Guest post by Marcus Vitruvius
This is a response to Armed Liberal’s and Nortius Maximus’ questions of where do we go from here, in the Iraq 2009 discussion.
Where we go from here depends on a lot of factors, the most important of which is, “What are we trying to achieve?” I’d say, provisionally, that what we’re trying to achieve is the elimination of Islamic terror, without other loss of national power and influence. (Ideally, while increasing it.) That’s a tall order. Frankly, to phrase it as the elimination of a tactic from a group makes it completely impossible without eliminating the group, so let’s scale that back to a goal of greatly diminishing the prospects of Islamic terror.
One of the central debates of this goal has been whether the reduction of Islamic terror is a military matter or a police matter, and the unsatisfying but correct answer is, “Neither and both.” Once terrorists are on our soil, it is (typically) a matter for our police forces. While terrorists are on friendly soil, it is (typically) a matter for the police forces of the friendly nation, even if those police forces are their military. While terrorists are on unfriendly soil, unfriendly police forces may even be complicit, and the task becomes one of delicately convincing that unfriendly nation that it is in their best interest to realign their policies with our, which may require military violence, or the threat of it. Finally, while terrorists are on uncontrolled soil, the task becomes one of building a trustworthy local police force, which may require military force to combat terrorists while more military force is helping strengthen those local police forces. Direct military conflict with terror forces would seem never to be the desired goal, but still seems likely to be necessary in the future.
This is why I have thought for years that this goal, the reduction of Islamic terror, is best prosecuted as the reformation of certain societies. I think of terror reduction as a non-local police matter, requiring that the police forces in the area be strong and opposed to terror, and the society in which those police are based to have a reasonably peaceful outlook.
So much for goals and abstracts. Looking across the board, I see two strategic targets: Iran, and Pakistan. They are certainly not the only strategic targets, but I think they are the most important ones: Iran, because it is a thoroughly vile regime that funds operations across the Middle East; and Pakistan because in its weakness, it allows for al-Qaida and related groups to stage operations into Afghanistan, Kashmir, and India.
Of those, I think Iran is probably more manageable over the short term (five to ten years.) Iran and its terror operations are a grand system, as it any national grand strategy; any strategy to oppose it should look at the elements of the system, and act in a way which maximizes disharmony between the elements of the system.
One large and important piece of the Iranian system is oil money; when the price of oil was high, at unsustainable levels of $150/barrel, the Iranians looked (and must certainly have felt) very strong indeed. With coffers overflowing, they could fund operations elsewhere with impunity, and even play games like threaten to take oil off the dollar standard. With oil prices fluctuating in the $35 to $50/barrel range, that is no longer the case. One thing we should certainly do is act to keep the price of oil as low as possible, for as long as possible. I don’t think that will be a problem in the short term of a year or two– OPEC production threats have been met with giggles by the consumer community, because we are all in recession, at the same time. My gut hunch is that in three to six months, prices will deflate further once the Chinese economy fully digests the impact of a United States and a Europe with less use for Chinese imports.
Now, in similar situations in the past, Saudi Arabia has been convinced to stab OPEC members in the back by refusing to implement meaningful cuts. I have read convincing analyses that their motive here was not altruism to the West, but very long term profit motives, with the idea of damaging other oil exporting countries economies and picking up market share in the long term. It seems at least plausible that the Saudis could be enticed to play this game again.
But, at the same time, Iraq is finally stable enough to think about serious oil exports. Six months ago, Iraq opened six oil fields and two natural gas fields for development. On December 31, they offered up nine more oil fields and two more gas fields. There are something like 45 billion barrels of reserves in those fields, with a projected rate of over three million barrels per day. Even taking those numbers with a grain of salt, half that amount of oil coming on line over the next five years should continue to depress oil prices. Therefore, what we should do specifically in Iraq, about oil, are these things:
1) Continue to act as security guarantor in Iraq for as long as needed. McCain’s notion of a Korean-model was not wrong. Physical security in Iraq is essential to continuing oil development
2) Grab as many of those fields as possible, and develop them as cheaply as possible.
