the crossing was closed entirely after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
The EU Ambassador to Israel said that EUBAM monitors could not return to man the crossing because the legal basis for EUBAM – the November 2005 agreement on movement and access – specified that the terminal was to be manned by the Fatah-aligned Force 17, who were no longer there.[2]_
Now, that was as of 2007 – in 2008 –
_On January 23, 2008, masked gunmen demolished the wall, that Hamas-linked militants had apparently weakened in 2007,[3] dividing the Egyptian and Palestinian portions of Rafah,[citation needed] and several hundred thousand Gazans entered Egypt, most of them to purchase food and supplies.[3] _
So, it’s hard to tell what the status is, of the crossing now, from Wikipedia. The Egyptians still control the Egyptian side, Israel still has the potential to control the crossing, but perhaps Force 17 made “control” on the Gaza side, of this one crossing, worthless?
Nevertheless – obviously, Hamas isn’t particularly caring about the fate of their people, in a multitude of ways. At the same time, Israel is still occupying Gaza – back to that 94% conrol of land figure above.
Which makes for an intractable situation, which the U.S. should remove itself from, until the lines of control are clearly demarcated.
Answer to the question –
“There is no more blockade on the Gaza side – or at least it is, in the main, ruined”:http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1201070777886&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
If this article is correct.
_If the problem is that Israeli military force is insufficient to alter the situation, but HAMAS is still attacking Israel with rockets, isn’t that an argument for more force being legally required of Israel?_
Sure. But how much? What would it accomplish? At what cost? Even a perfectly executed plan is going to have ‘collateral damage’. It makes sense to compare the amount of probable damage to the possibility of success.
For example: I have a weapon that could guarantee an end to rocket fire. It’s simple really, one tactical nuke and the whole affair is an afterthought. Is that a moral decision? Why or why not?
I agree that Israel has tried hard to limit collateral damage, but they have not been very helpful with humanitarian aid, and limiting refugee damage.
To what degree should they be? To what extent should any country be held responsible for the suffering of their enemies, particularly when that enemy attacked them?
Is every citizen of Palestine necessarily an enemy? Are crying babies responsible for setting rockets? According to the Geneva convention, no.
Via “Wiki”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_on_humanitarian_workers
bq. The legal basis for protection of humanitarian workers in conflicts is contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the related Protocol of 1977. These treaties describe the category of civilian non-combatant and outline the rights and obligations of non-combatants during conflict. These rights include the right to be treated humanely; to have access to food, water, shelter, medical treatment, and communications; to be free from violence to life and person, hostage taking, and humiliating or degrading treatment; and the prohibition against collective punishment or imprisonment. Civilian non-combatants include local citizens and nationals of countries that are not party to the conflict.
bq. While the Geneva Conventions guarantee protection for humanitarian workers, they do not guarantee access of humanitarian workers to affected areas: governments or occupying forces may, if they wish, ban a relief agency from working in their area.
Jeff, I think you’re completely off-base here. The goal isn’t to make the Palestinians suffer, it’s to defeat them with the imposition of the minimal amount of suffering necessary.
Clausewitz says that the goal of war is to impose our will on the enemy. Ideally, you do that with zero death and suffering -but the world is not an ideal place.
Marc
Again as to strategy: I do not think you can ever eliminate anti-Semitism and criticizing Israel is not anti-Semitism but this is overboard on the part of this Italian union:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5474090.ece
There’s one piece of crucial information that we lack: Does the Gazan population by-and-large support Hamas? They were elected at one point, but we don’t know if that was some combination of disgust with Fatah’s corruption and fear of Hamas, or whether it represents ongoing support.
Assuming that Israel has determined to break out of the ‘stability’ of rockets and retaliation, what they can achieve, and how, is going to vary depending on that degree of support. If most of the Gazans do not support truly back Hamas, and have been coerced into acquiescence or support, then the current tactics might work. Smash up the Hamas network, disperse the gunmen and capture some of the means of war, and the population might be willing to take another tack, in spite of disgust over who removed Hamas and how.
If Hamas really are Mao’s “fish in the sea”, then Israel has a different problem, that of defeating and subjugating a population. They must be beaten, know they are beaten, and despair of ever succeeding through the same strategies. Japan was brought up as an example. I think of the American Civil War. It wasn’t just Grant’s final defeat of Lee that ended that one, it was also Sherman who showed that he could march anywhere in the Confederacy, destroying food and infrastructure as he went, and that nothing the South could do would stop him.
If that’s the actual ante in Gaza, then you’ve got a choice as to how to do it. One is kinetic – just start smashing things and killing any that resist until the population decides that a quixotic quest to destroy Israel isn’t worth the ruin of their lives and families.
The other way is a siege, which is really what we’re talking about under ‘blockade’ above. Israel has long had the Gazans’ logistical throat in their hands, and it’s only their forbearance that allows Gaza and Hamas to exist and fire rockets. Fuel, power, food and water all come from outside. The only choice is what to cut off and how fast the population will capitulate. That is the military reality of the situation, which some combination of external pressure and Israeli compunctions has left off the table.
But if it’s a choice between Warsaw and “The Burghers of Calais”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Burghers_of_Calais as an endpoint, which would you pick? Here’s another case where over-niceness and attempts to evade the reality of the situation will lead to more bloodshed, not less.
The world is suffering from empathy fatigue when it comes to the Arabs and the Israelis. They have been at one another’s throats for the past 60 years and, if anything, things are getting worse, not better.
It appears that neither side has lost their stomach for war and the rest of us can’t really do much about it. I had a good dose of this mentality throughout my childhood being an Irish Catholic kid from New York.
This particular conflict is much worse because it is being played out on an incredibly strategic piece of Real Estate, overlooking, as it does the Suez Canal, the Arabian Gulf and the Dardanelles.
Look for another 50 years of what we have seen for the past 50, If we are lucky.