A Democratic Military

In keeping with my emphasis on looking for a Democratic security policy, I found (on Blue Force) that the Center for American Progress has released a proposed Democratic Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (note – pdf).

It’s interesting; the core is really three points:

First, rescaling the Administration’s ‘1-4-2-1’ policy (1 x defend the United States; 4 x deter aggression in 4 regional centers; 2 x regional combat operations; 1 x decisively win one of those two) into a ‘1-1-2-3’ policy, which they define as “a military that gives first priority to protecting the homeland, can fight and win one major regional conflict, can engage in
two simultaneous substantial peacekeeping and stabilization missions and can deter conflicts in three regions.”

Second, aggressively limiting the U.S. Nuclear arsenal. I don’t know nearly enough about the current U.S. nuclear status or policy (yet) to opine.

Finally, aggressively planning to use the military for domestic security – both pro-actively and in response to possible terrorist actions.

I’ll suggest that the key is “The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of a “threat-based” model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period.” Basically, this reads as though the goal is to throttle back the Defense budget and re-enjoy the “peace dividend.”

I hope that’s not what they’re really suggesting…

I do – firmly – agree that we need to think hard about the kind of military we are going to have four years from now.

And I agree with them (CAP) that we need to look hard at Cold-War type programs. They list:

* F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, which is an unnecessary and costly
supplement to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

* SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, which offers few technological
advantages yet substantially higher costs in comparison with existing
submarines.

* DD(X) Destroyer, which suffers from innumerable technological
difficulties and ballooning costs without offering any true advantage
over the Littoral Combat Ship.

* V-22 Osprey, which has caused numerous training deaths and
excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved
development issues while offering only marginal advantages over
existing helicopters.

* C-130J transport aircraft, which provides no additional capabilities over
existing transport aircraft and suffers from severe technological flaws.

* Offensive space-based weapons, which can be easily disrupted, are of
no use in low-tech asymmetric conflict, and are far more expensive than
existing technologies while offering few additional strike capabilities.

* Further deployment of the National Missile Defense System, which
offers unproven technology at exceptionally high costs to defend against
a highly unlikely nuclear missile strike against the United States.

I’m not entirely sure about offensive space-based weapons – it depends a bit on how they are defined. I definitely agree that a National Missile Defense System should not be deployed – until it’s passed a lot more tests. I fully support continued research, and eventual deployment of a demonstrably effective system.

The reality is that what we will need in the future decade looks a lot more like Kagan’s ‘Imperial Grunts’ and the civil affairs folks we have in Iraq than the massive, technologically cutting-edge systems we deployed against the industrial and technoical might of the Soviets.

Kagan describes it:

An approach that informally combines humanitarianism with intelligence gathering in order to achieve low-cost partial victories is what imperialism in the early twenty-first century demands.

The Basilan operation was a case of American troops’ applying lessons and techniques learned from their experience of occupation in the Philippines a hundred years before. Although the invasion and conquest of the Philippine Islands from 1898 to 1913 became infamous to posterity for its human-rights violations, those violations were but one aspect of a larger military situation that featured individual garrison commanders pacifying remote rural areas with civil-affairs projects that separated the local population from the insurgents. It is that second legacy of which the U.S. military rightly remains proud, and from which it draws lessons in this new imperial age of small wars.

The most crucial tactical lesson of the Philippines war is that the smaller the unit, and the farther forward it is deployed among the indigenous population, the more it can accomplish. This is a lesson that turns imperial overstretch on its head. Though one big deployment like that in Iraq can overstretch our military, deployments in many dozens of countries involving relatively small numbers of highly trained people will not.

But the Basilan intervention is more pertinent as a model for future operations elsewhere than for what it finally achieved. For example, if the United States and Pakistan are ever to pacify the radicalized tribal agencies of the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands, it will have to be through a variation on how Special Forces operated in Basilan; direct action alone will not be enough.

The readers of this site may not support the exact plans proposed by CAP; they propose a military repurposed to defend and clean up afterwards when the defense breaks down.