3) Try as much as possible to get other Western countries in on the other oil fields to develop them as cheaply as possible.
Those second two points are essential because Western models of oil extraction are extremely efficient in comparison to others. The range of technologies is part of this, as is Western style budgeting and planning. We must get the Iraqi government used to doing these things in a Western style fashion, because it just works better. It might bleed over to the rest of the nation as well.
(Incidentally, low oil and gas prices have harmful effects on the economies of two other governments we don’t like: Russia, and Venezuela. To keep the pressure on Russia, as well, we should be accelerating the revival of Libyan oil and gas fields as well, and encouraging Libya to integrate its gas fields with Europe via undersea Mediterranean pipelines.)
Another large and important piece of the Iranian system is its numerous proxies and clients, especially Hezbollah, Hamas, and Syria. It is possible that they are playing games in Afghanistan, too, although I haven’t read anything that makes me think that in particular; it is just a motif, and they certainly have the geographic proximity to do so. Part of what makes the proxy problem so difficult to fight is that, when Iran has oil money, it is fairly easy for them to regenerate their proxies, and more so when they have Syrian help. However, if the oil strategy outlined above works, then the regenerative strategies of Hamas and Hezbollah are significantly reduced. Therefore, if oil prices can be kept low for a few years, I would let Israel have a re-match with Hezbollah. I would practically encourage it, and give them whatever technical assistance they need in the gambit.
One certain way to make this easier would be to secure Syria’s assistance, which I think is not as far fetched as it seems. Syria and Israel had been making noises about a peace treaty for a large part of last year, and if it is possible for Egypt and Jordan to make peace with Israel, it is certainly possible for Syria to do so. The nominal peace treaty could be achieved in exchange for the Heights, while the deeper matter of flipping Syria out of Iran’s orbit and helping dismantle Hezbollah might be achieved in exchange for significant influence over Lebanon. This sounds like a demonic deal. It is. But the Lebanese have not been masters of their fate for a very, very long time anyway. It might be worth it, although I’d prefer to see it happen without promising Syria anything.
A third and final important part of the Iranian system is their demographics. Iran is young, poor, and ethnically and religiously diverse in its traditions, more so than is widely recognized. That the population is young is not really in dispute; it’s a matter of demographic record. That it is poor is not obvious, until one realizes how much the Iranian government spends on subsidies to keep its people happy. That it is diverse is not apparent until one realizes that it contains large Kurdish, Baluchi, Arab, Azeri, Turkmen populations and more, and also has a good Sunni minority. Demographically, this is not a stable country, which is partly why it is repressive in the first place, and why they spend so much money. So at roughly the same time that Israel should be encouraged to degrade Hezbollah, and the Saudis and Iraqis are being encouraged to degrade oil prices, the Iraqis and the United States should be doing everything in our power to encourage those groups to assert themselves, with the ultimate goal being a crumbling of the Iranian government and its reformation into something more human.
This strategy is not without its flaws. Any number of players here might simply not play. Or, the Iranian government might not crumble, but shatter, leaving the entire stretch from Iraq to India as mountainous, ungoverned crap. And certainly Iran will be very angry and reacting to this with force of its own, through proxies. But it is a strategy, and it’s a little more sophisticated than, “Go home, and hope for the best.” This at least has the virtue of turning the Iranian system inside out, causing them to need more money than ever at a time when less is available.
