First, a weak-ass apology; I’m diving into deep waters in raising these subjects, and I’m doing so knowing that I do not, at this moment, have the time to adequately address them. My outside life is pretty demanding right now; but I can’t give up completely. So I owe some of the folks I’m arguing with (in the best sense of arguing, I feel), and the folks just passing by and reading, an apology because I cannot spend enough time in front of the keyboard to hone the lengthy and deep arguments these issues require…if, in fact, I’m capable of making them. I’ll try and improve.
Plus I confused Derrida with De Man in a posting below.
Meanwhile, to paraphrase Truman Capote’s acid review of On The Road, instead of writing, I’ll type. (his review: “That’s not writing, that’s typing.”)
I’m very fortunate to have a great visual and spatial memory, which reminds me that the little purple book I’m looking for was next to the big Caro books on the upper right shelf, which means it ought to be in…yes! this!!…box.
The Aquinas Lecture, 1961. Metaphysics and Historicity, by Emil Fackenheim

This effect of contemporary events is reinforced by an intellectual development which, in the West, began in the nineteenth century. For a century and a half, Western man has developed an ever increasing historical self-consciousness. And this has not been without grave spiritual effects. In earlier ages, most men could simply accept religious beliefs or moral principles, as unquestioningly true. In this historically self-conscious age, few men can ever forget that what seems unquestioningly true to one age or civilization differs from what seems unquestioningly true to others. And fron historical self-consciousness there is but one step—albeit a long and fateful one—to a wholesale historical skepticism: to the despairing view that history discloses a variety of conflicting Weltanschauungen, with no criterion for choice between them anywhere in sight [A.L.: except essentially artificial and arbitrary ones, per Derrida]. But when events move as they do today, this step is easily taken.
Just how commonly it is in fact taken may be illustrated by a review of three typically contemporary attitudes. The first is what may be called skeptical paralysis. Here historical self-consciousness has led to two results: to the insoght that wherever there has been great purpose, there has been great faith; and to the loss of the capacity for commitment to such a faith. Hence there is paralysis which recognizes itself as paralysis and preaches doom.
Then there is what may be called pragmatic make-believe. Here man, caught in skepticism, seeks escape from its paralyzing consequences. Unable to believe and yet seeking a purpose, he falls to pretending to believe, hoping that a pretended might do the work of an actual faith. But it cannot. For a pretended faith is no faith at all. Pragmatic make-believe collapses in self-contradiction.
When men truly suffer from this contradiction they may seek escape in the most ominous form of modern spiritual life: ideological fanaticism. Unlike pragmatic make-believe and like faith, ideology asserts itself absolutely. But unlike faith and like pragmatic make-believe, it is shot through with historical skepticism. For it knows itself to be not truth, but merely one specific product of history.
Hence, unlike faith, ideology must by its very nature become fanatical. When challenged by a conflicting faith, faith may withdraw on its certainty of being true. Because it knows itself to be but one product of history, ideology can achieve certainty only by making itself true; and this it can do only be re-creating all history in its own image. When challenged, therefore, ideology cannot withdraw on itself; it must seek to destroy the challenger. That is, in order to resolve its internal conflict between absolute assertion and historical skepticism, it must engage in a total war from which it hopes to emerge as the only ideology left on earth.