But neither can we afford a military unable to project the kind of force and nonlethal presence required to win the kinds of wars we are likely to face in the next decade, ragerdless of the neat systems and contracts that it may own. The CAP proposal is a step toward a national dialog defining that kind of military; we ought to extend that discussion here and try to come to a conclusion of our own.

15 thoughts on “A Democratic Military”

  1. I agree that it is not about the toys, but the Clintonistas bought their balanced budgets by spending the military’s stored capital. This cannot be allowed to happen again.

    We must implement the National Missile Defense System ASAP. It is only liberal affection for the Soviet Union that keeps them harping about that point. If the system needs more testing and perfection, lets do it. But leaving our throat open to be slit by mad men is bad policy.

    The F22/F35 issue is one that I have a tough time with because of my lack of technical knowledge. Air superiority is a sine qua non of American military power. Can we maintain it without these new planes? Should we send the designers back to the drawing boards?

    “aggressively limiting the U.S. Nuclear arsenal.” during the 1st debate Kerry said we should not build bunker buster nukes because we were setting a bad example for the NoKos. I thought that was idiotic beyond beyond all reasonable bounds. If this is the same type of thinking it is only another reason why these people are ineligible to control any branch of the federal government.

  2. Sigh. Democratic disease again. Allergic to use of military force to break things and destroy hostile regimes. Peacekeeping is a misnomer. We did NOT “do peacekeeping” in Post-War Germany and Japan. We destroyed totally their regimes and their militaries, and the peace kept itself. Because of the alternative. Even more death and destruction.

    Dems keep thinking they have re-invented human nature or their progressive values trump actual reality beyond Davos to say, Lagos Nigeria.

    What’s really bad about this proposal is how intellectually bankrupt the Dems really ARE in Military Affairs. It IS as you say the return of the Peace Dividend (which was disastrous, leaving us without the ability to remove hostile regimes which threaten us, see Iran).

    Aggressively limit the US nuclear arsenal? That’s ten kinds of stupid, and Exhibit A that Dems view American Military capacity and capability as more dangerous than our enemies. When Iran is threatening to nuke us with regularity, cutting our ability to respond is just … STUPID. And par for the course of the Party of Code Pink.

    All of this plays to the neo-Isolationism of Dems. We’ll “run away and pretend the bad men will never attack us again.” The Military is useless against terrorist attacks domestically unless it’s to shoot down airliners, which encapsulates the Democratic response to terror generally. Don’t for heavens sake allow Airline pilots to carry handguns, and actually profile people likely to be terrorists (hint: Muslims) but have F-16’s ready to shoot down airliners after they are hijacked (maybe).

    Bottom line, we have a group of threats like Pakistan, Iran, etc. that provide real threats that only a robust military capable of projecting force far away can manage.

    Ballistic Missile Defense? Given that Iran is constantly improving their missiles (and can already launch them from freighters the poor mans Ballistic Missile Submarine) along with Pakistan, doubtless Saudi and Egypt and other states the idea of stopping work on a defense in this area seems awfully stupid to me.

    Space based weapons are of GREAT use, and who thinks we won’t be facing say Russia or China in Iran if they make alliances there? Dems are saying “that really HIGH ground, let’s have hostile forces there or just not seize it.” Like I said, Dems simply don’t understand military affairs and this shows it.

    The US advantages in combined arms seems foolish to throw away which this plan seems to do. Osprey and C-130J are dogs though. They should get zeroed out but require more Helicopters and modern airlifters to replace them. Not enough to just not build the bad systems, you still need to spend money.

    Existing airframes are wearing out. The F35 is qualitatively better than the J-22; the Russians HAVE planes that meet or beat the J-22, time and innovation don’t stand still. Dems are saying “hey let’s use the systems we designed in the 1970’s for longer, and the stuff (J-22) we designed in the 80’s” You wouldn’t use that with a computer and it’s disastrous in air superiority which the US depends on.