The second strategic target is Pakistan, and the militants (and al-Qaida) within them. Here, the militants have become very adept at using the existing system of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan against us. Clearly, the militants have something of a safe haven in Pakistan, both politically and geographically– it is nasty, nasty terrain. Pakistan military support is necessary just to keep the militants from striking into Afghanistan, but every time that support gets too meaningful, the militants can play the India card. Meaning, launch a devastating terror attack on India; India is forced to rattle sabers toward Pakistan; Pakistan is forced to move its military from the Afghan border to the Indian border; the militants have far less pressure on them and can continue their efforts into Afghanistan. All of this is exacerbated by the nature of Pakistan’s ISI lending tacit support to the militants, Pakistan’s overall highly fragile nature, and their status as main corridor into Afghanistan.
This is a Gordian Knot of a problem. I can identify any number of elements of that system which could change and result in a huge advantage for our operations. The problem is, none of them seem particularly likely to happen. India is not going to give up Kashmir. India is not going to stop threatening Pakistan when militants attack it. Pakistan is not going to magically defang its intelligence service and play nice. I don’t know how to change our system.
Pakistan’s militants are very, very good at never facing pressure from all angles at once. If we cannot change our system, it is tempting simply to let the strategy be, “Force their system under pressure from all sides at once.” After some time with Petraeus shaping the political and military ground in Afghanistan, team up with the Indian intelligence forces and declare open season on recalcitrant ISI members and encourage them to launch operations across Pakistan’s border to destroy known terror camps.
There are two problems: First, that’s harder than it sounds. The strikes would have to be effectively simultaneous. Second, Pakistan could fall, with the attendant problems of nukes getting loose and the loss of our transport corridor into Afghanistan, crippling our operation. They could achieve the second part even without a collapse, by simply denying us transport rights.
I think that leaves us with three alternatives:
1) Make a plan to route around Pakistan, squeeze the Pakistani militant system, and see what happens. Frightening.
2) Work actively with the Pakistani government to help them clean out their military and intelligence services. This would be painfully slow, and who knows if the Pakistani government would even cooperate?
3) Pursue options against Iran, and use Iran as the alternate transport corridor into Afghanistan… then pursue plan 1 above.
Sequencing is important here: Pursuing options against Iran while working with the Pakistani government is certainly an option. Under the best possible circumstances, we would be left with multiple corridors into Afghanistan and a potentially more useful Pakistani government to be used when the time comes.
But admittedly, this second section has been a large amount of words and letters amounting to, “There are no good short term options in Pakistan.”
Just checking…
When looking straightforwardly at what we need in order to survive produces the conclusion that we are in an existential fight with Islam and we need to acknowledge it and fight it, our needs will instead be redefined as much as needed so that we don’t have to face that conclusion, right?
This is the basic assumption Armed Liberal accepts, and that everyone has to accept now to be part of the respectable discussion, since George W. Bush and Barack Obama both supported it, and it is the tacit bipartisan consensus in our societies.
To this I’ll just say: I dissent.
There’s no point in my adding more than that, since the real discussion will take place on the basis of your meta-assumption, not mine.
–
Second, the aim is at most to diminish Islamic terror, right?
Not the results it seeks, such as the success and the spread of Islam and the Islamization and / or subjugation of non-Islamic societies?
That is, if Notre Dame and Westminster Cathedrals go the way of the Bamiyan Buddhas, and this is the result of illegal terror attacks that’s bad and a security problem, but it it’s a result of demographics and dawa, that is just democracy in action and why not?
Again, this is now the consensus position. And again, I dissent.
If it’s fine for civilization X to take turf Y from civilization X, to devour it in that region, to replace it, I’m not seeing the question of “how” as one worth fighting over. If violent deaths and injuries were our sole concern, we should focus on road safety, not on Islamic terror.
David, I obviously haven’t been clear in making my point around this issue – and I’ve been writing about it for a long time…
Yes, the basic axis of this struggle is ‘civilizational’ between radical subgroups in Islam and the West.
Fully engaging in that struggle means two things: a lot of dead Muslims, and a security state in the West which means we can all kiss our civil liberties off into Room 101. Both of those are Bad Things in a bunch of dimensions, and – bluntly – worth seeing a continuous low level of conflict, with deaths on both sides, to avoid.
So we do the same thing I discuss the Israelis doing below – we kick the can down the road until we have no choice. I’m not sure yet what the boundary to getting there looks like yet; but it’s far short of losing Notre Dame.
The whole point of the exercise we’re in is to find a way to keep from simply declaring war and loading up the bombers. And, in truth, the level of conflict to date doesn’t justify that level of response.
Marc
Armed, I’m not sure how you mean your first sentence.
Mr Blue’s previous stated desideratum of “less Islam”, though certainly impolitic / undiplomatic when stated plainly, doesn’t inherently mean “[declare] war and load up the bombers.” Any more than “jihad” inherently means “direct frontal assault with arms.”
And no, I am not being sarcastic.
Kicking the can down the road? To do that effectively, one must take aim at the can somehow, and scuffs will appear at points of contact with road, foot and can.
I have my personal views on this subject. Not all of them seem to suit this venue or the coming transformed WoC given the likely level of debate were I to indulge myself. Such is life, I guess.
The original post has sort of dropped out of discussion, but I did put up a list of our options as a comment. Effectively, our options have not changed since 2001, though our situation has improved markedly. And we still have the full gamut from surrender to kill ’em all to pick from.
Jeff, #4:
I saw your response to AL late last night, and made a remark to myself to read it in detail today– I’ll probably have comments once I do.
Mr Blue, #1:
At least tell me the nature of your first dissent: You think it is possible to eliminate tactic X from group Y without eliminating the group itself? Or you think that we should not scale back from elimination of tactic to drastic reduction of tactic?
Or am I misunderstanding you entirely?
A possible strategic course of action seems to present itself if one considers the conflict at its most fundamental level. A clash between an existential secular form of governance [we humans can and should define the nature of our existence and conduct – most probably via representational democracy], and theocracy [we humans can and should accept a divine [though mediated by assorted priests/mullahs] description of why we exist and how to conduct ourselves. The supreme law of the land to be one or the other – secular law or religious law. I think this to be the fundamental question. And the most clearly demonstrated correlation between one option versus the other seems to be the level of education or (if you prefer the level of ignorance) of the supporters of the two factions. Ergo, look towards education as your long term strategic weapon against those who would threaten secular democracies with theocratic alternatives.
Anyone following this thread should read the Mumbai attack dossier linked from AL’s post just above. Chilling stuff. Most to the point here, the ‘Major General’ in the Indian intercepts of phone traffic from Pakistan to the terrorists during the attack has been identified as former head of the ISI Hamid Gul.
So either Mumbai was winked at, if not backed, by the Pakistani government, or that government is unable to control terrorist actions launched from the heart of its own territory. Not good news, either way.
Tim #7,
I think it’s been known for quite some time that the civilian government is not in charge of the ISI. It’s highly questionable that even Musharraf’s military government was in charge of the ISI. (I personally think it was not, but reasonable people can differ.)
That is part of what makes the problem of Pakistan, and by extension, Afghanistan, so intractable: There is no unified government in Pakistan. There is a thing we call the government and which we negotiate. Its writ does not extend to the full geographic extent of the state, nor does it extend to the army, nor to the ISI.
The situation under Musharraf was similar– his write did not extend to the full geographic extent of the state, nor to the ISI, nor to the judiciary.
But how can you pull off the top of a weed and kill it if you leave the roots in the ground alone? The roots are where all the bad guys come from and leaving them intact will only assure that the weed will flower again.