    Most of all this plan is small, a book-keepers attempt to cut here and there for more pork and “humanitarian” military forces that never kill anyone or do anything bad (and never leave the US). Philosophically I believe the best way to deter aggression against us is to be able to destroy any combination of likely enemies with as much impunity as possible.

  3. “Sigh. Democratic disease again”

    JR – When you’re done fighting those shadows in your mind maybe you’d consider actually reading some books on the subject. Two that come to mind right away are Hammes’ “The Sling and the Stone” and Zinni’s “Battle Ready” both written by people who have, I’m sure, much more authority on the subject than yourself. Both of these men are, or at least were, Republicans, and both forcefully advocate for a force that can deal with the actual threats we face (rather than the ones we’d like to imagine are out there or boogey men that keep little children up at night). But- I have to go back and reread the CAP piece, because I don’t remember anything about destroying our capabilities to face other ACTUAL large state enemy, rather we need to stop pretending that we are in an arms race when the next most powerful state is light-years behind us. If CAP did say that, and I’m betting you didn’t read one page of the document before you started lashing out at the Democrats, than I’ll gladly join you in castigating them.

    If there is someone who is intellectually bankrupt, JR, it is you, since you apparently cannot see security as anything other than blowing something up. Has that made Iraq a lot more secure? (And I dare you to call Tony Zinni intellectually bankrupt to his face! ;-] )

  4. I agree that the focus needs to be on the infantry and logistics, but I’m going to hop in and defend the F-22 Raptor and V-22 Osprey here.

    It is quite clear that we need to maintain our existing superpower combat capabilities, if at a lower level in the past, into the foreseeable future. Just because the long war is going to mostly be low-intensity does not mean that we won’t have short, high-intensity wars mixed in. If, for example, China invades Taiwan, that would be a high-intensity war. And here’s the thing: some of China’s vast array of aircraft are capable of matching and beating current US aircraft (F-15, F-16, F-18), and once that’s done, they’ll still have bomb trucks and interceptors and we won’t. (We could not replace our losses in the course of a war even 2 or 3 years long: the aircraft simply take to long to produce.)

    The way to beat superior numbers is superior quality, and the F22 brings that in spades. It is faster, more maneuverable, harder to target than any other aircraft available — even the F35 — and has very powerful teeth. If we fight China (or even Iran, which has some fine aircraft of its own, though relatively few of them), the F22 will be key to defeating the enemy air forces while keeping our losses low.

    But what about the F35? Not the same class. While it’s better than what we have today, the F35 is not designed to gain air superiority. As with the F16 or F18, it’s designed to be a moderately effective fighter and a moderately effective bomber. It could do the job, but with substantially higher losses than the F22. This is the same kind of high-low mix that has worked so well for us with the F15 on the high end and the F16/F18 on the low end. I say we keep the mix. (We can debate the number of F22s, but I think we should have a few squadrons of them at least.)

    On the Osprey, it’s a tough call. We’re doing something here that is difficult because it is new technology. Yes, we can continue to use helicopters, but we then have to accept the flaws with helicopters: they carry less, are slower, have shorter range and are easier to shoot down. The purpose of the V22 program was to provide the Marines a way in over a defended coast that didn’t involve losing a huge amount of them to ground fire. As the Apache attack into the Karbala Gap showed, helicopters operating in advance of ground forces over well-defended terrain are vulnerable.

    The engineers think they have solved the problems, and it has been a while since we’ve lost a V22 in testing. I think that the capabilities it brings are worth pursuing.

    On a lot of the other programmatic points, I agree with the study. We should stop the Virginia program and instead focus on modern conventional submarines based overseas, while maintaining our current deep-water nuclear submarine fleet.

    We should focus on LCS over DDX, but remember that they have very different missions. We need a cheaper destroyer for deep-water escort, as well as LCS for inshore work.

    OK, so agree with them on two things.

  5. I opened the URL and started reading their document. I got disgusted rather quickly. I saw Afhanistan and Iraq several times, and they put down the US effort basically calling it a failure.