It is often noted by the left that Iraq, since it is now dominated by Shia’ah Islam, may have reasons to establish a kind of alliance with Iran, or at least stand aside and allow Iran to assert itself. However, there’s a rather enormous sectarian divide between the sort of Shi’ism that rules Iran and the sect that controls Iraq. Both sects are “twelvers” in that they believe in a hidden Twelfth Imam who will return at the “end of days” (some versions say hand in hand with Christ). The traditional approach to this was to exclude religious figures from political power, since political power was seen to reside exclusively in the Imams… and there are none available. (The Twelfth Imam is not in heaven, like Christ, however. He’s in the world, but hidden or “occulted.” This is the approach taken by the “Quietists” such as Ali Sistani, and they are undeniably the controlling sect in Iraqi Shia’ah society. Even though they eschew direct power, they wield considerable influence… but their basic tenet is more or less compatible with liberal society. It amounts to a “separation of church and state” similar to what is practiced in the West. Hence, with certain reservations, they’re our natural allies.
There are also a lot of Quietists in Iran, but the rulers belong to another “disquieted, or loud” sect, the Al Faqih, which argues that the political jurisdiction of the Imams was delegated to certain Ayatollahs. Quietists in Iran tend to be a persecuted group, even though they way be the larger sect in terms of raw numbers. But this basic sectarian division within Shi’ah Islam reinforces other elements of diversity that feed political instability in Iran. One could imagine a fairly robust coalition between secular liberals, some pragmatic Sunnis, and Quietists, in the long run… matching what seems to be happening in Iraq. The Al Faqih’s days may be numbered.
MV writes:
bq. “3) Try as much as possible to get other Western countries in on the other oil fields to develop them as cheaply as possible.”
The irony is, this means we’ll be basically encouraging the French to pick up Iraqi oil contracts via ELF et. al., given their depth of experience and contacts in Iraq. Sticks in my craw a bit, but makes sense so should be done.
Maybe we could quietly boost BP as well, and Royal Dutch Shell – both countries stepped up big in Afghanistan. If that kind of influence is even an option any more. The Iraqis will be handling these contracts on their own, and will have their own agenda that may overwhelm influence attempts. Which is fine, it’s part of what people like me always wanted for them. Just pointing out that the world as it is may not play ball with the idea.
Second, I note the point re: Libyan gas fields online and a pipeline under the Med. That’s another excellent project for France to undertake, and it would be a big deal for Europe. Note that Italy is already committed to the Russian pipeline, despite historic ties to Libya. Too many bought pols there to be a reliable conduit for Libya is my guess… but it might be worth testing the waters on an Italian-British approach that used Malta as a waypoint, and appealing to some of the Italian regions that may have lost out on the Russian pipeline.
The other prong of that strategy needs to be Algeria. Russia did a $7.5 billion weapons deal that aimed to secure Algerian gas fields, and Algeria is Europe’s #2 supplier after Russia. Parts of that deal are now unwinding, and for various reasons, doing more unwinding on the weapons and gas end is a job France is best suited to. That undersea pipeline could/should land in France, which would increase France’s clout in Europe. Definitely sounds like a job for Sarko.
Looking farther out, France is currently friendly but that could easily change back to semi-hostile. Over an even longer term, therefore, working to expand their commerce and influence in Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Europe may have blowback consequences.
Given the larger danger Iran represents, that’s an acceptable price to pay if other options do not exist. But I would look to an “insurance” approach that spreads all of these development opportunities. Enough so Paris picks up a significant economic victory or 2, but others also pick up benefits and future influence.
Joe, #11:
The irony is, this means we’ll be basically encouraging the French to pick up Iraqi oil contracts via ELF et. al., given their depth of experience and contacts in Iraq. Sticks in my craw a bit, but makes sense so should be done.
Mine, too, but strategy is no place for sentiment. (This is why no one plays Diplomacy with me, any more.)
Second, I note the point re: Libyan gas fields online and a pipeline under the Med. That’s another excellent project for France to undertake, and it would be a big deal for Europe. Note that Italy is already committed to the Russian pipeline, despite historic ties to Libya.
Well, the Italians might be getting chilly in a few days, if the EU/Ukraine don’t cave before their stockpiles run out.