    That is a political document, not a QDR.

    I got pissed reading ( paraphrased ) ” We must use the NG as a domestic force on homeland security and avoid situations like what has happened extending them in Iraq and Afghnistan. ”

    I closed their pansy political whine then.

    In other words, be able to not go into conflict, because it sounds good now to say that, and democrats are pansies and don’t really mean it elsewhere in their document where they say we must be able to pre-emptively strike when imminent danger is around and be able to fight and win a regional conflict.

    Since only 17k or 15k troops are in Afghnaistan, and they constantly whine we can’t maintain Iraq at 150k and the war is wrong and wasn’t needed, well what the heck would we need more troops for ?

    I suspect they want to put a bunch of democrat wanna be jag brats on Treasure Island California like John Kerry was to blow around and hangout for bands of brothers points whenever they are suffering the standard wimp deficit headcount pretend hawk force, which is always.

    I can’t take em seriously. I just can’t do it. I’ve heard years of whining now. It’s a joke, they’re a joke.

    Harry S Truman would punch them square in the schnokker and tell them to stop being foolish traitorous morons.

    I didn’t read the whole thing, but I wonder where the mtluti-cultural sensitivity training monetary increases are worked in. Perhaps they want a conferrence on how to love and understand our enemy, or worse yet and probable, how we learn to be a friend so that our enemy is a friend as well.

    I can’t read it, I just can’t do it. I can’t believe what they say. I suspect my voting stylus will magnetically reject the democrat chadhole.

    I’m sitting here and in my head is Osama’s latest translated speech text and all I see him saying is the democrat QDR plan. I mean Osama IS a democrat. Have they consulted Binny for some of their truce force transformations ?

    How many psychiatrists and psychologists did they want as new hires? Are there Koran mistreatment admonitions in there ? I suppose they mention a no torture oversight committee to be conjoined to the international criminal court with direct consulations to the league of arab nations.

    You just know it’s in there somewhere. Did they declare cleaner bombs instead of smarter ones?

    I can’t take it.

    It’s a joke.

    It’s one of those must do assignments that is really a burden to them, and they’ed rather be skiing or decorating the University anti-hegemony speech room.

    Roll they’re QDR up and fire it out of a circus cannon. They can sue for cruelty when the confetti falls down on the animals backs.

  6. Can anybody name one major weapons system developed since the 80s that Democratic defense experts have not denounced as a failure or a boondoggle?

    If there’s ever been a weapon they liked, somebody please name it. It sure wasn’t the B1, the F18, the Bradley FV, the M1 Abrams, or anything with “Stealth” in the nomenclature.

    I recall as a kid watching a Democratic defense intellectual on the Phil Dononhue show (which is where such people belong) who claimed that helicopters don’t work very well. Not some particular model of helicopter, mind you. Any goddamn helicopter.

    Don’t even get me started on SDI. (Don’t get the other side started either.)

  7. Nice to see them at least in the game on some level and grappling with some of the issues. They’re leftists, which means they’ll have warped values, but they can still play effectively if they have military understanding and are accurate.

    Not seeing a lot of that – they may be playing, but they aren’t major league ready by a long, long shot. To note a few obvious points they missed:

    * Virginia Class subs have notable advantages over existing ships, especially in the emerging and important realm of littoral (close to shore and shallow water) warfare which will characterize much of the Global War on Terror and future security threats. They are quieter, far more maneuverable in shallow water, and combine improved special warfare capability with land strike (Tomahawks), advanced surveillance, and anti-ship capabilities. They’ll also be adding UAV and UUV capabilities. So these folks are simply wrong on the facts.

    Submarines have expiry dates due to the pressure changes on their hulls, and the Los Angeles Class fleet requires replacement as their hulls are retired. Virginia takes many of the advances from the 3-boat Seawolf class ($3.5-4.0 B per), and puts them in a cheaper platform. Rebuilding 688I Improved LA class won’t get that, and would have pretty comparable costs (would be around $1.5-1.8 billion, vs. $1.9-2.3 billion for the Virginias).