It is a clearly good move for Europe as a whole, because the Russians simply are not reliable partners for them. (To be frank, Europe is not a good partner for Russia, either. Europe and the United States, through NATO and EU expansion, really kicked Russia in the nuts over the past twenty years. I make no excuses for it, and think it was the right thing to do because the opportunity would never come again, but the Russians are understandably displeased. So long as Europe and Russia are what they are, they are not suitable partners for each other.)
It is also a uniquely good move for France, because it ties directly into the idea they floated a while back about a Mediterranean Union sort of overlapping the European Union. This is such a stereotypically French deGaullist move that I laughed when I read about it– a concession that they cannot dominate the European Union as planned, phrased in the form of the announcement of plans to create a Mediterranean Union that they can. Because a network of undersea pipes leading from Libya to France plays very strongly to that idea, and moves it from farcical to a vaguely viable twenty year project… your comments about potential blowback are well-taken.
The worst case situation there is that France would manage to use it’s dominating position in the MU and it’s heavy presence in the EU to become the pivot point of Europe that it’s always wanted to be… with the added downside that a true MU would necessarily be a very strong player in the Middle East. I’m still not convinced that they could become a true competitor to the Anglo-American alliance for geographic reasons, but they could certainly be ferociously annoying.
The best case situation of an MU is that France would dominate that, while Germany would dominate the EU, making the traditional Anglo (and now American) roles of playing the European powers off each other easier, at least in theory.
Still, hedges are good, and I would have put this idea in the original post, but it was long enough as it is. My hedge is uniquely American: Technology. First generation biofuels are food-plant based, play havoc with global food commodity markets, and still emit greenhouse gas. Second generation biofuels are non-food-plant based, have little or no effect on commodity prices, and have much more benevolent carbon footprints. Third generation biofuels will be algae and microbe based and can be theoretically carbon negative. (Just make a surplus and don’t burn it.)
The biggest– perhaps only– problem to my mind with cheap fuel prices is that the demand for third generation biofuel research (and industry generation) is probably going to shrivel. I still think we should set a symbolic but non-zero target of national oil consumption to be replaced by third generation biofuels by 2020. I strongly suspect we could get to 1% by that time. Now, 1% of 20 million barrels per day is only 200,000 barrels per day, but if we can go from 0 to 1% in ten years, no one will have any doubts about what we could do by 2025 or 2030, oil becomes a manufactured commodity, and the Middle East returns to a region important only for the reasons Mahan pointed out.
I am not ordinarily a fan of big government tech programs, but I make an exception for programs that aim to make a geopolitical shift in our favor. (I’m funny that way….)
Me, #12:
Well, the Italians might be getting chilly in a few days, if the EU/Ukraine don’t cave before their stockpiles run out.
So naturally, the first e-mail I looked at after hitting send told me that the EU and Russia have worked out a potential deal over the Ukraine pipelines.
#5 from Marcus Vitruvius:
It depends on the character of group Y. History has shown that it was possible to end witch-burnings without ending Christendom. History has not shown that it is possible to take the Koran and the things it advocates out of Islam.
But Geert Wilders thinks it is possible, and I wish him well. I’m ready to believe in the success and peaceful, neighborly prosperity of a post-Koranic, post-jihad Islam.
But show me. I’m not willing to assume it, or buy it like a cat in a bag. I have to see the goods, like the post Vatican II reforms being consolidated.
In a sense, I agree with you: I think Islam is inseparable from striking fear into the hearts of non-Muslims, from intimidation tactics and sometimes violence, and I think we cannot get rid of Islam altogether, so we cannot get rid of Islamic terror altogether. Therefore, the idea that we want less Islamic terror is good sense. It is a more rational aim than no Islamic terror, which is unachievable.
But this requires less Islam.