    One of the Clinton Administration’s better moves, I thought.

    * C-130Js and KC-130J tankers are performing well in combat zones, especially the “hot and high” conditions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Previous Herc models were being forced to carry less than half of their cargo limit under those conditions, but the Js are unaffected. Most people would call that “additional capabilities,” and relevant ones at that. Another basic factual error.

    Having said this, the issue with the Herc is that it’s the bottleneck for a survivable and air-mobile US Army. Its 20-ton capacity is insufficient for survivable land vehicles, which fall in the 25-30 ton category (Europe’s A400M will have that capacity). This is wearing out the C-17 fleet prematurely, and has resulted in billions in R&D wasted trying to square the 20-ton survivable circle (most recently with the questionable $120 B Future Combat Systems program, which just admitted failure here).

    Again, you’d have to do military analysis not political BS to make such a criticism.

    * The DD (X) offers many advantages over the Littoral Combat Ship, and claiming that it doesn’t calls their military understanding into severe question. Better stealth, AEGIS-class air defense instead of one based on man-portable Stinger missiles, much improved land strike.

    As a program, however, I still think it sucks. $30 billion for 5-8 ships is a recipe for an overstretched and brittle navy, and I’m not fully convinced this ship even represents the required answer re: fire support from the sea.

    * Their dismissal of the F-22 is on specious grounds – “Cold War” aircraft, blah blah, political talking points not military analysis. There is an argument to be had, but it needs to be informed. That argument needs to take into account the rapid growth of advanced SAM systems (which F-22’s are muh better suited to destroy than F-35s because of their greater stealth), export of Su-30 class aircraft to many potentially hostile countries, and the need for supercruise (above Mach 1) and the F-22’s long range in many Pacific scenarios.

    Over time, I’ve become convinced that the F-22 may in fact be the necessary aircraft, and the F-35 the very capable distraction that could be replaced by cheaper F-16s, T/A-50s, carrier-capable O/A-10 E/F – and frankly if you’re going to fight Small Wars, a whole passel of cheap Cessnas and/or higher end but silent Schweitzer Recon aircraft, plus some cut-down gunships based on C-27J “Baby Hercs”. X-45C and X-47B J-UCAS UAVs are ongoing outside the F-35, so they aren’t replacements.

    This would offer a very different kind of high-low mix optimized for the conflicts the USA faces, while preserving numbers, not sacrificing too many attack capabilities given the CONOPS of Global Strike kicking down doors first, and adding new and needed capabilities. Problem: the USA has sucked 9 allies into the F-35 consortium, and can’t get out.

    I’d enjoy an intelligent, thoughtful discussion of TacAir generally and what the USA should do to address its ongoing numerical collpase (which severaly affects the 1-4-2-1 concept) and poor balance for the kind of wars the GWOT will entail (UAVs are not the answer to everything). This document ain’t it.

    * The V-22 Osprey: I agree with them! Without question, Clinton’s worst military procurement move was saving this plane. It’s a huge white elephant whose performance advantages over conventional helicopters are overstated. Especially near sea level, where it will operate when flying from US Navy ships. Often performing short missions that make its capabilities irrelevant. Worse, its transition from forward to vertical landing makes it very vulnerable at the worst time (i.e. over a hot LZ). Its $100 million per costs are reducing the USMC’s overall air capabilities, even as its limitations are forcing compromises and expensive redesigns of other weapons to accomodate it.

    I believe the Marines should have put the money into 1.5X as many heavy-lift CH-53K Improved Super Stallion helicopters at $55M per, to get a truly mobile “operational maneuver from the sea” force with the same refuelling capability, good range, and the ability to transport heavier weapons and some armor (that’s a problem for the V-22). The other 0.5X should fund some MH-60s in the short term, plus commercialization of gyrodyne and compound helicopter technologies which can produce the V-22’s full capabilities in a cheaper, more survivable, and heavier platform down the road.

    One for the alternative QDR.