If you have imported a substantial Islamic population, you have also imported a support base for terror and a permanent lobby group for Muslim domination and weak responses or non-responses or appeasement or outright capitulation to Muslim menaces and violence. If you want more people calling for death to all Jews, import more Muslims. If you want a stronger support base for terror plots and daily intimidation directed at gays, women in bikinis and other soft targets, import more Muslims. If you want less of a permanent, implacable threat to your non-Islamic society, import less Muslims, and if you can send the ones you have away.
If you want more jihad terror from the Palestinians, send them more money, and as for them, so for the Islamic world generally. If you add to the pile of resources that can be thrown against you, expect to be attacked more; but if you’d rather not be attacked more then send less or preferably no jizya, whether it’s called ‘aid’ or not.
To struggle against the tactic alone is like struggling against the impacts produced by a tiger’s teeth and claws, while maintaining peace with the tiger. The nature of the beast is that you are dealing with all of it, or in practice none of it.
The nub of my first dissent is not really an assumption but a meta-assumption, a view of how acceptable assumptions are come by.
If we look at things straight on, the same whether we are looking at the leviathan of Islam or the tiny and now historical cult at Jonestown, I’m happy.
If we describe things one way when the threatening population is not too numerous or too hostile and doesn’t have oil, with any result being fair enough as long as it fits the facts, including something blunt like “we need fewer neo-Nazis and less neo-Nazism in general”, because we’re not afraid to call them as we see them – that’s fine. When the standards are different according to whether we’re talking about a few nutcases dressed up in historical costumes or a numerous and aggressive death cult with lots of oil and real killers, so that what would have been clear proof of hostility now isn’t, I have a problem. I don’t think that sound assumptions are reached this way.
I think that is the meta-assumption we’ve settled on in dealing with Islam: we’ll change the rules of interpretation however much we have to so that unpalatable conclusions about Islam’s relationship to the House of War are not reached, and it’s all right to do that.
I think we should arrive at our ideas on how much Islamic pressure we can live with indefinitely and how much Islam has to be constrained and reduced so that it produces less pressure than we can live without any tacit meta-assumption that whatever points to a fundamental conflict and not to a negotiable conflict over tactics must be wrong.
From Armed in #2:
bq. Yes, the basic axis of this struggle is ‘civilizational’ between radical subgroups in Islam and the West.
And David in #1:
bq. …the elimination of a tactic from a group makes it completely impossible without eliminating the group,…
For not the last time, this is the basis of the argument about Islam.
Is Jihad in all it’s forms part and parcel of Islam or does the West think that we can separate them? And terror is part of Jihad, btw.
To understand Islam we must take it from their viewpoint. If we do that then we come to the conclusion that terror and Jihad against the kufir is demanded and part of the basic tenets. Therefore they cannot be separated. If that is so then talking amongst ourselves about reducing Islamic terrorism is just self abuse. They would never couch the question that way.
That is what is wrong with the discussion in Western halls, having it at all is a catch-22. We deny the others viewpoint to the exclusion of reality. Apply the hierarchy is “alienness”:http://tmereport.blogspot.com/2008/10/marcus-tullius-tiro-common-ground-or.html from Orson Scott Card’s works to the discussion and figure out for yourself where the Islamist would put Westerners and Jews:
bq. The Hierarchy
Utlanning (from Swedish: “outlander” or “foreigner”) – these individuals, while ‘strangers’ in the traditional sense, are members of a person’s own species or culture.
Framling (“stranger”, from the Swedish främling) – this term refers to strangers who are of the same species, though from another world or culture, one who is “both substantially similar to and significantly different from ourselves.”
Ramen (Card’s original term) – these are strangers of who are of another species, and yet capable of communication and peaceful coexistence with, in Card’s model, Homo sapiens sapiens.
Varelse (from Swedish: “creature”) – pronouced ‘var-ELSS-uh,’ this term refers to strangers from another species who are simply not capable of communication with Homo sapiens sapiens.
It seems to me that the Islamist considers _US_ varelse and is acting accordingly.