    * No missile defense. As states like Iran build nukes and we could be facing multiple unstable nuclear states in the Persian Gulf. Yeah, that’s intelligent. Maybe they think the UN will save tham. Actually, they probably are that dumb.

    Just as they clamour to get off the missile defense bandwagon, the Europeans are quietly getting on with the MEADS missile program (Patriot’s successor), PAAMS/Aster ship-based air/missile defense system for French, Italian, UK ships, etc. The Euros see, as these guys don’t, states like Iran and North Korea playing with nukes and working on longer range missiles. They look ahead 20 years, as a US QDR is mandated and a milittary planner must for weapons development, and draw the logical conclusions. Japan, meanwhile, is onboard right now with the USA and that’s a key part of the alliance these days. Israel has its own program, of course, and India is putting one together as well.

    Killing missile defense as a platform these days is going to be like signing onto Murtha’s surrender plan – only a Democrat could believe this will improve their standing on national security. More “defenselessness, retreat, and defeat” – and stabbing allies in the bargain. But that’s SOP, isn’t it?

    Bottom line:

    These guys have a long way to go before they can even be credible debate participants. I hope they put in the effort.

  8. Here’s another view, from another “leftist surrender monkey” “Max Boot”:http://www.latimes.com/news/columnists/la-oe-boot8feb08,1,1998431.column?ctrack=1&cset=true that was linked to on “Blue Force”:http://blueforceblog.com/node/135

    bq. Why is the Pentagon still throwing money into high-tech gadgets of dubious utility while ignoring the glaring imperative for more boots on the ground? Part of the answer may be politics: Big-ticket weapons have more champions on Capitol Hill than do ordinary grunts. But there also appears to be a large element of strategic miscalculation here.

    bq. For all the QDR’s genuflections toward irregular warfare, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld still seems to think that Iraq and Afghanistan are the exceptions, not the norm — that in the future we won’t need so many ground troops. The U.S. has already paid a high price for the misguided decisions not to send enough troops to secure Iraq or to capture Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora. Now, it appears, we are fated to make the same mistake on future battlefields, simply because we won’t have enough troops available

    Seriously- why do you (#s 2, 5, and 7) take the simple minded view that this is a partisan issue? If you think that we on the left will not defend ourselves, by any means necissary, than I suggest you come tell me that load of bull to my face! You can act like a tough guy, keyboard commando, but I bet you’ll go running for mommy (or Rummy) if you had a real threat in front of you.

    This isn’t about being tough, it’s about having the capabilities to deal with THE REAL THREATS we face. All the blustering BS in the world won’t keep us safe.

  9. Glenn (#7) – the SSGN “Tactical Trident” conversions of Ohio class SSBNs, optimized for large numbers of cruise missiles and 66-102 Special Ops troops. Democrats actually pushed for 4 over Republican objections (the GOP wanted just 2).

    This was back before the War on Terror, and will turn out to be a very good move indeed.

    The Virginia subs were also a Clinton program. Though of course now the “progressive alternative” QDR has decided it doesn’t like them.

    The Littoral Combat Ships began under W., but seem to have good support across the aisle and no prominent critics. We’ll see if that lasts once they’re actually being built on a scale above concept ships, which is where it usually ends.

    Any of the bomber programs? Maybe the B-52… when it debuted in the 1950s.

    Any of the fighter programs? They generally liked the F-16. which was a model defense procurement program, and one of John Boyd’s babies. The A-10 got good support, too, to the point some say they were overbuilt. I say they were ahead of their time, and the numbers will be a plus long term.

    There have been some Democrats, of course, who voted against every single defense bill. This was true even during the Cold War. While Kerry wasn’t one of those, Zell’s “spitballs” jibe was dead-on as a general characterization of his record.

    The numbers of Democrats like that are growing these days as the middle flees to independent status or the GOP. As we’ve seen with the trumped-up and deeply dishonest “white phosphorous” agitprop, the military occupies a spot right next to religion on many Democrats’ hate list.

    If this isn’t reversed at some point, we’ll continue to have the current problem wherein the GOP’s larger message is about spending more on defense, and the Dems are all about criticizing programs and pushing to redirect money away from defense.

    And everyone, of course, is piggy about whichever projects happen to be associated with their districts. Whether they’re needed or not.

    There are good folks like Rep. Roscoe Bartlett [-R] and even Duncan Hunter [-R] who are taking this stuff on, and Lieberman [-D] of course is too, with a top-notch aide. But overall, in this environment, there is not a broad and keen enough focus on questions of balance, force mix, or the systemic problems in the procurement system that create the defense procurement cost spiral.

  10. Something struck a nerve with Alex. Alex, you can’t seriously be suggesting that the left can be trusted with anything involving national security, are you? Zell was right, not just about Kerry, but about the Democrat party as a whole. Not all Dems of course (he’s one, and Joe Lieberman is another) course, but every Dem who favors a strong military (not just abstractly, but actually supports the programs that make the military strong) is a voice in the wilderness within his own party. Even Hillary, who is pretty hawkish for a Democrat, is going to have problems with her own party because of her national security positions. The bottom line is this — we can assume that a Dem candidate who is acceptable to his or her own party just can’t be trusted on national security issues, because the Dem party, if not the party of Code Pink, is the party of Jimmy Carter. Here’s a specific example for you — instead of choosing as House minority leader a Democrat whose positions on national security are responsible or nearly so (Steny Hoyer), the Dems pick the dullest knife in the drawer, Nancy Pelosi, whose only ability it seems is reliably reciting Moveon.org’s positions. Getting rid of her in favor of someone trustworthy, and doing the same thing in the Senate (dump Reid) and at DNC (dump Dean) would be important first steps in demonstrating good faith. I won’t be holding my breath.

  11. While I certainly don’t agree with a lot in the QDR, the fact remains that many big-dollar purchases (specifically, the F-22 and Virginia projects) exist to replace airframes/hulls that are aging out and must be retired. When talk of cost vs. capability comes up, all too often the original prices of the old equipment are used, which is totally unrealistic today. A 688-class sub may not have cost 2 billion to build 25 years ago, but it certainly would today, and honestly you wouldn’t want another one when the Virginia is, in every aspect but flat-out speed, far far better. The same goes with the Raptor and the F-15; airframes simply age out and need replacing, and there’s no real cheap way to do it. The alternative is down-sizing the force, which if you consider the existing op tempo of fighters and subs, is a highly questionable proposition.

    Also, if the cost of these projects is really an issue, the cost per unit goes way down if you just go ahead and buy lots to begin with, instead of hemming and hawing and only buying a few now, then a few more, and so on. It’s not like we’re not going to eventually get the stuff, like it or not. This is particularly important with the VA-class subs; one of the biggest reasons the Seawolf class boats are so pricy isn’t all the gizmos inside, it ‘s the fact that we only bought two (and then a third, just to keep EB busy)

  12. FormerDem

    The problem you face is trying to convince America that the people who still believe, after all that has transpired, that occupying Iraq was a good idea, should be allowed to influence foreign policy going forward.

    Good luck with it.

  13. “If you think that we on the left will not defend ourselves, by any means necissary[_sic_],”

    I believe that you on the left will defend yourselves. I have no doubt of that. The real question is whether you have any commitment to defending the United States of America. On that point I remain unconvinced. As far as I can tell, the only countries the left has ever really wanted to defend were the USSR and Cuba.

  14. Why is the Pentagon still throwing money into high-tech gadgets of dubious utility while ignoring the glaring imperative for more boots on the ground? Part of the answer may be politics: Big-ticket weapons have more champions on Capitol Hill than do ordinary grunts.

    It’s also politics the other way around. Boots on the ground tend to be treated as a fungible asset; it’s an easy, visible, and relatively cheap way for one to ‘prove’ one is strong on defense.

    There’s little publicity and there are no champions when troop numbers are cut back (indeed, one can even say that one is ‘shrinking the size of government’).

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